

Cash incentive offer for Falklands jobs

PEOPLE with professional skills are being offered tax-free bonuses of up to £6,050 a year to leave Britain for a new life on the Falkland Islands.

The Overseas Development Administration, a branch of the Foreign Office, is offering the incentive to teachers, mechanics and engineers recruited for the Falkland Islands government.

More than 50 priority jobs have been chosen following the end of hostilities.

In some cases, it will mean the new staff will receive over 50 per cent more than an islander for doing the same work.

The salaries of the teachers will total around £10,000, achieved by adding the basic Falklands teacher's salary to the inducement offered by the Overseas Development Administration.

The salaries which include the inducement bonus are only being offered to staff appointed by the Falkland Islands government and recruited through the agency. The special inducements are not being offered to the 1,000 people who have applied to go to the Falklands through the Falkland Islands Office in London.

FREE PASSAGE

A spokesman for the Overseas Development Administration said: "The tax-free top-up is offered purely as an incentive."

Other bonuses include family accommodation for £55 a month, free passage to and from the islands and some help with schooling in Britain.

Teachers salaries on the Falklands range between £5,498 and £4,428. Teachers recruited in Britain receive a tax-free top-up of between £4,332 and £6,050 for married people.

By CATHERINE STEVEN and £2,736 to £4,428 for single people.

Six teachers and one public works superintendent employed by the Overseas Development Administration will make their nine-day journey by air and sea to the Falklands next month as some of the first recruited under the scheme.

Mr Murray Laing, 30, a secondary school English teacher, has sold his home in Edinburgh to move to the Falklands after considering 12 other places, including Tonga. He will be joined in Port Stanley by his wife Anne, also a teacher, and daughter Stephanie, 11 months, in early spring.

Mr Laing's job will be to create a new English syllabus for Port Stanley's two schools, one secondary and one primary.

He is leaving Scotland after

seven years of teaching in a tough comprehensive because of disillusionment with the system, lack of promotion prospects, and the high incidence of stress-related disease suffered by his friends and colleagues.

He said: "The islands seem to offer everything that I have ever wanted. Responsibility in my job much more than I can have here in Scotland, an opportunity to pursue my other interests like amateur dramatics, folk singing, photography and studying life."

The Laings have no qualms about subjecting their 11-month-old daughter to the rigours of island life. Mrs Laing said: "I am looking forward to getting into the old fashioned way of family life out of the rat race. We want to join the simple life, baking our own bread and so on."



History teacher Mr John Sherwood and his wife Jane packing household equipment for their new life in the Falklands.

Mr John Sherwood, 30, a history teacher, will be accompanying Mr Laing to the Falklands. He will also be joined later by his wife, Jane, 29, who was recently made redundant from her secretarial job in Manchester.

Mr Sherwood, who is renting out their two-bedroomed home on the outskirts of Manchester, said: "We do not consider ourselves pioneers in a such but we are pioneers in a new way of life for ourselves. There will be so much to learn."

He is leaving after nine years at a 1,500-pupil comprehensive school. He said: "As a history teacher I will enjoy being somewhere where history has been made and that will reflect in my teaching. I will change the style of teaching to adapt to the Falklands life and take in such subjects as imperialism."

Thatcher ready for Franks

By GEORGE JONES
Political Correspondent

CABINET ministers are confident that Mrs Thatcher can withstand any criticism of her Government in the Franks Report on the events leading up to the Falklands invasion, which is to be published on Tuesday.

One Cabinet minister said there was nothing in the report "which cannot be overcome by a competent government". Others believe that the Prime Minister will be able to handle criticism of lack of preparedness.

Mrs Thatcher has made it clear to colleagues she believes that when the text is analysed it will not damage the Government's credibility, but Labour is anxiously awaiting the report which it hopes will provide the opportunity for a major onslaught on the Government.

The Foreign Office is already braced to receive the brunt of the criticism, but senior politicians who have given evidence to Lord Franks and his team of senior Privy Counsellors believe that the main emphasis will be on identifying weaknesses in the machinery of government, rather than seeking individual scapegoats. Peter Taylor on Are the F.O.'s critics right?—P.17

Go-ahead on reburial

By PATRICK WATTS
In Port Stanley

request for advice on what to do with their dead. Sir Rex Hunt, the Falklands Civil Commissioner, said, "If they cannot be concerned about their dead, then we must."

The Falklands population fear that the Argentines may use the reburial of their soldiers as an excuse to visit the islands. Councillor Bill Goss said, "No Argentines should be allowed to view the cemetery here until they formally announce a cessation of hostilities."

Some islanders have suggested taking the bodies to South American port and leaving them.

Islanders retain warm mem-

TWELVE British undertakers have arrived in the Falklands to re-bury nearly 250 Argentine soldiers. After some controversy it was decided to establish a special cemetery for them at Darwin.

The undertakers will first lift the 55 bodies buried in the Stanley cemetery. Most have small wooden crosses with names attached.

More difficulties will arise with Argentines buried on the mountains. Few are identifiable and some are known to be badly disfigured.

The British Government had originally suggested three sites for burying the Argentines at Darwin, San Carlos and Stanley. Local councillors rejected this idea and eventually the Darwin site was chosen.

The Argentines have never replied to a British Government

ovies of last week's visit by Mrs Thatcher, particularly her unambiguous statement: "We will not discuss sovereignty with Argentina."

Iron image

She seemed not to live up to the Iron Lady tag, as she talked away happily with small children, who poured gifts of flowers upon her, old women and many of the British servicemen on the islands.

Traces of the image remained, as when she criticised her husband Dennis as he stood in the doorway at Government House, with an overcoat held over his head gloomily surveying the driving hailstones.

From the Governor's car, Mrs Thatcher ordered him to hurry up. "There are three soldiers standing out here wet through," she said.

The only mention of rising interest rates, falling pound and unemployment came when she encountered a soldier who had just come from the operating theatre at the local hospital. "What about the unemployment in the United Kingdom then?" he asked. It is doubtful that he heard her, "That's another problem," as he was wheeled away.

Femail

Falklands bound!

THE WOMEN SPEARHEADING A CIVILIAN TASK FORCE

IN A FLUSH of patriotic fervour, more than 2,000 Britons last year applied to emigrate to the Falklands. All but a few hundred have now dropped out. Maybe the realities of a life without dry-cleaners, garages, or even roads, finally discouraged them. Despite the potential discomforts, however, two women teachers will be on their way to the South Atlantic next month. And both have very good reasons for going...

Interviews:

CORINNA HONAN

GERALDINE BENNETT gave her boyfriend an ultimatum: 'Marry me or I'll go to the Falklands.'

He said no so she found herself seriously considering her own suggestion.

And suddenly, uprooting herself from Lancashire, where she has taught physical education in the same comprehensive for seven years became less the remedy for a broken heart than

a positive way of getting out of a rut. At 29, her promotion prospects were nil. Love nil. What did she have to lose?

When the Overseas Development Administration accepted her services as an English teacher — her second subject — for the 100 pupils at Port Stanley High School, she was jubilant.

'Twenty-nine is the age where you either plunge ahead with your career or have

babies. This is an exciting adventure, something completely new and different, a turning point in my life,' she explained.

She likes the idea of escaping the hustle of the twentieth century. In the Falklands, there will be time for reflection, for reading, even for studying penguins.

Her pupils, she imagines, will be better behaved and more resourceful than in other parts of the world. 'My kids come to

school with red eyes from watching video all night. Nor has she given up the idea of falling in love again. In a garrison town with 4,000 troops and a mere handful of single women there will be many easier to replace the recalcitrant boyfriend.

'I'll stand a better chance of finding the right one,' she said candidly. 'I don't expect anyone even needs to dolly themselves up out there.' In another century, on another continent, Geraldine might have been one of those hardy pioneer women of the Wild West with the light of adventure in her eyes and her pick of the men starved of female company.

Dancing

Not, she said hastily, that she will be looking for a husband. If it happens, it happens. If it doesn't, there will be plenty to do — like starting a gym club or even aerobics and dancing classes.

Patricia Hands, an unmarried teacher in her late thirties, will probably find she has little in common with Geraldine when they meet aboard a VC10 between Brize Norton and Ascension Island on the first leg of the journey.

On boyfriend, she says: 'I'm not interested.' On exercise: 'Tumbling out of my flat and into the car.' She expects to arrive 'horizontal' at Port Stanley after ten days of 'terrible seasickness' and already has decided to frosty feet over her two-year contract.

Yet Patricia, who has also taught scripture and English for many years at a private girls' school in the Channel Islands, volunteered for the noble cause of all.

During the war she had been glued to her television set. As soon as the Argentines surrendered, she wrote to the Ministry of Defence.

'I really did feel very strongly that I wished to be as much help as I could to the islanders. Teaching was the only skill I had to offer,' she explained.

Thirteen perfectly-groomed schoolmistresses who wear

colour - co-ordinated clothes from C & A has since discovered she will occasionally have to be dropped at remote settlements by helicopter in icy winds.

She has also been told that the pair of tights — that necessary item of clothing all women take for granted — was sold in Port Stanley about a year ago.

'I didn't think of any of these sort of things when I volunteered,' Patricia said frankly at her parents' home in Solihull near Birmingham. 'My heart keeps sinking the more I find out.' 'Can you imagine what it's like buying two years' supply of hair-colourants and moisturisers? I've already bought 30 pairs of tights, I've got hairspray and every nook and cranny of my three secondhand trunks — in fact personal items are taking up the bulk of my luggage.' Will she be able to adjust?

Patriotic

'Well, I'm a very patriotic person,' she said. 'I don't expect it's going to be easy. I hope there's a real job to do and I want to be busy most of the time — otherwise there's no point in going.'

She has no illusions that her Falklands adventure may prove anything more than an interesting interlude in her life — wisely, she has taken the precaution of making sure that Quernsey Education Council are keeping a journal for her until she returns.

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Packing the essentials she doesn't expect to find in the Falklands... Teacher Patricia Hands. Inset — Geraldine Bennett and, above left, the pupils at Stanley's Infant and Primary School.

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The unchanging truth about dictators and appeasement

BRITAIN'S DISTANT OUTPOSTS — I

Daily Telegraph

13th January
1983

IT is alarming to hear some of the things that people say which gain circulation in Latin America over the South Atlantic problem. In Argentina if it is what the discredited military tyrants want to hear, it is given banner headlines. For example in Parliament on Dec. 14, Mr Tony Benn said: "Almost everyone except the Prime Minister realises that the exclusive sovereignty of Britain over the Falkland Islands cannot survive much beyond this decade."

I would say that almost everyone (except Anthony Wedgwood Benn and a few trendies) realises nothing of the sort. One would think he had never heard of the gateway to the Atlantic and the freedom of the sea lanes round the Horn. But whatever he believes, all Benn achieves by proclaiming that sort of little Englander nonsense is the propping up of military juntas in Argentina, because what he said is the one thing they want to hear, and the only card they have left to play in seeking the support of the unfortunate Argentine people.

On Nov. 29 there was a debate in the House of Lords about British nationality for the Falkland Islanders. The real significance of this was not so much the merits of the case; what was of paramount importance was the Argentine interpretation factor. We are being watched all the time in South America to see whether the Task Force was just a flash in the pan, and whether Foreign Office officials may one day revert to appeasement of a corrupt régime which is now despised within its own borders.

★
IN the Lords debate the Government made the right decision, and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have now said repeatedly that there will be no negotiations on sovereignty. But it came as a shock to me when the question of sovereignty and the possible negotiation of it seemed to be clearly implied, after all that had occurred, in a letter from our United Nations representative to the Security Council on Aug. 22. This indicates that the old tendency in Whitehall is still there. "Yes, Minister" used to be my favourite television programme. Today I cannot watch it without nagging disquiet. At home it is now referred to as "The Falklands Show."

In October I was in New York during the United Nations "Malvinas" debate and took soundings of both North and South American opinion. The debate was, of course, absurdly premature and nobody took it seriously. I welcomed the vote against us because it got certain parties off the hook, especially those countries which had been embarrassed

by the Falklands war. On the whole most countries, apart from Argentina and Soviet subordinates, are bored with the Malvinas cause. But obviously the Organisation of American States had to adopt a public posture in support of Argentina. Having done so, and having won the United Nations vote, honour may well have been served for those who matter. It will not be served, and they will not be off the hook, if we continue to give signals that sovereignty could one day be negotiated with Argentina.

Of course we have to recognise that Benn's is not the only voice now being raised at home which is at odds with the nation as a whole. It is becoming trendy among an establishment minority to question the Falklands operation... "we should not have done

**Whatever follows the visit
of Mrs Thatcher, it is
no service to either
Falklanders or Argentines
for Britain to give the
junta false hopes, argues
Lord BUXTON**

it, who wants the Falklands anyway?" Nor, in Whitehall, has one perceived any sign of repentance, indeed the grapevine indicates a certain smugness, "I told you so. Look at the costs."

On the question of defence, I am convinced, like most people in Argentina and South America, that the junta would never have invaded if they had thought we would retaliate. They never challenge a determined opponent. What we have learned in the Falklands is that deterrence (HMS Endurance, etc.) is not only a critical factor, but that a deterrent becomes a dubious factor unless it implies that one will act decisively when challenged.

It is certain that the Argentines would never have invaded if they had had to start by sinking a Royal Navy ship. They invaded believing that Endurance had left the Falklands for home and for good on March 20. John Nott was wrong when he said in Parliament on Dec. 14, in reply to a question on deterrence, "May I remind the honourable gentleman that HMS Endurance was in the Falkland Islands when she was attacked. Apparently the deterrent value of HMS Endurance was inadequate." She was not in the Falkland Islands, and we must get this straight. The junta believed that Endurance had left for home on March 20 and this was a crucial factor in convincing them that they would be unopposed. The fact that she was, unknown to them, 800 miles away

at South Georgia, does not alter the argument. And there is an absolutely stark lesson to be learned here for unilateral disarmers. Just look what happens when a deterrent, however small, is withdrawn before an aggressive military régime!

Provided Argentina and the rest of Latin America know that we will always protect British citizens and territory, there will never be another Argentine invasion. If that is the case, all that are necessary for effective deterrence are sophisticated early-warning devices, the smallest trip-wire presence as before in terms of troops, and immediate airborne access, which was never available before. That will be enough. All talk of big garrisons and huge costs are far-fetched, and perhaps deliberately far-fetched.

Scaremongering is also being indulged in reference to Exocet missiles and the danger of sudden Argentine air attack. There is talk of possible nuclear bombs. We should tell Argentina now that if one single attack is made on a British vessel in the South Atlantic, by Exocet or anything else, we will immediately sink an Argentine ship whether at sea or inside an Argentine harbour.

The generals understand that language. That, in my view, would be a rational and statesmanlike disposition, one which would help the Argentine people themselves and avert further catastrophic follies by their inept oppressors. And if there is ever a nuclear threat to the Falklands, we should position missiles there immediately, directed at Buenos Aires.

I should not like to be thought hostile to the Argentine people. I felt deeply for Argentine friends in their humiliation, and they included diplomats, people in office and others in all walks of life. They suffered indeed through the stupidity of their pompous régime and through our own misleading and misguided policies over 18 years, which compounded the situation.

★
TODAY they have a junta who are fearful of handing over power to civilians because they shrink from disclosing what happened to 15,000 of their own citizens. How contemptible it is that anyone in this country could ever have contemplated putting free British citizens under such a repellent rule, and it makes no difference whether their numbers were 1,800 or 18,000.

The time for talks with an Argentine Government, about everything except sovereignty, is after military dictatorship has ended, and not before. To refer to the possibility now is a cynical disservice to all parties, including the majority of the Argentine people. To do so is to encourage the junta to continue repression and to hang on.

Further articles will deal with Hongkong and Gibraltar.

Fighters escort Thatcher plane

By Alan Hamilton

Mrs Margaret Thatcher is due back home this evening after a carefully disguised getaway from her visit to the Falkland Islands.

Yesterday, the last day of her five-day visit, the Prime Minister carried out a well-publicized tour of the battlefields of Mount Longden, Tumbledown and Mount Kent, and a flight to penguin and seal colonies on the western islands.

But she threw journalists and potential Argentine intruders off the trail by beginning her day's "yomp" soon after dawn, and by 9.30am local time she had taken off in an RAF Hercules, escorted by Phantom fighters, for the 23 flying hours home. She was due to take several hours' rest at Ascension Island, where she will be briefed on the deteriorating economic situation at home, before making the second, more comfortable leg in a VC10 of RAF Transport Command.

Mrs Thatcher was involved in a scare before she left. Her Hercules was taxiing to take off when a fault was discovered in one engine. She was transferred to another Hercules, but her departure was delayed for 90 minutes.

During her early morning excursion the Prime Minister walked in driving rain for half a mile over the rugged ground of Tumbledown to inspect former Argentine positions.

Behind her she left 1,800 delighted Falklanders, at least half of whom had the chance to see or meet her and her husband Denis, but she has also left doubt over the fate of 200 Argentine war dead buried in temporary graves.

Mrs Thatcher said during her visit that Britain would rebury them in proper war graves on the Falklands but opposition from some islanders has led to the suggestion that they may be buried at sea.

Señor Nicanor Costa Méndez, Argentine Foreign Minister during the conflict, said yesterday the Mrs Thatcher's visit constituted "a real act of moral aggression, violating all norms of conduct."

Construction News reports today that three British civil engineering groups have submitted tenders to build the planned runway and associated airport buildings at Port Stanley, which will allow access to aircraft at least the size of a Tristar.

Churchill and Falklands

From Prebendary G. A. Lewis Lloyd

Sir, I was much interested in Peter Hennessy's article, "The other invasion scare" (January 3). But he says, "The story begins in February, 1951". Sir, it does not! It begins early in 1942.

In those war days, Churchill was very suspicious of the Argentines' intentions re the Falklands. They not only wanted them for themselves but also, as strong Axis sympathizers, they were anxious to provide German U-boats with bases from which to act against south Atlantic shipping. So, early that year, he sent a Falkland Islands Force (one battalion infantry, 1/2 battery of anti-aircraft guns, and ancillary arms) to occupy the Falklands as a deterrent to invaders.

It worked. We never saw a shot fired in anger. We were there for 18 months, returning home in time for the invasion of Europe.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. A. LEWIS LLOYD

(Staff Chaplain, Falkland Islands Force, 1942-44),

4 St Mark's College,

Audley End,

Saffron Walden,

Essex.

January 3.

WAR STRAINS SURVEY FLEET

By DESMOND WETTERN
Naval Correspondent

THE Falklands conflict and the urgent need to develop the islands' economic potential have put a new burden on the Navy's little-known survey fleet, whose activities range from the Channel to the Caribbean, South Georgia, and Saudi Arabia.

Three-quarters of the waters in the immediate vicinity of the Falklands have not been properly surveyed for 50 years or more, but two-thirds of Britain's coastal waters have also still to be surveyed to modern standards.

The South Atlantic is scientifically one of the least-known areas of the ocean, and the Navy is working all the year round measuring water depths, tides, currents, and seabed stability, vital for off-shore oil exploration and for setting up new port facilities in the Falklands.

In the past, most of the surveying around the Falkland Islands and its dependencies was done only during the southern summer months by the Antarctic ice patrol ship, *Endurance*, but, until she returns south early in the spring, the work is being carried on by the survey ship *Hecate*, which is also serving as the South Georgia guardship.

90ft leeway

In home waters, one of the Navy's 11 survey ships and craft has been specially fitted to search for wrecks mostly from two world wars to ensure that none in navigable channels is less than 90ft below the surface at low tide.

It is the policy of Rear Admiral David Haslam, Hydrographer of the Navy, to increase the surveying of smaller harbours particularly from the Wash along the Channel coast to Cornwall for the benefit of small boat sailors.

Some yachtsmen's charts even show the location in small ports of the harbourmaster's office and the nearest public telephone box.

But with three of the four ocean-going survey ships used throughout the Falklands' operation as hospital ships, it was necessary in 1982 to charter three commercial vessels under Naval control to survey oil rig and tanker routes along the north west Scottish coast, and a trawler is to be requisitioned throughout 1983 to continue this work.

Last winter, the ocean survey ship *Herald* operated along the coasts of Oman, the Sudan and North Yemen.

Hunt urges Argentines to 'grow up'

By Andres Wolberg-Stok
in Buenos Aires

SIR REX HUNT, Falklands Civil Commissioner, has told an Argentine magazine the solution to the Falklands dispute is "for Argentines to grow up, become more mature, and stop claiming something that does not belong to them and never did."

In an interview published in the weekly magazine *CIETE DIAS*, Sir Rex also said the islanders were better off now than before the Argentine invasion on April 2.

'Intense destruction'

Interviewed by telephone from New York, Sir Rex added that the benefits derived from the presence of the British troops now stationed in the Falklands "far outweighed" the inconveniences.

Ninety per cent. of the farms were now back to normal working, although the remaining 10 per cent., especially near Port Stanley, still had to overcome "intense destruction."

7,219 JUNTA VICTIMS NAMED

By Our Geneva Correspondent

The names of 7,291 people who have "disappeared" in Argentina since 1976 are in a report by a South American human right committee. Clamor, published by the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

The figure must be multiplied by two or three to obtain the real number of disappeared persons, the report says.



Britannia for Falklands

David Norris in his studio in Cranleigh, Surrey, yesterday with his 8ft plaster model of Britannia which, when cast in bronze, will stand on top of a 22ft stone column in the Falklands as part of the official war memorial. The figure is to be unveiled in June to mark the first anniversary of the end of the campaign.

The Hydrographer's Department has also been helping the Saudi Arabian government to plan a surveying programme. This winter two coastal survey ships, the *Fox* and *Fawn*, are operating in the western Caribbean around Jamaica, Cuba and Nicaragua.

MINEFIELDS FENCED BUT FALKLANDERS STILL FACE RISKS

By Maj-Gen. EDWARD FURSDON
Defence Correspondent

ALL the known Argentine minefields in East and West Falkland have now been securely fenced off.

The immediate areas of the main battlefields—such as Goose Green, Two Sisters and Tumbledown—are now surface cleared.

The tracks leading south-west from Stanley to Darwin, and north-west to Estancia House, are now both cleared for use, but only along their surfaces or between the safe lane marking pickets.

By early last month, Royal Engineer teams working under direction of the Tri-Service Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Headquarters, had classified all the original areas of hazard into three.

Danger areas

Category 1, or Green areas, are those which have been exhaustively checked and are believed to be safe.

These are now principally Stanley itself, Stanley Common lying immediately south of it, the airport and its close environs and a strip of coast by Port Harriet south-west of Sapper Hill.

Category 2, or Blue areas, are those for which there is no evidence that they contain mines or booby traps, but may of course contain unexploded bombs, missiles or ammunition.

Category 3, or Red areas, are those known to contain mines or booby traps, and for which the rule is—"Do not enter."

Safety standards

The difficult and dangerous task has reverted to peacetime EOD "Battle Area Clearance" in which normal safety standards apply. In principle areas essential to the life of the community will be cleared as required.

Clearance of the other areas will await the results of the intensive trials, now being conducted of various types of mine-clearing equipment.

These include devices such as flail and other mechanical techniques, but these are only practicable in places where total break up of the ground is acceptable.

There is still a tremendous task ahead for the Army in the South Atlantic and for the R A F experts.

The Royal Navy's teams are hard at work doing the clearance below the high water mark for the large amounts of unexploded material lying underwater. It could continue for years.

1,141,000 rounds

The outstanding minefield work comprises the south-east Stanley area corner, Goose Green in East Falkland and at Fox Bay and Port Howard in West Falkland. There are also Argentine mines to be cleared at Grytviken and at Leith in South Georgia.

The EOD teams' score for clearances of British and Argentine items up to last Saturday is formidable and commendable. It includes 83 bombs, 3,843 rockets, 4,102 shells, 273 missiles, 1,625 mines, 18,514 mortar bombs, 3,620 grenades, 1,313 cluster bomblets, 57 booby traps and 596 pyrotechnic devices.

In addition 1,141,000 rounds of small arms ammunitions up to 200 millimetre have been disposed of and a total of 8,701 hectares of ground searched.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**BRITISH VIRTUES MADE OUTCAST**

SIR—The visit of Mrs Thatcher to the Falkland Islands serves, once again, to highlight the attitude adopted by Mr Tam Dalyell and other liberal/progressive politicians when confronted by a national issue.

The Falkland Islands war was fought to free a small territory from occupation by an expansionist Argentina governed by Gen. Galtieri.

This general (in his own land a ruthless military dictator, where thousands of his political opponents were disposed of without trace) had, prior to the war, been castigated, and rightly so, by Mr Tam Dalyell and those of his political persuasion.

It was to be expected that the dictator's subsequent overthrow would be a matter for rejoicing and congratulation for those who had accomplished it. However, in so far as Mr Tam Dalyell and many Church leaders are concerned the exact reverse is the case. Condemnation is heaped on the liberator. Excuses made for the aggressor.

What is the reason? It is not far to seek. The statutory military dictator so detested by the Left is not the ultimate in villainy.

That role is permanently reserved for any British leader who, upholding the values of a past generation, applies them in the present. Honour, chivalry and courage, so conspicuously lacking in the higher echelons of the intelligentsia, are detested. Those who possess such virtues are outcasts.

Against this detestation all other outrage, by whomsoever committed, military dictator or otherwise pales into insignificance, and in the South Atlantic the dictator is exonerated and the liberator condemned.

D. P. APTHORP
Darsham, Suffolk.

Rare encounter

SIR—At the end of the last war Mr Tam Dalyell (Jan. 10) was about 13 and his entry in "Who's Who" gives no indication that he has any experience of war at sea.

The Belgrano, although old, was a

former American heavy cruiser capable of very high speed. She was reported as being armed not only with guns, but also with long-range guided missiles. She probably represented the greatest single threat to the Task Force.

Having had four years in command of submarines during the last war, may I assure Mr Dalyell that submarine encounters with heavy ships are very rare, of necessity fleeting, and seldom repeated. I had one myself, and it was unsuccessful.

Of Mr Dalyell's statement that the Belgrano represented "no conceivable threat to the Task Force," there is an old-fashioned expression to describe it: "codswallop." This expression may be unfamiliar to one, such as Mr Dalyell, delicately nurtured at Eton. However, it can sometimes be found in dictionaries of the more vulgar sort.

P. B. MARRIOTT
Capt.
Thetford, Norfolk.

Bevin's reaction

SIR—Mr Tam Dalyell (Jan. 10) in pursuing his vendetta against the Prime Minister over the Falkland Islands, would do well to consider the words of that great socialist Ernie Bevin.

When Bevin, as Foreign Secretary in the Attlee Government, arrived in Berlin to take his place at the Potsdam Conference, he was met at the airport by General Ismay. According to Ismay, Bevin's first words were: "I'm not going to have Britain barged about."

Bevin admired Churchill. I am sure he would have approved of Mrs Thatcher. He would not have thought much of Mr Dalyell.

CHRISTOPHER ROWAN-ROBINSON
Hove, Sussex.

Provocative measures

SIR—It is necessary to look at only the first point in Mr Tam Dalyell's letter to realise how one-sided are his opinions.

How can he describe the establishment of the Exclusion Zone, a defensive measure, as "provocative" when Argentina, earlier, had been really "provocative" by invading the Falklands?

G. W. HEADON
Warlingham, Surrey.

The Daily Telegraph, Friday, January 14, 1983

5

Tenders submitted for 9,000ft strategic runway at Port Stanley

By Air Cdre G. S. COOPER Air Correspondent

A DEFENCE study into building a strategic runway at Port Stanley for the rapid reinforcement of the Falklands is nearing completion.

British civil engineering groups have submitted tenders to build the planned runway and airport buildings.

The Royal Engineers have been surveying several sites for a 9,000ft runway to take VC-10 jet transports and the British Airways TriStars, which are to be converted to strategic tanker-freighters for the R.A.F.

The military air bridge requirement is in addition to the need to build an international airport for commercial use to link the Falklands with the outside world by air.

Hercules answer

The short-range air service from Argentina has been suspended indefinitely.

The lack of a suitable runway and the refusal by South American countries, including Chile, to let British operators use mainland airfields as staging posts has prevented long-range transport aircraft flying to Stanley.

For safety reasons, civil passenger aircraft need to nomin-

ate diversion airfields for use in emergency.

The R.A.F. gets over these two problems by flight refuelling Hercules transports that can use Stanley's short runway.

With tanker support, the Hercules can get back to Ascension if the crews cannot land at R.A.F. Stanley. But on some occasions aircraft have diverted to airfields on the South American mainland north of Argentina.

Cut troop costs

A longer runway would allow troops to be deployed quickly, thus reducing long-term garrison costs but cutting down the need for a large Army presence.

It would also allow Nimrod maritime flights from the island without being dependent on mid-air refuelling.

The cost of the runway would be £20-£30 million, according to Whitehall sources, against the £424 million garrison costs forecast for next year.

But this would provide the barest of facilities and not include the cost of new roads and an airport terminal.

The improved 6,000ft runway laid at R.A.F. Stanley with matting has a life of two to three years, and apparently there are problems of space and a soft-

sub-surface that prevent it from being extended to 9,000ft.

Alternative sites have been identified at Goose Green and at March Ridge, near Fitzroy.

If approval is given—and this is by no means certain because of the high cost of construction—a separate decision will have to be taken on whether the runway and airfield facilities will be built by the military or by a civilian contractor.

Another problem being studied by the R.A.F. is the payload capability of TriStars operating from Ascension's relatively low load-bearing runway.

TriStars have fewer wheels than the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10s to spread the weight of a maximum load, but the R.A.F. may find it can operate the aircraft successfully by reassessing the runway limitations at Wideawake, Ascension's airfield, or flying the TriStars with less than full loads.

FALKLANDS SHIP TO BE SOLD

By Our Naval Correspondent

The first of the Navy's ships to play a prominent part in the Falklands conflict, the 16,500-ton Royal Fleet Auxiliary Stromness, which was converted in five days from a stores ship to carry Royal Marines Commandos, is to be sold to the American Navy.

BIGNONE IN TALK WITH BRAZIL

By Our Buenos Aires Correspondent

President Bignone, of Argentina and President Figueiredo of Brazil met yesterday on the border between the two countries

Falklands lesson teaches Argentina to re-arm and re-think

BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT IN BUENOS AIRES

THE ARGENTINE armed forces have been re-arming fast since their defeat in the Falkland Islands six months ago, replacing large amounts of lost equipment and buying the new military hardware which their recent battle experience has shown to be indispensable for modern warfare.

If Argentina should ever consider going to war with Britain over the Falklands a second time, its armed forces will be better equipped and better trained to do the job.

Foreign military experts estimate that Argentina lost about \$800m (£503m) worth of equipment during the war, including a cruiser—the General Belgrano—a submarine, more than 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and the entire weaponry of three army brigades.

The air force and fleet air arm took the heaviest losses. New aeroplanes and anti-aircraft defences constitute the main thrust of the re-armament programme now underway.


The first priority was to replace between 40 and 50 Mirage III and Skyhawk fighter bombers shot down by British anti-aircraft defences and Harrier jump jets.

Last November, arms traders were saying that Argentina had already purchased 10 second-hand Mirages from its close ally, Peru, and 22 to 24 Daggers, an Israeli-built version of the same aircraft, from Israel.

Another urgently needed replacement was a Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, purchased from the U.S. at the end of last year to replace a similar aircraft which crashed in Port Stanley during the fighting.

A similar more recent deal involved the Argentine Navy's purchase of four Lockheed Electra airliners from the U.S. for conversion into maritime patrol aircraft.

The Falklands conflict showed the lack of adequate maritime patrol aircraft to be a major weakness in Argentina's defence.



General Belgrano: among £503m worth of Argentine equipment lost during the Falklands conflict

The navy hurriedly arranged the loan of two twin-engined Bandeirante patrol aircraft from Brazil during the crisis and requisitioned executive jets to scan the sea between Argentina and the Falkland Islands.

But these makeshift arrangements still left much to be desired. According to last

September's edition of the official air force magazine, Aeroespacio, the Argentine air force was unable to fly attack sorties on the British task force on 13 of the 45 days between May 1 and the Argentine surrender on June 14 due to lack of information about suitable targets.

During the war, Argentina

also learned from the British the strategic value of helicopters as troop transports and airborne weapons platforms for attacking infantry and shipping.

The Argentine forces made little effective use of their own mixed bag of helicopters, however 22 of which were destroyed, according to the Army Commander-in-Chief, Cristino Nicolalde.

Now, the Argentine military are looking closely at buying French-built Puma transport helicopters and are also shopping around for an attack helicopter.

France's delivery of a further nine Super Etendard jet fighters with their complement of Exocet missiles last November has immeasurably increased Argentina's naval attack capacity, but these aircraft were ordered well before the Falklands conflict and cannot be properly regarded as part of Argentina's post-war rearmament programme.

The Argentine navy launched a massive modernisation and re-

equipment programme after frontier tension with Chile over the Beagle Channel dispute in 1978 and is now reaping the benefit of these orders.

The first of four frigates and two submarines ordered from West Germany are due to arrive later this year and more submarines and six corvettes are being built in Argentine shipyards with West German technical assistance.

The Falklands conflict showed Argentina's need for more effective anti-aircraft defences. The armed forces were particularly pleased with the performance of their Franco-German Roland missiles, used to guard Port Stanley airfield, and their Swiss Oerlikon radar-guided anti-aircraft cannons. According to arms traders, they want to order more of both.

Another arms purchase reportedly in the pipeline is a batch of 15 Xavante jet trainers from Brazil. Argentina will need them to train a new generation of fighter pilots, to re-

place the cream of its air force which died in the "bomb alley" of San Carlos bay, where British warships were moored.

Improvements in personnel selection and training are likely in all three services as a result of experience gained in Argentina's first war against a foreign enemy for more than 100 years.

Barely-trained 18-year-old recruits, however brave and determined, were no match for Britain's highly trained professional troops. Several senior officers and politicians have called for an end to conscription and better training to raise the combat standard of Argentina's armed forces.

The Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Jorge Augusto Hughes, said last week that arms purchases since 1978 accounted for less than 10 per cent of Argentina's \$43bn external debt. But central bank officials estimate the arms bill to be about \$5bn—and by all accounts it is still climbing.

Argentines helpless but angry at Thatcher trip

From Andrew Thompson, Buenos Aires

There has been widely felt resentment in Argentina at Mrs Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Falkland Islands, but despite the rhetoric, the knowledge remains that there are few immediately available counter-measures.

Within the military government Señor Juan Aguirre Lanari, who was responsible for giving the official response, had a hectic week. Mrs Thatcher's surprise arrival in the islands caught him half-way to Nicaragua, where he was to attend a meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers. He made a statement from Caracas branding the visit as "an attempt to perpetuate British colonial domination" over the islands.

In his speech to the assembled ministers on Wednesday, he denounced Mrs Thatcher for her "belligerent" attitude, and accused Britain of installing a military base on the islands equipped with nuclear weapons which posed a grave threat to world peace and was a destabilizing element in the South Atlantic.

Although there has been widespread support within Latin America and the non-aligned countries for Argentina's position, officials know that there has been no real advance towards answering the United Nations' call for a

peaceful settlement of the islands' future.

The English language *Buenos Aires Herald* has described much of Argentina's post-war efforts as, at best, "successful damage control practised by experienced diplomats under difficult circumstances".

The newspaper *Clarín* said: "The support of the third world, and above all of Latin America is moving, but is not enough to tip the balance in our favour."

There are some sectors of Argentine society which believe in what has been described as different forms of "permanent war".

Señor Manfred Shonfeld, a columnist for *La Prensa*, for example, believes Argentina's strategy should include harassment air raids and that the day Argentina knew of Mrs Thatcher's presence, "some key targets in the occupied capital of the Malvinas should have been smouldering in ruins".

The left-wing Popular Left Front called for the nationalization of British property, a unilateral moratorium on the foreign debt, and the internment of British residents.

These remain, however, minority voices. The general opinion, with many different nuances, remains that a diplomatic struggle must be waged. In this view there are too many other problems facing the

country which must be faced first, such as the transition to democracy.

Señor Pablo Gonzalez Bergez, of the Democratic Action Party, said bluntly: "I don't care a hoot where Mrs Thatcher may be. The visit is not one of the country's most serious problems".

But it still irked national feelings. Señor Nicanor Costa Mendez, the former Foreign Minister, called the visit "immoral". Señor Ernesto Sabato, a writer, said it was "pompous". Señor Lorenzo Miguel, a trade unionist, called it "an insult" and Señor Francisco Manrique, the Federal Party leader said it was "an affront to all Argentines".

The optimists, in private conversation, recognize that they are setting their hopes on a number of separate developments over a period of years. These include the return of democracy to Argentina.

Another factor, which it is hoped, will raise the chances of a peaceful settlement, is the high cost to Britain of maintaining a garrison on the islands.

● **MANAGUA:** Despite strong opposition from some participants, the non-aligned foreign ministers meeting here are widely expected to denounce harshly the United States' role in Latin America (AFP reports).

Hope for Belize

President Efraín Blos Montt said Guatemala would drop its claim to all the former British colony of Belize but still wants a fifth of it.

Fairclough to build £16m RAF complex

FAIRCLOUGH International has pulled off the first large civils award to come out of the Falklands conflict with a £16 million contract for work on mid-Atlantic Ascension Island.

As with contracts let for work on the Falkland Islands, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has departed from its normal practice of inviting up to 15 firms to bid for defence contracts. Fairclough's award is understood to follow on from a cost plus consultancy award without

tenders for the construction job being invited.

Fairclough is to build an RAF camp complex on Ascension Island, which is 6,300 km from the UK and about the same distance from the Falkland Islands. Work is understood to include accommodation and leisure facilities and some runway alterations.

Portakabin has won a contract for the supply of site camp units and also for other accommodation facilities. Most units have already been shipped out.

A demand from Whitehall that awards and tenders for Falklands and Ascension be handled swiftly by the Property Services Agency is understood to be the main reason for the departure from normal MoD tendering procedures.

This departure has already been highlighted by a decision to ask six contractors to come together and form three joint ventures to bid for construction of a new airport outside Port Stanley. This led to bids being put in late last year from Cementation with John Laing, Costain with Tarmac and Wimpey with Taylor Woodrow.

Although the three joint ventures were asked to meet a tight bidding deadline no award has yet been made. Nor has there been any public commitment to go ahead with the project which was seen by Lord Shackleton as the key to the islands' future.

Another contract likely to be awarded soon is one for up to £20 million worth of accommodation modules for East Falkland.

Again a tendering procedure is understood to have been avoided with Sea and Land Pipe understood to be negotiating the job.

The units which would be shipped out to Stanley are similar to those used in the North Sea and would form a floating hotel in Stanley harbour.

Last week about 40 firms contacted the Crown Agents in response to a tender for the provision of labour for road improvements on the Falkland Islands. A large number of these are understood to have been recruitment agencies which have been eliminated from the running. The Crown Agents have now shortlisted 12 contractors to bid for the work.

An award is expected shortly as the Agents want the men to move on site next month.

Lord Barber.

MEN WHO GAVE THE WARNINGS

WARNINGS of the Argentine invasion were given by Mr Anthony Williams, 59, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina at the time of the crisis and Capt. Nicholas Barker, 49, commander of the *Endurance*.

He arrived in Buenos Aires in February, 1980, to restore full relations between the two countries, ambassadors having been mutually withdrawn in 1976.

Mr Williams, an experienced diplomat who had also been ambassador to Cambodia and Libya, complained bitterly to the Argentine Foreign Ministry in March when a party of so-called scrap metal dealers landed illegally on South Georgia.

Subsequently, messages of growing urgency were sent in



Capt Nicholas Barker

code from the embassy to London warning that the Argentine navy was getting ready to attack.

Capt Barker, was commanding officer of the Royal Navy's Antarctic ice patrol ship, *Endurance*, 3,600 tons, which was due to be scrapped before the Falklands crisis.

Capt. Barker said he and his men realised what was happening in Argentina by the reception they received on a courtesy visit to the port of Ushuaia, by what they read in local newspapers and other indications—all relayed to London.

D Tel. 18/1/83 Carrington drew fire off FO

By DAVID ADAMSON *Diplomatic Correspondent*

THE resignation of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary, and two other Ministers, drew much of the fire that was then being directed at the Foreign Office.

But the senior officials concerned in the events leading up to the Falklands crisis remained in place and the extent of their responsibility, as advisers to the ministers, has been a matter of debate ever since.

At the time of the invasion Sir Michael Palliser was Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the most senior official in the Foreign Office.

The post was one of considerable prestige and influence. He is not only an administrator, was not only an administrator, but the chief adviser to the Foreign Secretary.

He has access to all the information, secret or otherwise, flowing through the department and he was a member of the Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services.

Relations between the Permanent Under-Secretary and politicians have not always been happy or exactly respectful.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, an earlier holder of the post, said of politicians: "They embody everything that my training has taught me to eschew—ambition, prejudice, dishonesty, self-seeking, light-hearted irresponsibility, black-hearted mendacity."

Clash with Owen

The urbane and patient Sir Michael, by contrast, usually got on well with his politicians.

His relations with Lord Carrington were happy and Mr Healey, Labour's foreign affairs spokesman, charged to his rescue when Mrs Thatcher denied him the usual automatic peerage following his retirement.

Although he retired a few days after the invasion, reaching the age of 60, he was not dispatched to Harrogate.



Sir Michael Palliser

might have been expected if the Prime Minister had found his advice seriously lacking in elementary foresight.

Instead she brought him back as a special adviser on the Falklands attached to the Cabinet Office.

The man who succeeded Sir Michael at the Foreign Office was Sir Antony Acland. At 52 he was regarded as young for the post.

At the time of the invasion he was in what turned out to be a vulnerable job—chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Unlike the Permanent Secretaries Committee, it does not report direct to the Prime Minister.

But it is the collecting point for information from two important sources. The Secret Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelligence Staff.

Whatever intelligence there was on Argentine intentions and preparations was channelled through and analysed by his committee.

The names of two other officials have been mentioned in speculation about where responsibility lies for the Government being taken by surprise by the invasion.

They are Mr John Ure, the Superintending Under-Secretary for all American departments north and south; and Mr [Name obscured], Head of the South Atlantic Department.

D. Tol. 12/1/83 Watkinson and

FRANKS AND HIS TEAM

Thatcher does not escape scrutiny

THE six members of the Franks committee whose report is published today share widespread experience of politics, business and the civil service.

Lord Franks

LORD FRANKS, 78, son of a Congregational minister, took a double first in classics at Oxford and stayed on for ten years as a fellow of Queen's College, and eventually university lecturer in philosophy.

In the war he rose to Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Supply before returning to Oxford in 1946 as Provost of Queen's.

A year later he headed the team of experts accompanying Mr Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, to the conference on European Co-operation in Paris.

In 1948, aged 43, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States, the second youngest man at that time to have held the post and the first to have been neither a politician nor a diplomat.

On his return in 1952 he entered the City, serving as chairman of Lloyds Bank from 1954 to 1962, in which year he was created a Life Peer, taking the Liberal whip.

At that point he returned to Oxford again as Provost of Worcester College, a post he held until 1976. He also became on its foundation the first Chancellor of the University of East Anglia.

Married, with two daughters, he has been much in demand as a member and chairman of official bodies.

Lord Watkinson

LORD WATKINSON, 73, brought to the committee the experience of successive careers in politics and industry. Elected to the Commons in 1950, he became a junior Minister two years later and went on to serve as Minister of Transport and of Defence.

Ousted from Mr Macmillan's Cabinet in 1962, he received a viscountcy and left politics to become chairman of Cadbury - Schweppes and eventually President of the Confederation of British Industry.

Lord Barber

LORD BARBER, 62 was Chancellor in Mr Heath's government

MINISTERS whose actions have come under the scrutiny of the Franks Committee, include Mrs Thatcher and such household names as Lord Carrington.

Biographical notes on five of them are:

Lord Carrington, 63, resigned as Foreign Secretary after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and has since been appointed chairman of the General Electric Company.

Educated at Eton and Sandhurst, he succeeded to the title in 1938. During the 1939-45 war he served in Europe with the Grenadier Guards, reaching the rank of Major and being awarded the Military Cross.

Resigning his commission in 1945, he took up farming in Buckinghamshire, but within a year began to take an active part in the House of Lords, soon becoming a Conservative Whip.

In 1951, at the age of 32, he became a junior Agriculture minister. He survived the Crichton Down affair, when Sir Winston Churchill refused his resignation, and moved in 1954 to the Ministry of Defence.

When the Conservative party returned to power in 1970 he became Defence Secretary, moving to the Department of

the Royal Navy during the war, mainly in destroyers on Atlantic convoy duty.

He was first elected to the Commons in 1955 as MP for Merton and Morden, and moved to his present constituency of Spelthorne in 1970.

Having served as secretary of the Conservative backbench Defence Committee, he was appointed a whip in 1967 and in December 1973 became chief whip, a post he held until the 1979 election victory.

Mr Atkins was then appointed Northern Ireland Secretary, and remained responsible for the province's affairs for more than two years.

In September, 1981, Mrs Thatcher moved him to the Foreign Office in place of Sir Ian Gilmour, and from then until last April he represented the department in the Commons.

Richard Luce, 46, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office who resigned in the aftermath of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, paid the price of the Foreign Office's failure to foresee the crisis.

He was seen at Westminster as a rising figure, having gone from an Under-Secretary at the foreign Office at the start of this Government to Minister of State at the time of his resignation in April.

The MP for Shoreham since 1974, he had previously represented Arundel and Shoreham since 1971. Educated at Wellington and Christ's College, Cambridge, he served as a national service officer in Cyprus from 1955-7 and was a district officer in Kenya from 1960-2, before moving into marketing as a brand manager at Gallagher.

Mr Nicholas Ridley, 54, now a Treasury Minister, was the Minister responsible for negotiating with the Argentines about the future of the Falklands in 1980.

He proposed a "leaseback" deal with the Buenos Aires junta over sovereignty, but his ideas went into cold storage after a hostile reception at Westminster.

Mr Ridley, MP for Cirencester since 1959, is known as a hard-liner in the Conservative party.



Lord Carrington

Energy in the closing months of the 1974 miners' strike.

Having led the party's peers for a further five years in opposition, Mrs Thatcher appointed him Foreign Secretary when she came to power in 1979.

While seen as a pillar of the Government, Lord Carrington was at a disadvantage in never having sat in the Commons. He tendered his resignation after a hostile reception from a private meeting of Conservative MPs following the emergency Com-

January

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Falklands award

IT HAS been confirmed that Sea and Land Pipes has been awarded a rushed contract by the Ministry of Defence for accommodation on the Falkland Islands.

The firm's costs are to be assessed halfway through the job and a final figure will be worked out on that basis. Completion is due by April.

The award is understood to owe much to the intervention of MP Jim Prior whose constituency contains the East Angles S&LP yards. Work involves the fabrication of 308 containers measuring 13 m by 2.5 m by 2.5 m to be arranged in a five-storey structure on a barge anchored off Port Stanley. The top three floors will house troops, the second floor will be part accommodation and part social facilities and the lower floor will contain catering facilities.

Sea & Land
Pipe

Falklands: How Britain missed the boats

ALTHOUGH Lord Franks's report deals with one monumental failure of judgment by the Cabinet Office's Joint Intelligence Organisation, it sidesteps many other intelligence failures during the period before Argentina's invasion of the Falklands.

Chief among them was the failure of the Assessments Staff to read Argentinian newspaper reports and public comments, which reliably predicted what would happen and were couched in explicitly warlike terms – unlike the words used in previous moments of tension over the islands. One former member of the Joint Intelligence Staff, Air Commodore Brian Frow, calls the Franks report a 'whitewash'. He says: 'It's ridiculous to say that the indicators were not there and were not being read.'

Air Commodore Frow himself read the indicators while heading the London-based Falkland Islands Office. In September 1981, he held a press conference to announce that an Argentine invasion was now, for the first time, quite certain if negotiations failed.

In October 1981 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) increased its priority for intelligence on Argentina. This message was passed to GCHQ, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelligence Staff. Nothing was done. Franks doesn't say why.

He does say that extra intelligence resources might not have helped to predict Argentina's intentions. Predicting intentions is indeed tricky (although the Argentine newspaper reports made it easier); but monitoring actual military deployment is comparatively simple and easy to arrange through satellite reconnaissance and signals intelligence. Critical days of warning could certainly have been provided.

Franks also says that warning could have been given if the British defence attaché could have provided 'direct coverage of military movements in Argentina'. Allegedly, he didn't – a claim dismissed by former intelligence staff as 'ridiculous'.

The Franks report adds that it would still have been 'difficult to evaluate such information because of the absence of knowledge about the normal pattern of Argentine military activity.' Yet the report then says that 'there was no intelligence, from American sources or otherwise, to show that the force at sea before the invasion was intended other than for the normal naval exercises'. How Britain could know nothing about 'normal pattern' of activity and yet recognise

'normal exercises' is not explained.

Similar incongruities abound in the report. Franks says that 'no satellite photography was available on the disposition of the Argentine forces'. However, according to Air Commodore Frow, maritime forces 'around the globe' are under continuous scrutiny, but the usual means of satellite reconnaissance of the sea is radar, infra-red scanning or signals intelligence – not 'photography'. It is, in fact, inconceivable that information was not available from the rings of radio direction-finding stations which surround each ocean.

In reply to claims that Argentine intentions might have been deduced from the sudden movement of an acknowledged \$500 million of Argentine funds out of London in the 'period running up to the invasion', Franks argues that the Bank of England would not normally receive reports of such an outflow until weeks later. He totally fails to mention the existence of the Economic Intelligence Organisation and Committee (see NS 19 Nov 1982), which does for financial intelligence what JIC does for foreign and diplomatic information.

Secret intelligence on the movement of money is easily available from GCHQ's intercepts on all the normal commercial communications channels in and out of Britain. The Economic Intelligence staff could have obtained the information in time – if they had been asked. A former director of Economic Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence, Edward Radice, said this week that such operations had been successfully mounted to follow Rhodesian finances and Biafran funds in the late 1960s, 'once we had a political direction'.

This question of political direction lies at the heart of the intelligence failure. Franks's guilty parties – the Joint Intelligence Committee and its subordinate groups – consistently misinterpreted information, and 'missed a great deal more through lack of interest. JIC has, for the moment, a Foreign Office chairman, and its Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs) are drawn largely from Foreign Office and MoD staff with experience in the geographical region. Both the JIC and the CIGs often bias their work to the political evaluations and priorities of either their parent departments or the government as a whole.

That happened with intelligence on the Falklands time and time again. SIS's agents and informants in the Argentine foreign and defence ministries were few in

number, and all seem to have told their intelligence case-officers what the British government cared to hear. That message was that the junta really did not mean business.

For that reason, priorities for GCHQ and other agencies to intercept signals or gather data were not increased. So, when an assistant rushed into John Nott's office late on 31 March with the decrypt that revealed the time and date of the invasion of Port Stanley, it was far too late.

Duncan Campbell

Sewers may collapse if water strike goes ahead

DOUBLE-DECKER buses may fall through the streets and into the sewers if next week's water strike goes ahead. This is not some lurid prediction of the tabloid press but the more measured view of the House of Lords select committee on science and technology, whose report on the water industry was published last month.

The committee argued that the government was leaving the sewerage renewal programme £100 million a year short of capital investment. If the programme was not speeded up, hydraulic overload was increasingly likely, leading to the weakening of external support for sewer pipes and, eventually, massive ground collapses.

One of the teams that will be on strike from next Monday deals with repair equipment, so the possibility of fixing old sewers will be reduced. The threat of ground collapse is only one of many potential horrors ahead, including polluted rivers, water rationing and blocked drains.

The apparent insouciance with which the government has ap-

proached the prospect of a national strike is typical of its attitude to the water industry. The National Water Council has repeatedly criticised lack of capital funding, necessary to locate leaks (estimated by some at 30 per cent of all water supplied), mend drains and renovate sewers. Capital funding has fallen by half in real terms over the past ten years.

The House of Lords committee was especially critical of 'the relaxed attitude of the Department of the Environment, which accords badly with the collapse data'. Of the estimated 210,000 km of sewers in Britain, about 15 per cent are more than 100 years old; in Manchester, it is 80 per cent.

Oddly enough, many water authorities do not even know where their sewers are. The Anglian Water Authority, for instance, knows the whereabouts of only 8 per cent of its 22,000 km of sewers.

According to Eddie Newall, leader of 30,000 water workers, the threat of an all-out strike from next Monday cannot now be lifted without the intervention of environment secretary Tom King. Newall claims that the National Water Council, which negotiates on behalf of the 10 water authorities in England and Wales, had planned to raise its 4 per cent offer to 6 per cent last November, but the government vetoed the increase. During a debate on the Water Bill (which abolishes the National Water Council), Denis Howell MP asked King three times if he would deny this story; King refused.

But it is not certain that even an offer of 6 per cent would satisfy the unions, who have been insisting for over a year that their position in the earnings league table should be raised to the upper quartile of male manual workers' earnings.

This claim was not resolved in

Burst water mains: the shape of things to come?



D. Tel. 26/1/83

A DAILY TELEGRAPH EXCLUSIVE PATTERN FOR YOU TO KNIT

A cable straight from the Falklands

Our exclusive pattern, with its back-to-nature styling, is perfect for chilly February days. It is knitted in pure Falklands wool, and has a low-buttoning front with panels of cable as decoration.



Picture by
KENNETH
MASON

Sketch by
BERYL
HARTLAND

THE Falkland Islands enter our lives in a gentler way with the arrival here of their knitting wool, all from fine sturdy sheep who are now back to doing their own peaceful thing: growing their wool.

We have commissioned an exclusive pattern to knit in this attractive wool, which takes perfectly to a slightly Aran, cabled, back-to-nature styling.

Falkland Islands' wool has, curiously enough, not been sold here before in its pure state although it has been blended by Hayfield into a mixture yarn (no longer available). Now Viking are importing the raw knitting wool of the Falklands and having it spun in Yorkshire in its pure state.

The wool, an Aran gauge, comes at 75p a 50 gram ball in just five natural colours: natural white, beige, brown, pale grey and deep grey. You will find it, by mid-February, in Rie's Wools of 243 High Holborn, London WC1 and also at Selfridges.

The Viking people have prepared some knitting pattern booklets and you can obtain one by sending 65p, plus s&e, to Viking Wools, Hawkshead, Cumbria. Each booklet contains eight knitting patterns using the new yarn.

In the meantime consider our own cardigan with its low buttoning and sharp cabling. It takes eight balls for bust size 34in, also eight for the size 36in.

Serena Sinclair



and launches the Falklands Sweater

Island dress



WITH classic hand-knits like Guernseys and Arans back in the fashion limelight, where, I have been asking myself, is the Falklands Sweater?

The islands send 2.25 million kilos of high-quality Falklands wool each year to Britain. But most of it ends up on the open market in Bradford, where it is blended with other wool and dispersed around the world.

No one—not even Betty Miller who runs the local cottage industry shop in Port Stanley—has produced a sweater in pure Falklands wool to challenge Britain's traditional knits.

Now The Standard is putting that right. I have commissioned from one of our foremost knitwear designers an exclusive pattern for a Falklands Sweater which we can wear, and even knit, with pride.

Nancy Vale, whose 1000-strong team of home knitters produces the best British classics in thousands for a world-wide market, as well as high fashion numbers for New York designer Ralph Lauren, has used a combination of highly symbolic stitches to create The Standard's Falklands Sweater.

Central to her design is a chunky cable, representing the link between the islands and Britain. On either side are bands of V-stitch, for valour and victory.

V-STITCH for valour and victory . . . Nancy Vale's design for The Standard's Falklands Sweater.

Delightful

Rugged moss stitch, for the land itself, makes up the background, and weaving its way between the patterns, cutting right through the welts and neckband, is a tough rope stitch for strength.

What makes the Falklands Sweater extra-special is the sheer quality of the wool itself.

Because there are no trees or bushes on the islands, no vegetable matter rubs into the sheep's fleece. So Falklands wool is clean, strong and, above all, silky.

Spinners in Bradford swear they can pick Falklands wool



"We commissioned a Franks Report on the Labour Party's showing in the polls and you'll be delighted to know it absolves you of any blame."

Prime Minister warned that veto risks new Falkland conflict

Continued from page one

islands and, if possible, the dependencies, too. No solution which satisfied their demand could possibly be reconciled with the wishes of the islanders or of Parliament.

She was challenged on the point by Dr David Owen, the former Labour Foreign Secretary who is now Foreign Affairs spokesman for the Social Democrats.

In a ferocious speech castigating the Prime Minister he said: "This House has a duty to say to the British people that we fought against aggression and not for a flag. The sooner the Prime Minister forgets the word paramountcy in terms of the wishes of the islanders the better."

Dr Owen's onslaught, brought the Prime Minister to her feet more than once. She accused Dr Owen of ignoring the fact that the Commons itself had committed itself to the paramountcy of the wishes of the islanders.

Dr Owen would not be intimidated. "Speak for yourself," he said, "I have never used that word." And he went on to point out that the 1,800 Falklanders represented less than a parish council in terms of numbers.

Mr Michael Foot, leader of

the Opposition, developed his argument that the Franks Report had demonstrated a breakdown in Cabinet government by showing that the Falklands had not been discussed by ministers collectively, either in Cabinet or in a crucial overseas and defence committee, for some 15 months before the invasion.

He insisted that Mrs Thatcher had a duty to draw sensible lessons from the experience of the Falklands affair, and to re-establish the principle of collective ministerial responsibility through Cabinet discussion. Otherwise the same kind of mistakes would be made again.

Mr Foot ironically expressed the thanks for Mrs Thatcher's tribute to the Foreign Office. But he pointed out that it was not a daily, or even a weekly occurrence for a Foreign Secretary to resign.

He asked how long Lord Carrington's successor, Mr Francis Pym, was likely to survive.

Mr Foot recalled that the Franks Report had recorded the comment of a British ambassador defining British policy on the Falkland Islands before the invasion as "a general Micawberism." That,

he said, was a phrase which might be substituted for the Resolute Approach.

Throughout the debate, the curious shape of HMS Endurance, the Navy's survey ship, sailed backwards and forwards. Both Mr Foot and Dr Owen denounced the Government for announcing the vessel's withdrawal.

Mrs Thatcher claimed that a previous Labour government had also sought to withdraw HMS Endurance, which had now, she announced, been retrieved once and for all.

This statement brought predictable laughter from the Opposition benches, and when Mr Winston Churchill attempted to suggest that the Labour government had only retrieved the ship after some Argentine shooting Mr Foot pointed out that such an interpretation, if true, could only make the failings of the Tory government even more serious.

But one question last night was how the Commons would be able to sustain an entire second day for a debate which was already flagging yesterday. Many MPs regarded it as a tedious exercise in historical analysis rather than a contribution to the formulation of future policy.

Falkland veto risks conflict, MPs warn

By Ian Aitken,
Political Editor

The Prime Minister was challenged in the Commons yesterday to justify her Fortress Falklands policy in the South Atlantic and warned that her determination to give the 1,800 inhabitants of the islands a virtual veto over British diplomacy could lead to a repetition of last April's catastrophe.

This issue, founded on Mrs Thatcher's reiteration of the principle of paramountcy for the wishes of the islanders emerged as the crucial fact in the first day of the Commons debate on the Franks report on the causes of the Falklands affair.

It now seems likely to overtake the more backward-looking issues raised by the Franks analysis of the events that led up to the Argentine invasion.

The Prime Minister opened

the debate with an announcement that she was taking the advice of Lord Franks and his colleagues and intended appointing a full-time chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee from her staff in the Cabinet Office.

The report suggested that the committee had not successfully processed warnings of a possible invasion, partly because it was under the control of a full-time official of the Foreign Office.

Mrs Thatcher followed her announcement with a tribute to the efficiency of the Foreign

FO loses key security chair, back page; Parliament, page 8; Letters, page 12

Office in general, and to the performance of Lord Carrington and his fellow ministers who resigned as a result of the Argentine invasion.

In the Lords the former Foreign Secretary said that nine months after the event he still did not believe that he could have acted differently.

Although Mrs Thatcher paid a tribute to the work of the Ministry of Defence, it was noticeable that she added no personal praise for Sir John Nott, who stayed on as Defence Secretary when Lord Carrington resigned.

Mrs Thatcher conceded that there had been much criticism of the Foreign Office, and Labour MPs promptly reminded her that many of the criticisms had come from her.

Undeterred, Mrs Thatcher declared that these criticisms had been quite unjustified. "That needed saying, and I'm glad to say it," she declared, in the tone of someone swallowing some rather nasty medicine.

She told MPs that Argentina was interested in only one thing—sovereignty over the

Turn to back page, col. 5

January 26th Daily

Telegraph

Anniversary plans for the Falklands

By JENNY SHIELDS

MR TIMOTHY RAISON, Minister for Overseas Development, is likely to head a list of VIPs at the Falkland Islands' 150th anniversary celebrations next month.

Also on the guest list are Lord Shackleton, who has prepared two reports on the islands' economy, the first in 1976, and Lord Buxton, ITN chairman, and his film-maker daughter Cindy, who was trapped in a remote part of South Georgia by the Argentine invasion.

Although Jan 3 was the Falklands' 150th anniversary as a British Crown Colony, the celebrations have been postponed until the last week in February because of the disruption caused by the invasion.

Mr Reginald Williams, assistant civil commissioner, said yesterday from Port Stanley: "By the time the week of celebrations starts on Feb 20 the farmers will have finished the sheep shearing and hopefully the racecourse will have been repaired."

The Ministry of Defence has confirmed it will be responsible for the guests' travelling arrangements. They are expected to fly like Mrs Thatcher via Ascension Island.

The Royal Mint is to strike a special range of commemorative coins to mark the anniversary. A limited edition of 10,000 silver crowns and 150 gold-proof crowns, costing £995, is to be struck.

There is to be a thanksgiving service in Port Stanley Cathedral.



Mrs Ethel Ferguson, 83, leaving Wroughton RAF Hospital, near Swindon, yesterday, with nursing sisters Flt Lt Ruth Bleasdale (left) and Flt Lt Claire Newton who are accompanying her on a flight back to the Falklands. Mrs Ferguson came to England for a hip operation after a fall.

Falklands patient, 83 flies home

FALKLANDER Mrs Ethel Ferguson, 83, was given a VIP send off when she left hospital for home today after being flown to Britain for an operation.

Mrs Ferguson, who broke her hip in a fall, had to be treated in Britain because of limited hospital facilities in the Falklands. Medical aid, once available in Argentina, has stopped since the conflict.

The little grey-haired grandmother, who was given a red carnation, waved to doctors and nurses as she left the military hospital in Wroughton, Wiltshire, before her marathon RAF flight back to Port Stanley. "It has just been wonderful here," she said. "It's such a nice friendly hospital."

E. Standard

25/1/83

Peace signal out of Buenos Aires

AFTER a week of conflicting reports about Argentine military intentions in the South Atlantic, the Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires has issued a remarkably placatory communiqué committing Argentina to a peaceful solution of the Falklands question.

The ministry denied "international journalistic versions" of a recent increase in military activity, and said Argentina was scrupulously observing the de facto cessation of hostilities currently in effect.

The communiqué continued: Argentina is firmly committed to search for a peaceful solution to the controversy over the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organisation of American States, and with the support of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Ministry also reiterated Argentina's longstanding readiness to renew negotiations with Britain.

It said the sole object of the recent "demonstratory" Press reports had been "to justify the huge (British) military presence in the South Atlantic and London's refusal to negotiate."

The moderate tone of the communiqué contrasted with recent aggressive pronouncements by individual government officials, notably Senor Martinez Vivot, the Defence Minister.

There appears now to be

By TONY ALLEN-MILLS
in Buenos Aires

several conflicting points of view in the upper echelons of the Buenos Aires regime on what strategy Argentina should adopt to bring Britain to the negotiating table.

Some hardliners evidently feel that Britain would soon tire of being under constant military pressure in the Falklands.

The Foreign Ministry seems to be convinced that a diplomatic initiative with the support of the rest of the South American continent and the Third World had the best chance.

Thatcher resolute

Other Latin American countries are known to be opposed to a further disruptive outbreak of hostilities in the South Atlantic.

The Foreign Ministry's statement may have been aimed at reassuring other governments whose post-war support for Argentina might waver in the event of further military aggression.

But with Mrs. Thatcher resolutely determined to give nothing away as far as the Falklands are concerned, the situation in the South Atlantic remains tense, and it is not out of the question that the Argentine military could once again take matters into their own hands.

Details began to emerge yesterday of a new incident involv-

ing the Swedish cargo vessel that tried to visit Argentina after delivering goods to the Falklands.

Swedish Embassy sources said the Linne, 5,551 tons, had been refused permission to dock in Buenos Aires to take on board a consignment of fruit for Europe.

The Buenos Aires agent who arranged shipment is understood not to have realised that the Argentine port authorities might not welcome a vessel, even a non-British ship, that had been delivering goods to the Falklands.

The Swedish Embassy said the Linne put to sea again without incident after permission to dock was refused.

£40m runway for Falklands

By Our Diplomatic Staff

Plans to build a new runway for the Falklands, costing nearly £40 million, which will allow long-distance jets to land there are to be announced by the Government early next month.

The new airstrip will either replace the existing Port Stanley runway, or be sited near the Fitzroy settlement. An extension of the runway at Stanley would be a complete rebuilding project costing as much as a second airfield laid across the flat rock at Fitzroy.

The RAF has also pointed out the advisability of a civilian airport away from the military operations at Port Stanley where a squadron of Phantom fighter-bombers is based.

Wide-bodied TriStar jets will refuel Hercules transporters flying to the Falklands from Ascension Island. There appears no prospect that any of the neighbouring South American countries will help Britain with stopover facilities in a Falklands air link.

The problems of supplying the Falklands by air and overall Foreign Office policy for the future of the islands were discussed last week at a closed meeting of British Ambassadors from South America who flew to London.

Sir Anthony Acland, head of the Diplomatic Service, presided at the consultations. It was one of the regular meetings of the ambassadors held about every two years, but was of particular importance this time in view of the growing urgency in London of settling the future administration of the Falklands.

The present thinking in Whitehall is that the Falklands must lose the colonial image which has drawn heavy attack in the United Nations. Instead the islands will probably be turned into some form of protectorate or associated state, with Britain responsible for defence and foreign affairs.

Why the Falklands invasion could have been foreseen—29.

All right for some in Stanley

By PATRICK WATTS in Port Stanley

COMPLAINTS are beginning to be heard about the living conditions of British troops on the Falklands, particularly at the contrast between the best and the worst.

A captain from the Royal Corps of Transport claimed that conditions were "similar to being on exercise in Germany," but then admitted that he personally had the luxury of living with a family in Port Stanley.

He had enough hot water for a daily bath, and the woman of the house insisted on washing his clothes. "I try to pay but she will not accept a penny," said the captain contentedly.

On the other hand, troops at Ajax Bay have to walk about a mile once a week to a lonely farmhouse at "Wreck Point" in order to take their baths. At one position at San Carlos troops have their daily drinking water brought in by helicopter.

The authorities are trying desperately to have everyone

out of canvas by the time the winter winds and snow arrives. A floating accommodation block, the Coastley, was officially opened two days ago by Mr Jerry Wiggin, Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Armed Forces. This will accommodate about 1,000 men.

There is a second such block due here in April and several ships at anchor in Stanley harbour provide bunks for several hundred Servicemen.

A non-commissioned officer explained to me that there were video shows and films available daily. Nevertheless he felt as though he was "returning to a prison every evening."

In the town of Stanley many private houses are being rented out to the military who continually advertise on the radio for further space. There are 50 troops living in one large house, and 30 in a smaller building.

Food is plentiful. Many of the families benefit from excess rations of the soldiers and they provide fresh eggs and vegetables in return.

been an increase in kidnap- the Price Government.

Argentina fails to impress US team

From Jackson Diehl
in Buenos Aires

Members of a visiting US congressional delegation said in Buenos Aires at the weekend that they would oppose any move by the Reagan Administration to certify human rights improvement in Argentina and resume suspended military operation while the military Government remained in power.

Mr Michael Barnes (Democrat, Maryland), the chairman of a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and the leader of the delegation, said the Administration was actively considering moving within the coming months to meet the congressional requirement of the report certifying improvement on human rights in Argentina.

President Reagan must deliver such certifications on human rights to congress for both Argentina and Chile before the military aid and sales to those countries, suspended during the Carter administration, can be resumed.

"This Government should not be given a good housekeeping seal of approval," Mr Barnes said of the Argentine military administration in a meeting with American correspondents.

Instead, he said the Reagan Administration should wait until a new civilian democratic government takes over from the military after elections scheduled for later this year.

Mr Barnes and Miss Barbara Mikulski (Democrat, Maryland), another member of the delegation said that human rights conditions in Argentina appeared to have significantly improved since the early years after the military takeover in 1976.

According to Mr Barnes and US officials, a formula is now under consideration that would involve certification of Argentina but not of Chile, where progress on human rights issues specified in congressional legislation is less clear. However, the certification of Argentina would not likely be followed by any substantial package of arms aid or sales and could be largely symbolic, officials have said.—Washington Post.

Reuter adds: Argentina has denied reports that it plans to harass British forces in the Falkland Islands and reaffirmed its wish for talks with Britain to work out a peaceful solution to the dispute.

Cocoa brought to boil

Cocoa, Fla.: Crowds pelted police and passing cars with fire started and some shots were reported during one incident in this cocoa town.

Nicholas Shakespeare

Guardian

24/1/83

The man who would be King (of Patagonia)

This century has rather cropped the divinity which used to hedge a king. Today his touch is just as likely to transmit scrofula as to cure it, for we know now we are all made of the same clay; also that, like cream-jugs and chamber pots, we tend to get used for different purposes. Not even a monarch is immune from the realities of modern life. "There's a lot of unemployment in my profession", Albert I of the Belgians once said, and royal redundancies have been especially bad of late, with two world wars claiming the thrones of four emperors and 11 kings. According to the corpulent King Farouk, there will be only five monarchies left by the year 2000: the four kings in a pack of cards, and the King of England.

Philippe Boiry, who runs a public relations firm, hopes to reverse the trend. He is a monarch-in-waiting. A pleasant, precise Frenchman in his mid-fifties, he sports a grey moustache and smokes a pipe. As the hereditary Prince of Araucania (in southern Chile) and Patagonia, he is heir to a kingdom five times the size of France - a kingdom, more interestingly, which includes the Falkland Islands.

A few days after the Task Force sailed I visited his small chateau of La Chêze in Périgord, the birthplace of the first King, Orélie-Antoine de Tounens. Anticipating my scepticism the current claimant had produced some impressive documents: the original constitution, letters of appreciation from Peron, Franco, Allende and Eisenhower, and a copy of the national anthem, composed in 1864, which he hoped to have recorded. How, though, had it all began?

"Orélie's ambition", the Prince explained, "was to set up a monarchy in South America. As a lawyer he confirmed that Araucania was independent from Chile and Patagonia did not belong to Argentina - these regions, you see, were inhabited by Indians who had never submitted either to the Spanish or the Creole republics which followed. In 1860 he entered the territory, where he was accepted and elected King. The amazing thing is how a white man could persuade these natives to elect him." I had to agree. "Well, there was a tradition dating back to the Aztec and Incas according to which a white man would come and liberate the Indians from their Spanish oppressors."

Looking at the map on the wall I noticed beneath a clutch of familiar islands, the words: "Parts of the kingdom occupied by foreigners but claimed for the kingdom for geopolitical reasons". The Prince elaborated: "They are the natural extension of the Andes, geographically speaking, and therefore of

Patagonia. My father always held the title Prince of the Falklands to assert this reclamation. But I really haven't done anything about it."

Though the flame he lit flickers on, Orélie did not rule for long. He minted some coins, he designed a flag, he was imprisoned and repatriated several times, and he died in penury in a village near La Chêze. We followed the signposts to his tomb. In the graveyard, above the inscription, there was an odd-looking crown.

"The mason didn't have a model to go on so he used one from a pack of cards, the King of Hearts. The actual crown was stolen about 20 years ago." As I paid my homage, I asked Philippe Boiry if he felt it important to maintain the family tradition. "The answer is simple. When a monarchy is set up, so are some rights which remain permanent." His two aims were to disseminate the history of his dynasty, and to fight for the rights of the Indians who remain in that part of South America. He has never yet been to the area, but says he is still recognized there and recently received a letter of tribute from the main Argentine tribal leaders. Not long ago he discovered some sticks of maize beside Orélie's mossy tomb, and a message in Indian with the words: "Don't forget us."

There is little fear of that. In the evening I attended a reception in his honour along with members of his court in exile. "It is hard to make decisions alone," he confessed, engulfed in pipe smoke. The men he relied on were an eccentric bunch who carried Araucanian titles like the Marquis de Queilen-Cura. Obviously a lot of money had been spent on medals: the Chancellor of the kingdom was Christmas-treed with them. He wore silver cuff-links with Philippe's face ("only ten have these"), a large Order of the Southern Cross ("only thirty have these") and a tie-pin ("only three have these").

Needless to say the Falklands formed a large topic of conversation. After a toast to the Prince, and to "L'Araucanie libre", I was taken aside by another member of the court. He was, he explained, a cousin of the Comte de Bougainville, a descendant of the first settler on the Falklands. He had, he said, the only solution to the problem. Philippe had to go out, raise his white, blue and green flag and toss a coin on an annual basis as to who would govern.

The trouble was, he meant it.

Philippe Boiry is among the subjects of a BBC1 Documentary next Wednesday called "The Men who would be King".

Lessons for the future over past Falklands dilemma

From Mr E. H. St G. Moss

Sir, You write (leading article, January 19) that "Successive governments wanted to give away the Falkland islands, but could not find how to do so without stubbing their toes on the boulders of the British democratic tradition". This is one, not unreasonable, way of putting it. Another way would be to say that successive British governments recognized that the British national interest would be best served by relinquishing the Falklands commitment, but they were prevented from doing so because the "right" of 1,800 Falkland islanders to keep the territory under British sovereignty, if they so wished, was regarded as paramount.

This did not flow from the application of any accepted principle of democracy. Theoretically Parliament would have been entitled to require the Falklanders to make a patriotic sacrifice (as others were later required to make a greater patriotic sacrifice) - though elementary justice would have made it essential to offer them generous financial compensation and resettlement elsewhere under the British flag if they wanted it. However no government, either Labour or Conservative, could press for such a course against the Falklanders' wishes, because the Opposition of the day, appealing to national pride, and probably supported by many in the Government party, would certainly have defeated it.

This was in a sense democratic; it reflected what would have been the immediate gut feeling of Parliament and people. But there is little evidence that in the years following 1965 the issue was ever honestly faced in its full implications and clearly put to the nation by any government or political party. If it had, what would the national reaction have been?

We do not know and never shall. But, whatever the answer might have been, we should not deceive ourselves about what happened in the event. The Argentines, irrationally, criminally, but not altogether unpredictably, launched an invasion. The Government had no option but to respond. The Armed Forces, taking enormous risks and at considerable cost, heroically reconquered the islands. Fortune, this time, favoured the brave. But we now have for the indefinite future an extremely expensive additional defence commitment, which paradoxically is a major political liability to the position of the West in Latin America.

All this on the basis of a theory of the paramountcy of the wishes of 1,800 islanders which does not seem to have been formally debated as a matter of principle (let alone applied elsewhere, eg, over Diego Garcia)

and is far from self-evidently justified.

Perhaps there are lessons here for the future.

Yours faithfully,

E. H. St G. MOSS,
29 Guildown Avenue,
Guildford,
Surrey.
January 20.

From Sir Duncan Watson

Sir, As one who, for a while, shared part of the responsibility for keeping balance on that tricky tightrope over the Falkland islands may I, through you, pray that in the debate on the Franks report Parliament may find its way to discuss the issue for what it is - an intractable problem that faces our nation and has done so for a long time, as successive governments have known only too well - and is now so much more difficult because of the Argentine "idiocy" last year.

Thinking particularly of those who, after we fell off the tightrope, had to exercise their military skills and give their lives to restore the status quo, may our parliamentarians speak for Britain, and not for party advantage, about how to work through this teaser in the best interests of ourselves and of the Falklanders - as we shall have to do, even though it is obviously going to take some time and who knows what Government may be in power when next it comes to the crunch.

Yours faithfully,

DUNCAN WATSON,
Sconce,
Steels Lane,
Oxshott,
Surrey.
January 19

From Mr R. Edey

Sir, In 1981 the Falkland islanders rejected the lease-back arrangement put to them by the Government. In view of the fact that the islanders' wishes were to be paramount, serious negotiations to introduce a lease-back arrangement with the Argentinians could not be meaningful. They were never intended to come to fruition.

It should have been realised that the Argentinians could not be stalled indefinitely by spurious talks and that sooner or later they would lose patience and be prepared to take the islands by force unless deterred from doing so by superior counter-force.

Had this been done war would not have ensued. The fact is it could and should have been prevented. The islands should have been defended against invasion from the moment it became clear that the wishes of the islanders left no room for political manoeuvre with the Argentinians.

Fortress Falklands has become a reality to allate. The Franks report

may vindicate the Government. History will not do the same.

Yours faithfully,

R. EDEY,
118 Sandgate High Street,
Sandgate,
Folkstone,
Kent.
January 20.

From Dame Alix Meynell

Sir, No doubt we can maintain the Falkland islands against attack by Argentina for the foreseeable future. But what will happen to the islanders' way of life? They have, I understand, been accustomed to rely on Argentina for all the grace-notes of life, from hospitals to boarding-schools, to theatres and shopping; and these can hardly be replaced from 8,000 miles away.

Fortress Falklands is likely, surely, to be quite as uncomfortable (probably more so) as Fortress Britain was during World War II. The life of the large English colony in Argentina may well also suffer.

Can we not discuss the emotive matter of sovereignty with the islanders, and at a suitable date later with Argentina, on the basis that there are two kinds of sovereignty: one (the most important now) is based on people and the will of the people and that is ours; the other is based on geography and that could be theirs in the long-term future if only they will wait?

Could we not come to an agreement to transfer sovereignty say 25 years' hence, followed by a lease-back agreement for another 25 years, thus leaving the present generation of islanders time to live out their lives there or move elsewhere?

It should surely be possible for two Christian and civilised countries to agree together on some such terms and thereafter to normalise relations between us, the Falklanders and the Argentine mainland.

Yours faithfully,

ALIX MEYNELL,
The Grey House,
Barn Street,
Lavenham,
Sudbury,
Suffolk.
January 20.

From Mr Andrew Moberly

Sir, Surely it is time that the Government, having been bold enough to go to war to save a worthwhile principle, now took the equally bold step of disposing of a worthless and expensive millstone.

"Fortress Falklands" may be the Government's only policy, but it is not the only option.

Yours faithfully,

ANDREW MOBERLY,
38 Lingfield Road, SW19.
January 19

Consumers still unprotected

From Professor R. M. Goode

Sir, Next year will see the lapse of a decade since the enactment of the Consumer Credit Act, yet still large parts of the Act have not been brought into force. About every six months since the end of 1974 the Department of Trade and its predecessors have announced their intention to lay regulations concerning the form and content of consumer credit agreements. Every time they have failed to do so, with one excuse after another: consultation, change of Government, change of civil servant, change of minister, change of mind.

What judgment would Government itself pass on private-sector management which so persistently failed to meet its own short-term action programme?

For eight and a half years consumers have been denied the protection that Parliament resolved they should have, whilst credit-granting institutions have had their own planning for the regulations made impossible and have had to labour under the burden of complying with two sets of regulations concurrently, one partly repealed, the other partly in force.

The results can be ludicrous. For example, a full credit advertisement by a moneylender must state the annual percentage rate of charge calculated in accordance with regulations made under the Act. On the other hand, there being as yet no regulations as to the content of the loan agreement itself, this is still required to conform to the Moneylenders Act 1927, which prescribes an entirely different rate formula, so that the rate stated in the agreement may bear no resemblance to that stated in the advertisement. Yet the Consumer Credit Act makes it an offence to publish false or misleading advertisements!

Now we are told that the minister has decided to call in all the papers and review the draft regulations yet again. For how much longer is Parliament prepared to have its will frustrated by the inertia and vacillation of the department responsible for implementing its legislation?

Yours faithfully,

R. M. GOODE,
Centre for Commercial Law Studies,
Queen Mary College,
339 Mile End Road, E1.
January 17.

Flatford at risk

From Mrs Mary N. Wheeler

Sir, John Constable (January 14) concludes that Flatford is a prime example of the need for careful legislation if its beauty is to be protected. Let me hasten to assure him and your other readers that the Suffolk County Council and other local planning authorities are well aware of the gap in the present legislation which permits the construction of "agricultural reservoirs" without the need for a specific planning permission in most cir-

Cassino destruction

From J. Tinker

Speechless MPs

From the Chancellor of the Exchequer

I was dismayed to see your back on Tuesday (January

constituency showed that I dealt with over 3,000 letters during the previous year and attended more than 500 meetings, both inside and outside the House.

On December 3, 1982, I had to protest to the Speaker at not being

The Franks report: was the government really blameless over the Falklands?

THE SEEKER after truth needs to read between the lines of the Franks report as well as the lines themselves. For the conclusion – that the committee does not feel justified in criticising or blaming the present government for the Argentine aggression against the Falklands – is in striking contrast with many details revealed in the body of the report. In fact, Franks should be seen as not just an account of the Falklands affair, but as a piece of damaging evidence about Mrs Thatcher's personal style of leadership.

There is no doubting the dilemma (the word occurs again and again in the report) which faced successive British governments over the Falklands. This consisted of the fact that each side – London and Buenos Aires – held irreconcilable views. Argentina, rightly or wrongly, firmly believed and still does believe that its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is absolute. Successive British governments, while ready intermittently to broach the question of sovereignty with Argentina, have never departed from the principle that any solution must have the consent of the islanders.

The word paramountcy, with which Mrs Thatcher made such play during the months of crisis last year, was not an invention of her own. It was a restatement of a long-standing commitment. Franks was not asked to say whether this was a wise or feasible commitment. (If he had been, he might have commented that a similar pledge was noticeably unforthcoming to the wretched denizens of Diego Garcia.) Add to this two-sided dilemma a third element, the reluctance, hardening into refusal, of the islanders to contemplate a change in their status, and the result was a dangerously intractable situation.

The officials at the Foreign Office, and Lord Carrington, the foreign secretary, were well aware of its potentially explosive nature. Indeed, one thing that emerges clearly from the report is that the much-maligned Foreign Office, often accused of wishing to "give away the Falklands", was guilty of no such thing. Between the moment when the Conservative government took office in May, 1979, and February, 1982, Lord Carrington sent members of the defence committee nine minutes on the Falklands. The first of these, in September, 1979, asked for approval for a plan to negotiate a deal with the Argentinians, under which they were to be given sovereignty of the islands with Britain then leasing them back.

The 'inadvisable' withdrawal of HMS Endurance

Carrington was anxious to clear this matter up before he went to New York for a meeting with the Argentinian foreign minister. But the prime minister ruled that a decision should not be rushed: it should be discussed at an early meeting of the defence committee. After his New York meeting, Carrington circulated another memo, an annexe to which warned of the high risk that Argentina might resort to direct military action if it concluded that there was no real prospect of Britain's negotiating the transfer of sovereignty. But this time Mrs Thatcher ruled out a discussion of the issue at the defence committee, until the Rhodesian issue was settled. The committee eventually did discuss the Carrington proposals in early 1980 and again in January, 1981. But that was the last time, until April, 1982, despite periodic memos from Carrington.

The inescapable conclusion is that under the Thatcher regime, ministers and their advisers meet and discuss less frequently and thoroughly than under previous administrations, both Labour and Conservative. How else to explain the extraordinary gap of 15 months during which there was no discussion within the vital defence committee about the Falklands?

The dispute over the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, for example – described as "inadvisable" by Franks – was just the sort of issue which should have been thrashed out at the defence committee. Carrington was keen to keep the ship on station, foreseeing, correctly, in June, 1981, that its


withdrawal would be taken as a sign to Argentina of a reduction in Britain's commitment to the Falklands. When this prediction was borne out, he pleaded again with Mr John Nott, the defence secretary, for the ship to be kept in service, suggesting a discussion. No such discussion ensued. As the crisis drew towards a climax, in the spring of last year, the prime minister became aware of the dangers. On a telegram from Buenos Aires in early March, 1982, reporting a newspaper article which argued the case for seizing the

islands, she wrote: "We must make contingency plans." Franks "regrets" that there was no prompt response to this high ministerial directive. But the truth is that since September 14, 1981, the chiefs of staff had had a paper ready which outlined the military options open in the event of Argentinian aggression. This paper could have been considered at any time by the defence committee, but no such meeting to discuss the Falklands was called.

There is no doubt that Franks thinks, as well he should,



A verdict that is at odds with the evidence



that this absence of defence committee meetings was most odd. "Officials," the report says, "were looking to ministers to review the outcome of the contingency planning they had done." That they were disappointed can only be read as a serious criticism of the judgment of the person directly and ultimately responsible for the defence committee: the prime minister.

Lord Carrington, one of the most popular and successful foreign secretaries for many years, is accused by Franks of two major errors of judgment. The first was to reject a plan by his junior minister, Mr Ridley, to educate public opinion both in the Falklands and in Britain about the dangers of failing to negotiate a settlement with Argentina, and the positive advantages to be gained from a scheme of lease-back. This decision effectively left Britain with no negotiating policies. As the British ambassador in Buenos Aires put it in a telling phrase, this meant that all that was left of British policy was "a general Micawberism". Franks is critical of the way Carrington arrived at this decision, and of its effects.

Yet Carrington himself was hamstrung by the commitment to the paramountcy of the islanders, and by what he judged to be the opposition within the cabinet and in the House of Commons to any such policy. Tory hawks were still incensed about what they saw as a Carrington sell-out in Rhodesia; and there is good reason to think, though Franks makes no reference to this, that Carrington had initially had difficulty in persuading Mrs Thatcher to address herself at all to the Falklands problem.

The second error occurred at a vital Foreign Office meeting on March 5, 1982. Here the foreign secretary, informed of the Labour government's decision in 1977, at a time of Anglo-Argentine tension, to send a small naval task force to the Falklands area, decided not to pursue the matter. "Officials did not recommend to ministers at the meeting that they should consider a naval deployment." Why not? It is at least arguable, and Franks argues it, that the despatch of such a force, at the same time as a warning was given to Buenos Aires that an attack on the Falklands would be opposed in strength, might have prevented real trouble.

The Falklands lobby has mesmerised governments

This is just the kind of issue on which Franks, understandably, refuses to pass definitive judgement. The committee could not know, no one can know, what would have happened if, in the months leading up to the invasion, some things left undone had been done, or vice versa. It is this refusal to use hindsight, and not to speculate on what might have been rather than what was, which led Franks to the remarkable concluding paragraph of acquittal for the present government of any blame for the Argentine aggression. But this acquittal comes at the end of the chapter which previously includes a formidable list of prevarications, delays, and lapses in judgment.

The long history of the Falklands dispute, "read as a whole", as Mrs Thatcher rightly insists it must be read, is a depressing record. Not only is the Thatcher style of government found, at least implicitly, to have been defective in crisis management, but, in a larger sense still, that government, along with its predecessors and their leaders, is culpable of a lack of leadership. For years, the pressures of the small and noisy Falklands lobby and its supporters have mesmerised governments and parliaments into a state of inertia and refusal to face up to unpleasant facts. Despite the laudable efforts of some Foreign Office officials to project these realities and give them a proper priority, ministers' failure to react conjures up the Churchillian phrase of "adamant for drift".

Today, the luxury of drifting is no longer available. We are now well and truly stuck, for an indeterminate time, in a situation which an earlier, sustained display of statesman-

LORD FRANKS implores us to read his report as a whole. Having done so, I can see why. It is only by doing so that we can understand the complexity of the basic issues relating to foreseeing and preventing the invasion; but also because the 339 paragraphs bring home to the reader the underlying dilemma that has faced successive British governments since the Sixties and that indeed confronts us all now even more starkly than ever. The problem is basically this:

(i) Without a negotiated settlement with Argentina the economic development of the islands will remain stultified; and Britain will be saddled with a continuing military threat that can only be met by a considerable diversion of military resources.

(ii) No negotiation can succeed unless the Argentinians get some satisfaction on sovereignty; and while British governments of both parties have accepted the possibility of a sovereignty negotiation involving, for instance, leaseback, this has not been acceptable to the islanders or to opinion on either side of the House of Commons.

It may well be asked why in that case British governments, whether Labour or Tory, did not set about trying to persuade opinion. The answer is that, given the intensity of feeling, it would have been an extremely difficult exercise, which might have impaired our negotiating position with Argentina. But any course of action would have been difficult - if it had not been so.

The fate of the leaseback option

the problem would have been solved years ago; and when in the end the talks collapsed as they were bound to do if sovereignty was not included, the true reason for the breakdown was buried in the ugly rush to find a scapegoat.

Nor is it surprising that the finger of blame was pointed at

the Foreign Office, whose business it is to deal with foreigners and promote British interests by peaceful means if possible, and whose staff are dispersed about the world without any capacity for collective self-defence.

The Franks report does not deal with the failure of governments to tackle this fundamental problem. But it does make a judgment arising out of it that I find dubious. It records that in mid-1981 the government concluded that "the only feasible option was leaseback preceded by an education campaign both in the Falkland Islands and at home." It states that Lord Carrington, convinced that there was no prospect of selling leaseback at that stage either in the islands or at home, decided on September 7 not to pursue this course of action, but to discuss the

whole matter with the Argentinian foreign minister in New York later in the month and to suggest to him that it would help if the Argentinians were able to make constructive proposals.

The report draws the conclusion that the effect of this decision was "to pass the initiative to the Argentinian government". Now I do not think that international affairs can be conducted on the basis only of formal proposals; there has to be informal

By Nicholas Henderson

Sir Nicholas Henderson, now retired from the diplomatic service, was successively Ambassador in Warsaw, Bonn and Paris, until taking over the Washington Embassy in 1979. He was there throughout the Falklands crisis.



feeling of the ground. But, more important, HMG never had, nor wanted, the initiative. It has always been the Argentinians who have been pressing for changes, and we who have wanted to stick to the status quo.

I have one other personal comment on the report, which is the great plausibility of Franks's judgment that insufficient allowance was made for the possibility of Argentina's military government acting

unpredictably. The truth is that it is extremely difficult to predict unpredictability; and that if you survey the world looking for things that people might do if they behaved irrationally, the international community will become a nervous wreck.

Nevertheless, I share the report's verdict. It has always seemed to me that as a country we tend to think that other people act as we do and are guided by a cold calculation of their own best interests; and, as a result, we have often been led to misjudgments, as over Czechoslovakia in 1967, Khomeini and Afghanistan in 1979. Let me, in passing, express a doubt whether this natural tendency will necessarily be redressed by new machinery.

Focusing as it does on the responsibility of the British government, the Franks report does not, of course, analyse the role of the US government - whether the invasion might have been prevented had Washington acted differently.

There are, to be sure, some interesting references on the subject. The report states that when on March 31 I outlined to Mr Haig the intelligence reports on Argentina's intentions to invade, he had been unaware of their significance. This account hardly does justice to the extraordinary meeting we had. Having discussed the episode with him this last week, I know that he will not mind if I record here that his reaction to my information was electric.

The high-ranking officials who were with him remained sceptical about the threat. They had just had an assurance from the Argentinian Foreign Minister that the Argentinians were not contemplating confrontation with us; indeed they had had this assurance confirmed. I pointed out that the movements of the Argentinian fleet should surely be seen as a refutation of these assurances. Haig himself was in no doubt. He immediately saw the danger and sprang into action.

To my question to him a

few days ago whether upon reflection he thought that the Argentinians could have been headed off from invading if the Americans had exerted influence earlier to deter them, Haig replied negatively. He said that from the talks he had had with Galtieri, he realised that the Junta had been bent for sometime on the invasion, confident that the British would not react with force - a conviction based on their view as military dictators that, in Haig's words, "no democracy could or would respond in that way."

From the talks he had had with the Junta in Buenos Aires during the shuttle, Haig had deduced, so he tells me, that they had decided upon attack some time in advance and that the scrap merchants were disguised service personnel deliberately sent to South Georgia as agents provocateurs.

No diplomatic move is feasible

This does not tally with the Franks view that the decision to invade was a last-minute one and that the incident of the scrap-merchants was seized on to escalate the situation rather than the first-stage of a scenario leading to the invasion of the Falklands.

Haig thinks that the Argentinians may have received false signals from Washington about their attitude in the event of invasion, though certainly not from him. He thinks that the confusion of signals may have become more pronounced after the invasion than before. He is convinced, I should add, that without his efforts at negotiations in the shuttle between Washington/London/Buenos Aires and without the disclosure that was revealed by this of the intransigence of the Argentinians compared with the reasonableness of the British, the British would not have secured the US support that they did. He knows, as indeed do I, how invaluable was America's contribution in practical terms.

As I have said, the report leaves the unpleasant reminder that the problem remains even more intractable than ever. Hitherto the Argentinians have been prepared to talk about other things, e.g. communications, as well as sovereignty. Up to now we have been ready to discuss sovereignty even though under a strict proviso about the wishes of the inhabitants. But now the Argentinians will certainly discuss nothing but sovereignty; whereas that is not a subject that we can talk about in the present circumstances.

For the moment, therefore, I am sure that no diplomatic move is feasible. Nor can we ease up at all on the military requirements for the defence of the islands. It is the Argentinians who have brought about a fortress in the Falklands by making the place a battlefield.

I do not think, however, that we should underestimate the international difficulties that lie ahead for us. The Europeans will be providing the Argentinians with plenty of the most modern arms including exocets. Washington will be fortifying relations with Buenos Aires. We will be under pressure from our Community partners and from the USA to negotiate. At the non-aligned summit due to be held in New Delhi in the spring and at the next United Nations general assembly we must expect awkward resolutions calling for renewed negotiations. It will no doubt be pointed out that HMG has gone about the world for years urging everyone to settle differences by negotiations and we can expect to be asked to follow our own advice.

It is, of course, much too early to try to foresee what form the negotiations might take or what it might be about. Although I have no official role now whatever, I am sure that in some way at some stage the problem will have to be internationalised. Other countries will have to be brought in, not least to remove the prospect of an indefinite security problem; and perhaps something will be sought along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty of 1961. But, as I suggest, the floating of any idea now is unrealistic and could even make it less promising later.

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
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New Statesman. "I got the chop from that as well. I have no doubts. I was absolutely

THOMAS MO had the sweet

PROFILE

THE SUNDAY TIMES



Mrs Thatcher . . . no blame

Falklands: Spy men shake-up

A MAJOR shake-up in Britain's Intelligence network is likely to be the main recommendation of the Franks Committee report on the Falklands crisis.

Lord Franks's team will call for big changes in the way top-level intelligence is gathered, processed and laid before the Cabinet.

But its overall conclusion is that

Britain probably could not have prevented the islands' invasion because the final Argentine decision was taken only a few days before the attack.

Mrs Thatcher will emerge with her reputation intact and there will be little ammunition for Opposition leaders to fire at her and her colleagues.

As expected, the report, to be published tomorrow lays the main blame for the failure to alert Ministers to

the Argentine threat on the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The committee, which includes heads of civil and military intelligence agencies and various chiefs of staff, will be accused of failing to read the alarm signals from Buenos Aires.

More significantly, it will be accused of failing to predict an invasion even after Argentine commandos had landed on South Georgia.

Together with criticism of the Foreign Office over the handling of talks with Argentina last February, Foreign Office Minister Richard Luce, who resigned with Lord Carrington, is blamed for the apparent lack of understanding of the signs of increasing belligerence.

The Ministry of Defence also faces criticism for the strength of its fight to withdraw the ice-breaker, HMS Endurance, from the South Atlantic to cut costs.

This was widely seen by the Argentine Junta as further evidence that Britain was not committed to retaining the Falklands.

Labour leader Michael Foot made it clear yesterday he will use the Franks report to judge whether Mrs Thatcher acted as decisively as former Labour premier Jim Callaghan, who has claimed he sent off two frigates and a submarine to deal with a threat in 1977.

Pleaded

But Mr Callaghan's Initiative is played down in the report, which raises doubts as to whether the Argentines knew British ships were there. MRS THATCHER told Falklanders they were 'preaching to the converted' when they pleaded with her not to negotiate with Argentina over sovereignty.

She told Tory trade unionists in Bristol at the weekend the islanders told her they wanted a better life for their children which would be a memorial to those who died.

As Premier says she wants to 'run the whole way'

Maggie's poll plans

By ROBERT PORTER
Political Correspondent

MRS THATCHER said yesterday that she does not want an early election.

But she conceded that 'uncertainty' could affect the Government's performance—and if that happened she might go to the country ahead of time.

The view in Westminster last night was that despite the Prime

'I don't want early vote—at present'

Minister's personal preference, all options were open and there could be an election any time between this June and spring next year.

Mrs Thatcher, speaking on London Weekend Television's Weekend World said she was too busy fulfilling her programme to have thought about an election date yet.

'My personal preference is to run the whole way' she said. 'I admit

freely I do not want an early election—but I am not going to close any options.

'There comes a time when uncertainty can tell, and it can affect the current Government's performance. At such times, one has to consider what is the best date for a General Election.

'It may be in the face of that we shall run the whole way. It may be

that I think it better to get rid of the uncertainty.'

The Prime Minister was bitterly critical of Labour's proposal for drastic devaluation of the pound, and the effect this had on panic selling of sterling last week.

Labour leader Michael Foot said that despite his party's internal problems, they were ready and prepared for an election from June.

Mr Foot claimed it was Government policy which had hit exchange rates and caused bankruptcies on an unprecedented scale.

Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine said last night that disarmament proposals by Soviet leader Yuri Andropov may be a ploy to help his potential political allies win electoral power in Britain.

6 We would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands.

—THE FRANKS REPORT

NOT GUILTY

By GORDON GREIG and ROBERT PORTER

THE Franks Committee cleared the British Government yesterday over the Argentine junta's invasion of the Falkland Islands.

Mrs Thatcher and her Ministers could not have been expected to foresee the invasion nor could they have prevented it.

That is the verdict of the independent committee after a six-month

**Report in detail:
Four-page pull-out inside**

investigation into Whitehall archives and intelligence reports and vigorous questioning of the individuals concerned.

Lord Franks's team of six—including Merlyn Rees and Lord Lever, senior Labour politicians approved by party leader Michael Foot — exonerates the Prime Minister totally. Indeed, she is revealed as pressing for contingency plans to counter Argentine threats to the Falklands long before the danger was apparent to most others.

And in a strange reversal of fortune, Lord Carrington, who resigned as Foreign Secretary over what he called the 'national humiliation' of the invasion as Tory MPs bayed for blood, comes out better than John Nott, who was forced by Mrs Thatcher to stay on as Defence

First to raise alert was Maggie



Secretary until this month's Cabinet reshuffle, when he was knighted.

There are criticisms of Lord Carrington on specific questions but there is no judgment that he or any other central figure failed in their duty.

The major criticism of the Government is over its decision to scrap the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance as part of the defence cuts. This gave the wrong

signal to the Argentines, convincing them that Britain's commitment to the Falklands was weakening. The Franks Committee reveals how Lord Carrington and the Foreign Office fought the Endurance decision while Mr Nott and his Defence team wanted the ship scrapped.

And the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Cabinet, which is staffed by For-

eign Office and Intelligence experts, is caned for not responding swiftly enough to a sudden chill in the diplomatic climate in Buenos Aires.

Mrs Thatcher is expected to announce next week a shake-up in the way the Cabinet's intelligence-gathering machine is run.

In the Commons yesterday she made it quite clear that the union jack will fly over the Falklands for the foreseeable future.

At one point she exclaimed: 'We have no option but to fortress Falklands, if we are to continue—and I believe we should—to honour the wishes of the Falklanders themselves.'

The 106-page report gives the Opposition remarkably little to bite on in its scrutiny of the Falklands story.

But one of the most astonishing disclosures is that Lord Carrington's authority at the Foreign Office was so unchallenged that the Cabinet did not discuss the Falklands question from January 1981 until the day before Argentine troops went ashore at Port Stanley.

Warning

Lord Carrington kept the subject tightly in his own grip and, apart from a series of minutes he circulated to Mrs Thatcher and other colleagues, the Falklands were never formally on a Cabinet agenda.

Would it have made any difference if they had been? Franks suggests that 'it could have been advantageous for everyone to have got together.'

But in the last weeks there was only one moment—on March 3, still with time to act—when there was a flurry of alarm about Argentina's intentions. It involved two women.

In Montevideo the British Ambassador to Uruguay, Miss Patricia Hutchinson, telegraphed a warning that Argentina might take military action.

And in Downing Street, Mrs Thatcher saw another telegram which alerted her

Turn to Page 2, Col. 3

Daily Mail COMMENT

These were not their finest months

THE Argentine invasion of the Falklands was, for Britain, 'a national humiliation'. Those were the words of Lord Carrington at the time.

It took the courage of our fighting men, the will of our people and the leadership of one woman to avenge the humiliation.

But many brave lives were sacrificed to liberate the Falklands, which have now had to be turned into a vastly expensive armed fortress.

Was there no other way? Could British diplomacy not have foreseen and forestalled this invasion?

The measured conclusion of the Franks Report is that it would not be reasonable to blame this British Government for failing to prevent the unprovoked Argentine invasion of sovereign British territory.

If on the crucial charge of negligence the Tory Administration is found 'not guilty', it cannot be said that Ministers and officials come through the rigorous Franks investigation with flying colours.

The decision, ordered by John Nott, to withdraw Endurance from service in the South Atlantic was taken by the junta as a sign of British weakness. Lord Carrington, to his credit, did oppose that decision.

British Intelligence in Argentina was patchy. Our chaps there didn't even seem able to interpret what they could discover just by reading the local newspapers about the ever more rancid political mood in that country. The Joint Intelligence Committee in Whitehall conveyed no sense of urgency.

When the Prime Minister did suggest in early March that we should have military contingency plans, her advice seems to have been disregarded.

Lord Carrington wished he had sent a submarine on March 5... but he didn't. The months preceding the Argentine invasion were definitely not the finest for those responsible for securing the safety of the Falklands.

In their defence, it can be argued—as Lord Franks does—that they were acting in the desultory tradition established by previous Governments, both Labour and Tory, over decades.

The Falklands had low priority in the Foreign Office and at Defence.

If politicians and diplomats did give a thought to those distant islands it was about how to persuade both the Falklanders and backbench opinion at Westminster that it was necessary to do a deal with Argentina.

The more we signalled our wish to negotiate with Buenos Aires, the less clearly we demonstrated our will to defend the Falklands, if the junta chose war and not diplomacy. That was no way to handle Fascist dictators (very much a protected species in Argentina).

Yes, there were misjudgments. But, surely, on the scrupulously sifted evidence of Franks, the resignation of Lord Carrington and two other Foreign Office Ministers plus the proffered resignation of John Nott (who has anyway since quit the Government with a knighthood) is more than sufficient political atonement for such mistakes as were made. The slate has been wiped clean. Britain under Mrs Thatcher did win a glorious victory for freedom. Now let there be an end to the carping.

THE FRANKS REPORT



CLEARED



ACQUITTED



CENSURED

The spy network that let us down



by HUGH

TREVOR-ROPER
LEADING HISTORIAN AND MASTER
OF PETERHOUSE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

THE long-awaited Franks Report is now out. It will not disappoint the admirers of Lord Franks.

It is, as we would expect from him, thorough, cogent, lucid, studiously fair and convincing.

It will disappoint the enemies of the Prime Minister who had hoped to see her branded as a warmonger or censured for indifference. In fact, both she and her then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, come out of this long trial with the approval even commendation of the judge.

Those who clamoured loudest for an inquiry into the events of last spring, and the personal responsibility for them, were anxious that the terms of the inquiry should be limited to those events. They did not wish time to be wasted on past history.

But the terms given to Franks and his fellow Privy Counsellors allowed them to take account of 'all such factors in previous years as are relevant', and in fact, they have gone back to 1965, the year in which the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was brought formally to international attention.

Surrender

This is essential if the events of 1982 are to be seen in their context. As Franks himself says, the Report 'needs to be read in full'. Only thus can we understand the pressures whose sudden increase precipitated the crisis of last year. Those pressures were threefold. First, there was the Argentine claim for sovereignty over the islands. This has become a fixation; nothing less will satisfy them, and they are supported by other Latin American countries.

Secondly, there was the attitude of the islanders. This too is a fixation. They will never accept Argentine rule. Thirdly, there is the desire of the British Government to find some means of satisfying one party without exasperating the other.

On the face of it, the problem is insoluble, and after following the successive compromises proposed by successive British Governments, and rejected with disdain by either the islanders or the mainlanders, we can see why the problem, which had the highest priority in Buenos Aires, soon recognised a low priority in London.

One solution proposed was to leave the problem to time: to improve practical communications and relations between mainland and islands and let the question of sovereignty ride, as it has ridden for two centuries.

The Argentines would have none of that.

Another was to surrender sovereignty and lease it back. The islanders would have none of that.

There is also the prospect of Fortress Falklands, which is where we are now.

It was always likely that the Argentines would lose patience in the end and try a coup; but what kind of coup, and when? In the past few years the attitude of both islanders and mainlanders hardened, and the British Government was well aware of the danger, which increased sharply after the seizure of power by General Galtieri and his friend, the hawkish Admiral Anaya.

In February 1982 there were Anglo-American talks in New York which seemed friendly; but the Argentines then broke the agreement and raised the heat through a Press campaign at home.

Protested

Then came the affair of the scrap merchants on South Georgia, and warning messages, and straws in the wind.

But what did these warnings amount to? Seen in isolation, they can be made to look serious; but seen in context—against the background of 17 years' pressure, provocation and pinpricks—they are nothing new.

The evidence supplied to the British Government suggested that the Argentines would tighten the screw—would deny facilities and supplies to the islands, threaten, but not invade. If they did invade, they could hardly be prevented.

prevented the invasion. There were alternative courses which might have been taken, but it is impossible to say whether such alternative action would have had a different effect.

General Galtieri was hell-bent on action, and indeed, as it turned out, on self-destruction. Against such determination there is no protection; only the salutary lesson of punishment which may deter a would-be initiator. However, Franks does make one small practical suggestion. It seems that the intelligence received by the Government was not perfect. The Government's source of intelligence is the Joint Intelligence Committee which gathers information from various outlets and presents regular assessments.

Disease

Franks believes that, in this affair, this machinery was 'too passive' in operation to respond quickly and critically to a rapidly changing situation; in attention to it, paid too much about the time was reassuring about the prospect of an early move to confrontation, and too little to other information.

This, in my opinion, is the occupational disease of secret intelligence organisations. No doubt Lord Franks's proposals for correcting it will now be taken seriously.

Thus, in the end, Franks has given us an analysis, not a judgment. The view taken by the Foreign Office—the view that Galtieri would increase the pressure but not plunge into war—was indeed a miscalculation but it was not one for which blame should be attached to any individual. Lord Carrington can now, if he wishes, return to politics.

Mrs Thatcher once again has triumphed over her assailants. As for the problem of the Falkland Islands, that remains as insoluble as ever.

Maggie to shake up the spym

MRS THATCHER is expected to tighten her grip on Whitehall's intelligence co-ordinating machinery.

The Prime Minister is apparently determined to act following the Franks Inquiry's sharp criticism of the way the Joint Intelligence machinery reacted to the Falklands crisis.


Franks makes two principal suggestions which the Prime Minister is ready to accept:

1. There should be an immediate review of the workings of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, which is based on the Cabinet Office and advises Ministers and their officials on the basis of intelligence and diplomatic reports.

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee, which brings together the security and intelligence agencies, the Foreign Office, Defence Ministry and Treasury, should be chaired by someone appointed by the Prime Minister. The chairman should work from the Cabinet Office, not the Foreign Office as at present.

The Franks Report's main criticism is that the Falklands—and Argentina—were considered a low priority issue and that there was inadequate liaison between the agencies concerned.

'We are concerned here with the defects in the Joint Intelligence



HMS Endurance on patrol in the South Atlantic

Joint Intelligence Committee assessments over the past two decades.

In the late Sixties, annual JIC assessments suggested that military action by Argentina over the Falklands was 'unlikely'.

In the early 1970s, the assessment was that direct military action could actually be 'discounted', but towards the end of 1973, it was that that Argentina's attitude was 'hardening'. In 1974, the JIC assessment was that 'adventurist' operations by Argentina were 'more likely' — in other words, unofficial occupation without the full authority of the Argentine Government.

In 1975, the JIC prepared a new assessment which warned that a planned invasion could not be wholly ruled out.

But most enlightening was the assessment of July 9, 1981.

Less than a year before the invasion, the JIC reported, in the words of the Franks Report, that 'there was no sign of diminution in Argentina's determination eventually to extend its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands area, but that it would prefer to achieve this objective by peaceful means and would turn to forcible action only as a last resort.'

In March 1982—one month before the invasion—it was decided that there should be a new assessment of Argentina's threats. Work was started on it, but was never completed. . . . Franks points out that immediately

before the invasion Whitehall had no intelligence cover on military movements inside Argentina.

There was no intelligence from American sources—or any other source—to show that the Argentine Navy at sea intended any more than naval exercises.

And Franks stresses: 'If, as we believe, the decision to invade was taken by the junta at a very late stage, the intelligence agencies could not have been expected to provide earlier warning of the actual invasion on 2 April.'

But the report adds: 'It might have been possible to give some warning of the military preparations preceding the invasion if there had been direct coverage of military movements within Argentina.'

Overseas and Defence Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, is at the top of the Intelligence Information ladder. One step down is the Joint Intelligence Committee, which works out of the Cabinet Office. Its job is to assess reports and advise Ministers and senior officials.

Below the JIC is the Joint Intelli-

gence Organisation, which puts Assessment Staff to work on intelligence reports coming into Whitehall from all over the world.

The JIO oversees Current Intelligence Groups — based on regions around the world. The Latin America group will have been responsible for Argentina.

These groups pull together reports drawn principally from five sources: military intelligence, diplomatic sources, open sources such as newspapers, security sources such as MI6

and the CIA, and finally, signals and satellite intelligence provided, for example, by the Government Communications HQ.

The chairman of the JIC before the Falklands invasion — when intelligence assessments were vital — was Sir Antony Acland. He has since been appointed head of the Diplomatic Service.

His successor — who was in the chair at the time of the invasion — is one-time ambassador Patrick Wright.

The Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, sunk by a British torpedo on April 25, with the loss of 368 lives

There was gloom in the intelligence world last night that they are again being blamed for a lapse — this time in failing to get and assess information, rather than for letting it leak.

The security agencies and military intelligence organisations who actually collect the information claim that they have always been starved of sufficient cash to do their job properly, especially in a large country such as Argentina where to check up on military moves would

need dozens of operatives in the field or high-definition spy satellites permanently in position.

The officials working for the Joint Intelligence Organisation who must sift through the masses of information sent in to them argue that they are often given too much unimportant trivia which is sent up to them apparently to justify the existence of some gathering agency. And they believe that it would take a near-genius, working in the stress of war, properly to interpret every nuance.

The South Georgia whaling station where

'A mistake Endurance'

THE Government was wrong to announce the withdrawal of HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic, says the report.

But an even bigger mistake was Defence Secretary John Nott's refusal — even under pressure from Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington — to reverse that decision.

The reason: it gave Argentine's military rulers the impression that the British Government was ready to abandon its commitment to defend the Falklands.

This is the Franks Inquiry's clear-cut verdict on Endurance, the ice patrol ship which became a symbol of British sovereignty over the Falk-

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SIR ANTONY ACLAND
Former Intelligence Chief

machinery as we have seen it working in an area of low priority . . . we believe that, in dealing with Argentina and the Falkland Islands, it was too passive in operation to respond quickly and critically to a rapidly changing situation which demanded urgent attention.'

Franks complains that the Joint Intelligence Organisation failed to review developments in the final months before the April invasion last year.

'We were surprised that events in the first three months of 1982 . . . did not prompt the Joint Intelligence Organisation to assess the situation afresh.'

'We consider that the assessment machinery should be reviewed . . . we think it should look at two aspects in particular. The first is the arrangements for bringing to the Joint Intelligence Organisation's attention information other than intelligence reports. The second is the composition of the JIC. On this, consideration should be given to the position of the chairman of the Committee; to the desirability that he or she should be full-time, with a more critical and independent role; and in recognition of the Committee's independence in operation from the Government Departments principally constituting it, to the chairman's being appointed by the Prime Minister and being a member of the Cabinet Office.'

At present the chairman is a senior official from the Foreign Office. The Franks Report highlights one consistent theme running through

Countdown . . . and 'misjudgment' by

From Page 19

Office pointed out that while the evidence of Argentine intentions to attack the next day was highly suggestive it was not yet entirely conclusive and diplomatic action was being taken to prevent an attack.'

Franks highlights the insidious danger brought about by the way Argentina interpreted what it saw as signals from the British Government. 'Argentina's growing military power coincided with an increasing concentration on the part of the United Kingdom on its NATO role and the progressive restriction of its other defence commitments.'

'As the Argentine threat grew, in deciding to maintain only a token presence in the area in the form of a small detachment of Royal Marines and, in the summer months, HMS Endurance, successive British Governments had to accept that the islands could not be defended against sudden invasion.'

'These decisions were taken in the light of wider strategic interests but it is likely that they were seen by

Argentina as evidence of a decreasing British commitment to the defence of the islands, however strong that commitment was a publicly asserted.'

The report stresses other signals casting doubt on British intentions. 'These included the Government's preparedness subject to certain restrictions to continue arms sales to Argentina (and to provide training facilities in the UK for Argentine military personnel); the decision not to implement some of the recommendations of Lord Shackleton's 1976 report, notably that relating to the extension of the airport; and the failure in the British Nationality Act to extend British citizenship to those inhabitants of the islands who either were not themselves patrial or did not have a UK-born grandparent.'

The verdict on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office assessment of how the problem would evolve is among the harshest in the whole report.

It acknowledges that the view taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was 'one which could reasonably be taken in the light of

all the circumstances at the time.'

But it adds cuttingly: 'In the event not, fixed to be a misjudgment, but should be attached to any individual.'

The Report focuses on three important factors in the misjudgment:

'First in underestimating the importance that Argentina attached to its timetable for resolving the dispute by the end of the year;

Bellicose

'Secondly, in being unduly influenced — understandably and perhaps inevitably — by the long history of the dispute in which Argentina had previously made threatening noises, accompanied by bellicose Press comment and indeed backed up its threats with aggressive actions without the dispute developing into a serious confrontation.'

'Thirdly, in believing, on the basis of evidence, that Argentina would follow an orderly progression in escalating the dispute, starting with

economic and diplomatic measures.

'Sufficient allowance was not made for the possibility of Argentina's military Government, subject to internal political and economic pressures, acting unpredictably if at any time they became frustrated at the course of negotiations.'

'The July 1981 intelligence assessment had warned that in those circumstances there was a high risk that Argentina would resort to more forcible measures swiftly and without warning.'

Clouding the judgment at the Foreign Office was one overriding belief which the report says was borne out by intelligence: 'That in action, let alone invasion of the islands, would take place before the second half of the year.'

At the same time the Franks Committee makes two important reservations about sitting in judgment:

'In our review we have taken particular care to avoid the exercise of hindsight in reaching judgments of the development of policy and on the actions of Ministers and officials.'

'We have also borne in mind that

our task required us to focus exclusively on the Government's responsibilities for the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, whereas those concerned, both Ministers and officials, had to deal with many other major and pressing preoccupations.'

One significant assessment is on the conduct of Ministers and officials at the Foreign Office in handling the swift moving developments after the New York talks between Britain and Argentina on February 26 and 27, 1982.

The Franks Committee pays tribute to the skill shown by Mr Richard Luce — the junior Foreign Office Minister who resigned with Lord Carrington — and by his officials in New York.

But there is no disguising the impression that officials were far too optimistic in their view that the New York talks had gone 'somewhat better than they feared'.

In cutting terms the Franks Committee admonishes the Whitehall experts: 'The evidence we received suggested to us that Foreign and

Commonwealth Office officials did not press Ministers to consider deterrent rather than diplomatic counter-measures or prompt the Joint Intelligence Organisation urgently to update its July 1981 assessment that they believed Argentina would not resort to military action before initiating diplomatic and economic measures.'

Hostile

The lack of liaison is also underscored in the report. In one particular aspect — the surveillance of the scrap merchant men's landings following the visit of their employer Senator Davidoff to South Georgia in December 1981 — there is forceful criticism.

'The committee emphasises: 'If Senator Davidoff's operations had been more closely monitored from December 1981 onwards and there had been better liaison between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, and the Governor in preparation for the

second visit in March 1982. Ministers would have been better able to deal with the landing on South Georgia when it occurred.'

The biggest target for criticism is the Ministry of Defence.


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The report states: 'We consider that there was a case for taking this action at the end of the previous week in the light of the telegram of March 24 from the Defence Attache in Buenos Aires and the report of March 25 that Argentine ships had been sailed for a possible interception of HMS Endurance.'

The attempts to deter the Argentines were not adequate in the committee's view.

'We believe that there would have been advantage in the Government's giving wider consideration at this stage to the question whether the potentially more threatening attitude by Argentina required some form of

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Endurance on patrol in the South Atlantic

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
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
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They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandon-

ing its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas.

'They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision.'

In July, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires warned the Foreign Office that Argentine newspapers were reporting British plans to abandon the Falklands.

And in September, the Intelligence services reported that Argentine diplomats were taking precisely that view.

On January 22, 1982, Lord Carrington again warned John Nott about the growing protests in Parliament over the decision. He asked for talks.

But on February 3, Mr Nott replied that the decision was final — a difficult decision, Mrs Thatcher told the Commons days later, but all the same, final.

The Franks Inquiry's verdict: although Endurance could never repel a full-scale Argentine invasion, she had become a symbol of British defence policy.

Battles

'That was clearly borne out by the Press and Intelligence reports of Argentine reactions to the decision to pay her off,' says the report. 'We conclude... that it was inadvisable for the Government to announce a decision to withdraw HMS Endurance and that, in the light of the developing situation in the second half of 1981, they should have reconsidered their decision to pay off HMS Endurance at the end of her 1981/82 tour.'

In fact battles between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office over the cost of keeping HMS Endurance in the South Atlantic went on until just a few days before the invasion.

Lord Carrington needed the patrol ship to evacuate the Argentine scrap merchants on South Georgia and wanted it to be retained. At the Ministry of Defence, Gerry Wiggin, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, replied, saying that Endurance would be kept on 'for the time being', but Ministry of Defence could not justify paying for her retention.

untdown... and 'misjudgment' by FO

Argentina as evidence of a decreasing British commitment to the defence of the Islands, however strongly that commitment was publicly asserted.

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First in underestimating the importance that Argentina attached to its timetable for resolving the dispute by the end of the year;

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Secondly, in being unduly influenced — understandably and perhaps inevitably — by the long history of the dispute in which Argentina had previously made threatening noises, accompanied by bellicose Press comment and indeed backed up its threats with aggressive actions without the dispute developing into a serious confrontation.

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The lack of liaison is also underscored in the report. In one particular aspect — the surveillance of the scrap merchant men's landings following the visit of their employer, Senior Davidoff to South Georgia in December 1981 — there is forceful criticism.

The committee emphasises: 'If Senior Davidoff's operations had been more closely monitored from December 1981 onwards and there had been better liaison between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, and the Governor in preparation for the

second visit in March 1982. Ministers would have been better able to deal with the landing on South Georgia when it occurred.'

The biggest target for criticism is the Ministry of Defence.

The decision to order the first nuclear-powered submarine to sail was taken on Monday, March 29 — less than four days before the invasion.

The report states: 'We consider that there was a case for taking this action at the end of the previous week in the light of the telegram of March 24 from the Defence Attache in Buenos Aires and the report of March 25 that Argentine ships had been sailed for a possible interception of HMS Endurance.'

The attempts to deter the Argentines were not adequate in the committee's view.

'We believe that there would have been advantage in the Government's giving wider consideration at this stage to the question whether the potentially more threatening attitude by Argentina required some form of

deterrent action in addition to the diplomatic initiatives and the contingency planning already in hand.'

One issue of fundamental importance is cleared up by the Franks Committee: Were the Foreign Office officials pursuing a policy of their own to get rid of the islands regardless of Ministers' views?


The committee is unequivocal: 'We have found no evidence to support this damaging allegation and we believe it to be totally without foundation.'

On every occasion that a new Government — or new Ministers — came into office a full range of policy options was put before them.

In every case Ministers made a decision of policy and chose to seek a negotiated settlement that would be acceptable to Argentina and to the islanders.

Without exception they rejected the alternative of 'Fortress Falklands', which would have involved the isolation of the islands from Argentina and probably from the rest of Latin America.'

THE FRANKS REPORT



Victorious return: Flag-waving crowds greeting the QE2 on her return to Southampton from the South Atlantic

THE Franks Committee says it has to clear up 'damaging misunderstandings' by knocking down a 'lumber of assertions made in speculation about the crisis.'

Here are the false claims and the committee's rebuttals:

1. Ministers and officials secretly told Argentina that Britain was prepared to give up the Falklands.

'We have found no evidence to support this allegation. On the contrary, Ministers and officials made clear to Argentina that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount.'

2. Clear warnings of the invasion from American intelligence were circulating more than a week beforehand.

'No intelligence about the invasion was received from American sources before it took place, by satellite or otherwise.'

3. Around March 24 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires passed on definite information to London about an invasion and predicted the exact day.

'We have examined all the relevant telegrams and intelligence reports and interviewed the individuals concerned. We are satisfied that no such communication was made.'

4. Two weeks before the invasion the Cabinet's Defence Committee rejected a proposal by Lord Carrington to send submarines to the area and the Government rejected advice from the Fleet commander to send submarines after the landing on South Georgia.

Untrue. The Defence Committee

By JOHN DICKIE

THERE was bewilderment in Westminster last night at the strange number of gaps and unanswered questions in the report.

The biggest mystery left unresolved is why the Prime Minister allowed Lord Carrington, the central figure in the Falklands crisis, to leave the country at the height of the developing drama on March 30 for a visit to Israel.

As the Foreign Secretary he was absent from Downing Street nerve centre from midnight on Thursday, April 1—only a few hours before the Argentine invasion.

During his visit to Israel he gave an impression of a Minister more concerned with the dangers of a conflict in the Middle East than the Falklands.

The report makes no mention of the fact that Lord Carrington cut

did not meet at that time. The first discussion took place on March 29 when the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington decided to send a nuclear-powered submarine.

5. Argentina was informed by the British Government of its decision to send a task force in 1977 (claimed by Jim Callaghan and Dr David Owen to have averted the danger of an invasion that year).

'We have no evidence that the Argentine Government became aware of this deployment.'

6. Captain Nicholas Barker of HMS Endurance sent warnings that an invasion was imminent which were

ignored by the Foreign Office and Defence Ministry and Captain Barker saw Defence Secretary John Nott, who ignored his advice.

Captain Barker never met Mr Nott. He reported his concern about events within his knowledge, but none of his reports warned of an imminent invasion.

7. On March 11 an Argentine military plane landed at Port Stanley to reconnoitre the runway.

An Argentine Hercules transport leaking fuel landed at Port Stanley on March 7. The Argentines already had all the information they needed about the runway as they operated

flights to Port Stanley from Argentina.

8. The Argentine Government made a bulk purchase of maps of the Falklands in Britain before the invasion.

'No such bulk purchases were made.'

9. There were massive withdrawals of Argentine funds from London banks shortly before the invasion, of which the Government must have been aware.

'We are satisfied the Government had no information about such a movement of funds.' Withdrawals by Argentine banks in March would not have been reported to the Bank of England until May. Argentina did

And the unanswered questions

short his visit to the EEC summit in Brussels, leaving the Prime Minister there, on the morning of Tuesday, March 30, because of the Falklands crisis.

If the matter was important enough for him to curtail his summit trip to

Franks Report left unanswered the key issue of why there was no attempt to have an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council until the very eve of the Argentine invasion.

If the crisis was so serious that

The key dates and events

December 1981	General Galtieri comes to power in Argentina.	
January 1982	Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa warns that Argentina is considering military action over the Falklands.	April 2
February 3	Mrs Thatcher defends the planned withdrawal of ice patrol ship HMS Endurance as part of defence cuts.	April 3
February 26	In New York Foreign Office Minister calls with Argentina's Enrique Ros.	April 25
March 19	Scrap metal merchants from Argentina land on South Georgia and start dismantling former whaling station at Grytviken.	May 2
March 29	Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington discuss Falklands on flight to Brussels for	May 4
		May 21
		May 25
		June 14

Common Market meeting. Then decide to send submarines. The Falklands invaded. British Marines surrender after three-hour battle. United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 calls for an Argentine withdrawal and withdrawal of Argentine troops. South Georgia recaptured. Argentinean cruiser General Belgrano sunk. HMS Sheffield hit by Exocet missile. British troops establish beachhead at San Carlos. HMS Coventry sunk. Atlantic Conveyor hit. Ceasefire. General Menendez surrenders to Major-General Jeremy Moore.

move out half a billion dollars in the period running up to the invasion but since the withdrawals were in dollars there would have been no effect on the sterling exchange rate to alert the Bank of England.'

10. On March 29 the Uruguayan Government offered the British Government facilities for Falkland Islanders who wished to leave the islands before the Argentine invasion.

'Neither the Foreign Office nor the British Embassy in Montevideo had knowledge at the time or thereafter of any such offer. The Uruguayan Government have also described this allegation as completely without foundation.'

In the course of the report on Franks Committee comments other stories which have been woven into the history of the Falklands dispute.

'It has been said that the British Government never gave the Argentines a clear warning that any invasion would be met with a massive retaliation.'

But the Franks Committee reports: 'When speaking personally to General Galtieri, President Reagan stated forcefully that action against the Falklands would be regarded by the British as a casus belli. We conclude that warnings by the British Government of the consequences of invading the Falkland Islands were conveyed to the Argentine Government.'

The committee also refers to the 'allegation that over the years Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials pursued a policy aimed at getting rid of the Islands, irrespective of the views of Ministers.'

It reports: 'In our examination of the papers we have found no evidence to support this damaging allegation, and we believe it to be totally without foundation.'

Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington talked of hardly anything else on their flight to the Market summit why did they not decide on having the UN Security Council convened on Tuesday, March 30?

Westminster also found it puzzling that the Franks Committee had apparently not pressed either the Prime Minister or Lord Carrington to explain why it was left so late to seek the help of the U.S. Government.

It was only on the evening of Sunday, March 28, that Lord Carrington sent a message to Secretary of State Alexander Haig asking him to 'consider taking the matter up with the Argentines.'

By the time the Prime Minister sent a message to President Reagan — just before 9 p.m. on March 31 — Argentina's President Galtieri was set on an unstoppable course.

There was a sense of disbelief that Carrington thought it important enough to have the Falklands question discussed in Cabinet between January, 1981 and March 25, 1982.

20 JAN 83

PAGE 2

Police

Continued From Page One
the remand. The officers will appear again on March 17.

Applications for legal aid were made on behalf of the two detectives by their solicitors, and magistrate Mr Edmund MacDermott said both cases were suitable.

Immediately after the hearing a row broke out when it was revealed that the men's home addresses were not given on the charge sheet.

In cases of attempted murder, the full details of defendants are normally made publicly available. DC Jardine's address was given as Scotland Yard and Finch, Paddington Green.

Newspaper, radio and TV reporters also complained that they were not allowed into the court until the hearing had already got under way.

A third officer, Detective Constable John Dean, of C11 branch, remains under suspension while a full report is compiled by Commander Michael Taylor, of the Yard's Complaints Investigation Bureau.

Waldorf improves

STEPHEN WALDORF was continuing to improve in hospital last night.

He was able to breathe for a short time without the support of a ventilator.

A spokesman for St Stephen's Hospital, Fulham, said: 'It seems that his life is not now in immediate danger.'

Wall Street

NEW YORK: The Dow Jones Industrial Index closed at 1,068.06 yesterday, a fall of 11.59 points. Volume of shares traded totalled 80.90 million.

THE FRANKS REPORT

Falklands 'facing commando raids'

Hit-and-run war alert on islands

Mail Foreign Service

BRITAIN'S garrison on the Falklands was braced last night for hit-and-run raids by Argentine commandos.

American Intelligence sources are predicting that Argentina is about to mount such an operation, which could involve landing men on remote parts of the islands from submarines.

Support for this assessment came from diplomatic sources in Buenos Aires, which said an Argentine Army brigade was being trained as a new commando unit.

It was also reported that two squadrons of Mirage fighter-bombers had been moved to the south of the country, within reach of the Falklands. And, there has been a recent increase in chest-

beating statements about the islands by Argentine military leaders.

U.S. intelligence officials also said Argentine naval patrol aircraft have stepped up their activity in the South Atlantic, including reconnaissance of two British scientific stations—Farad and Rothera on the Antarctic peninsula more than 1,000 miles south of Argentina.

Diplomatic sources said much of the increased patrolling had been carried out at the edge of the British-declared exclusion zone around the Falklands.

In London, the Ministry of Defence said it was 'taking seriously' an American television report that Argentina 'may be preparing to terrorise the Falklands' by raiding targets like radar sites, communications bases and anti-aircraft batteries.

CBS correspondent Bill Lynch also

claimed that U.S. Intelligence had warned of an Argentine plan to lure a British helicopter outside the exclusion zone round the Falklands and shoot it down.

However, experts in Whitehall and Washington agree that there is no question of Argentina trying to mount another full-scale invasion.

They are expecting what was described as a 'quick, in-and-out landing' for propaganda purposes. One official said: 'They could hoist the Argentine flag, take some pictures and then depart before anyone knew they were there, if they landed in some of the remote areas.'

On the Falklands yesterday, RAF Phantom jets were carrying out extra flying missions. There was also a Category Yellow air-raid warning when radar contacts were picked up off West Falklands. The warning was reduced to a category White alert when, it is believed, the incoming planes were identified as friendly.

Carrington farewell to politics

By Political Editor

LORD Carrington is saying goodbye to active Tory politics.

He put his feet up on the director's desk, pushed back his chair yesterday and said: 'Come back? At my age? Look, they are painting the chairman's office for me here.'

And as an afterthought, he murmured: 'There are other things in life than politics.'

The former Foreign Secretary has swapped his Foreign

Office window on the world—with its view of Buckingham Palace and St James's—for a sixth floor window at GEC, the vast electronics and engineering conglomerate, and a view over Park Lane.

Twenty-four hours after emerging from the Franks

Report as a much-maligned Minister who did the decent thing and resigned, Peter Alexander Rupert Carrington is bubbling with release from the nightmare of the past nine months.

At 63, he is clearly satisfied he can with honour haul down the curtain on a Ministerial career spanning 32 years.

He does not agree with some of the Franks conclusions. He is particularly scathing at the

idea that the Foreign Office is always trying to sell Britain down the river.

He said: 'The FO has been treated disgracefully. One of the things I find rather alarming is that there seems to be a certain class of person in Parliament and the Press who seems to believe there is something disreputable or even treacherous about trying to come to an agreement with a foreign power.'

Daily Mail, Thursday, January 20, 1983

We will hit back, junta is warned

By ALAN YOUNG and HARVEY ELLIOTT

BRITAIN will retaliate if there are further Argentine attacks on the Falklands, Mrs Thatcher said yesterday.

Her warning was a swift reaction to reports that Argentina was preparing for commando raids and the interception of British fighters.

Mrs Thatcher told MPs: 'The possibility of further attacks is one that has been ever-present with us and one for which the troops are alert.'

The Prime Minister complained that the continuing threat resulted from Argentina's failure to agree to the permanent cessation of hostilities 'let alone renounce the use of force.'

The acknowledgement that forces were ready to repulse the Argentines was immediately taken by Falklands war critic Tam Dalyell to indicate that Britain was prepared to attack the mainland.

But Mrs Thatcher said: 'We should have to consider our position with re-

ARGENTINE Defence Minister Julio Martinez Vivot said yesterday: 'The hostilities are not at an end because Great Britain insists on basically warlike attitudes. These have a very high cost and cannot last because the Malvinas [Falklands] will eventually be Argentinian, by right.'

And he added, in an Argentine magazine, that Mrs Thatcher's visit to the islands had been an act of 'arrogance' which would 'result in negative consequences for Great Britain abroad'.

gard to what to do, as well as repulsing them.'

Yesterday's statement followed warnings from American intelligence sources that Argentina was ready for a hit-and-run campaign against the garrison of 4,000 men on the Falklands.

Allegations about conditions and morale at the garrison are to be investigated by Junior Defence Minister Jerry Wiggin, who flew to the Falklands on Wednesday.

Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine sent an urgent signal to Mr Wiggin after publication yesterday of a letter from a soldier claiming that servicemen were inadequately fed and forced to use poor sanitation.

But the immediate reaction in London was one of disbelief that a man on active duty, probably on uninhabited West Falkland, should complain.

Conditions are not good. But they are no worse than thousands of troops have endured over the years from Korea to Malaya, Borneo or the Middle East.

A stream of journalists, officials and Ministers has been to the Falklands and seen the conditions in which the troops are living, but Mr Wiggin has been told to look into the allegations in detail.

One of Mr Wiggin's duties yesterday was to open a new floating barracks complex, the Safe Dominia.

Argentina is establishing military bases in Antarctica, according to the American television network CBS. It quoted U.S. intelligence sources yesterday, saying that such a military presence would 'complicate the job of British forces defending the Falklands.'

DAILY MAIL / WORLD WIDE

Argentine raiders face 'bloody nose'

22/1/83

Daily Mail

22/1/83

Argentines 'harass ship'

THE Foreign Office is investigating reports that a Swedish ship which delivered pre-fab housing to the Falkland Islands was detained by the Argentines. London has asked the Swedish Government for details after reports that skipper Bjorn Johansson of the 2,800-ton cargo ship Linne was held in Buenos Aires for questioning.

Foreign Office officials could not say when the incident took place but confirmed that the Swedish ship was carrying cargo to Port Stanley on a one-way charter.

Pym's warning—Page FOUR

By JOHN HARRISON,
Political Reporter

THE Argentines would get a 'bloody nose' if they attacked the Falkland Islands again, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Francis Pym, warned yesterday.

He said: 'If the Argentines were really going to mount another military operation, they'd score the biggest own goal there's been for years.'

They would find a well-prepared British defence force waiting for them, and the world would condemn any attack as 'absolutely monstrous.'

Mr Pym was asked on BBC Radio Four's World at One programme how seriously he took American reports that Argentina might be planning a series of hit-and-run raids on the islands.

Protection

He replied: 'I have been watching this very carefully and there are indications and the possibility of these raids and harassment. The Americans have made public this possibility, but I have known about it all along.'

'I hope it is not true, but if they were to try to carry out something like that I predict they will get a bloody nose.'

Mr Pym said Britain's forces would repel any enemy attack.

Mrs Thatcher told MPs this week that Britain had no option but to have a Fortress Falklands.

But Mr Pym — now speaking on LBC Radio — said he thought 'fortress' was a 'misdescription'.

The islands would be given the same protection as mainland Britain. 'Britain is not a fortress,' he said, 'but it is protected militarily. If someone was mad enough to attack they would be met with a pretty sharp response.'

• Argentine Defence Minister Julio Martinez Vivot yesterday dismissed reports of impending Argentine raids on the Falklands as scaremongering.

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Mail Exclusive... as the Franks report on the Falklands is published, the defeated man who started

Galtieri... a prisoner on his own balcony



BY TED OLIVER
Reporting from Buenos Aires

THE cigarette is never far from his lips and the whisky glass is rarely far from his right hand.

The man with the inapt middle name, Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, is living out his uneasy enforced retirement in Argentina.

The Franks report, published today would never have been necessary if it had not been for Galtieri's pride, stubbornness and downright stupidity.

Now he is paying for those failures. He has armed bodyguards, burly men with guns, not so much to protect him as to make sure he doesn't embarrass the current regime.

Uniform in mothballs

Outings are few. Recently on holiday at the seaside resort of Mar del Plata he was spotted. Passers-by hurled abuse, insulting him and his family. He was spat at and fists were shaken but it stopped just short of physical assault.

The man who has addressed crowds of almost one million from the balcony of the pink presidential palace in Buenos Aires finds it wiser to send his maid to replenish drink and tobacco supplies.

Once he hosted a barbecue for 1,500 people, who consumed 11,000 quarts of wine, 5,000lb. of beef and sausages. Now he rarely dines out, although there are dozens of fashionable restaurants near his apartment.

His usual dress is casual open-necked

shirts and slacks. The uniform from his presidential days, with the pounds of braid and medals, is in mothballs.

One of his former friends said: 'Galtieri is a man of the past. The present junta want to have him around to remind people that they are not to blame.'

'Leopoldo was the man to blame for the Falklands fiasco and the new bosses want to make sure that the scapegoat sticks around.'

Galtieri rose from relatively humble backgrounds. His wife Lucy comes from one of the best families in Buenos Aires and was happy to bask in her husband's glory.

There are rumours that now all is not well with the marriage. Lucy, say acquaintances, is not happy about being in disgrace, spurned because of her husband's actions.

Galtieri is not badly off financially. He has a pension of about £750 a month, inflation-proofed against the world's craziest economy. That puts him in the top income bracket in Argentina.

And few, if any, of Argentina's dictators have failed to salt away a sizeable sum from 'presents' in Brazilian or Uruguayan banks.

His 22nd floor apartment is in Avenue Sucre, at Belgrano, the most fashionable suburb of Buenos Aires. Galtieri acquired it when he was head of the Army. 'It's amazing how easy generals can find the best apartments,' said one junta-watcher.

Galtieri is said to be co-operating on a book about the war, The Names of Defeat, but projected publishing dates have come and gone.

His English is limited, despite having

spent six months in America where he developed his taste for Scotch - Glenfiddich when he can get it.

He began his Army career in the Engineer Corps and a former friend said: 'He can scarcely claim academic or intellectual brilliance. He got to the top, not because of brains or flair, but because he was a dull, but ambitious, plodder.'

Galtieri spends a lot of time on his balcony, smoking and looking out across the roof-tops to the elegant parks with statues of national heroes.

He has no date for sitting with the sculptor. Abject failure does not rate even a bust, not even in Argentina where they will put up statues to just about anything.

The failure of others

The sound of the cheers and the adulation of vast crowds still ring in his ears. An intensely vain man, he will savour those sounds for ever.

He may remember the words one of his aides whispered in his ear: 'Enjoy it now, boss, while it lasts.'

Conversations with him are marked by long embarrassing silences as he searches for words. He will offer to get coffee or another drink to give himself time to collect whatever thoughts he might have left.

He retains his obstinate view that he was right to order the invasion, despite the deaths of so many young men on both sides.

Failure for everything connected with the war was down to someone else he says. The identities of the men he says are to blame may well be in the book and that could be the reason for its non-publication.



Unhappy wife Lucy



Overflowing as



Another cigarette, another memory: Galtieri on balcony of oblivion - and balcony scene of adulation from days at the pink palace

Galtieri... a prisoner on his own balcony



BY TED OLIVER
Reporting from Buenos Aires

THE cigarette is never far from his lips and the whisky glass is rarely far from his right hand.

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
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he can live with his country and his nation, his people and his God. But can they live with him?



Memory: Galtieri on balcony of oblivion—and balcony scene of adulation from days at the pink palace

Unhappy wife Lucy

Overflowing ashtray, smokescreen over blame

SOUTH ATLANTIC TENSION ONLY PARTLY DEFUSED

By TONY ALLEN-MILLS in Buenos Aires

TENSION in the South Atlantic has only partially been defused by the Argentine Foreign Ministry's public commitment this weekend to a "peaceful solution" of the Falklands dispute.

Although an official communique has stressed Argentina's "scrupulous" observance of the *de facto* cessation of hostilities in the area, it seems unlikely that British forces in the islands will be tempted to relax.

FRANKS 'AN INJUSTICE TO HAIG'

By DAVID SHEARS
in Washington

SIR Nicholas Henderson, Britain's Ambassador to Washington at the time of the Falklands invasion, reported yesterday that Mr. Haig had felt as Secretary of State that Argentina had decided to attack the islands some time in advance.

Furthermore, Mr. Haig had concluded that the so-called scrap merchants sent to South Georgia in advance of the Falklands conflict had, in fact, been Argentine Servicemen in disguise, sent deliberately to stir up a confrontation.

Sir Nicholas, now in retirement, made these disclosures in an article in yesterday's *Washington Post* commenting on the Franks Report which found that the invasion could not have been foreseen.

"The report states that when, on March 31, I outlined to Alexander Haig the intelligence reports on Argentina's intentions to invade, he had been unaware of their significance," Sir Nicholas wrote.

"This account hardly does justice to our extraordinary meeting."

'Reaction electric'

The former ambassador said that having discussed the matter again with Mr. Haig only last week, "he will not mind if I record here that his reaction to my information was electric."

His officials had been sceptical, having received assurances from Argentina that no confrontation was contemplated, but "Haig himself was in no doubt! He immediately saw the danger and sprang into action."

Sir Nicholas said that Mr. Haig had concluded upon reflection that Argentina could not have been headed off from invading by American pressure.

"He said that from the talks he had had with Argentine President Galtieri, he realised that the junta had been bent for some time on the invasion, confident that the British would not react with force."

'First stage play'

"From the talks he had had with the junta in Buenos Aires during the shuttle, Mr. Haig had deduced, so he tells me, that they had decided upon attack some time in advance and that the scrap merchants were disguised Service personnel deliberately sent to South Georgia as agents provocateurs."

"This does not tally with the view that the decision to invade was a last-minute one, and that the incident of the scrap merchant was seized on to escalate the situation rather than the first stage of a scenario leading to invasion of the Falklands."

"Haig thinks the Argentines may have received false signals from Washington about their attitude in the event of invasion, though certainly not from him."

"He thinks the confusion of signals may have become more pronounced after the invasion than before."

"He is convinced, I should add, that without his efforts at negotiations in the shuttle between Washington, London and Buenos Aires, the British would not have secured the American support that they did," said Sir Nicholas.

Most observers in Buenos Aires agree that the foreseeable future holds no serious threat of a return of Argentine military aggression in the South Atlantic.

But diplomats and other professional forecasters in Buenos Aires are too familiar with the Argentine armed forces' record of dangerous unpredictability to rule out trouble, altogether.

During the seven months since the surrender at Port Stanley, the Argentine military high command has steadily been re-equipping and retraining its forces.

In some respects, the military is now in better shape than it was at the time of the invasion of the islands last year, despite the catastrophic losses suffered by all three services.

Heavy losses

The navy's squadron of Exocet-armed Super Etendards has been increased from five to 14, thanks to new shipments from France. Maritime reconnaissance capabilities have also been vastly improved by the purchase of four Lockheed Electra patrol aircraft from the United States.

Military sources confirm that the Cordoba-based Fourth Army Brigade has recently been undergoing intensive commando training and the army is also reported to have taken delivery of a French jumbo-jet load of amphibious landing craft.

Replacing the heavy losses incurred by the air force during the war is likely to cost Argentina millions of dollars, but the country's acute economic crisis does not appear to be deterring the junta from considering expensive new contracts.

Air force sources were quoted this weekend as saying that Argentina may purchase Alpha jet fighter-bombers, built in France by Dassault. The main obstacles to the purchase appeared to be financing conditions, which were "extremely rigid," the sources said.

Banking deals

But the navy has been unable to improve its ineffectual fleet significantly and that factor alone should deter any large-scale aggression by the junta, which is hardly likely to risk further humiliation at the hands of the British.

Another important deterrent to hostility is Argentina's deals with the international banking community over cash to bail out the country's disastrous economy.

Apart from negotiations with the International Monetary Fund on a standby loan, Argentina has also secured a bridging loan worth \$1.1 billion (£700 million) from an international consortium, including British banks.

Any resumption of military hostilities in the South Atlantic would risk jeopardising agreements with the banks and the IMF, which has imposed strict conditions on renegotiation of Argentina's crippling foreign debt.

Swedish ship leaves

OUR COPENHAGEN CORRESPONDENT writes: Contacts between the Foreign Office in London and the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm concerning the Linne, 3,551 tons, a Swedish coaster which was refused entry into an Argentine harbour, at Rio de la Plata, have been concluded and both countries have now dropped the case, according to a Foreign Office spokesman in Stockholm. The Linne sailed from Port Stanley for Rio de Janeiro on Jan. 6 after off-loading prefabricated houses made in Sweden. Then the empty ship was rerouted to Rio de la Plata, to collect a cargo of citrus fruit.

Because the Linne's last port of call had been Port Stanley, Argentine authorities were unwilling to allow the ship to enter the Rio de la Plata harbour. The Linne is now heading for Algeria, according to Gothenburg Marine Radio.

Peterborough—P14

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Argentina bars ship

From Bernardo Kucinski
in Sao Paulo

The Argentine navy has intercepted Brazil's Antarctic expedition ship, Barao de Teffe, which was returning to Punta Arenas in Chile.

The Argentinians demanded that a local pilot be put on board for the crossing of the Beagle Channel, to which Argentina and Chile lay claim.

But the ship's captain obeyed orders from Brasilia refusing to comply and altered his course.

There was bitter reaction in Brasilia to the incident which happened on Tuesday.

Brazil has asked Argentina to explain why it intercepted the vessel, which was on its first voyage to the Antarctic and has recently called at several ports on the continent.

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Fred Dean, who was suspended at the same time, is still under investigation

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Falklands garrison 'ready for Argentine hit-and-run raids'

By David Fairhall,
Defence Correspondent

US reports that Argentina was planning hit-and-run raids on the Falklands garrison were being taken seriously by the Ministry of Defence yesterday.

Although British sources offered no independent confirmation of the US television report, they pointed out that "we have never lowered our guard, because the Argentines have never said that hostilities have ceased—the general commanding our garrison is bound to bear that in mind."

CBS television network quoted US Intelligence sources as saying there was evidence of unusual training and preparation for commando-style operations, with British radars, communications centres and Rapier anti-aircraft missiles batteries considered likely targets. It also suggested that the Argentine air force was hoping to shoot down a British aircraft, perhaps using its newly delivered Mirage III interceptors to challenge the

RAF Phantoms that have reportedly been flying close to Argentine air space.

The Defence Ministry cedes, in the words of a military official, "there just not enough troops to the cliffs right round islands." But RAF sou pointed out that the air

re-transferred from their base in the northern city of Cordoba to a number of airfields on the Patagonian coast in southern Argentina three weeks ago.

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Thatcher summons her
Cabinet, page 2

fences around Port Stanley were far better than the force defences. It had a cover, well-sited Rapier batteries and long range Phantom fighters, with their own down radar, instead of more limited carrier-borne Harriers.

In Buenos Aires yesterday diplomatic sources said Argentine air force had two squadrons of Mirage to southern air bases within striking distance of the land islands. The jets had

Guardian 20/1/83

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Guardian
20/1/83

HOME NEWS

More cash likely as Falklands economy moves into front line

Thatcher calls in War Cabinet after 'Argentine raids' warning

By Julia Langdon,
Ian Aitken and
Patrick Keatley

An emergency meeting of the "War Cabinet" was summoned by the Prime Minister yesterday to discuss the threat of renewed hostilities by the Argentines.

Mrs Thatcher called together for a two-hour meeting the minister who handled last year's crisis in the Falkland Islands, the top service chiefs and — for the first time — the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

The meeting was a measure of the seriousness with which the Government was treating the possibility of imminent action against British forces in the South Atlantic.

The Chancellor was apparently asked to join the meeting because of the potential cost involved in any response.

The Government had already been expected to commit itself to much crucial new spending in the Falkland Islands as a result of the Franks Commission report. This would include strengthening of the islands economy in the light of the Shackleton report.

Mrs Thatcher was told in no uncertain terms by members of the Executive and Legislative Councils in Port Stanley during her recent visit that Britain was expected to provide improved air services, a new emphasis on education in the light of the loss of school facilities in Argentina, and some radical steps to enable islanders to buy land. Ministers are now studying the implications of these demands.

But Mrs Thatcher now acknowledges that a new danger faces the islanders — the possibility that they will be swamped by the military. She is expected to offer the maximum encouragement to the tiny civilian population to take charge of their own lives as far as possible.

The Foreign Office will not hold an internal inquiry as a result of the report, because

the Foreign Secretary, Mr Francis Pym feels his senior officials have been vindicated.

In a statement last night — his first since publication of the report — Mr Pym said: "My initial reaction is one of satisfaction — but not surprise — that the report makes no major criticisms, and that the criticisms of the last nine months have been authoritatively laid to rest."

Mr Pym and his senior advisers feel that the kind of sword-rattling contained in hints from Buenos Aires about new hostilities makes a nonsense of Argentina's demand for fresh negotiations with Britain.

On the question of how intelligence material should be processed, the Foreign Office does not feel possessive about its chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and would feel no slight if the present set-up were changed. The deputy chairmanship is held by the Ministry of Defence and the committee reports directly to the Cabinet Office, so that the JIC is not an FO-dominated operation.

Yesterday's development came while a wrangle took place at Westminster about next week's debate on the Franks Committee report. The shadow cabinet decided at a meeting that one day should be sufficient for discussion on the report, despite the previous request by the party leader, Mr Michael Foot, for two days.

The Franks report's unprecedented insight into the machinery of government has exploded the convention that Cabinet committees and advice from civil servants to ministers must remain secret.

It is doubtful whether the degree of detail into which the report goes would normally have been available even under the 30-year rule governing public records. But the argument in Whitehall yesterday was that the information was no longer sensitive because the Government is not concerned about its relations with Argentina.

Threat of new Falklands conflict causes US concern

From Nicholas Ashford, Washington

There is growing concern in Washington about a possible new outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Argentina in the South Atlantic.

This concern has been fuelled by recent Argentine purchases of military aircraft and other offensive equipment; increased reconnaissance activity by Argentine aircraft over the Falklands and the British Antarctic Territory; and accelerated training programmes for the armed forces.

Although it is thought unlikely that the Buenos Aires Government is considering a new invasion attempt at this stage, it is believed that a campaign of harassment and hit-and-run commando attacks for propaganda purposes is being planned.

American concern about Argentina's intentions was officially reflected by a State Department spokesman yesterday, who emphasized that the US remained opposed to the use of force to settle disputes.

"This policy remains unchanged and was reflected in our support of United Nations Sanctions against Argentina last Autumn," resolutions said.

According to intelligence sources, quoted by the Washington Post, the US has been providing military aid to the British Government in the Falklands.

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Carrington proposes long-term treaty

By Henry Stanhope

A new Antarctic treaty allowing British administration of the Falkland Islands under international sovereignty was proposed by Lord Carrington yesterday as an eventual answer to Anglo-Argentine confrontation in the South Atlantic.


But the former Foreign Secretary, in an interview on the morning after publication of the Franks report, emphasized that it was only a long-term possibility.

In the short term he agreed with Mrs Margaret Thatcher that there was no alternative to the so-called Fortress Falklands policy with a substantial military garrison stationed there.

He agreed with Mr James Callaghan who in the Commons had described the events of the past nine months as a short-term victory and a long-term political retreat to a dead end.

But thought that the Government had had no alternative to sending the task force when it did. No government could have otherwise survived.

Lord Carrington, who resigned after the Argentine invasion, could foresee no early resumption of talks with Argentina. "I am sure the time is not proved."



Mr James Callaghan: 'Threats not met professionally'

Thatcher 'apathy' amazes Callaghan

By Anthony Bevins, Political Correspondent

Mr Callaghan set the tone for the Opposition attack on the Government in next week's two-day debate on the Report, when he accused Mrs Thatcher of lacking both interest and professionalism in dealing with the threat of a Falkland's invasion.

He told *The Times* that he was willing to hide any counter-attack against himself, based on the Franks Report, of the 1977 incident when two frigates and a nuclear-powered submarine were sent to the South Atlantic.

The former Prime Minister told the Commons on March 30, after the occupation of South Georgia and before the invasion of the Falklands "that when the existence of the 1977 task force became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed."

Franks stated: "We have had no evidence that the Argentine Government became aware of this deployment."

Mr Callaghan said last night that he had made his point on March 30 in a supplementary Commons question.

But he emphasized: "That was not the major point. Minutes which he had read to the Franks Committee said: 'The objective of the force should be to buttress our negotiating position by displaying a force of sufficient strength as to convince the Argentines'."

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Public may get say on cruise

By Rodney Cowton, Defence Correspondent

The Government is likely to commission a public opinion poll in the next month or two to enable it to assess attitudes to the proposed deployment of cruise missiles in Britain.

The first British-based cruise missiles are due to become operational at Greenham Common in Berkshire in December. Ultimately, in the absence of any international agreement to limit the number of so-called theatre nuclear weapons, there will be 96 cruise missiles at Greenham and 64 at Molesworth in Cambridgeshire.

The Government is now seriously concerned about the volatile nature of the opposition to the Armed Forces' plan for several months public acceptance of the necessity for the deployment of cruise missiles.

One strand in those discussions has been the possibility of the Government seeking an independent assessment of the indications are that such a poll will be commissioned, though the detail has yet to be worked out. It is likely that any Government-backed poll would be fairly narrowly based on the question of whether or not the Government should proceed with the deployment of nuclear weapons and the issues of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Fagan freed after 11 months

Michael Fagan, who was last night freed from security Park Lane hospital in Liverpool, has been released.

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ington, Essex, once an anti-aircraft centre guarding north London

beyond, in the classroom where Police Constable John Nunn, an

affected morale, but what happened has caused grave concern among

undergoing a week's commando firearms training, a number of

Threat of new Falklands conflict causes US concern

Continued from page 1

a permanent national objective."

Another officer said that military units were maintained on "a permanent state of alert" and were ready to respond to any political decision.

Defence sources here say that launching commando raids on the islands would be a technically difficult operation because any flight carrying paratroops could be intercepted by the British Phantoms.

Naval support would also be necessary, and this too would run the gauntlet of British defensive measures in the exclusion zone. Nevertheless, some form of air raids on certain objectives, such as radar emplacements, could be technically feasible.

Politically, however, any resumption of hostilities would carry high internal and external costs.

The armed forces have called elections for the last quarter of

this year and have an extremely low standing in popular opinion. Externally, renewed fighting would undermine Argentina's diplomatic offensive and imperil the renegotiation of its huge foreign debt.

⊗ No comment: No 10 Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence both refused to comment last night on the reports of possible new hostilities by Argentina, but it was being pointed out in Whitehall that the troops on the Falklands

were on a permanent state of alert (our Defence Correspondent writes).

The British garrison is likely to be maintained at around its present level throughout this year. Whitehall sources last autumn were speaking in terms of a review early this year, but this now seems unlikely to lead to any reduction.

The Government will be particularly likely to err on the side of caution because of the

political embarrassment would arise from an Argentine incursion.

At present there are 3,000 and 4,000 troops on the Falklands.

⊗ Propaganda value: A successful breach of the defences would make an ideal propaganda for the Buenos Aires Government, especially after Mrs Thatcher's commitment in the Commons to "Falklands Fortress pol-

German news agency

Illia mourned

Buenos Aires (Reuter) - The Argentine Government has ordered a state funeral and five days of national mourning for former President Arturo Illia, who died on Tuesday aged 82. Dr Illia, a leader of the Radical Party, was President from 1963 to 1966.

Obituary, page 12

Topless slip-up

Washington (AP) - The US Air Force has disciplined several officers, some

386/1/13
13/1/13
13/1/13

Argentine officers 'did not fight'

From Andrew Thompson
Buenos Aires

Father Domingo de Pablis, and Argentine Army chaplain who was attached to the 7th infantry regiment during the war with Britain on the Falkland Islands, has launched a blistering attack on the officer corps.

He said that during the war: "I didn't see warriors, I saw a drawing room or desk officers. The war was lost, above all, because those officers did not fight."

At a press conference in the Argentine provincial capital of Santiago del Estero, 700 miles north of Buenos Aires, he said "The war ended when a so-called general Menéndez surrendered on a day called June 14. I say so-called because I was there and I never saw a general." Father de Pablis was referring to the surrender signed by the military governor of the islands, General Mario Benjamin Menéndez when Port Stanley fell to British forces.

The priest, who witnessed the fighting at Two Sisters, and was later taken prisoner and returned to the mainland on board the Canberra, said the troops he was with knew of the surrender only when they saw "soldiers and officers returning in disorganized fashion". Referring to the officers, he said: "They did not even know how to organize an orderly withdrawal."

The officers he saw did not know the difference between a rocket and a missile. "They told us they were uninformed because these arms were very expensive," he said.

He added "When an officer goes to war, he has to lead his troops from the front, not from behind". He mentioned that Colonel "H" Jones, the British officer, had died doing just that at Darwin.

'Whitby Gazette'
(About) 16 January 1983

Falklands jobs offer

Whitby Gazette 0947 Editor's Office 602836

An urgent invitation for Whitby men to fly out to their twin town of Stanley and help rebuild the war-torn Falkland Islands has been sent to the town by Civil Commissioner Sir Rex Hunt.

Sir Rex has written to former Whitby Town Mayor, Councillor Richard Wastell, who himself served as a bricklayer in the Royal Engineers in the islands, during the Second World War.

During the next few months, Sir Rex writes, a Falkland Islands Government Office will be based in London to interview and select those that are needed "most urgently". Masons, bricklayers and carpenters all fall into that category.

He says:

"If you know of anyone who is interested in the Whitby area, I suggest you ask them to get in touch with Mr Adrian Monk, 2 Greycoat Place, London SW1.

Says Sir Rex: "The rehabilitation work here is going ahead and keeping us all more than fully occupied. Our great constraint is accommodation and until we get more houses up,



Sir Rex — "bricklayers and carpenters needed urgently".

we cannot invite the many would-be immigrants from the UK to come out.

"We are already bursting at the seams in Stanley and the new blood that we so badly want will have little chance of a roof over their heads before the middle of this year.

"We have military everywhere and the harbour is bustling with activity. The overcrowding has naturally brought its problems but, on the whole, the benefits of a large military garrison far outweigh the difficulties."

The letter is signed by Sir Rex and bears the Royal crown and

the stamp of Government House, Falkland Islands.

A spokesman at Whitby's Employment Office stressed that no official approach has yet been made to them.

However, he added: "It is hopeful and there should be applicants — it just hinges on the conditions, whether locals would have to sever links with Whitby or not."

The spokesman revealed that a total of 50 joiners and bricklayers are registered unemployed in Whitby at present, but there are more than 100 semi-skilled workers who might be interested.

Latest unemployment figure in Whitby is 23.4% and one of the worst in the country.

The spokesman said: "The scheme is very interesting.

"If this comes through the official channels, we would advertise and deal with the response."

● The letter from Sir Rex clearly states that immigrants to the Falklands are needed, but anyone wanting to establish whether a short term work contract would be available could also write to Mr Monk at the address given.