

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

No. 14/27

C.S.

1927  
1924.

No. 14/27

SUBJECT.

192

Previous Paper.

Representations by Hon. H. H. R. Grenham  
M. L. C., regarding Defenseless Research  
and Development Fund "

MINUTES.

Contains M. R. D/43/27 transferred  
to Confidential File.

Contains M. R. D/43/27 transferred  
to Confidential File.

Subsequent Paper.

D.

DEPENDENCIES.  
(Miscellaneous)

1927.

No.

D/43/27

Hon. H. H. R. Gresham.

SUBJECT.

1927

5th July, 1927.

Previous Paper.

Confidential

REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY HON. H. H. R. GRESHAM,  
M.L.C. REGARDING "DEPENDENCIES RESEARCH AND  
DEVELOPMENT FUND"

MINUTES.

Letter from Hon. H. H. R. Gresham M.L.C. of 5th July, 1927.

1-2.

G. S.

S. H. H. R.

Jul

2a. ~~Telegram to S. of S. of 7<sup>th</sup> July, 1927.~~  
Hon. C. S.

3-8.

I attach a summary of  
the points to be mentioned  
to S & S. Please prepare draft  
despatch.

Att.

7/27.

Subsequent Paper.

Urgent

Hon. Treasurer.

Draft despatch referred to you,  
please, in accordance with Sir Exallby's  
direction.

2. Will you kindly make any comments  
upon what may occur to you and in particular  
carefully check the financial figures?

3. I should be glad if you would let  
me have this file back as early as possible.

J. G. L.

J. G. L.

8.7.27

Hon. Col. Sec.

I am of opinion that the  
draft despatch shows the position clearly.

2. Figures have been checked.  
I have noted in pencil the actual sums  
of surplus Dependence's Revenue transferred  
to the Research Fund in the years 1924,  
1925 and 1926. The amount to be  
transferred this year will approximate  
£60,000.

3. I have also shown actual balance  
of the Research Fund as at 28<sup>th</sup> February  
1927. The Fund should reach £400,000  
by the 31<sup>st</sup> Dec<sup>r</sup> 1927.

M. Bryan Hathorn

Treasurer

9.7.27

Spoke Mr. P.

£350,000 will  
be a safe figure

J. G. L.

9.7.27



C.S.O. No. *C/14/27*

Inside Minute Paper.

Sheet No. *2*

- 9-20. Confidential despatch of 9<sup>th</sup> July, 1927.  
21. Letter to Hon. A.H. R. Grecham, 14<sup>th</sup> July, 1927.  
22. Telegram to Secretary of State 20 Oct 1927  
23. " from " " " 27/10/27.

*Y<sup>e</sup> and 23 attached. I will copy*

*✓*  
Hon. Members of Council  
C/forwarded  
21.10.27.

Hon. Members of Council of the first  
of this telegram.

*Just*

*28. 10. 27*

*Yes. Please. I am indeed grateful to  
S. of S. for his kind and considerate  
telegram.*

*28. 27  
10*

*A.H.*

24. Telegram to S. of S. of 29/10/27.

*4. 10. 12. 27*

*6. 31. 10. 27*

- 25-26. Extract from minutes of meeting of the  
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- 27-29. Extract from minutes of meeting of the  
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- 117-119. Report by Capt Stenhouse  
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138. Lr. from His Excellency to Sir Samuel Wilson  
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from Mr J. Bowers, then 2<sup>nd</sup> Off.

of R.R.S. "William Scott"



(2)

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

July 5th 1927.

Sir,

I beg to refer to Ordinance No. 6 of 1924, entitled "Dependencies Research and Development Fund 1924" and to enquire whether in the opinion of the Government an appeal should not at once be made to the Secretary of State with a view to the repeal of this Ordinance.

2. As a Member of the Legislative Council who was present at the passing of this Ordinance, I beg to say, that I view with very serious alarm the expenditure of enormous sums of money on researches of doubtful utility in connection with the Whaling Industry when the Colony proper is badly in need of improvement and development in practically every direction one looks. It is unnecessary to say that had this Colony received the monies spent by the Fund during the last three years, including 1927, its financial position would have been on a firm basis for many years to come.

3. In reviewing the expenditure since the Fund was inaugurated I have arrived at the conclusion that not only has far too much money already been spent but that there has also been a very serious waste of money. It is extremely difficult to believe that the scientific results obtained have warranted an expenditure of approximately £215,785. In particular, I would mention what can only be described as an appalling mistake, namely, the expenditure of £207,785 in connection with the rebuilding, fitting out and expenses of the R.R.S. "Discovery". That this vessel is quite unsuitable for working in these latitudes is beyond dispute and it can only be surmized that the technical advisors responsible were guided more by sentiment in the selection of this famous vessel than knowledge of conditions south of parallel 50° S.

4. We have also the item "William Scoresby" and here again the expenditure and running expenses appear to be out of all proportion to the results achieved. That \$71,184. should be spent on working out marine stations and trawling around the Falklands is really unbelievable. The same applies to the Marine Station at South Georgia on which £20,112 has been expended.

5. In view of the foregoing figures, which include the estimated expenditure for 1927, and also the following reasons I beg to express the hope that the Government and Unofficial Members of Councils will make a determined effort to bring about the repeal of this Ordinance:-

- (a). That it is wrong in principle that Revenue should pass direct into the hands of a scientific or any other body and be administered by them.
- (b). That whilst the movement of plankton and the collection of specimens may be of interest to scientists it is of no economic value to the Colony or its Dependencees. The outstanding fact is that whales are either in the vicinity of South Georgia, South Shetlands and South Orkneys, where they can be caught, or they are not there. If they do not visit those places no amount of scientific endeavour will entice them to go there. Were this possible there might be some excuse for a large expenditure to date but we are faced with prodigality and waste of money of which there is apparently no end in sight.

I am,

Sir,

your obedient servant,

*W. H. R. Graham*

Member of Legislative Council.

The Honourable

The Colonial Secretary.

Stanley.

2/14/27.

2a

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From His Excellency the Governor.

To The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

TELEPHONED.

Despatched : 7th July, 1927. Time : 4.30 p.m.

Received : ... 192 Time :

CHAPELRIES

LONDON.

Confidential. Regret to inform you that at meeting of Executive Council to-day protest was raised by unofficial member against expenditure of surplus Dependencies funds on Discovery Expedition. States feeling in Colony strongly opposed to further expenditure and presses for repeal of Ordinance No. 6 of 1924. Adds that matter may be brought up in Imperial Parliament and press campaign started. I am using my influence to prevent latter course and I will report fully by despatch. I have thought it best to communicate this to you immediately in case of further developments as I infer that you are unaware of local feeling in the matter.

GOVERNOR.



From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

To draft despatch embodying the following points.  
Order in which stated need not be adhered to.  
Confidential.

- 1) IN CONFIRMATION OF my confidential telegram dated 7.7.27. I have the honour to forward the following particulars
- 2) AS GOVERNOR OF THIS COLONY I <sup>consider</sup> it is my duty to give you the true feeling of the people who inhabit it, <sup>without fear or favour,</sup> and at the same time my own <sup>considered</sup> opinion, dispassionate and unbiased, on any particular problem which may arise; neither underestimated or exaggerated, and then to carry out your instructions, whatever they may be, to the best of my ability. It is in this spirit I indite this despatch.
- 3) I enclose copy of letter forwarded to Hon C.S. dated 5.7.27. State who Mr. Gresham is. <sup>From</sup> I have formed a high opinion of his business capacity and general ability. ~~Certainly~~ <sup>Carries more weight</sup> in Colony than anyone else. Feel sure his letter was written pro bono publico and in no party spirit of criticism. Loyal to Govt. & F.
- 4) Matter brought up at meeting of Ex. Council. Discussed. Members all in agreement. <sup>Mr. Gresham</sup> Stated matter, if no satisfaction was given, would probably be brought before Imperial Parliament & Press campaign started. Have used personal interest to prevent this. No idea that as many influential people have money invested in Colony.

From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

- 5) Having carefully considered the problem from every point of view & consider Mr. Graham's complaint is just;
- 6) The interest of the Colony (where I mention Colony I include the Dependencies) <sup>& its future</sup> should come first;
- 7) At present we are in a sound financial position but unfortunately we depend entirely and absolutely on two products - wool and whale oil. IF the <sup>price of the</sup> Farmer was to drop to 1/- per lb and the latter to give out we should be forced to live on our capital for a few years and then to apply to the Imperial Govt for a grant-in-aid.
- 8) We have now a unique opportunity, which may never occur again, of putting our finances on such a footing that we could face the future quite undismayed whatever happened.

Quote here amounts spent each

year on Discovery etc 1st year 192?

2nd year 192?

3rd year ?

if <sup>had been</sup> this <sup>invested</sup> at 5% we should now have £ <sup>annual interest</sup> <sup>the interest-amount from</sup> <sup>to our</sup> <sup>add this on</sup>

over permanent investments i.e. £

cost of the Discovery permanent investments i.e. £

the total will have been £

annually received. At its rate after

? years the interest from fixed investments

will have been enough to finance the colony.

(6)

From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

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9. The Discovery does not do exploration and which might be of great benefit to the colony by ~~discovery~~ discovering new islands or land stations in the Indian Sea & <sup>exercise</sup> on which whaling stations could be started to our profit. Instead of that she follows the ordinary beaten tracks which are already well-known to whalers.
10. She does not do mapping which would have been of service to navigators.
11. She only does scientific work which is of great value to the scientific world but not to us.
12. The habits of <sup>except from an academic point,</sup> whalers, ~~do not~~ <sup>do not</sup> affect us at all. For we can only deal with them if they are within workable reach of our land stations, and as we can always find out from the whalers who have a life's experience behind them. The only points we have to consider are the preservation of whales and the observance of the laws & this we are quite capable of carrying out ourselves.



From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

- 13) In Again invidious distinction in between our  
our civil servants & the members of the  
Discovery. I might quote as an example  
Mr. Bennett, as compared with Mr. ?  
Mr. Bennett is skilled naturalist. Hard life  
year after year. Lonely & in exile. Grave  
risks & discomfort.

His pay and leave. Discovery's men leave  
& pay.

- 14) Again the buying of the Discovery has given  
rise to grave criticism, ~~After the purchase~~ and it is felt that  
too technical knowledge has been purchased and  
practical knowledge as otherwise how could the  
mistake have been made

- 15) Again it is felt that a colony with  
its Executive <sup>and</sup> & Legislative Assembly is put in  
an unenviable position of having no say in  
the finances derived from this source, but that  
this important work is performed by a  
Committee living thousands of miles away with  
no experience of local conditions.

From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

16) Again I submit that as the results of the Discovery are purely scientific, properly shared by the whole world, other countries interested who reap the benefit of the scientific knowledge thus gained should pay a pro rata share, so that the whole cost shall not be fristed in this colony.

17) If left to us we could supply a great deal of the scientific knowledge required in an inexpensive manner by engaging for individuals to occupy the whalers to the different parts of the Dependencies. The ~~idea~~ but we could not do could money wait for a few years

18) We gain much knowledge at little cost. Quote Mr. Bennett's notes, on whales etc. The new map of the islands sent up by the Harbour Master etc.

19) Consider that the claims of education, housing, sanitation, the roads, schools and the medical service come ~~before~~ Assign scientific knowledge of a purely

(3)

From His Excellency the Governor

to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

<sup>I respectfully submit</sup>  
academic interest, and that the heavy financial burdens the  
Empire has to bear as the after-effects of the Great War does not  
justify the expenditure which gives no financial return  
26) I must apologise at the great length

of this despatch, but I have thought  
it advisable to explain the whole  
matter from every point of view, as I  
can find no record of any such  
statement having been submitted to you  
before, and I respectfully ask for  
your sympathetic interest and kind consideration  
of the problem.

I have etc.

Att.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

9th July, 1927.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir, In the Colony than that of anyone else.

I have the honour to confirm my confidential telegram of the 7th of July, 1927, relative to the protest which has been raised against the continued expenditure of the surplus revenues of the Dependencies of this Colony for the purposes of the 'Discovery' expedition and to report in full on the circumstances of the matter.

2. In the first place I would say that as Governor of this Colony I consider it is my duty to give you the true feeling of the people who inhabit it, without fear or favour, and at the same time my own considered opinion, dispassionate and unbiassed, on any particular problem which may arise, an opinion moreover which is neither underestimated nor exaggerated, and then to carry out your instructions, whatever they may be, to the best of my ability. It is in this spirit that I indite this despatch.

In duplicate.

3. I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed on this subject to the Colonial Secretary bearing date the 5th of July, 1927, by Mr. H. H. R. Gresham, local Manager of the Falkland Islands Company, who is, as you are aware, an unofficial member of the Legislative Council and

also/

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

L. C. M. S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

also provisionally of the Executive Council. I have formed a high opinion of Mr. Gresham's business capacity and general ability and on matters such as the present his opinion undoubtedly carries more weight in the Colony than that of anyone else. I feel sure that his letter has been written in no petty or carping spirit of criticism, for I am told that he has always shewn himself to be most loyal in his co-operation with the Government and there can be no ground to suppose that he is actuated by any but purely disinterested motives for the common good.

4. I would explain that the matter was brought up by Mr. Gresham at a meeting of the Executive Council on the 7th of July, 1927, and discussed in detail. The members were all in general agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Gresham who stated that it was with great regret that he felt himself constrained to voice the growing discontent and that if no satisfaction could be obtained by local appeal he feared that the matter would be raised in the Imperial Parliament and a campaign started in the home press. I have exerted my personal interest to arrest such a course at any rate for the present but I must lay before you the possibility that Mr. Gresham's apprehensions may prove to be founded on no empty words in view of the many influential people who have vested interests in the Colony and the Dependencies.

5. I have myself carefully considered the problem presented from every point of view and I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Gresham's complaint is substantially just. I am further of

the /

the opinion that in considering this problem the interest of the Colony, in which term I include the Colony proper and the Dependencies, and its future should be placed first whereas at present this objective would seem to be but secondary and indirect.

6. It is true that for the moment with its carefully accumulated surplus balances and with the Land Sales Fund in reserve the Colony is in a sound financial position but it is equally true that we are so unfortunately situated as to depend entirely and absolutely on two products, wool and whale oil. If the price of the former were to fall below the figure of 1s. 0d, per lb. and the latter to give out the administration would have no alternative but to subsist on capital for some few years and then to apply to the Imperial Government for a grant-in-aid.

7. As you are aware the surplus revenues of the Dependencies have averaged more than £100,000 during the years 1924, 1925, and 1926, and are expected to be £60,000 or more during 1927. The present is therefore a unique opportunity which may never again occur of placing the finances of the administration upon so firm a basis that whatever happened the future could be faced without dismay. As you are aware the total expenditure on the 'Discovery' expedition amounted up to the 31st of December, 1925, to £190,557 and the total estimated expenditure for the years 1926 and 1927 is £79,347 and £46,821, respectively, or £316,725 in all up to the 31st of December, 1927, at which date there should

should be in addition accumulated balances in the sum of £350,000 at the least giving on a conservative calculation a gross amount of £650,000 to be transferred from the funds of the Dependencies to the credit of the Research and Development Fund in the three years immediately subsequent to the enactment of Ordinance No. 6 of 1924. This amount invested, at interest at 5 per centum would yield an annual return of over £30,000 to which there is to be added the present income of £9,000 per annum approximately from permanent investments on account of the Land Sales Fund and the Currency Note Investment Fund, a total of £39,000 per annum, or the equivalent approximately of the estimated expenditure of the Colony for the current year under the eighteen ordinary heads. If the annually recurrent cost of running the administration of the Colony including the Dependencies on sound but economical lines to the exclusion of any new or capital works is set at the round figure of £50,000 and the annual surplus revenues of the Dependencies at the minimum figure of £50,000 also it will be seen that within ten years from this date the interest from fixed investments would have <sup>been</sup> sufficient to finance the Colony in all essential services for all time.

8. I have stated above that the interest of the Colony is but indirectly served by the 'Discovery' expedition. I would explain that hitherto the ships of the expedition do not appear to have undertaken any work of exploration which might be of great benefit to the Colony through the discovery of new islands and harbours where bases  
for/



for whaling operations could be established to the profit of the public purse. On the contrary they follow for the most part the ordinary beaten tracks which are already well-known to those engaged in the industry. Furthermore the amount of survey work accomplished is very small in comparison with its imperative importance to navigators, and in this connection I would remark that it is difficult to regard with equanimity the fact that the existing charts of the South Shetlands and the South Orkneys, for example, published by the Admiralty are of little use to the Norwegian captains of the floating factories who prefer to trust to their own knowledge and experience of these waters. In brief the energies of the 'Discovery' expedition are to all intents and purposes confined to work of a scientific nature which is no doubt of considerable value to the scientific world but is of no practical advantage to the Colony.

9. From the point of view of this administration knowledge of the life habits of the whale has no bearing on the issue except as a matter of academic interest. It is only practicable to exercise control over or to make use of the whales when they are within a workable distance of the land stations or harbour bases in the several Dependencies, and their prevalence or otherwise within such distance can always be ascertained from the whalers whose knowledge is based on the experience of a lifetime. The sole matters which concern this administration are the preservation so far as is possible of the whales which frequent its territories and the observance

Executive the /

(5)

Executive Council, and all the Zoologists except the laws and regulations governing the whaling industry. These matters, I beg to submit, can quite adequately be carried out by the executive without the assistance of the scientist or the theorist.

10. Grave criticism has been directed against the purchase of the R.R.S. "Discovery" for the service of the expedition, and of the expenditure which has been lavished upon the vessel subsequent to purchase for refit and equipment. No secret has been made of the fact that she is entirely unsuited for cruising in latitudes south of  $40^{\circ}$  and that built for the ice she is useless except in the ice into which she pays only occasional visits. It is felt that an error of the first magnitude has been made and that technical knowledge has been allowed to take precedence over practical knowledge at a capital cost of some £130,000.

11. The distinction moreover in the rates of salaries paid to the members of both the executive and scientific staff of the 'Discovery' expedition and to the permanent civil servants of the Colony is most invidious and a subject of strong comment and source of potential discontent. Dr. Kemp and Commander Stenhouse as you are aware draw salary in excess of any official in the Colony with the exception of myself and in addition receive free keep on board ship, the three senior Zoologists receive in similar circumstances salary in excess of or equivalent to the maximum grade of the office of Treasurer, the second senior member of the

Executive /

Executive Council, and all the Zoologists except the four most junior are more highly paid than Mr. A. G. Bennett whose total emoluments per annum amount to £450 in respect of the joint offices of Customs Officer, Acting Government Naturalist, and Whaling Officer, South Shetlands, held by him.

At the South Shetlands moreover Mr. Bennett performs the additional duties of Magistrate, and of Postmaster. Mr. Bennett has practical experience of whaling in the South Shetlands extending over a number of years and he has made an exhaustive study of the whale and its movements in these waters. The life of a British Whaling Officer living alone with the Norwegian fleet is exacting and the responsibility and risks attendant thereon require great moral and physical courage in the individual. I consider that it is most commendable in Mr. Bennett that he should never have attempted to draw a comparison between the conditions of service under which he and his colleagues in the "Discovery" are called upon to work.

12. Again it is impossible to disregard the feeling locally that a Colony with its own Executive and Legislative Councils is put in the invidious position of having no voice in the disposal of the moneys derived from its Dependencies, with which in reality it must form one composite whole, but that this function of primary importance is delegated to the sole authority of a Committee sitting many thousands of miles distant with little, if any, experience of local conditions.

13. I would further submit that as the results of the 'Discovery' expedition will be of a purely scientific/

scientific nature presumably shared by the whole world the other countries who stand to reap the benefit of the knowledge thus gained should pay a proportionate share of the cost of running the expedition and that the total cost should not be left as a burden upon the revenues of the Colony.

14. I am, however, of the opinion that a great deal of the scientific knowledge required could be obtained by this Government in an inexpensive manner by arranging, for example, for scientific officers and naturalists to accompany vessels of the whaling fleets to the different parts of the Dependencies. Information would thus be steadily accumulated from year to year and any slight delay in the collection of data which might be occasioned could surely not be of such vital consequence. In actual circumstances knowledge of considerable value is acquired from various sources at little or no cost. I would instance Mr. Bennett's reports and memoranda on whales and whale movements and also on ice conditions as well as the new chart of the South Orkneys which was obtained by the Harbour Master from the captain of the floating factory s.s. "Southern Queen" and forwarded to you for transmission to the Admiralty as an enclosure in my despatch, No. 111 of the 1st of July, 1927.

15. I consider moreover that the claims of the Colony in the way of education, housing, roads, and the medical and sanitary services come before those of scientific knowledge of an interest which is almost entirely academic, and I respectfully submit  
that/



DESPATCH of the 9th of July, 1927.

that in these days of national economy the heavy financial burdens which the Empire has to bear as one of the after-effects of the Great War do not justify expenditure of such magnitude without adequate return.

16. I have to apologise for the great length of this despatch but I have thought it advisable to explore the matter in its every avenue as I can trace no record of any such statement having been submitted to you before and I respectfully ask for your sympathetic interest and kind consideration of the problem.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

ARNOLD HODSON.

3. In reviewing the expenditure since the Fund was inaugurated I have arrived at the conclusion that not only has far too much money already been spent but that there has also been a very serious waste of money. It is extremely difficult to believe that the scientific results obtained have warranted an expenditure of approximately £115,735. In particular I would mention what can only be described as a

THE HONOURABLE  
THE COLONIAL SECRETARY,  
STANLEY.

ENCLOSURE TO FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL

DESPATCH of the 9th of July, 1927.

COPY.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

July 5th 1927. "Discovery".

Sir,

I beg to refer to Ordinance No. 6 of 1924, entitled "Dependencies Research and Development Fund 1924" and to enquire whether in the opinion of the Government an appeal should not at once be made to the Secretary of State with a view to the repeal of this Ordinance.

2. As a Member of the Legislative Council who was present at the passing of this Ordinance, I beg to say, that I view with very serious alarm the expenditure of enormous sums of money on researches of doubtful utility in connection with the Whaling Industry when the Colony proper is badly in need of improvement and development, in practically every direction one looks. It is unnecessary to say that had this Colony received the monies spent by the Fund during the last three years, including 1927, its financial position would have been on a firm basis for many years to come.

3. In reviewing the expenditure since the Fund was inaugurated I have arrived at the conclusion that not only has far too much money already been spent but that there has also been a very serious waste of money. It is extremely difficult to believe that the scientific results obtained have warranted an expenditure of approximately £316,726. In particular I would mention what can only be described as an

appalling/

THE HONOURABLE  
THE COLONIAL SECRETARY,  
STANLEY.

appalling mistake, namely, the expenditure of £207,785 in connection with the rebuilding, fitting out and expenses of the R.R.S. "Discovery". That this vessel is quite unsuitable for working in these latitudes is beyond dispute and it can only be surmized that the technical advisers responsible were guided more by sentiment in the selection of this famous vessel than knowledge of conditions south of parallel 50° S.

4. We have also the item "William Scoresby" and here again the expenditure and running expenses appear to be out of all proportion to the results achieved. That £71,124 should be spent on working out marine stations and trawling around the Falklands is really unbelievable. The same applies to the Marine Station at South Georgia on which £20,112 has been expended.

5. In view of the foregoing figures, which include the estimated expenditure for 1927, and also the following reasons, I beg to express the hope that the Government and Unofficial Members of Councils will make a determined effort to bring about the repeal of this Ordinance :-

- (a) That it is wrong in principle that Revenue should pass direct into the hands of a scientific or any other body and be administered by them.
- (b) That whilst the movement of plankton and the collection of specimens may be of interest to scientists it is of no economic value to the Colony or its Dependencies. The outstanding fact is that whales are  
either/

either in the vicinity of South Georgia, South Shetlands and South Orkneys, where they can be caught, or they are not there. If they do not visit these places no amount of scientific endeavour will entice them to go there. Were this possible there might be some excuse for a large expenditure to date but we are faced with prodigality and waste of money of which there is apparently no end in sight.

I am, etc.,

(SGD.) H.H.R. GRESHAM.

Member of Legislative Council.



(21.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

C/14/27.

14th July, 27.

Sir,


I am directed by the Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th of July, 1927, on the subject of the Dependencies Research and Development Fund established under Ordinance No. 6 of 1924 and to inform you that the representations made by you in this connection are receiving His Excellency's most careful consideration.

2. I am to add that a further communication in the matter will be addressed to you in due course.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

  
Acting Colonial Secretary.

THE HONOURABLE

H. H. R. GRESHAM, M.E.C., M.L.C., J.P.,

STANLEY.



C/14/27.

DECODE.TELEGRAM.*From* The Governor.*To* The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

---

*Despatched:* 20th October ... 192 7 *Time:* 12.15. p.m.*Received:* ... .. 192 .. *Time:* ...

Urgent confidential my despatch confidential 9th July  
I observe from minutes of Discovery Committee dated  
August 10th and received October 19th that it is still  
proposed to procure a third ship for the service of the  
expedition. Respectfully submit that as Governor and  
an ex-officio member of the Committee I should be con-  
sulted before a step of this importance is taken and that  
the Chairman of the Committee may be instructed accordingly.

Governor.

TELEGRAM.

*From* The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

*To* His Excellency the Governor.

---

*Despatched:* 27th October, 1927. *Time:* 12.25.

*Received:* 28th October, 1927. *Time:* 11.00.

GOVERNOR  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Your telegram of 20th October question of procuring another ship is still under consideration by Discovery Committee who are not yet in a position to make any recommendation to me in the matter. I shall of course consult you if and when purchase is recommended. Full consideration will be given to your despatch of 9th July Confidential.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

DECODE.

24

TELEGRAM.

From His Excellency the Governor,

To The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Despatched: 29th October, 192 7 Time: 12.45 pm

Received: ... .. 192 Time: ....

CHAPELRIE

LONDON.

Your telegram of 27th October respectfully beg to thank you for your kind consideration this matter which has caused me great relief.

GOVERNOR.

Extract from Minutes of Executive Council Meeting  
held on the 7th of July, 1927.

Para 17.

The Honourable H. H. R. Gresham begged leave to bring before the Council the matter of the Dependencies Research and Development Fund Ordinance on which he had recently addressed a letter to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary. He stated that it was with regret that he raised the subject at his first meeting of the Executive Council but he had discussed the Ordinance with other members and had come to the conclusion that a determined effort should be made immediately for its repeal. He was present at the meeting of the Legislative Council at which the Ordinance was passed as a member of the Council, but he confessed that at the time he did not realize the enormous expenditure which would be involved. He never thought that it would amount to so much.

He looked upon the whole of this expenditure as outrageous and a scandal and it was apparent that a colossal waste of money was taking place in every branch of the Expedition. Apart from the economic point of view he should like to see the Ordinance repealed. It seemed to him wrong in principle that money should pass from the Colony into the hands of any scientific body without going through the Colony's accounts and being voted upon in the Legislative Council in the usual way.

These enormous sums were being spent on purely scientific work of a kind that was of no advantage to either the Colony or the Dependencies and of interest only to scientists and the British Museum. Nothing was being done that would benefit the whaling industry, and so far as he could see there was no end to the waste.

He/

He was of opinion that the feeling in the Colony was such that if the Ordinance were not repealed representations would be made to the British press with a view to the question being raised in Parliament.

His Excellency stated that he would take an early opportunity of bringing the matter to the notice of the Secretary of State and at Mr. Gresham's request agreed to communicate his representations by telegram.

*L.H. 13 June.*  
*Club Executive Council*



Extract from Minutes of Executive Council Meeting  
held on the 15th of November, 1927.

4. With reference to paragraph 17 of the minutes of the meeting held on the 7th of July, 1927, the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, speaking by His Excellency's direction said that in continuation of the previous debate before this Council on the subject of the Dependencies Research and Development Fund, he wished to raise formally the added argument why the revenues earned in the Dependencies should be credited to and administered by the Colony instead of being paid over, or rather the surplus of them, paid over to the body known as the 'Discovery Committee'. That argument was based on the practice in New Zealand. As Honourable Members were aware the Government of New Zealand since 1923 had administered a region known as the Ross Dependency by virtue of an Order of His Majesty in Council, dated the 30th of July, 1923, constituting the area in question a dependency under the administration of the Governor-General of New Zealand. So far as he was aware the revenues of the Ross Dependency were credited to and administered by the Dominion Government, and he failed to see why, simply because this Colony was smaller and less known than the Dominion of New Zealand it should receive differential treatment at the hands of the Imperial Government. He thought that the point should be put before the Secretary of State and, if the Secretary of State considered fitting, before His Majesty's Government.

His Excellency added that this was not a matter raised in any spirit of irritation or intrigue but on the supposition that the Secretary of State would give it full and sympathetic consideration, realising that it  
was /

was His Excellency's duty as Governor of this Colony to regard its interests as prior to any other claim in virtue of the oaths he had sworn and taken for the good Government of this Colony and its people and which left him no alternative but to carry out.

The Honourable the Colonial Secretary, continuing, said that as Honourable Members were aware this Colony was by no means poor, relatively speaking: at the moment he had considerable accumulated funds in the shape of the Land Sales Fund and a comparatively large surplus balance standing to the credit of the Colony's General Account. If we were to receive the full revenues of the Dependencies we should be in an extraordinarily strong financial position, and he thought it would come as a generous gesture on our part, if we were given the entire control of these monies, to contribute a sum of say £10,000 annually in the interests of Imperial Defence. We very rarely had a warship visiting these waters, the reason given for these infrequent visits being <sup>that</sup> the cost of fuel was prohibitive, and all we should ask in return for our contribution would be more frequent visits from His Majesty's ships.

The Honourable the Treasurer expressed himself as in entire agreement with all that the Honourable the Colonial Secretary had said.

The Honourable H. H. R. Gresham said that he also was strongly in favour of the proposal which His Excellency had put forward through the Colonial Secretary. It seemed to him that this Colony had always been regarded as weak and that for that reason it did not receive the same treatment as the larger Colonies. A case in point was that when the farmers of the Falkland Islands

united/

Wm. Brown  
Clerk Executive Council

DUPLICATE

42

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Downing Street,

3 January, 1922.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in accordance with the undertaking given in my telegram of the 27th October careful consideration has been given to your confidential despatch of the 9th July, in which you deal with the protest that has been made in the Legislative Council against the continued expenditure of the surplus revenues of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands for the purposes of the "Discovery" Expedition.

2. Although I appreciate the spirit which has prompted you to write your despatch, I must, at the outset, observe that there is little that is new in the first question which you raise. Perusal of the correspondence noted in the margin shows that the principles governing the appropriation of the revenues of the Falkland Islands Dependencies were laid down after the most exhaustive discussion with your predecessor.

3. That correspondence dealt adequately, in my opinion, with the claim of the Falkland Islands to participate in the proceeds of the revenues of the Dependencies and I am not aware that any new factor has since emerged to change the situation. It was pointed out in Mr. Churchill's despatch No.101 of the 29th August,

1922

Yours,

ARNOLD HUDSON, ESQ., C.B.E.,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.,

13.3.22. No.113  
29.11.21.  
1.3.22. No.23  
1.3.22.  
22.5.25. No.75  
22.5.25.  
29.8.22. Conf.  
29.8.22.  
29.8.22. No.101  
29.8.22.  
29.8.22. No.28.  
7.4.24.

1922, that it was never contemplated that the Dependencies referred to in the Letters Patent of 1908 should form an integral portion of the Falkland Islands Colony. It was pointed out further, in the same despatch that after meeting the cost of providing the machinery of Government in the Dependencies the proceeds of revenue were to be devoted to measures for the benefit of these Dependencies. Accordingly, Sir J. Middleton was informed that, while the Secretary of State had every desire to ensure that the Dependencies should bear a proper and adequate share of the cost of the Central Administration it was impossible to agree to any arrangement which involved the acceptance of so extreme a view as that, for example, which had been advanced in the Governor's despatch of the 22nd May, 1922, viz: that the Dependencies should properly be charged with a proportion of the cost of the streets and lighting of Port Stanley.

4. If the Secretary of State found it impossible to accept the proposals put forward in 1922, I find it not less impossible on the same grounds, as well as on grounds of equity, to accept the more far-reaching proposal put forward in paragraph 7 of your despatch, which amounts, in effect, to a suggestion that the proceeds of the special taxation imposed in the Dependencies for the particular purposes connected with the Whaling Industry, in accordance with the principle enunciated in section 35 of paragraph 156 of the Inter-departmental Committee's Report, should now be diverted from that purpose and devoted to swelling the already substantial surplus balances of the Falkland Islands so as eventually to relieve the inhabitants of the Colony from taxation for all time. It is true that you have included



included the Dependencies as part of the Colony for the purposes of your argument; but since the failure of the whaling industry, which you instance in support of your contention, would leave the Dependencies practically uninhabited, the actual benefit from the acceptance of your proposals would fall exclusively to the inhabitants of the Colony.

5. In the circumstances, I am unable to agree that any contribution to the Falkland Islands from the Dependencies beyond the appropriate share of the latter towards the cost of Central Administration should be made. I am satisfied moreover that the amount of the contribution already made on that account is not illiberal.

6. It follows from what I have written that, if the revenues of the Dependencies are not to be called upon to bear the cost of special services, taxation there should be reduced to rates not more than sufficient to cover the cost of the Administration, a course which must inevitably react unfavourably on the revenues of the Colony of the Falkland Islands. On the question of the state of local feeling towards the imposition of special taxation for the purposes of the Research and Development Fund you confirm the evidence furnished by your predecessor that the idea is out of favour with residents in the Falkland Islands Colony; but I suggest that it does not follow that that view necessarily represents the opinion of the taxpayers mainly concerned, i.e. the persons interested in the Whaling industry in the Dependencies from whom the revenue is derived. On the latter point I would mention that, ever since the initiation of the "Discovery" enterprise, a good deal of evidence

evidence has from time to time reached the Colonial Office tending to show that the investigations not only command the approval of the whaling community, but receive their active co-operation and assistance.

7. I turn now to the criticisms of the work of the "Discovery" Expedition. In the first place I would remind you that this work implements the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee which were designed to secure for the Dependencies the economic development of the whaling industry and of other industries, and also to determine what purely scientific investigations were most required in connection with those regions. It has never been intended to limit the researches entirely to such as have immediate economic aims, which would be a sure way to diminish their utility. Nevertheless I am informed that in every programme of work which has been drawn up by the "Discovery" Committee the economic aspect of the work has been given first place, so that the statement made in paragraph 13 and repeated, though in somewhat qualified form, in paragraph 15 of your despatch that the work of the Expedition is purely scientific is somewhat erroneous. There would appear to be some inconsistency between your statement in paragraph 9 that "knowledge of the life habits of the whale has no bearing on the issue except as a matter of academic interest" and your further remark in the same paragraph, that "the sole matters which concern this Administration are the preservation so far as is possible of the whales which frequent its territories and the observance of the laws and regulations governing the whaling

whaling industry". Success in securing the maximum supply of whales is not likely to be attained, except by regulations based on a full knowledge of the habits and life history of the animals.

8. The methods employed by the "Discovery" expedition are those whose value has been fully demonstrated in fishery research in the North Sea and the North Atlantic. In the endeavour to obtain full knowledge of whales and of the circumstances which influence them the Committee is making use of all known methods of enquiry both by statistical and anatomical research on whales brought into the whaling station and by the closest possible investigation of the conditions of the waters which they frequent. The Committee are convinced that the plan adopted is the only course by which adequate information can be obtained and that all who have had experience of similar problems will endorse their view.

9. You have referred in your despatch to the meritorious services, often carried out under conditions of considerable hardship, of the Government Officers employed in the regulation of the whaling industry. With those remarks I am in full agreement and I am informed that the Discovery Committee has been greatly impressed by the zeal which Mr A.G. Bennett has shown in working up certain statistical data relating to whale-movement. It is, however, the opinion of the Committee, which I do not hesitate to accept, that many of the necessary investigations could not be carried out at all by either or both the alternatives outlined in paragraphs 9 and 14 of your despatch and that other investigations

investigations could only be pursued by those methods in a wholly inadequate manner.

10. It may not be out of place for me to remind you, in this connection, that some at least of the whaling community are fully alive to the value of scientific research. I understand that one of the Norwegian Whaling companies has equipped a special vessel for exploration in the South during the present season. Though the main object of the expedition is the discovery of new whaling grounds, it is noteworthy that a staff of scientists will be carried and that this staff will be occupied for the most part in investigations on plankton and hydrography. I would remind you also that the trawling work of the "William Scoresby" which was undertaken in the neighbourhood of the Falkland Islands in the early months of the past year was of direct interest to the Colony.

11. The Committee agree that the amount of survey work so far accomplished by the Expedition is much less than they would have wished, but it has been found in practice very difficult to combine survey work with the other activities of the vessels. Nevertheless an appreciable quantity of valuable information has been obtained regarding harbours and anchorages at South Georgia, South Orkneys, South Shetlands and the Palmer Archipelago and will shortly be published by the Admiralty. The matter has engaged the Committee's attention for some time past and it is hoped to make arrangements which will allow the services of the survey officer to be more fully utilised in future; but even with a staff detailed exclusively for Survey work in the Dependencies

Dependencies many seasons would have to elapse before correct charts could be published.

12. You have drawn my attention to the criticism which has been directed against the purchase of the R.R.S. "Discovery" for the service of the Expedition, and against the high cost of reconditioning the vessel. I take this opportunity of recording the facts.

13. You will be aware that the Interdepartmental Committee recommended the acquisition of two wooden sailing vessels. They were guided by the advice of a special Ship Committee which included a representative of the Hydrographer's Department of the Admiralty and the late Dr Bruce of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition. Representatives of the whaling industry were also consulted. After the Secretary of State then holding office had accepted those recommendations, specifications and estimates of the cost of the proposed ships were obtained which showed that the larger would cost £200,000 and the smaller £100,000 to build. Such figures were obviously prohibitive, and a special Committee, one of whose members possessed Antarctic experience, was appointed to consider what, if any, alternative was or might become practicable. Enquiries were made in many quarters, including Dundee, Norway and Sweden, regarding the possibility of purchasing suitable ships. Of the various numbers and types considered there were none suitable but the "Terra Nova" and the "Discovery". The former was in Newfoundland and was not for sale and the "Discovery" was thus the only wooden ship available. You remark that this vessel is entirely unsuited for cruising in latitudes South of 40°.

She



She was in fact, designed in the Admiralty Construction Department and is the only ship now in commission which has been built in this country specially for work not only South of the 40th parallel but in Antarctic seas. The programme of work then in contemplation included work in, and in the neighbourhood of the Weddell Sea, where much pack ice would be met and where there was not only the possibility, but the probability, that the ship might be beset and even forced in winter in heavy moving pack ice in which only a wooden ship of special design and exceptional strength would have a chance of survival if heavy pressure were encountered. In my opinion, the Committee were not only well advised to consider the purchase of the "Discovery" but they would have incurred a grave responsibility if they had recommended a steel vessel or any ship not specially built for the emergency of wintering in the ice. Considerations of safety, which do not appear to receive adequate recognition in your despatch naturally and properly weighed heavily with the various Committees which considered the matter. It is true that the work during the first season was handicapped by the excessive rolling of the "Discovery". The fitting of sister keels has, however, practically removed this cause of complaint; and the Committee are not without hope that some additional alteration may without any great expense, further improve the efficiency of the vessel though it has, of course, been recognised from the first that neither the "Discovery" nor, indeed, any other single vessel even when supplemented by the whale-marking vessel, could completely fulfil the requirements of Research and the Commanding Officer, while

original

requirements of all the purposes in view.

14. The price of the "Discovery" was expected to be in the neighbourhood of £10,000 and the cost of re-conditioning was estimated by the Consulting Naval Architects as between £40,000 and £50,000 but by the Admiralty at possibly as low a figure as £20,000. These estimates were given under reserve and with the qualification that only very rough estimates could be given in advance, since the work which it would be necessary to perform could not fully be ascertained by any feasible method of preliminary opening up. It was only as the work proceeded that it would become possible to identify all the decayed timbers which required replacement. Before taking a final decision, however, the question of building two ships was again considered, but the cost was still estimated at £240,000. That sum, like the original estimate, was prohibitive, and, if the work of the investigations was to proceed, it was clear that the acquisition of the "Discovery" was the only means to that end then available. At a time when the need for economic development throughout the Empire was, as it remains, so pressing the abandonment or indefinite postponement of the researches was only to be contemplated in the last resort, and since a beginning was possible within the means of the Research Fund the Secretary of State authorised the purchase at a cost of £5,000. This is the step which in my view you are not justified in describing as "an error of the first magnitude" or indeed as an error at all, and it is a significant commentary on any such opinion that both the Director of Research and the Commanding Officer, while freely criticising

criticising certain shortcomings of the vessel, voluntarily admitted that at the time and on the information then available they would not have dissented from the decision to purchase.

15. I come, now, to the question of reconditioning. After a special report from the Admiralty had been received on the capacity of the firm concerned to carry out their contract, the lowest tender received was ultimately accepted; but it should be made clear that this tender was for such reconditioning as could then be specified, that it was realised throughout that further work would be necessary, and that a scale of charges for such work was arranged beforehand. Although, at the survey prior to purchase, the ship had been opened up so much as to evoke a protest from the owners it was found necessary in the course of reconstruction to replace heavy timbers in so much larger quantity than had been anticipated that the original contract had to be revised and the work carried out on a "time and line" basis so that the cost plus purchase price, survey fees and charges, wireless etc. was increased to £113,500 in all. In the case of substantial extra payments to the Contractors, members of the Construction Department of the Admiralty whose advice had been placed at the disposal of the Committee were consulted and gave their support to the decisions taken. It is indeed to be deplored that the expenditure proved to be so considerable but the contractors' claims were scrutinised with the greatest care throughout the progress of the work and the increased payments were unavoidable and fully justified. In this connection it is not out of place to point

point out that prior to the 1st June 1925, when the reconditioning was practically complete no expenditure of any description was incurred on the sole authority of the Committee.

16. You have alluded in paragraph 11 of your despatch to the distinction between the rates of salaries paid to the employees of the Expedition and those paid to permanent civil servants in the Colony. There are several reasons which, in my opinion, justify that distinction. Amongst them may be mentioned the existing demand for naturalists possessing the special qualifications required as compared with the limited supply of such officers, who have received a costly scientific training and are in a position to command higher salaries. Further, some of the appointments necessitate the employment of officers of uncommon ability and considerable experience. Additional inducement by way of higher salaries is also necessary in view of the risks and discomforts incidental to work at sea as compared with those on land. Another factor which cannot be ignored is that the posts held by the officers concerned are not permanent and pensionable.

17. It is, I think, unnecessary to answer paragraph 12 of your despatch in detail, having regard to the explanation given in the first six paragraphs of this reply; but I would point out that the authority to incur expenditure from the Research and Development Fund rests substantially with the Secretary of State and not with the Discovery Committee. Their authority is limited to expenditure within the amount estimated to be required annually for the work of

of the investigations, and such amount receives the Secretary of State's approval only after the estimate has been submitted in detail. I am confident that you will agree, on reconsideration, that in view of the nature of the work to be performed, it would be impracticable to administer the expenditure from Stanley where many of the data required to frame the estimates are not available and could not be made available without inordinate delay.

18. Before closing this despatch I must refer to the international aspect of the whaling question which is no less important than the economic and scientific aspects. The possibility of international action in regard to the exploitation of the products of the sea has formed one of the questions considered by the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law. A result of recommendations made by that Committee is that the last Assembly of the League adopted a resolution instructing the Economic Committee of the League to study the question whether and in what terms, for what species and in what areas, international protection of marine fauna could be established. The French Government recently circulated a draft convention for the regulation of whaling to the Governments represented upon the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, and it seems probable that His Majesty's Government may be required eventually to furnish the French Government with their views on the draft convention. Representations have been received from the Government of New Zealand on the effect of the operations of unlicensed whalers in the Ross Sea. The Norwegian Government have approached His Majesty's Government informally with



(30)

with a view to the conclusion of a bilateral agreement for the regulation of unlicensed whaling.

19. The instances mentioned indicate that it will probably be necessary before long for His Majesty's Government in Great Britain in consultation with the Dominion Governments concerned, to endeavour to frame a common policy in regard to the question of the international control of whaling and to be prepared to deal with international situations which cannot precisely be foreseen but are likely to prove of considerable difficulty. It is largely from the result of the "Discovery" investigations that His Majesty's Government hope to obtain the technical information required, and from this point of view His Majesty's Government regard the investigations as having become of decided importance to Imperial interests.

20. In conclusion, I would observe that the need for such investigations as a means not only of safeguarding the existing industry against collapse but also of ascertaining whether it could be safely extended was recognised before the outbreak of the late war. The scheme has received the warm encouragement of the Secretary of State and of his predecessors, and active interest in the work has been displayed by some of the Dominion Governments. I am confident that, in the light of the considerations put forward in this despatch you will agree that to abandon so promising an enterprise at a moment when a satisfactory beginning has been made would be a grave mistake.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient,  
humble servant,

(For the Secretary of State)  
(Signed) W. ORMSBY GORE.

(16)

S.G.No.10/28

Magistrate's Office,

South Georgia.

10th January, 1928.

Confidential

How C.S.

My dear Sir Samuel,  
I forward you privately copy of ...  
as I do not wish to irritate the Committee  
Further.

They  
Your Excellency,

After having been so short a  
time in this Dependency I approach with  
diffidence the matter on which I am about to  
address you.

I, however, feel it my duty to point out  
that the extraordinary waste of public money  
in connection with the "Discovery" Scientific  
Expedition here is not only exposing the  
British Administration of this Colony to  
ridicule but is liable to become a serious  
grievance on the part of the whaling community  
who, I am given to understand, voluntarily  
agreed to the original taxation imposed on  
the industry. As a typical example of the  
local public opinion I can only quote a  
statement made to me by one of the whaling  
managers to the effect that he had heard a  
rumour "that the local Barnum's circus was  
to be suppressed."

His Excellency A. Hodson Esq., C.M.G.,  
Government House,  
Stanley.

State.  
we do nothing for whaling community.  
Even by for their own rights  
4 doctors & we better service of  
latter!!  
Handships of Barnes  
Rumbles. Human nature being  
it is can you wonder  
exists!  
Have formed high opinion  
of Alistair - not likely to escape  
or make stupid statements.  
He was in the Navy  
his brother is Sir Archibald  
Alistair of Sutherland, Devon.  
etc. etc. etc.

Reply to Magistrate  
was interested in his speech  
which he was making  
attentions. Embolden my comments on

page 3.  
A.H.



3. The obvious differences in salaries, quarters and general treatment accorded to the Government Officials here and the Marine Station Staff has been the subject of considerable comment.

SALARIES. In this case only one example need be quoted. The salary of the Cook of the Marine Station (in my opinion an entirely unqualified man and a source of considerable trouble amongst the subordinate Government officials) is the same as that of my Assistant Customs Officer, who has been in the Government service for over four years. The Marine Station Cook also receives free messing and an allowance of 1.1b of tobacco per month.

Also 11/10/08  
1-10-08 year!

QUARTERS. In this case the differences are so enormous as to make the general comparison impossible. It should be sufficient to say that the Marine Station is fitted with central heating (although the Station is customarily vacated in the winter months) and equipped with water lavatory, and a bath room with an efficient hot and cold water supply. The Government Quarters have no central heating, no sanitary system whatsoever (except for an earth closet built by themselves) and the only facility for washing purposes is one cold water tap to the scullery. This source of supply has been to my certain knowledge frozen up for considerable periods during the past two winter seasons.

~~Marine~~ Headquarters,  
mental & physical, of our  
staff all through winter,  
Discovery staff disappear.

4. The different treatment does not render it in any way easy for the Magistrate to maintain his position in the Dependency. In this connection I have been personally informed that, my opinion as Magistrate is of no value whatsoever as Dr. Kemp's ruling would be accorded the support of the Colonial Office in London and would therefore have precedence over any decision of the Colonial Government.

5. I should like to point out that a work which the R.R.S. "Discovery" could possibly have performed which would have been of extreme value, both to the whaling companies and to the Government, appears to have been practically completely overlooked, this being the proper charting of the waters and harbours of this Island. This matter appears to have been mentioned in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (See page 21., para. 118 and also para. 27 of the Summary of Recommendations).

6. I also beg to suggest that a small portion of the Dependencies revenue may be devoted to matters which are already seriously considered as offering suitable openings for trade developments in this Dependency.

I am particularly referring to:-

- (a) The establishment of a fur fox industry on this Island. This appears to be more than feasible when the close analogy between the Pribiloff Islands and South Georgia is taken into account (See the Report of the Interdepartmental

Committee/

*I am prepared to consider  
sympathetically any private  
Co which might wish to  
explore this avenue of  
trade but God forbid that  
we should enter into adventures  
of this sort.*



Committee/

on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, page 46 para. 4.).

- (b) The manufacture of fish guano on a commercial scale as at present practised, I understand, in Norway.

7. It appears to me obvious that from whatever point of view the Marine Research Station and it's work is regarded that the primary point at issue is the preservation of the whaling industry and I venture to suggest that a more efficient supervision of the floating factories and shore stations is an immediate necessity. If more whaling officers could not be appointed to do this the supply of a suitable vessel, such as the "William Scoresby", to enable the principle whaling officer to pay surprise visits to the shore stations would at least help in this matter. At the moment if he wishes to visit any station he has previously to borrow a whale catcher from that station. The vessel suggested could also be used for the purposes mentioned in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committ on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, (See Appx. XLX, page 131, para.1). In this instance I should like to draw Your Excellency's attention to the following statement on line 12, reading as follows:- "This would relieve the research ship for work which, though possibly of less importance could not be carried out without her".

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

*Fredrick Allison*  
Magistrate.





C.S. M.P. 9/14/27

47

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

C.S. No.....

MEMO.

Departmental Number.

S.G.No.21/28

From. Magistrate, South Georgia.

Date.....12th January, 1928.

To. Hon.Col.Sec., Stanley.

Reference  
Numbers.

I should be glad if you would be good enough to  
cause the attached letter to be submitted to His Excellency  
the Governor.

*Frederick B. Allen*

Magistrate.

Y.2.

*Substantive*

*Just*

18. 1. 28.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

27th January, 1928.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Sir Samuel,

I forward to you privately a copy of a memorandum from Alison, the Magistrate at South Georgia; my reason for not sending it on officially is that I do not desire further to irritate the "Discovery" Committee.

2. The memorandum speaks for itself and it is unnecessary for me to say much in addition to what I have already written but I do wish to tell you that I consider our position vis à vis of the whaling community very weak from this aspect. As it is we do absolutely nothing for them except to collect from them many thousands of pounds annually by way of duty on oil. They even maintain their own harbour lights and medical men the services of which latter we are obliged/

BRIGADIER-GENERAL

SIR SAMUEL WILSON, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,  
ETC., ETC., ETC.

obliged from time to time to borrow :

3. You will appreciate too I feel sure the discomforts and dangers experienced by our Whaling Officers who spend the whole of their summer isolated from their own people and cooped up in a filthy whaling factory in the ice at the South Shetlands or the South Orkneys and then return to snow-bound South Georgia for the winter just at the time when the Marine Station at Grytviken closes down and the staff of the "Discovery" expedition go off to Cape Town for the season. Human nature being what it is can you wonder that dissatisfaction exists at this great dissimilarity in treatment.

4. I would say that I have formed a high opinion of Alison. He is not likely to exaggerate or to make stupid statements. He was previously in the Navy and holds the rank of Lieutenant-Commander on the retired list and is the brother of Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., of Budleigh Salterton, Devon, who is still serving as a Lieutenant-Commander

on/

on the active list of the Navy.

With kind regards.

Yours very sincerely,

Your Excellency,

ARNOLD HODSON.

After having been so short a  
time in this capacity I approach with  
diffidence the matter on which I am about to  
advise you.

I, however, feel it my duty to point  
out that the extraordinary case of public works  
in connection with the Discovery-Eden  
Expedition here is not only affecting the  
Administration of this Colony but is  
likely to become a serious grievance on the  
part of the working community who, as given to  
stand, voluntarily agreed to the original  
conditions imposed on the industry. It is a typical  
example of the kind of public opinion I

HIS EXCELLENCY  
A. W. BURNETT, Esq., F.R.S.,  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
STANLEY.

COPY.

MAGISTRATE'S OFFICE,

SOUTH GEORGIA.

10th January, 1928.

Your Excellency,

After having been so short a time in this Dependency I approach with diffidence the matter on which I am about to address you.

2. I, however, feel it my duty to point out that the extraordinary waste of public money in connection with the "Discovery" Scientific Expedition here is not only exposing the British Administration of this Colony to ridicule but is liable to become a serious grievance on the part of the whaling community who, I am given to understand, voluntarily agreed to the original taxation imposed on the industry. As a typical example of the local public opinion I can only

quote/

HIS EXCELLENCY  
A. W. HODSON, ESQ., C.M.G.,  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
STANLEY.



quote a statement made to me by one of the whaling managers to the effect that he had heard a rumour "that the local Barnum's circus was to be suppressed."

3. The obvious difference in salaries, quarters and general treatment accorded to the Government Officials here and the Marine Station Staff has been the subject of considerable comment.

SALARIES.

In this case only one example need be quoted. The salary of the Cook of the Marine Station (in my opinion an entirely unqualified man and a source of considerable trouble amongst the subordinate Government officials) is the same as that of my Assistant Customs Officer, who has been in the Government service for over four years. The Marine Station Cook also receives free messing and an allowance of 1 lb. of tobacco per month.

QUARTERS.

QUARTERS. In this case the differences are so enormous as to make the general comparison impossible. It should be sufficient to say that the Marine Station is fitted with central heating (although the Station is customarily vacated in the winter months) and equipped with water lavatory, and a bath room with an efficient hot and cold water supply. The Government Quarters have no central heating, no sanitary system whatsoever (except for an earth closet built by themselves) and the only facility for washing purposes is one cold water tap to the scullery. This source of supply has been to my certain knowledge frozen up for considerable periods during the past two winter seasons.

4. The different treatment does not render it in any way easy for the Magistrate to maintain his position in the Dependency. In this connection I have been personally informed that my opinion as

Magistrate/

Magistrate is of no value whatsoever as Dr. Kemp's ruling would be accorded the support of the Colonial Office in London and would therefore have precedence over any decision of the Colonial Government.

5. I should like to point out that a work which the R.R.S. "Discovery" could possibly have performed which would have been of extreme value, both to the whaling companies and to the Government, appears to have been practically completely overlooked, this being the proper charting of the waters and harbours of this Island. This matter appears to have been mentioned in the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (See page 21, para. 118 and also para. 27 of the Summary of Recommendations).

6. I also beg to suggest that a small portion of the Dependencies revenue may be devoted to matters which are already seriously considered as offering suitable openings for trade developments in this Dependency.

I/ he

I am particularly referring to :-

- (a) The establishment of a fur fox industry on this Island. This appears to be more than feasible when the close analogy between the Pribiloff Islands and South Georgia is taken into account (See the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, page 46 para. 4.).
- (b) The manufacture of fish guano on a commercial scale as at present practised, I understand, in Norway.

7. It appears to me obvious that from whatever point of view the Marine Research Station and it's work is regarded that the primary point at issue is the preservation of the whaling industry and I venture to suggest that a more efficient supervision of the floating factories and shore stations is an immediate necessity. If more whaling officers could not be appointed to do this the supply of a suitable vessel, such as the "William Scoresby", to enable the principle whaling officer to pay surprise visits to the shore stations would at least help in this matter. At the moment if he wishes to visit any station he

has/

has previously to borrow a whale catcher from that station. The vessel suggested could also be used for the purposes mentioned in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, (See Appx. XIX, page 131, para.1). In this instance I should like to draw Your Excellency's attention to the following statement on line 12, reading as follows:- "This would relieve the research ship for work which, though possibly of less importance could not be carried out without her."

I have, etc.,

(SGD.) FREDERICK B. ALISON.

Magistrate.



TELEGRAM.

*From* The Colonial Secretary.

*To* The Magistrate, South Georgia.

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*Despatched:* 2nd February, 1928. *Time:* 4 p.m.

*Received:* .... 192 *Time:*

MAGISTRATE  
SOUTHGEORGIA

Strictly confidential please endeavour to obtain written statement of views on Discovery expedition from each of the Whaling Managers and other influential persons in the Whaling Industry at South Georgia for handing to His Excellency on arrival. These statement should be kept strict confidential and personal to yourself and are regarded as being of the utmost importance.

SECRETARY.

DECODE.

C/14/27.

58

**TELEGRAM.**

*From* His Excellency the Governor,

*To* The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

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*Despatched:* 2nd March, 1928. *Time:* 15.00.

*Received:* ..... 192 .. *Time:* .....

CHAPELRIE,

LONDON.

Confidential your despatch of 3rd January  
confidential Discovery expedition on return from  
visit to Dependencies I am preparing further  
despatch on this subject which should reach you  
at the beginning of May.

GOVERNOR.

59  
C/14/27.

(It is requested that, in any reference to this minute, the above Number and the date may be quoted).

MINUTE.

6th March, 1928.

*From*

THE COLONIAL SECRETARY,

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

*To* The Magistrate,

SOUTH GEORGIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

With reference to your memo. No. S.G. 21/28 of the 12th of January, 1928, I am directed by the Governor to inform you that His Excellency was interested in your letter dated the 10th of January, 1928, addressed to him on the subject of the 'Discovery' Expedition, and that the representations contained therein are receiving his earnest attention.

2. I am to add, with regard to the suggestion contained in paragraph 6 of that letter, namely that a small portion of the Dependencies revenue might be devoted to assist in the establishment at South Georgia of such industries as the farming of the fur fox, that while His Excellency is prepared to consider sympathetically the proposals of any private company which might wish to explore this avenue of trade, it would appear to him neither feasible nor desirable, under present circumstances, that the Government should enter into adventures of this sort.



Colonial Secretary.

FAULKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

60  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

15th March, 1928.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my Confidential telegram of the 2nd of March, 1928, informing you that I am preparing a further despatch on the subject of the "Discovery" Expedition in reply to your Confidential despatch of the 3rd of January, 1928, and to state that I regret that owing to the length and the importance of the despatch and to the pressure of official business connected with the visitation to the Colony of the Lord Bishop of the Falkland Islands and otherwise I have not been able to complete it so as to reach you as promised by the beginning of May.

2. I shall arrange, however, for it to be completed and sent to you without fail by the mail which is due to leave Stanley by R.M.S. "Orita" on the 2nd of May, 1928, and to arrive in England about the end of that month.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

ARNOLD HODSON.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

L. C. M. S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

Stanley, Falkland Islands. (61)

7th May, 1928.

Sir,

The return of the Royal R.S. "William Scoresby" to the Colony prompts me to refer to my letter of the 5th July, 1927 and, respectively to ask whether the Secretary of State is enquiring into the expenditure and general running of the "Discovery" Expedition.

2. I may say, in referring to this subject again, that apart from my letter referred to, that it is common knowledge in Stanley that the recent arrival of the R.R.S. "William Scoresby" has created an extremely bad impression owing to the behaviour of some of the officers and crew on arrival. Particulars of the situation are quite well known to the Police Authorities.


3. In conclusion I beg to say that I fully realize that His Excellency the Governor is trying to rectify this dreadful waste of Public money and the chaotic state of affairs which would be quite evident were a full enquiry to be held.

If nothing is done, after His Excellency's representations, it appears extremely likely that the various land owners in the Colony will wish to make the whole matter known at home either through the medium of the House or the Press.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Member of Executive and Legislative  
Councils.

The Honourable.  
The Colonial Secretary.

Stanley.



A/S TØNSBERGS HVALFANGERI  
SOUTH GEORGIA

HUSVIK HARBOUR 25 February 1928

- PRIVATELY -

*Confidential.  
Forwarded re  
our conversation  
E.S.B.  
M.H.*

To

His Excellency The Governor  
of The Falklands Islands & Dependencies.

S T A N L E Y .  
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Sir,

From Manager Mr. Esbensen I have been informed as to Your Excellencys instructions according to which the S/S "Fleurus" shall have to proceed to Montevideo. Furthermore I have received Your Excellencys greetings to Mr. Adamsen, of which Mr. Adamsen has been informed.

Relative to the S/S "Fleurus" I beg to inform Your Excellency that I am now by wire applying for postponement of the repairs for a period of three months or up to the next time the ship will call at Montevideo.

Concerning those improvements, which Your Excellency wanted to have done onboard the "Fleurus" I beg to mention, that I am now communicating with the Head-office at Tønsberg in this connection and I propose that these arrangements ought to be done at the same time as the repairs of the ship.

##  
In connection with The Discovery Expedition I shall most respectfully beg to draw Your Excellencys attention to

that, of which I think Your Excellency ought to be informed, viz.: that unjust report, which has been sent on to London by the Leaders of the Discovery Expedition regarding the former Magistrates of South Georgia, Mr. Binnie and Mr. Barlas, and which report has resulted in Mr. Binnie having been compelled to give in his resignation and Mr. Barlas degraded to a lower rank.

Personally I do know these men to be absolutely upright and I am convinced that both of them in every way have looked after The Government's interests in the very best way.

It is hurting deeply to learn that such men, who have faithfully served The Government during a long period should be treated in such a way because of irresponsible gossip.

I intended to bring this matter before Your Excellency during the conversation I had the honour to have with Your Excellency yesterday, but the time being rather short I thought it more wise to write to Your Excellency about the matter.

I trust that Your Excellency will make further investigations into this matter and in such case I feel convinced, that both of these Gentlemen will have full satisfaction in every way.

Thanking Your Excellency for the opportunity Your Excellency has given us to meet with You this time I beg at the same time on behalf of the men at this station to thank Your Excellency most sincerely for the great interest Your Excellency has shown in arranging this sportsmeeting and for the cup Your Excellency did set up as prize, and I do hope, I shall have the honour to see Your Excellency here in Husvik Harbour at next



years sportsmeeting.

Trusting Your Excellency shall have a good voyage to Stanley this trip

I beg to remain,

Sir,

Yours faithfully

*Halmar Andersen*  
Manager.

FAULKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

69  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

31st March, 1928.

Sir,

In duplicate.

I have the honour to forward to you a copy of an extract from a letter addressed to me privately, while at South Georgia, by Mr. Hjalmar Andersen, the much respected Manager of the Tonsberg Whaling Company's land-station at Husvik Harbour, on the subject of the allegations stated to have been made at the Colonial Office by Dr. S. Kemp and Commander Stenhouse of the "Discovery" Expedition against Mr. E. B. Binnie, late Magistrate at South Georgia, and Mr. W. Barlas, the Deputy Magistrate. I would state that similar protests were also made to me verbally by the Managers of the other whaling stations in South Georgia who appeared to be greatly upset at what they had heard in this connection and firmly believed to be true.

2. I find it indeed difficult myself to give credit to the report but such is its persistence that I feel constrained to bring it to your notice. I feel that if there had been anything in what is stated to have happened this administration would at least have been informed, if not, consulted. I would ask, however, that the matter may be investigated and that I may be informed of the actual facts of the case.

3. I do not know Mr. Binnie personally but I have ascertained/

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

L. C. M. S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

ascertained on the spot that he was much liked and respected in South Georgia and that no suspicion is breathed against his honesty or fairness. I have, however, met Mr. Barlas for whom I have the highest regard and whom I consider to be a most capable and conscientious officer. I trust that your opinion of him has in no way been influenced by reports of this nature which I discount as altogether unfounded and I take this opportunity of repeating my previous recommendation that his work may be deservedly recognized by promotion in the near future either to the office of Magistrate, South Georgia, if and when it falls next vacant, or to some other suitable post. Mr. Binnie, as you are aware, has retired recently from the service at his own request and ostensibly at any rate of his own desire.

4. In conclusion I would say that I have brought this question to your notice in no improper spirit and with no intention of delivering an indirect attack on the "Discovery" expedition but because I consider it my duty at all times to uphold the interests of those who serve under me and to probe the truth of any allegations of this sort which come to my knowledge.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble, servant,

ARNOLD HODSON.



(65)

ENCLOSURE TO FAULKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH  
of the 31st of March, 1928.

South Georgia.

HUSVIK HARBOUR,  
25 February 1928.

. . . . .

In connection with the Discovery Expedition I shall most respectfully beg to draw Your Excellency's attention to that, of which I think Your Excellency ought to be informed, viz.: that unjust report, which has been sent on to London by the Leaders of the Discovery Expedition regarding the former Magistrates of South Georgia, Mr. Binnie and Mr. Barlas, and which report has resulted in Mr. Binnie having been compelled to give in his resignation and Mr. Barlas degraded to a lower rank.

Personally I do know these men to be absolutely upright and I am convinced that both of them in every way have looked after the Governments interests in the very best way.

It is hurting deeply to learn that such men, who have faithfully served the Government during a long period should be treated in such a way because of irresponsible gossip.

I intended to bring this matter before Your Excellency during the conversation I had the honour to have with Your Excellency yesterday, but the time being rather short I thought it more wise to write to Your Excellency about the matter.

I trust that Your Excellency will make further investigations into this matter and in such case I feel convinced that both of these Gentlemen will have full satisfaction in every way.

. . . . .

ENCLOSURE No. III, TO FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL  
DESPATCH of the 8th of May, 1928.

.....

3. On completion of that programme Mr. Deacon will transfer to the Marine Station to work up his hydrographic results and the ship after bunkering in South Georgia will proceed to Deception Island taking observations at positions 7 to 14 and if possible two lines of stations at 10 mile intervals across Bransfield Strait.

4. If supplies of fuel are sufficient and if the weather is exceptionally good an attempt may be made to run the line of stations to Cape Horn and the Falkland Islands taking observations at positions 15 to 22. If, however, weather conditions should be unfavourable for that purpose, the vessel should return to South Georgia, taking two or three additional stations en route and sailing for Port Stanley at the end of the whaling season. It is desirable to repeat stations 1 to 6 if opportunity occurs.

.....

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

8th May, 1928.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir,

In continuation of my confidential despatch of the 15th of March, 1928, I have the honour in the first place formally to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch of the 3rd of January, 1928, on the subject of the continued expenditure of the surplus revenues of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands for the purposes of the "Discovery" expedition, and to express to you my grateful appreciation of the close attention which you have given to my representations in the matter. I am disappointed naturally that you have not been able to agree in the views advanced but I wish once again to state that I am ready at all times cheerfully and loyally to execute your instructions regarding this or any other matter. Nevertheless I feel the present question to be of such vital importance to the existence of this Colony and to constitute from the other aspect such a grave public scandal that I am constrained to beg leave further to approach you therein prompted now as before with the same spirit.

2. I am aware that the issue of the unity of the Colony and of its Dependencies has already been settled, as you point out, in the not remote past. I cannot, however, justify my position without making

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THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

L. C. M. S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

one more appeal in favour of complete unity. For I must maintain that except in the sole province of finance such unity is the established fact. I am styled the Governor of the Colony and of its Dependencies and I do not see therefore how I am able properly to divest myself - or my predecessors for me - of the responsibilities which are laid upon me under the provisions of the Colonial Regulations No. 2 to No. 13 alike as regards the Dependencies as the Colony. For example the duty of collecting the revenue in the Dependencies is left to me through my officers and yet the duty of controlling the expenditure is taken from me - indeed an anomalous state of affairs which cannot but result in irresponsible extravagance. The Executive and Legislative Councils of the Colony have identical powers under the constitution in the Dependencies and with the addition of a Magistrate resident in South Georgia the administration of both is entrusted to the same higher officers. It has been the practice for many years for officers borne on the establishment of the Colony to be detailed for duty in the Dependencies during the whaling season and the principle of the interchangeability of officers belonging to the respective staffs has never to my knowledge been disputed. Alone in regard to the monies levied in the Dependencies has the distinction been drawn and I have to urge that this distinction is locally and also imperially inconsistent. I should explain that my reference to the imperial sphere is intended to point the comparison between the standing of the Falkland Islands and New Zealand in this regard and I would ask that I may be corrected if I err in stating that the revenues raised from the whaling operations conducted in the Ross Sea are credited

direct/



direct to the main account of the Dominion's Government concerned and are thereafter available for expenditure on the general service of the state. I cannot avoid the reflection <sup>that</sup> ~~but~~ in such event the differential treatment to be observed arises from the disparity in size and means of the two countries which are not the less partners alike for better or for worse in the Imperial Commonwealth. I am confident that you will not lightly disregard such an appeal which, I submit, is only in accordance with the British tradition of fair play equally for great and for small.

3. It is true that the accumulated surplus balances of the Colony are at the present time substantial. But just as formidable are the accumulated arrear of constructive work which remains to be done. There are no roads in the Colony. There is only one port with even primitive facilities, and only one lighthouse on all the length of its treacherous coasts. No adequate provision has been made for the care of the sick and of the aged and but the slightest thought has been given to the higher needs of the people who lack almost totally any source of recreation and inspiration. It is due nevertheless to them and to their forebears, to the fact, that is, of their settlement in these distant islands and of their endurance of the most trying conditions conceivable that the Empire is now in the position to exercise control over the world's whaling industry. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that if it had not been for the British occupation of the Falkland Islands the Argentine Republic would have taken possession of all the Dependencies. These considerations may run the risk of being overlooked in the light of modern developments but they are, I hold, of themselves a full and sufficient answer to the objection

raised,



raised that the benefit from the acceptance of my proposals would in certain circumstances fall exclusively to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

4. I am again unable to reconcile this instance of disintegration with the spirit of co-ordination which is so characteristic of the whole trend of the times both in things Imperial and in things universal. As an example of the precept that "Union is strength" put into practice I would quote the comparatively recent constitutions granted to the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth of Australia and I would instance as a contemporary essay more widely to extend the application of this principle the appointment of the Parliamentary Commission to investigate the question of the closer co-operation of the great East African group of Colonies. I must think that in the case of the Falkland Islands also you will be the first to wish for that prosperity in a British possession, though isolated and neglected, which in this manner can be assured for all time without a burden of any description upon the resources of the Mother Country. With the accumulated funds standing in the account of the "Discovery" expedition and the surplus revenues of the Dependencies annually accruing paid to the credit of a unified administration it would become straightway possible properly to care for the present residents in the Colony both old and young, to provide some prospect of advancement for the future generations, and in short to turn to good use the excellent material available which otherwise is in sore danger of going almost entirely to waste. From the Imperial aspect moreover this Government would then be in the position actively, and if need be, liberally to participate in any scheme for inter-colonial development in whatever direction such might be

appropriately/

appropriately presented and would have the means at its disposal once and for all to raise the Colony from that slough of despondency in which for many years it has been sunk and to establish it firmly so that it will ever be able proudly to lift up its head as an independent equal amongst its fellows. Moreover in the event of the revenues of the Colony and the Dependencies being administered as one it would be the immediate impulse of this Government to offer to contribute towards the cost of Imperial Defence the sum, say, of £10,000 annually in return for which nothing more would be asked than the less infrequent visits to local waters of ships of His Majesty's Fleet.

5. I know that I lay myself open to the charge of importunity by my insistence on this side of the question. I do speak, however, in accordance with my oaths of office as Governor of this Colony and of its Dependencies, without fear or favour, although perhaps in my own interest it were more prudent and certainly easier to be content to let matters rest, and I cannot, without respectful but strong protest consent to the abrogation of my powers and the powers granted under the constitution to the Executive and Legislative Councils, composed, as they are, of experienced and responsible men with full knowledge of local conditions, in favour of a Committee occasionally convened eight thousand miles and more away from the scene of the operations which it is empowered to direct. I maintain that the conduct of an enterprise such as the "Discovery" expedition is beyond the competency of any Committee however constituted and in this connection I would make so bold as to recall to your memory your own words spoken at the last dinner of the "Corona Club" when you alluded to the danger which the Empire had run of losing what is act-

ually/

(96)

ually one of its largest and wealthiest colonies through the impotent vacillation of a Committee sitting in London. I ask therefore in the spirit of dutiful but firm resolve that I should be granted your authority forthwith to repeal the Dependencies Research and Development Fund Ordinance, No. 6 of 1924, and that thereupon the "Discovery" expedition should cease.

6. As I have said earlier in this despatch I have been actuated in bringing forward this whole question of the "Discovery" expedition in large measure because I apprehend that the outcome of its prolonged existence will be a public scandal of the first magnitude revealing inter alia a prodigal waste of the national assets, and I am anxious above all things to avoid the emergence in this Colony of any public scandal of which there occur to me at once egregious examples such as the failure of the Bombay Reclamation Scheme and of the Uganda Cotton Growing Policy. If I may be permitted in an official despatch to refer to my own political opinions I would state that I am a staunch Conservative, so much so as to merit the title of "die-hard", and that I cannot but contemplate with dire dismay the possibility of the inopportune disclosure as part of an "economy" campaign of the financial affairs of the "Discovery" expedition with results as far-reaching, it may be, in their consequence as those attendant on the publication of the Zinovieff letter or <sup>of</sup> the incidents connected with Mr. Ramsay McDonald's motor-car. I know for a fact that important business interests in Stanley are in close touch with an influential member of Parliament and that every move in this matter is keenly watched. I attach in evidence, as it were, a copy of a further letter addressed to the Colonial Secretary on the subject by

ENCLOSURE I.

Mr./

Mr. H. H. R. Gresham, the local Manager of the Falkland Islands Company, and a member, as you are aware, of the Legislative Council and provisionally of the Executive Council, whose opinions carry much weight and who possesses strong support.

7. You will appreciate that I am loathe to enter into the details of the scandal such as they appear to me to constitute it but I see no alternative in substantiation of my contentions but to give chapter and verse and to formulate definite criticisms. In the first place then with reference to the R.R.S. "Discovery" I regret that I do not see my way to withdraw my statement that an error of the first magnitude was committed in the purchase of the ship. I beg to point out that the words actually used by me "entirely unsuited for cruising in latitudes south of 40°" are meant to bear their most literal interpretation and that the expression "cruising" is used expressly in contradistinction to making a direct passage or lying in the ice. I am informed that the Captain of the ship, Commander Stenhouse, D.S.O., himself an ardent lover of sail as opposed to steam, while stating that he would desire no stouter ship for work in the nature of polar exploration complained that she was useless in keeping to a programme of stations for the purpose of an oceanic survey and was positively unsafe for any operations necessitating manoeuvres in loose ice or off shore. In support of this opinion it will suffice for me to invite your reference to Commander Stenhouse's report on the voyage of the R.R.S. "Discovery" from Cape Town to South Georgia in November, 1926, and to cite an instance on the occasion of the first visit of the R.R.S. "Discovery" to the Colony in the early part of that same year when for a time she was in imminent



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peril off a lee shore on the north-east coast of the Falkland Islands. Dr. Kemp, moreover, the leader of the expedition has said, I believe, that from every point of view almost, except that of sentiment, an iron ship would have been far more suitable, reliability and accommodation being but two of the essential advantages to be gained from the employment of a vessel of this description. The R.R.S. "Discovery", as you are doubtless aware, hitherto has not penetrated into the packice; in fact she has not remained in Antarctic waters after the beginning of the winter. She has, it is true, made a rapid excursion to Wiencke Island in the Palmer Archipelago and has experienced considerable hazards in entering at the South Orkney Islands, both localities, it should be noted, during the summer and in the course of her cruise from South Georgia to the South Shetlands, Cape Horn and the Colony. The Norwegian mariners whose seamanship is beyond question conduct their whaling operations exclusively with iron ships many of which are old British merchantmen constructed in some cases as far back as the eighties of the last century. In these ships they pursue the whales wherever they go even into the packice. In them they keep the seas and work up their catch in all weathers. It is absolutely incredible to me therefore in the light of the foregoing that in the selection of the vessel forming the primary component of the equipment of the expedition lifelong experience and first-hand knowledge of the actual conditions should have been taken so little into account. If, however, the R.R.S. "Discovery" was originally obtained for the sole reason that she was so exceptionally well fitted for work in the ice I am totally at a loss to understand the latest decision/



decision of the committee that work in the ice is not necessitated by the programme to be carried out and that another ship should be obtained in replacement of the R.R.S. "Discovery" as being better suited for the purposes of the expedition. In my view no more condemnatory example can be imagined of inconsequent stupidity and wanton waste.

3. Again on the score of technical advice pure and simple the Committee, I submit, either has been the victim of a grievous misjudgment or alternatively has shut its eyes to what it would not see. How otherwise is it possible to explain the fact the the R.R.S. "Discovery" when put into commission rolled so badly as not only to be unserviceable but also unseaworthy and that on her trial trip after purchase and equipment the members of the Committee who sailed in her from Southampton could not proceed beyond the end of the English Channel and suffering severely from mal-de-mer were glad indeed when she was put about and safely made port? I suggest that it would not have been difficult to ascertain fully defects so pronounced before the ship was bought. In ordinary life one does not buy a horse for a few pounds without thoroughly trying its paces and the old saw "caveat emptor" would surely have been more vividly present in the minds of the members of the Committee as individuals had they been negotiating the purchase of any article for their own use or in the course of their usual business or profession. I will not labour this point further as I feel certain that the Committee in their own hearts will be the first to acknowledge my contention to be correct. In fact I understand from Mr. A. G. Bennett, Customs Officer and Acting Government Naturalist, who has recently visited the Colonial Office while on leave in the United Kingdom,

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dom and has spoken with members of the Committee that privately at least certain of them recognise that a mistake has been made and are greatly distressed at the possible consequences of the present agitation which I have felt it my duty to lay clearly and fully before you. Incidentally I have heard also that it has been virtually decided by the Committee to purchase in the place of the R.R.S. "Discovery" or in supplement thereof an oil-burning steamship until recently engaged in the Baltic trade. I have not naturally given <sup>due</sup> ~~over~~ credit to this suggestion in view of the assurance contained in your telegram of the 27th of October, 1927, that I shall of course be consulted in such a connection but I would here beg leave to observe as a definite instance of the invidious position in which I find myself placed in regard to the "Discovery" expedition that on the occasion of the present visit to the Colony of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" I was not even furnished by the Committee with a copy of her sailing orders but was obliged to request the Commanding Officer of the vessel to supply me with one.

9. It might have been thought that with the lessons of the R.R.S. "Discovery" before them the committee would have been careful indeed when the matter of the provision of a second ship came up for consideration. I submit, however, that the experience of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" is not less lamentable. This ship you will recollect was constructed and commissioned for the special purpose of marking whales and is styled the whale-marking vessel. The history of her construction is indeed incredible. If the advice of practical men was sought it was in practice entirely disregarded. In spite, I had almost said in defiance, of expert knowledge the building of the vessel was given on contract/

contract to a firm technically and substantially incapable of the task with the result that when completed the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" was inadequate to perform the duties for which she was intended and had cost a figure greatly in excess of that paid by the whaling companies for a catcher of the latest type. At least such is the common report which has been repeated to me by the Managing Director of the Southern Whaling and Sealing Company and which would seem to be borne out in fact when it is considered that the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" finally cost £40,473 and a modern catcher costs between £20,000 and £25,000. There is, moreover, no gainsaying the fact that as originally despatched to these waters the vessel was too slow to pursue and mark whales and is still, if not actually unseaworthy, at least very difficult to manage in any seaway being down by the head owing to the position of her forward oiltanks and prone to labour under the weight of the seas which she ships incessantly by reason of her well-like midships and high bulwarks. She is in addition most cramped for living and working accommodation alike for the officers, scientists, and crew.

10. The misconception which has arisen over this matter of the hunting and the marking of whales is ludicrous if it were not so serious. I should explain that it is no simple one but requires specialized knowledge and aptitude. For the difficulty lies not in the shooting of the harpoon, or in this case the dart, but in the tracking and approaching of the whale which, when hunted, is readily scared. As you are aware, the whale-gunners are amongst the most highly paid men in the industry so that the utter absurdity of expecting the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" to undertake work of this nature/

nature with an unskilled personnel is at once apparent, and would have been made known to the Committee if they had thought fit for one moment to consult those on the spot who are obviously the best qualified to advise. It is the admitted fact that up-to-date the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" has marked, or is supposed to have marked, at the outside four whales during her first season in these waters and when she was in Stanley in May, 1927, the hand harpoon-gun used for the purpose was rusty with disuse and neglect. Furthermore the type of dart which it was proposed to use was so heavy and unwieldy with its round flat disc at the head that unless it were to fall true into the blubber of the whale it would strike at such an angle as to be torn out again by the rush of the whale through the water and was in any event useless for firing up-wind as it would drop short into the sea before reaching its object. I understand that Captain Sorlle, one of the managers in South Georgia, has been consulted with regard to the invention of a new type of dart but I do not know that further steps have been taken to enable the vessel to pursue what is, after all, the ostensible purpose of its commission.

11. I contend that in any case the provision of a second ship for the expedition such as the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" is entirely unnecessary. If she is required for the marking of whales then I would reply that I am in the position by arrangements already made with the whaling managers to ensure that at least two hundred whales are marked annually by their catchers without expense of any sort to this Government apart from the cost of the actual darts and discs to be supplied. On the other hand if she is required just to take "Sounding" or "Readings" or whatever is the particular/



particular term then I would ask you to consider what an appalling waste of money is involved when I can again make arrangements for these to be taken by the s.s. "Fleurus" or by one of the spare catchers belonging to the several whaling companies at the mere cost of the temporary hire of the vessel and of the few necessary adjustments, obtaining at the same time the valuable help of the seamanship, skill, and local knowledge of the personnel.

12. I would remark in regard to the whole scheme of operations for the expedition and more especially in regard to the Marine Station in South Georgia that it is during the summer months only that these have been conducted in the region of the Colony. In the winter the ships have departed to warmer climes such as South Africa and the Marine Station has been closed down. This winter I understand that the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" is to lie at South Georgia and the Marine Station to remain open. I fail to see what work they can be usefully expected to perform as for the greater part of this period the seas will be too rough to permit of Marine Research and the cessation of whaling operations will automatically prevent the supply to the scientists of material on which to occupy themselves. In fact on the occasion of my last visit to South Georgia in February last very few whales were being caught and the Marine Station staff had little or nothing to do. I can but conclude that during the winter months they will hibernate in luxury far from the uncomfortable stress of the outside world and from the disturbing eye of supervision.

13. I would not have wished to pry into the domestic affairs, so to speak, of the Committee more than necessary but I must <sup>at</sup> before bring before you the

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disastrous state of affairs which has prevailed on board this unfortunate ship from the beginning of her history, because in this direction in particular I hold to be revealed the sheer inability of the Committee to administer an enterprise of this nature which involves the running of ships and the handling of men. On arrival at Stanley in May, 1927, the officers and men of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" were a most unhappy company and in the circumstances of which you are doubtless aware the former including the Captain, Lieutenant-Commander G. M. Mercer, D.S.O., all tendered their resignations which were in due course all accepted, the vessel in the meantime having arrived at Cape Town. In the circumstances which had arisen I have no cause to cavil at this action on the part of the Committee but I do say that these circumstances should never have arisen. I desire strongly, however, to criticize the action of the Committee thereupon in ordering the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" home to the United Kingdom to effect re-commission on completion of which she had to cover 8,000 miles to Stanley in order to return to the scene of her operations. I submit that the expense of engaging new officers and, if need be, men in the United Kingdom and sending them out to Cape Town by mail boat to replace those who wished to return and could similarly have done so by mail boat would have been very considerably less than the cost of the additional 10,000 miles and more of steaming distance necessitated by the plan actually adopted.

14. Another grave mistake would now seem to have been made in the selection of Commander H. de G. Lamotte, D.S.O., R.N. (Retd) to succeed Lieutenant-Commander Mercer in command of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby". Commander Lamotte may possess many fine qualities and

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may bear an excellent record of past service but I have no hesitation in stating that he is entirely unsuitable for the specific task of commanding the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" in her present commission and on her present duties in Antarctic waters. He has no previous experience of ice nor would he seem latterly to have been afloat at all for I am told that prior to his appointment he was engaged in the callings of a book-maker and wines salesman. Such antecedents are not belied by his appearance and I have reason to fear that he is not of temperate habits.

15. You will see from a reference to my confidential despatch of the 28th of May, 1928, that on arrival at Stanley on the 1st of May, 1928, the whole ship's company, generally, including officers, scientists and men were drinking together in public bars and that within six hours of arrival many of them were drunk in the streets of Stanley giving rise to a scandal so disgraceful that it cannot fail to become a matter of widespread notoriety. I will not here go at great length into this particular incident beyond stating that when the Colonial Secretary sent for Commander Lamotte in this connection and told him to take steps to put his ship in order Commander Lamotte replied that as the crew were not under the Naval Discipline Act he did not see what effective steps he could take to prevent his men getting drunk when on liberty. The Senior Scientist Mr. D. John in like case stated that they had never realized what was going to happen. I would, however, emphasise to prevent any possible misapprehension that the suggestion that the attitude assumed by me or by this Government on this occasion was hostile and aggressive is totally unfounded. The first that was known to me of the incident or series of incidents was a telephone report made to the Colonial

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Secretary by the Chief Constable and transmitted by the former to me that the Artificer Engineer J. Sutherland was in arrest in the gaol for being drunk and striking a police constable. It transpires in fact that the police constable in question Earl, an ex-Marine of 18 years service, had seen the man earlier in the day and had advised him in a friendly way to go back to his ship and only went subsequently to arrest him when summoned by telephone by a private citizen to the Millinery Store maintained by the Falkland Islands Company where he was molesting a lady customer and using obscene and disgusting language. I would also observe that, as you will see from the statements attached as enclosures in my confidential despatch above referred to, among those reported as being drunk or under the influence of drink in the streets of Stanley in broad daylight on the afternoon in question are the Senior Scientist, Mr. D. John, the Scientist, Mr. Marr, the Second Officer, Lieutenant-Commander K. Morley, and the Cadet Third Officer Mr. F. Pease.

16. Following upon his interview with the Colonial Secretary and his appreciation of my severe displeasure at the whole incident Commander Lamotte approached the Colonial Secretary on the 4th of May, 1928, on the subject of the desirability of obtaining a relief for his Second, and Navigating, Officer Lieutenant-Commander K. Morley. In consequence of the Colonial Secretary's advice Commander Lamotte on the 5th of May, 1928, submitted to me a letter a copy of which I annex reporting on the abilities and conduct of the officer in question. I consider this document to reveal an unheard of state of affairs as prevailing on board the vessel and to be in itself sufficient evidence to prove Commander Lamotte's utter unsuitability to be in command. I am

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forced indeed to the conclusion that Commander Lamotte has only submitted it from a sense of guilt and from a desire to clear himself. This case should moreover be taken in conjunction with the fact that in the harbour of Grytviken, South Georgia, Commander Lamotte twice put his ship ashore, once badly entangling his propeller in a mooring hawser, and had to call upon the <sup>ARGENTINE</sup> ~~Argentine~~ whaling company there to tow him off to the eternal shame of British seamanship. It must also be taken in conjunction with the fact that in entering Stromness Bay the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" struck a rock the existence of which has been known to local mariners for many years past. The full circumstances of this accident have been communicated to you in my confidential despatch of the 13th of May, 1928, forwarding a copy of the Report of the Inquiry held together with a statement of the reasons for which I am unable to accept the finding of the Court of Inquiry which exonerates from blame the Captain and all the officers of the ship.

17. In parenthesis I would remark that as you are aware I have been making great and increasingly successful endeavours with the loyal support of my Colonial Secretary to combat the evils of drink in the Colony. I have therefore been much upset by the sad lack of discrimination shewn by the Committee in appointing a man of the type of Commander Lamotte which has resulted in an added difficulty to be faced and overcome by me in this connection. Information has in fact subsequently reached me that on a recent date in South Georgia Lieutenant-Commander Alison, the Magistrate, was himself landed from the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" in a helpless condition of intoxication.

18. Again in parenthesis you will observe from a perusal of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry into the accident sustained by the R.S.S. "William Scoresby"

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that clause 3 reads as follows:-

"That the Court is fully satisfied that the existence of this rock has been common knowledge since the year 1908 and was actually surveyed by a member of the "Discovery" expedition in March, 1927."

Commander Lamotte and the Navigating Officer of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" seem, however, to have been in complete ignorance of the existence of the rock, a fact which in my opinion shews an extraordinary omission on the part of the "Discovery" Committee to impart important information acquired and an astounding neglect on the part of Commander Lamotte to familiarize himself with the lessons of local experience.

19. You will have seen, I think, that the interior economy of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" is totally out of order. I will now propose to shew you that no effort has been made even in outward form to comply with the sailing directions, vague as they are, laid down by the Committee for the guidance of the Captain in their letter of the 15th of December, 1927, a copy of the relative paragraph of which I enclose for your facility of reference. You will see that these instructions are inter alia that the ship should proceed to Deception Island and, if possible make two lines of stations across the Bransfield Strait. I will state simply the course followed by the ship in pursuance of these instructions. After leaving South Georgia Mr John, the Senior Scientist, telegraphed by wireless about the 18th of April, 1928, to Mr. W. Barlas, the Whaling Officer for the season at the South Shetlands who was then actually on board the whaling factory s.s. "Ronald" at Deception Island, asking what the ice conditions were and enquiring as to the possibility of reaching Deception Island. Mr. Barlas replied to the effect that at that time the strait was

ENCLOSURE III.

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open at Cape Melville and that he advised the ship in coming from the direction of the South Orkneys to keep well north of Clarence and Elephant Islands and then to try to make Cape Melville. If ice was found in this vicinity they could go further west and enter by the Nelson Strait which was quite clear. In matter of fact I am told that the Nelson Strait is nearly always open and is also easy to navigate. The R.S.S. "William Scoresby", however, did not succeed in reaching Deception Island and there is nothing to shew that she made any real attempt to do so for she eventually arrived in Stanley, as I have said in a preceeding paragraph, on the 1st of May, 1928, having crossed the Burdwood Bank on the way where incidentally she was for a time hove to by reason of the weather conditions. Mr. Barlas himself left Deception Island in the s.s. "Ronald" on the 25th of April, and came out through the Nelson Strait and the s.s. "Solstrief" used this same passage on leaving the whaling grounds as late as the 20th of April. Neither vessel experienced any difficulty in making her course and in Mr. Barlas' opinion there was absolutely no reason why the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" should not have proceeded to Deception Island in accordance with her instructions. He can only conjecture that she encountered ice above Clarence and Elephant Islands and on that account turned to the northward out of harm's way. Mr. Barlas also told the Colonial Secretary that in conversation with Mr. John, the Senior Scientist he understood him to express the view that the navigation on board the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" was very poor, and that they had frequent difficulty in determining the set stations and in knowing indeed where they were. It seems to me that the action of the Committee in sending out the R.S.S. "William Scoresby"

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with an untried complement both of officers and men, including a navigating officer who by his own statement is deficient in the required training, to operate in these waters which are notoriously the most difficult and dangerous in the world is little short of criminal.

20. I will not weary you by further instances in substantiation of my contention that the Committee as being composed of men lacking in practical experience and free from direct responsibility have proved themselves absolutely incompetent of conducting an enterprise such as the "Discovery" expedition. I do not wish, I would insist, to attack personally the members of this particular Committee or to expose myself to the charge of vindictiveness. Rather do I hold, I will repeat, that it is beyond the power of any Committee composed of men of whatever degree of scientific or administrative ability to execute the task. I am aghast only to think that they should ever have ventured to embark of their own resources on the solution of problems of an nature so intricate demanding qualifications so specialized. I trust that you will not think it improper for me to suggest that with equal logic and like prospect of success a Committee might be appointed and sit in the Falkland Islands to enquire into the causes of the decline of the ostrich industry in South Africa or to report on the methods of elephant hunting followed in the several parts of the world. Fantastic vision would seem in this case to have blinded the eyes of the most sensible of the "Discovery" Committee: included among the equipment of the ship are ice sledges and tents as though remotely a dash to the pole had been pictured. Not even in the matter of gear and kit was advice sought of the

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Norwegians who stand recognized as authorities on such a subject. Should you, however, on investigation find the Committee as a body are to blame, as I state, for the prodigal waste of the public monies which has been incurred I suggest that it would be a case for grave consideration whether their financial liability should not be brought home to them in a material manner. I can assure you that if the conduct of the expedition had been in the hands of my administration the state of affairs revealed would never have existed or if it had existed would never have been tolerated for one moment. I must fain at risk of repetition beg leave to impress upon you that the whole tone of the "Discovery" expedition such as I perceive it to be is one of slackness and carelessness which can alone be attributed to the absence of any personal control or immediate supervision.

21. I would pass now to a review of the question as to whether the objects set before the "Discovery" expedition are likely in any way to serve the interests of the Colony or of the whaling industry. In paragraph 6 of your confidential despatch under reply you state that a good deal of evidence has from time to time reached the Colonial Office tending to shew that the investigations undertaken by the "Discovery" expedition not only command the approval of the whaling community but receive their active co-operation and assistance. It is true indeed that the whaling companies have done and do their utmost to facilitate the work of the expedition and that they profess to sympathize with its general aims. I do<sup>not</sup>/agree, however, that they approve at all the methods adopted. Mr. Barlas is well known and liked by the whaling managers and he reports that as far as he understands it their view is that there is

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no sense in the expedition and that it is merely a waste of money. They admit that possibly it may be of some purely scientific value but in the way of assistance to the industry they expect little, if any, results to accrue. Of my own knowledge gained last February, from personal talks with the whaling managers in South Georgia I can say that they are actively hostile to the expedition and are dissatisfied to the point of anger at the reckless expenditure which is allowed to continue before their very eyes. One of the most influential of the whaling managers stated to me that they had no objection to paying the duties levied on whale oil but that sooner than see the proceeds thereof squandered as at present they would wish them devoted to any public service such as the maintenance of a hospital in England. You will appreciate no doubt that in a matter such as this silence may easily be mistaken for consent particularly when free expression of contrary opinion is restrained by natural niceness and by fear of giving offence. The latter sentiment, I am sure, is strong in the immediate connection where to an alien corporation so much must necessarily seem to depend on cultivating the good graces of a foreign Government with the power to make or mar its fortune. I submit moreover that original assent to the imposition of a certain form of taxation cannot in fairness be held to imply unlimited and unqualified approval of the actual expenditure of the revenues raised thereunder even though the agreed objects are in fact sought. I am not exaggerating when I say that the "Discovery" expedition is the common laughing-stock of the whaling fleet and that the whole situation is really most/  
that the attempts made to discover fishing grounds, for example, on the Burdwood Bank were almost entirely abortive by reason of the heavy seas and the repeated

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most comic if it were not fraught with such tragic detriment to the good name of British administration and seamanship.

22. I am anxious not to appear inimical constitutionally to the noble cause of science but I cannot escape the conviction that the results to be obtained by the "Discovery" expedition must be to a large extent of a theoretical nature, and are in no way commensurate practically with the enormous expenditure involved. I would put before you that to all intents and purposes the knowledge in pursuit of which it is engaged can be found compendiously stored in the voluminous report of the "Challenger" expedition and that its further elaboration is an extravagance which this Colony is unable to afford. Personally I believe that in a few years there will be no whales longer found in the neighbourhood of South Georgia not because whales are becoming scarce in the ocean but because all wild animals learn intuitively to avoid localities antagonistic to them. In such a case the most complete observations on the life history of the whale will be absolutely valueless to the Colony though no doubt of intense interest to zoologists throughout the world. Again in paragraph 10 of your confidential despatch to which I have already referred you speak of the trawling work done last year by the R.S.B. "William Scoresby" off the coasts of the Falkland Islands as being of direct interest to the Colony. I am unaware that these operations were attended with conspicuous success or were productive of new knowledge. A number of codfish and other specimens of marine life, gastronomically edible or curious naturally, were caught but I am told that the attempts made to discover fishing grounds, for example, on the Burdwood Bank were almost entirely abortive by reason of the heavy seas and the repeated

accidents with the gear. In any case it is well known that fish are to be had in any quantity all round the Falkland Islands. It is, however, equally the truth that there is no demand for fish for local consumption or market for it in the neighbouring countries of South America whether fresh or dried. However successful therefore these trawling operations may be from the scientific aspect I fail to see how they can even serve to promote the welfare of the Colony in the least degree. Rather it seems to me in these enlightened days of twentieth century civilization monstrous that the anatomy of whales and the minutiae of marine life should be regarded as of more consequence than the health and happiness of members of the human family however few and weak. So far then as the Colony is concerned its interests can only be academic and its material needs are so insistent as to override all other considerations. For it is indeed its very life that is now at stake. I give it as the cold fact in contrast to these considerations that up to the present time the "Discovery" expedition has cost the taxpayers without tangible result the stupendous amount of 2525,000 or more than six times the <sup>annual</sup> revenue of the Colony from ordinary sources.

23. It is I would recapitulate after mature consideration of every aspect of the question and thorough exploration of every issue my unaltered and unalterable opinion that the "Discovery" expedition and all its works should forthwith and forever cease. If, however, despite the weight of the arguments advanced you still desire in your wider appreciation of the importance of the investigations that they should proceed I have prepared, against the dictates of my true conscience, an alternative scheme by which I

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maintain under the direct control of this Government arrangements can be made to obtain results equally if not more satisfactory than those at present<sup>obtained</sup> with greater efficiency and at less cost. In broad outline the proposed scheme is as follows. The Marine Station at South Georgia would be maintained as the headquarters of the investigations and there the Senior Scientist and the requisite directional and organising staff would be permanently stationed and the necessary specimens and data collected and collated before despatch to the United Kingdom for detailed examination. To perform the actual work of making observations and of taking samples as well as of preparing a geographical survey - the latter a real need to which too little attention has been paid - a sufficient number of scientists would be posted, with advantage from many points of view and not least from that of the more effective control of whaling operations and the stricter enforcement of the relative regulations, at the local stations or on board the floating factories licensed in the Dependencies. The leadership of the expedition might well remain in the hands of Dr. S.W. Kemo, D.Sc., under the administrative supervision of this Government by which all expenditure would be authorised constitutionally through the Legislative Council and systematically checked. The Director of Research would of course be given a free hand in matters of a purely scientific description and would be at full liberty to correspond direct with the British Museum and other competent authorities at home or abroad. I am prepared moreover to see that a vessel may be necessary to enable the Director of Research to exercise an adequate control of the scattered personnel and activities of his staff and to make lines of stations o  
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gather data in localities which are not ordinarily visited by the vessels in which the scientists will be working. There would in my opinion be no objection to the retention for this purpose of the R.S.S. "William Scoresby" which would be thus available also for the general service as required of the Colony and the Dependencies, on the sole condition, however, that she is manned by Norwegian officers, and men, with personal and practical knowledge of these waters and with that instinct for ice which cannot be taught. I have actually in view one or more Norwegians who would fill admirably the positions of Captain or Mate of the vessel. The primary economy to be gained will be the cost of maintaining the R.S.S. "Discovery" in commission; if for the benefit of the whaling industry in other parts of the Empire it is held that such a vessel is required I consider that it is but fair that those parts should be called upon themselves to provide the necessary funds. Incidentally I have myself read in more than one newspaper of standing that the object of the "Discovery's" search is shrimps. You will be aware from other despatches which I have addressed to you that the University of Oslo has in fact adopted this same method of research and that during the past whaling season a party of distinguished naturalists from that University visited Deception Island on board one of the whaling transports and carried out extensive investigations in the vicinity. If the authorities of the British Museum should desire similar facilities to be afforded to members of their staff I shall be glad at any time to make the necessary arrangements and I do not anticipate any difficulty in so doing. Furthermore in continuation of my proposed method of

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conducting the research the intention would be that the Scientist Officers should remain at the land station or on board the floating factories during the whaling season and that during the Antarctic winter they should be employed on working up the results obtained either at the Marine station or at the British Museum, passages in the latter case to and from the United Kingdom being easily available at nominal cost by the whaling factories when they come and go at the beginning and the end of the season.

24. At an approximate figure I place the expenditure required annually to finance the investigations at on the lines proposed/between £30,000 and £35,000, ~~per annum~~ roughly calculated as under on the basis of the Estimate of the "Discovery" Committee for the year 1928:-

<u>SCIENTIFIC STAFF.</u>	
Director of Research @ £1,500	
12 Scientists @ an average of £2500.	£ 7,500
<u>MARINE STATION.</u>	
Entire year.	£ 2,500
R.S.S. "WILLIAM SCORESBY".	£ 15,000
<u>SURVEYS.</u>	£ 2,000
<u>MAINTENANCE OF SCIENTIFIC OFFICERS.</u>	
at land stations or on board floating factories.	£ 1,000
<u>TRAVELLING.</u>	£ 1,000
<u>CLERICAL STAFF, STATIONERY,</u>	
<u>PRINTING &amp;c.</u>	£ 2,000
<u>SCIENTIFIC STORES.</u>	£ 1,000
<u>PENSIONS AND INCIDENTALS.</u>	£ 1,000
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	£ 33,000
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or a saving of more than £10,000 and £20,000, respectively, on the next recurrent expenditure allowed for shortly to have the opportunity of discussing the/

the years 1927 and 1928. The annual balance remaining on the revenue and expenditure account of the Dependencies and amounting at the present time to 250,000 more or less would pass to the accumulated reserve funds of the Colony and the Dependencies and would be ready against any contingency which might arise in the affairs of either, the interest meanwhile being applied to the practical service of their more urgent needs instead of being hoarded, as at present, for some hypothetical use, it may be, distant in time and remote in sphere.

25. As I draw near to the end of this despatch for the length of which I must crave your patient indulgence I should explain that in writing it I would not appear to be possessed of that quality of avarice which I am unable to dissociate from the authorities of the British Museum. I claim merely that if the control of the revenue raised in the Dependencies is transferred to this administration - if, so to say, the birthright is restored - it will be exercised in the manner best calculated to secure the moral and material prosperity of this section of His Majesty's subjects and not to acquire the doubtful advantage of a more intimate insight into the generative organs of the whale. I believe that the late Director of the British Museum was especially intrigued by this form of marine life but I understand that the predilections of the recently appointed Director turn more readily to humming-birds. May I be pardoned therefore if I express the hope that under the new order of things the leviathan will be left to disport himself in peace at any rate from the inquisitive eyes of science.

26. In conclusion I would state that I hope shortly to have the opportunity of discussing this

whole matter with you in person and at the same time that I should welcome the visit to the Colony to enquire into it in loco of a senior official or officials from the Colonial Office, for example, Mr. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., or, if it were possible, by special favour yourself.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

ARNOLD HODSON.

If nothing is done, after His Excellency's representations, it appears extremely likely that the land owners in the Colony will wish to make the whole matter known at home either through the medium of the House of the Press, and in the event of this being done, the Government will be obliged to hold a full enquiry to be held.

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(sd.) R. E. M. Graham

The Honourable  
The Colonial Secretary.  
Stanley.

Member of the Executive and Legislative  
Councils.  
Godsall



42

ENCLOSURE No. 1, TO FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL  
DESPATCH of the 8th of May, 1928.

Confidential

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

7th May, 1928.

Sir,

The return of the Royal R.S. "William Scoresby" to the Colony prompts me to refer to my letter of the 5th July, 1927, and respectively to ask whether the Secretary of State is enquiring into the expenditure and general running of the "Discovery" Expedition.

2. I may say, in referring to this subject again, that apart from my letter referred to, that it is common knowledge in Stanley that the recent arrival of the R.S. "William Scoresby" has created an extremely bad impression owing to the behaviour of some of the officers and crew on arrival. Particulars of the situation are quite well known to the Police Authorities.

3. In conclusion I beg to say that I fully realize that His Excellency the Governor is trying to rectify this dreadful waste of Public money and the chaotic state of affairs which would be quite evident were a full enquiry to be held.

If nothing is done, after His Excellency's representations, it appears extremely likely that the various land owners in the Colony will wish to make the whole matter known at home either through the medium of the House or the Press.

I am,  
or Shannon's report.

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(sgd.) H. H. R. Gresham

The Honourable

The Colonial Secretary.

Stanley.

Member of the Executive and Legislative  
Councils

(71)

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE No. II, TO FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL

DESPATCH of the 8th of May, 1928.

Confidential

c/o Foreign Fleet Division,

G.O. London.

5th May, 1928.

His Excellency

The Governor of the Falklands

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the abilities and conduct of Lieut. Commander K. Horley serving as Navigating Officer and Second Officer of this ship.

His navigation has frequently been of a slovenly and therefore of a dangerous nature.

On one occasion he reported that he had definitely fixed the position by observation of the Sun. I knew that two sights had been taken and therefore approached the land in thick weather in a manner in which I should not have attempted if I had not been misled by this Officers report.

The true facts were reported to me by Lieut. Commander Shannon and where that although two sights had been taken only one had been worked out. The ships position was therefore not known with sufficient accuracy to approach the land in the manner in which I was lead to make the attempt until stopped by Lieut. Commander Shannon's report.

Lieut. Commander Horley had no explanation for his conduct on this occasion. Lieut. Commander Horley has told me he does not know how to work out star sights or to adjust compasses. These are subjects which all

Naval/

(70)

I have twice informed Lieut. Commander Horley that Naval Officers are taught and I cannot understand him not having had the usual instruction. In any case there is an Admiralty Manual of Navigation on board and under this Officers charge and there has been ample time since the ship commissioned for him to have studied these matters and to have become efficient in them.

The Chart House in this ship is below the upper deck and there is sometimes occasion for the Officer of the Watch to go below to consult the chart. These visits should naturally be few and only taken when conditions on deck permit this being done in perfect safety. I observed this Officer visiting the Chart House (out of which his cabin leads) much more frequently than there was any necessity for. Lieut. Commander Shannon also reported to me that he had heard that Lieut. Commander Horley was keeping his watch in the wheelhouse when the conditions for keeping a lookout were unfavourable from this position. I therefore issued the following order which was signed by Lieut. Commander Horley.

"Officers of the Watch are not to leave the top bridge between Sunset and Sunrise or the lower bridge at any time.  
Necessary charts are to be on the bridge"

I find on enquiry that Lieut. Commander Horley has frequently disregarded this order.

This Officers consumption of spirits was excessive. I ordered him to restrict his consumption which order he disregarded. I then ordered him to cease incurring any bill for wines or spirits. He disregarded this order and forced me to give an order to the Steward not to supply him with any wine or spirit.

It is most undesirable that any officer should remain in a ship after it has been necessary to give such an order concerning him to any rating.

I have twice informed Lieut. Commander Horley that I should take steps to have him relieved if his conduct did not improve.

I consider I have been more lenient with this Officer than the circumstances justified but have taken the following facts into consideration.

He has not been in very good health ( probably due to his own faults) and he has been recently divorced by his wife which may have had some effect on him.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's,

Obedient servant

(Sgd) H. de G. Lamotte

Commanding Officer.

I have read the above report on Lieut. Commander K. Horley and I concur.

(Sgd) R. L. V. Shannon, Lieut. Commr.

R.N. (Retd)



ENCLOSURE No. III, TO FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFIDENTIAL  
DESPATCH of the 8th of May, 1928.

.....

3. On completion of that programme Mr. Deacon will transfer to the Marine Station to work up his hydrographic results and the ship after bunkering in South Georgia will proceed to Deception Island taking observations at positions 7 to 14 and if possible two lines of stations at 10 mile intervals across Bransfield Strait.

4. If supplies of fuel are sufficient and if the weather is exceptionally good an attempt may be made to run the line of stations to Cape Horn and the Falkland Islands taking observations at positions 15 to 22. If, however, weather conditions should be unfavourable for that purpose, the vessel should return to South Georgia, taking two or three additional stations en route and sailing for Port Stanley at the end of the whaling season. It is desirable to repeat stations 1 to 6 if opportunity occurs.

.....

CODE.

TELEGRAM.

*From*.....His Excellency the Governor,

*To*.....The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

---

*Despatched* :    23rd May,                      192    8    *Time* :    12.00.

*Received* :                                      192            *Time* :

CHAPELRIE,  
LONDON.

Confidential my despatch of 15th March  
confidential Discovery Expedition promised despatch  
is being forwarded by mail of 28th May. Gresham  
unofficial member of Legislative Council leaves for  
United Kingdom by same mail.

GOVERNOR.

103  
DUPLICATE



FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Confidential.

Downing Street,

27 June, 1928.

Sir,

Redd 67  
65

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Hodson's Confidential despatch of the 31st of March forwarding an extract from a letter addressed to him by Mr. Njalmar Andersen on the subject of allegations stated to have been made at the Colonial Office by Dr. Kemp and Commander Stenhouse of the Discovery expedition against Mr. E. D. Binnie, late Magistrate at South Georgia, and Mr. W. Barlas, the Deputy Magistrate.

2. The suggestion that any such allegations were made at the Colonial Office is quite without foundation. Dr. Kemp remarks that irresponsible gossip is at the root of the matter, but that the gossip is not his, and he adds that he has always held the highest opinion of Mr. Barlas. Commander Stenhouse denies having made any report about either Mr. Binnie or Mr. Barlas. Mr. Binnie left the Service entirely of his own accord and to my regret.

3. You will, no doubt, inform Mr. Andersen in the sense of this despatch.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING,  
THE GOVERNMENT OF,  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

(Sgd.) L. S. AMERY.

114  
C/14/27.

10th September, 28.

Sir,

With reference to that portion of your private letter dated the 25th of February, 1928, referring to the unjust report alleged to have been made to London by the leaders of the "Discovery" expedition against Mr. Binnie and Mr. Barlas, late Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate, South Georgia, respectively, I am directed to inform you that the Governor has made due enquiry into the matter and has been notified by the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the suggestion that any such allegations were made at the Colonial Office is quite without foundation.

2. I am to add that the Secretary of State further says that Dr. Kemp remarks that irresponsible gossip is at the root of the matter, but that the gossip is not his, and he adds that he has always held the highest opinion of Mr. Barlas. Commander Stenhouse denies having made any report about either Mr. Binnie or Mr. Barlas.

3. I am also to add that the Secretary of State in conclusion says that Mr. Binnie left the service of this Government entirely of his own accord and to Mr. Amery's regret.

I am,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

Mr. Hjalmar Andersen,  
Manager,  
Husvik Harbour,  
SOUTH GEORGIA.

for Colonial Secretary.



Copy.

Downing Street.

11th December, 1928.

56930/28.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to request you to inform the Discovery Committee that after carefully considering their note on the criticisms of the Committee made by the Governor of the Falkland Islands he has come to the conclusion that they have completely and satisfactorily answered the very serious charges made by the Governor and that Mr. Hodson has been so informed.

2. I am to add that Mr. Amery has every confidence in the Discovery Committee and trusts that they will see their way to continue their valuable work.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) G. GRINDLE.

THE SECRETARY  
DISCOVERY COMMITTEE.

### Note on Criticisms of the "Discovery" Committee

made by the Governor of the Falkland Islands

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The Committee has considered the report of the Governor from the present Governor of the Falkland Islands to H.E. Secretary of State for the Colonies, and has concluded to draw its attention. They believe the first step should be to deal with matters beyond their jurisdiction of fact. The remaining paragraphs however contain certain extremely critical of the Committee's work in the Committee's management of the matter, "and the Committee is of the opinion that the Committee should forthwith and forever cease." The Committee will be satisfied that the Secretary of State has shielded himself from the imputation of bias. They nevertheless consider it proper and necessary to consider the specific allegations made against the Governor of the fact, and to review fully the same and the report in which these are being published, and to draw a future policy.

Before doing so, however, in view of the hostile and hostile character of the Governor's conclusions, they consider it desirable to call attention to the extraordinary and hostile nature of the statements on which these are based. To quote but a few instances, Captain Stokhouse is represented as complaining that "the Discovery was positively useless for any operations necessitating manoeuvres in loose ice or off shore". Captain Stokhouse (letter of 22/2/36) reported that in a gale between Tristan da Cunha and

\* The correct date of the Discovery is evidently as earlier than 1819, these matters being of that date is mentioned in page 15.



- 2 -

Note on Criticisms of the "Discovery" Committee  
made by the Governor of the Falkland Islands.

The Discovery Committee has considered the despatch dated May 8th\* from the present Governor of the Falkland Islands to H.M. Secretary of State for the Colonies, and communicated to them by his direction. They believe the first six paragraphs to deal with matters beyond their cognisance or function. The remaining paragraphs however contain certain extravagant criticisms of the Committee: these attribute to the Committee "inconsequent stupidity", "wanton waste", "action little short of criminal", and express the Governor's "unalterable opinion" that "the Discovery Expedition should forthwith and forever cease." The Committee note with satisfaction that the Secretary of State has dissociated himself from the intemperate language of the despatch. They nevertheless consider it proper not merely to examine the specific allegations made against their conduct of the work, but to review briefly the aims they pursue and the degree in which these aims are being fulfilled, and to touch on a future policy.

Before doing so, however, in view of the sweeping and hostile character of the Governor's conclusions, they consider it desirable to call attention to the extraordinarily hasty and incorrect nature of the statements on which these are based. To quote but a few instances, Captain Stanhouse is represented as complaining that "the Discovery was positively unsafe for any operations necessitating manoeuvres in loose ice or off shore". Captain Stanhouse (letter of 22:2:26) reported that in a gale between Tristan da Cunha and

\* The correct date of the despatch is evidently no earlier than May 28th, since another despatch of that date is mentioned in paragraph 15.

and Grytviken "the ship behaved wonderfully well" and that "few ships would have weathered this gale without damage." Further, being asked for comment on the substance of the Governor's remark, he directly denied making such statements as are attributed to him, wrote that it was "entirely wrong to say that the Discovery or any ship of her class is unsafe for working off shore", and referring to a passage cited in the despatch, says that the Discovery "had a short but severe buffeting, in the weather edge of the pack ice, which few ships, and certainly no ship unprotected against ice, would have survived without damage" (letter of 12:9:28). Similarly, the Discovery is said early in 1926 to have been "for a time in imminent peril on a lee shore on the north east coast of the Falkland Islands." This is without foundation: she was not in peril, nor on a lee shore. Again it is stated that there "is no demand for fish for local consumption or market for it in the neighbouring countries of South America, whether wet or dried." Yet in 1927 Argentina alone imported 17,000 tons of fish, and this with the Uruguayan import of 1925 and the Brazilian of 1926 (in each case the last figures available) totalled over 57,000 tons. The above are merely examples of more than a score of direct misstatements made or repeated in the despatch. The Committee feel that material of this character is totally inadequate as a basis for the broad conclusions and charges which the Governor has built upon it, and regret the expenditure of public time in dealing with them.

Paragraphs 7 - 26 relate to:

- A the purchase of the Discovery.
- B her efficiency.
- C the building of the William Scoresby.
- D her efficiency.
- E her personnel.
- F the general conduct of the work.

G the work done and its utility.  
H the Marine Biological Station at South Georgia.  
I Suggested Organisation.  
J the British Museum.

A. Purchase of the Discovery. The Discovery was bought not by the Discovery Committee, but on the recommendation of a previous Committee. As, however, the imputation is clear that experienced and expert advice was ignored in her purchase, it appears proper to explain the choice of the vessel. The original recommendation as to Research Ships was made by the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, (hereinafter referred to as the Dependencies Committee), in their report published as Cd 657. This Committee consulted Dr. Bruce, the leader of the Scotia Antarctic Expedition, Dr. Rudmose Brown, also of Antarctic experience, Captain C.A. Larsen, the founder of modern Antarctic whaling and explorer of the Weddell Sea, Captain Sörille, an experienced whaling captain, and Mr. Theodore Salvesen, head of one of the largest British whaling firms, and others, and the recommendations made by this Committee after hearing all the evidence were approved by Dr. Bruce, to whom they owed much. These recommendations were for the acquisition of two ships, both wooden, the larger of about 700 tons nett, (intended for oceanic work), protected against ice at and near bow and stern by wooden sheathing, and the smaller of about 230 tons nett, entirely protected in the same way.

The cost of building these ships, however, (estimated at £300,000) was considered prohibitive. In 1922 a Committee was appointed to consider what action could be taken to put the recommendations into force. This Committee, like its predecessor the Dependencies Committee, was Interdepartmental. It included among others two representatives of the Naval Construction Department of the Admiralty (one the Assistant

Director) the Consulting Naval Architect to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, a representative of the Royal Geographical Society of great Antarctic ice experience, and a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with long practical experience of marine biological work undertaken for economic ends. This Committee considered carefully the characters of practically all recent Antarctic Exploration ships, and of such whalers and sealers as were in the market, and recommended the purchase of the Discovery without a dissenting vote.

In view of the authorities consulted by the first Committee and the professional standing and experience of the members of the second, it is difficult to see what further steps could have been taken to secure the best information as to the conditions to be met and the best decisions to meet them. It should be understood that so far from the ship being bought without due enquiry into her condition and character as a sea boat she was "opened up" before purchase, to the very greatest practicable extent, and her conduct at sea was known to the Committee from the records of her past cruises under the command of Captain N.E. Scott, R.N., and those of other vessels of her class, designed to resist ice pressure.

When she passed into the control of the Discovery Committee the defects inseparable from her class were minimised as far as possible; the positions of the foremast and mainmast (which had been adversely criticised by Captain Scott) and the sail plan were changed, the latter with the advice and approval of Mr. Watt, who was specially recommended by Lloyds for this work on account of his great experience in the design of sail plans. At a later date sister keels were added, and reduced



the rolling very materially: after this had been done Captain Stenhouse reported that "The sister keels proved effective in reducing the rolling.....In consequence we were able to carry out a programme of long consecutive stations which would have been extremely difficult and almost impracticable before the keels were fitted." It should be added, perhaps, that the design of these sister keels provides that ice pressure would remove them, thus minimising, and it is hardly too much to say preventing, any danger to the structure and seaworthiness of the ship arising from their injury by ice.

Full accounts of the financial side of the Discovery purchase have been given by the Committee in December last in reference to previous criticisms of whose substance they were informed. They are not such as to substantiate the allegation of wasteful expenditure. The total cost of the Discovery including all reconstruction, survey, fees, charges and wireless was £115,500, at a time of high post-war prices. At various stages representatives of the Admiralty were consulted, and they concurred in the decisions taken, which subsequently were confirmed by the Secretary of State.

B. Efficiency of Discovery. The Governor's criticisms may be classed as directed against her safety and seaworthiness and her suitability for the work. In regard to the first, two allegations have been specifically denied above: she withstood gales of unusual violence and has penetrated pack-ice with complete success, and the latter as, in her Commander's opinion, no unprotected vessel could. On her return to England after two years commission in perhaps the worst seas in the world she was pronounced by Captain Hares, D.S.O., R.N., Assistant Hydrographer of the Navy, to be in splendid condition, a condition so satisfactory as to reflect the highest credit on her Master; and on dry docking this favourable opinion was amply confirmed as

regards the hull by Sir Fortescue Flannery. In view of these facts the Committee regard the Governor's strictures on her safety and seaworthiness as entirely unsubstantiated.

It may be added that the improvements decided upon after the trial trip were confined to skylight and ventilators, which previously had been the same in arrangement as used by Captain Scott, R.N. The alterations involved were accordingly only very slight. Incidentally it may be said that the members of the Committee on board were not seasick.

The question of suitability must be viewed from the starting point that economy prohibited the employment of a large semi-protected vessel for ocean traverse and oceanic work and a small heavily protected vessel in and near ice. Most nearly to secure the ends which both were <sup>to</sup> serve, a compromise was essential, but the Committee held and hold that this compromise must not jeopardise the reasonable safety of the staff. Ice protection was therefore the first essential to ensure.

The Governor views the question of suitability in the light of three assumptions all of which are unfounded. He supposes that the Discovery is intended to keep clear of ice and need not enter it, that the Discovery is useless for observations offshore and that the Committee would be justified in employing a steel ship in the same manner as the Norwegian whalers.

So far from the Committee having decided that ice work is not necessitated by their programme, as the Governor states, the employment of the ship in and along the ice edge this season was seriously considered, and will probably take place next year. It is incorrect to say as he does, that she was never in the ice; as has been seen she was. It cannot, moreover, be grasped too well that certain researches on whales must take her near the ice, as must exploratory work of all

sorts in the Palmer and neighbouring archipelagos, and, as is well known to whalers, a ship in the close vicinity of ice is very likely to be cut off. The early stage of such envelopment is indicated in the following passage from Mr. John's last Scientific Report from the William Scoresby. "We expected to sight the South Orkneys on the 23rd but did not do so. We fell in with pack-ice in the afternoon, skirted its edge, and made a station in an open lane in the pack at night. While this station was being worked the weather was perfectly calm, but during the night a wind arose from the S.W., and we got clear of the ice, which had commenced to move with wind and sea, with some little difficulty in the morning. It became apparent that when steaming westward, skirting the ice, on the previous day an arm of the pack running west to east lay to the northward of our course. Because of the rapidly rising gale, the proximity of ice, and especially because of the continued uncertainty of our position, it was decided that it would be advisable to run north clear of the ice and of any possible land. Our decks and deck structures became heavily coated with ice from the spray taken over and the snow which fell. It became necessary to heave to for the night." If this can occur 240 miles from the South Orkneys it is obvious that it is more probable in waters in which the Discovery has often worked.

The Norwegian vessels are some of them unprotected, but others are strengthened. For instance, Mr. Rasmussen's ships for Ross Sea whaling are strengthened, and he informed the Committee that in successive years the strengthening had been increased. It must be remembered also that southern whaling has a heavy casualty list: last season alone two factory ships were lost and others badly damaged. The risk of loss of life is greatly diminished for whalers by the fact that several (3 to 5) catchers accompany the factory ship: repeatedly the crew of a fatally damaged ship have been taken

off or rescued by others of the flotilla, but with a research ship this safeguard is absent. Moreover, great risks are taken for great financial gain. The Committee cannot feel justified in ordering their staff to incur greater.

The Committee have always realised that a ship of a type less liable to make so much leeway when on station and of a higher speed and a greater range could have carried out much of their work with greater facility than the Discovery. It is in fact true that she has limitations inseparably associated with her heavy ice protection. In planning her work due account has been taken of these limitations, and the programme laid down for her is more modest than that which would have been assigned to a full-powered steamship. For ocean traverses and the rapid execution of hydrological and biological surveys of whaling grounds reasonably free from ice, a fast steel ship would possess some obvious advantages, and the Committee are seriously considering the desirability of advocating the acquisition of such a vessel. Recent developments in the whaling industry, calling as they do for the attainment of economic conclusions at the earliest date possible, have emphasised greatly the desirability of this step. Such a ship, however, would not be intended to replace the Discovery, which is without doubt the strongest vessel in existence for work in pack-ice.

It should be clearly stated that the Discovery has accomplished a great volume of most valuable work. Her mean speed has been 5.2 knots, her mean daily run 124.3 miles. During her commission she has traversed 37,000 miles and taken 299 stations. It may be added that in routine work a "station" implies sounding, taking water samples and temperature observations at numerous depths, and the use of both vertical and horizontal series of nets, the former from

the bottom to the surface, the latter at various depths in the upper 200 metres. In deep water the work cannot be accomplished under about four hours. An idea of her capacity under moderately favourable conditions can be gained from her operations between South Georgia, South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Cape Horn, Port Stanley, in the spring of 1927. The weather was adverse in the first passage, with a succession of gales, headwinds and snow, fog and the presence of numerous large bergs (which on one occasion necessitated heaving to for the night). It was moderately fine in the penultimate stretch, to the Horn. On actual passage the ship covered 3610 miles in  $27\frac{1}{3}$  days and took 34 stations. In addition she took 37 stations while cruising in the South Shetlands, Palmer Islands and vicinity. Where weather conditions were at all favourable the programme was completed. The reports of Dr. Kemp and Captain Stenhouse on these operations are most valuable illustrations of what the work is like under conditions less adverse than the ship frequently encountered. The Committee have felt it desirable to discuss the suitability of the Discovery for whale researches in some detail. They hold that she has her definite and very important place in these investigations, which no other ship could fill as well, and they contest as demonstrably erroneous the Governor's implication that the Discovery is unsuitable for her work.

The total work performed by the Discovery has sometimes been compared with that of the German Meteor, working in the South Atlantic: such a comparison could not possibly be made by anyone properly cognisant of Antarctic conditions and of the totally different nature of the work of the two vessels and of the totally different regions in which it was undertaken.



In the sections of the despatch dealing with the Discovery the following inaccuracies occur besides those already noticed.

The Governor refers to statements attributed to Dr. Kemp to the effect that the Committee were influenced by sentiment in the acquisition of the Discovery. Dr. Kemp denies making any statement that would lend colour to this view.

The Discovery as commissioned is said to have been unseaworthy owing to rolling. This is unfounded. Stability tests were made before sailing. Moreover she was in commission a year before sister keels were fitted. She has always been liable to roll, as reported by Captain Scott, R.N.

The Discovery equipment with sledges and tents is mentioned with the comment "as if a dash to the pole was pictured", and it is said that Norwegian, the best advice, was not sought as to gear. The sledges and gear were bought in Norway on Norwegian advice. They are necessary and proper provision for a possible journey to safety should the ship be lost in ice. The past history of Antarctic exploration proves the efficacy of this precaution.

The Governor has heard that it is virtually decided to purchase the Halvtriger. The decision was against purchase.

The Committee submit the above paragraphs in refutation of the statement that the purchase of the ship was "an error of the first magnitude" or an example of "inconsequent stupidity and wanton waste."

C. Building of the William Scoresby. The despatch alleges that the Scoresby was built for the special purpose

of marking whales. This is only one of her three purposes: the others were trawling and the prosecution of marine biological and hydrological survey. The misconception presumably accounts for the comparison of her cost with that of a catcher. No such comparison can be made. The Scoresby is specially strengthened against ice, a feature which has already proved useful. No whale catcher affords an approach to the accommodation needed to carry out this survey work, nor has it a deck laboratory, trawling galleys, auxiliary deck machinery and other fittings. The Governor considers even the accommodation of the Scoresby "cramped alike for officers, scientists and crew": a first class catcher carries 13 men, and the hold, if converted for berths and additional stores could not on the most meagre scale add greatly to the accommodation. The Scoresby carries 22 in addition to Scientific staff: the reason being that she is required habitually to make long cruises and to perform different work. Bearing this in mind her cost will well stand comparison with that of a catcher. The price mentioned in the despatch (£20,000 to £25,000) for the latter must be accepted with caution. Accepting it, however, it presumably represents the sum paid to the builders: the corresponding figure for the Scoresby is not £40,473<sup>\*</sup> as noted by the Governor, but £32,470, and even if professional services, Crown Agents charges, etc. are included £34,184. The difference in price from that of a catcher seems amply justified.

Lastly, of the Committee, it is said "in defiance of expert knowledge the building of the vessel was given on

\* This amount approximates to the sum reached by adding £34,184 to the cost of scientific, trawling, medical and other equipment and marine stores.

contract to a firm technically and substantially incapable of the task." Both statements are incorrect. There is no record nor remembrance in the minds of the Committee of any recommendation of a builder being made by any whaling company. It is understood that Smith's Dock Company is the firm meant. The Committee were well aware of the special experience possessed by this Company; but even had such recommendation been received, they would not have been justified in accepting their tender (one of 13 Sealed Tenders received out of 22 invited), which was over \$9,000 above that accepted. It is true that the £32,470 include a payment of \$2,000 additional to the tender, made by the Crown Agents authorised by the Colonial Office: this payment was regarded as desirable upon grounds of general policy relating to Colonial contracts, but the Committee declared by Resolution that, having regard solely to the interests entrusted to them, they did not feel justified in recommending the addition, for which consequently they are in no way responsible. Even including this payment, the ship's price was over \$6,000 below the tender of the Smith's Dock Company. The Committee cannot admit that the contractors delivered an unsatisfactory ship. The exceptional endurance demanded of the vessel, including specifically the ability to make the passage from the Cape to South Georgia with reasonable safety, entailed very exceptional bunker capacity. In the Scoresby's design, every effort was made to keep heavy weight aft; the engines were placed as far back as was practicable, and oil and fuel tanks were treated in the same way. Provision of the necessary bunkering, however, unavoidably causes her, when full to capacity for a long voyage (and then only) to lie somewhat below her normal water line forward, though not "down by the head." The responsibility for this lies not with designer or contractor, but with the requirements of the ship.

It is a fact that a considerable amount of water was taken over the bows, which was a disadvantage in whale marking, but this has been obviated by the provision of a raised forecastle.

D. Scoresby efficiency. It is alleged that she is "too slow to mark whales." This is contrary to fact. It is true that when she was first commissioned difficulty was experienced in approaching whales; this was attributable to noises from the engine room, but the Director reported in February, 1927, "noise from the engine room has now, as far as possible, been eliminated, and with Mr. Scrymgeour's expert assistance on the bridge, we had no difficulty in approaching and keeping up with both Blue and Fin whales." As has been said above, the difficulty of shipped water and spray has been met also. The Committee do not admit that it is "an utter absurdity" to ask "unskilled personnel" to undertake this work. They would point out the great importance of having on their staff men able to mark whales in whatever region these may be met. Progress has been made along these lines; during the past season only two days could be devoted to marking, which at present is in the experimental stage, and on each of these days eight successful shots were made. The fact that few whales have been marked is due not to incapacity but to the employment of the ship on other work. The Committee have always considered it desirable that a British enterprise should be carried out by British hands. They feel moreover that the Governor overrates the part played in Norwegian gunners' success by skill: a whaling manager expressed to one of the Committee his opinion that with modern catchers 75% of the success was due to the ship. Skill apart, the employment solely of Norwegian gunners for whalemarking is open to grave objection. The high earnings of a successful gunner would probably make his employment prohibitive in possibility that she would be able to mark the large series of

expense: certain whaling companies are under suspicion of having falsified their statistical returns, and where whales are marked from catchers the greatest vigilance would be necessary to prevent fraudulent returns as to whales marked, and the marking could occur (by spare catcher) only on intensely whaled grounds such as those of South Georgia, where it would yield the least information as to migration and leave the staff novices in marking elsewhere. It may here be added that the statement that the Committee had any misconception as to the exact nature of the difficulty in marking is quite unfounded: they discussed it before a mark was devised or a ship commissioned. Equally misleading is the implication that they had ignored the possibility of the mark failing to fix itself. Tests were carried out on a dead whale, and on suspended blubber with skin attached, before the ships sailed. The Committee consider the one final test of a satisfactory marking method is a successful marking experiment, but it will be seen that such other tests as were possible were duly made. The mark suggested by Captain Sorlie may or may not prove an improvement: it would certainly prove extremely expensive in use.

Space does not allow of discussion of the Scoresby's trawling work, which has proved efficient, or, comprehensively, of her biological surveys. One instance of the latter may be cited. Between February 16th and March 13th last, she made a survey of waters within 80 miles of South Georgia, more than covering the extent of the whole whaling grounds of the island, at stations so disposed as to test thoroughly the prevailing conditions. In this work she steamed over 1,400 miles, and took 50 stations, which was 6 more than her allotted programme. Of this Dr. Kemp rightly says:- "The Scoresby left this country much later than we had hoped, and it seemed almost an impossibility that she would be able to make the long series of



observations which were required. In spite, however, of the fact that the season was a phenomenal one for ice, she succeeded in less than a month in completing all the stations round South Georgia. This was a wonderful performance, involving long spells of extremely hard work, and the greatest credit is due to all on board."

It should be added that great advantages accrue from the use of two ships, because for quick and confident conclusions as to a region, observations must be taken throughout it before time has permitted the conditions to change materially - what is necessary is as near an approach to a "snapshot" as possible: for this reason the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, in sampling the North Sea water, has on several occasions secured the co-operation with their research vessel of one or more Admiralty Patrol vessels, three or more vessels then being at work at once.

#### E. The Marine Biological Station at South Georgia.

The suggestion that the staff at this station will be unemployed during winter can only be explained by ignorance of the immense amount of work which must be done on the measurements and other observations of whales, the water and other samples collected, before sound conclusions of economic importance can be drawn. The Committee feel moreover that to assume that a staff which has shown such marked devotion to duty under the utmost discomfort of the flensing plane intend to "hibernate in luxury" is as ungenerous as it is offensive to the Committee's direction of the operations. A staff which has secured detailed observations on 1680 whales in three seasons cannot be regarded as slothful. It is difficult, also, to appreciate what it is that the Governor wishes to recommend regarding the station. First it is dubiously implied that to close the

station in winter is wrong, later it is clearly suggested that to keep it open is unjustified, and finally, in his alternative scheme, it is contemplated that the station should remain open all the year round.

F. The Scoresby's Personnel. The Governor's discussion of this personnel shows a tendency to emphasise bad points and ignore good qualities, that is not helpful in arriving at a sound judgment. Under Captain Mercer, R.N.R., the Scoresby carried out most valuable scientific work; he sent reports of the navigation and ice conditions that were of real value in interpreting the results obtained, and when he brought the ship home under the painful circumstance of an accepted resignation, not only was her general condition apart from damage from stranding entirely and markedly satisfactory, but among the ship's officers and company there was an absence of apparent friction that says a great deal for the courtesy and tact of all concerned. It is admitted that Captain Mercer did not successfully meet the difficulties of combining authority and consideration that his post entailed: but it is rarely possible for those without the requisite experience to realise the extraordinary and constant vigilance, control and tact that is needed by a Commander in handling a number of other officers and professional men in the confined quarters of a small ship under the conditions of these operations. The failure is emphasised, the good work done and the difficulties encountered have been ignored.

The Committee, however, are not concerned to deny the unsuitability for the service of men whose engagements they themselves have terminated. They do deny that the method of selection of these men was improper or in any way unsuited to secure the best men available on the terms offered, and that they failed in promptness in removing any man of whose un-

desirability evidence had been adduced.

Captain Mercer and Lieut. Commander Lamotte (R.N. retired), like Lieut. Commander Shannon (R.N. retired), whom the Governor approves, were appointed on the recommendation of a sub-committee under the Chairmanship of Captain Hares (then the representative of the Admiralty on the Committee), and including Sir Fortescue Flannery, Mr. Horsburgh, who has had much marine experience in the South, and Captain Stenhouse. Lieut. Commander Schofield, (R.N. retired), and Captain Trelawney, D.S.O., (R.N. retired), were selected from the applicants interviewed. The former withdrew, and the post was offered to Captain Trelawney, who had had much experience of small ships. On his withdrawal Lieut. Commander Lamotte was chosen. It will be seen that he was a third choice, which is eloquent of the difficulty of finding suitable men. His naval record was absolutely satisfactory, his occupation since naval service, which is believed to be incorrectly described in the despatch, is irrelevant. He gave the impression that he would be likely to prove a strict disciplinarian.

In regard to the Governor's recommendation of his dismissal, the Committee appointed a special sub-committee of enquiry as soon as the minutes of the Court of Enquiry into the stranding of the Scoresby in Stromness Bay were available. This Sub-Committee's finding may be summed up in two paragraphs of their report.

"As the conduct of Captain Lamotte in connection with the casualty to the William Scoresby was held sufficient to justify the determination of his engagement, it was not considered necessary to express any opinion as regards the Governor's allegation against him of personal slackness, lack of discipline and permitting excessive drinking."

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"Although agreeing with the Governor's recommendation

the members of the Discovery Committee present wish to place on record that the difficulty of dealing with the case had not been diminished by the fact that the finding of the local Court of Enquiry was not brought to notice until some weeks after the Governor had recommended that Captain Lamotte should be relieved of his command."

The Committee submit that they acted with due promptness as soon as they had reason to do so, and that they would have been unjustified in taking action on the Governor's recommendation alone. They would also draw attention to the fact that he informed them orally that he could not say whether he had or had not in his possession the Report of the Court of Enquiry which exonerated Lieut. Commander Lamotte, when he cabled recommending that officer's dismissal.

Lieut. Commander Horley (R.N. retired) was appointed under similar procedure. The Admiralty records were consulted by the Committee's marine officers, and nothing adverse to Lieut. Commander Horley was found. He was then appointed. The Committee consider the Governor's assumption that Lieut. Commander Lamotte's report on Lieut. Commander Horley, which led to the latter's dismissal, was "due to a sense of guilt" is uncalled for, and that the report was one that it was the commanding officer's duty to make.

It may be pointed out that in spite of the difficulties which have arisen with certain executive officers, the scientific work of the William Scoresby has not been adversely affected. Both with Captain Mercer and Captain Lamotte all hands combined to render it successful.

In regard to the charges of drunkenness and disorder, the Committee profoundly regret the grounds on which they were made. In regard to the ship's officers they have nothing more

to add, though it is true that such outbreaks are regrettably common among seamen after a long and arduous voyage. They confess however to be unable to deny Lieut. Commander Lamotte's contention that the fact that the ship's company was not under naval discipline militated against his ability to control his men when on shore.

The case of the scientific staff and of Cadet Pease is on another footing. It is not alleged that they were disorderly. Mr. Pease denies the charge altogether. Mr. John very rightly apologised to the Governor. Concerning both, affidavits were taken from witnesses and sent home: yet there is nothing to indicate that they were shown these affidavits, or that Mr. Pease was given any opportunity of defending himself. It is far from clear that Mr. John's expression of regret referred to the occasion to which the affidavits refer. There appears to be every possibility that the identifications in the affidavits may have been incorrect. Mr. John states that he realised in the morning that he had taken too much alcohol, and went quietly to the ship: the affidavits in his case refer to the afternoon. The Committee can but contrast the thoroughness with which information in support of the charges against these men was collected and forwarded with the apparent lack of provision of any opportunity for the men to comment on the affidavits or to present explanations or evidence in their defence. They consider also, particularly in view of the very serious effect on these young men's careers of an adverse report on their sobriety sent to Headquarters, that the case should have been met by direct personal request for an explanation in the first place, followed, if the Governor found this unsatisfactory, by a severe reprimand and warning as to the effect of any further misconduct. The Committee are unable to understand why, after Mr. John had been assured that the



charge would not be pressed, reference was made to it again in despatches.

F. The Conduct of the Work. The charge of slackness and carelessness is implicit in many paragraphs of the despatch, but follows immediate strictures on the Scoresby's last voyage to Stanley. It is said that "no attempt was made to comply with sailing directions, vague as they are, laid down by the Committee", and the voyage is treated incorrectly as if a passage to Deception Island was its first charge. The facts are as follows. It was April 17th before she was able to continue her programme. By this time the season was almost over, at any moment the pack ice from the Weddell Sea might be expected, and the Norwegians themselves thought the cruise should not be attempted. None the less she steamed south in the endeavour to continue her work, and was successful in taking eleven stations before her arrival in Port Stanley. In the course of this short cruise (lasting only 16 days) the vessel was hove to for 7 days. Much pack-ice was encountered - several stations were taken under its lee - and on the night of the 23rd, between the Orkney and Elephant groups, in a strong S.W. wind, the vessel had great difficulty in getting clear of the ice (see p. 7.). It was then, with the way to the south barred by the pack, that Mr. John decided to alter his programme and be content with a line of stations from that position to the Falklands. Mr. John had full authority to deviate from the programme when necessary. In the opinion of the Committee, Mr. John's conduct of the cruise was thoroughly sound and able, and he deserves much credit for it.

Again, the navigation is said to have been bad and the ship sent south "with an untried complement of officers and men, including a navigation officer who by his own statement is

deficient in the requisite training to operate in these dangerous waters." The ship's company was not untried, many members of the crew having served satisfactorily on the first commission. Lieut. Commander Lamotte, in the Committee's opinion, should have undertaken the navigation if he found Lieut. Commander Horley incompetent; and neither is now on the Committee's staff. On this voyage however, for several successive days the weather precluded the taking of sights, and no navigator could have determined positions accurately.

An allegation has been made by Lieut. Commander Horley that the Scoresby was not supplied with any South Atlantic charts. This statement is absolutely erroneous. The Scoresby was furnished by the Admiralty with an ample supply of Admiralty charts, including those of the South Atlantic, and replenishment supplies were sent and acknowledged up to the time of the ship sailing in December last. Moreover the Admiralty hold three receipts for supplies forwarded during February, which are signed by Lieut. Commander Horley himself.

The despatch states that the rock struck by the Scoresby in Stromness Bay was surveyed by a member of the Discovery Expedition, but not reported. This is incorrect. Its existence is, as said, a fact of common knowledge, and it is entered on the charts, but as the adjacent coastline is incorrect, the survey could not be utilised until this also had been surveyed. The rock is mentioned moreover in Admiralty sailing directions, with full instructions as to the proper course.

The Governor criticises the ordering home of the Scoresby from Cape Town on the resignation of her officers as unnecessarily expensive as compared with transferring men to and from the ship by mail steamer. This question was very

fully considered and, as a matter of fact, the original decision was not to bring the vessel home: both Captain Stenhouse and the Director of Research, however, made strong representations in favour of her return, which were considered at a special meeting convened for the purpose. After a thorough discussion it was unanimously decided, on the motion of Captain Hares, to recall the ship. Having regard to the fact that considerable repair had to be done on the vessel after her damage from grounding, there is no doubt that the course taken proved the most economical in the end.

Charges of wasteful expenditure have been met in specific instances above. The Committee feel confident that their expenditure will bear favourable comparison with that of other Antarctic expeditions. The Committee would add that all expenditure is in accordance with detailed estimates approved by the Secretary of State, and has therefore his sanction. The Committee's financial instructions, which were also approved by the Secretary of State, were drawn up with the advice and concurrence of the late Director of Colonial Audit, who expressed satisfaction at the manner in which the accounts have been rendered.

The Scientific aspect of the work is sufficiently dealt with by the reminder that the Committee's programme was approved by the Royal Society, and that Dr. Kemp's leadership and the execution of the work have met with commendation from the Linnean Society, the Zoological Section of the British Association, the Royal Geographical Society and the Challenger Society for the study of Oceanography.

G. Work done and its utility. One item of the Committee's operations stands apart from the rest in its

immediate utility, namely that of hydrographic survey. The Governor recognises that Geographical survey is "a real need", but thinks that "too little attention has been paid to it", and the Committee understand that he had previously complained that the work of surveying South Georgian waters and harbours had been completely ignored. Such is far from the case. An extensive survey programme was laid down by the Dependencies Committee. Owing to the impossibility of acquiring the two ships recommended and the inability of the Hydrographer to spare survey officers at that time, the staff contemplated could not be engaged. On the commissioning of the Discovery however, a trained Admiralty surveyor was engaged as Navigating Officer and has, within the limits of his opportunities, done valuable work. He has surveyed completely Undine Harbour, Larsen Harbour, Leith Harbour in South Georgia and Port Lockroy in the Palmer Archipelago, and partially surveyed Stromness Bay and Undine Harbour approaches in South Georgia, Palmer's Bay, King George I Island, Borge Harbour in the South Orkneys, Melchior Archipelago, and amplified the chart of Cumberland Bay. Charts embodying his results will be issued by the Admiralty. Before the receipt of the Governor's despatch the Committee had decided to detail this officer for survey work alone. He has been given a specially constructed motor boat, an assistant, motor man and three seamen, and is now at work in the South.

In regard, however, to the main work of the Committee, the Governor considers that it is unnecessary, because all the knowledge sought is to be found in the Reports of the Challenger Expedition, it is useless because shortly all whales will have been frightened away from South Georgia, and he is greatly perturbed by the alleged unpopularity of the work among the Norwegian whalers.

It is difficult to take the first of these three opinions as seriously meant. The Challenger Expedition, which

took place in the early seventies was perhaps the greatest of such enterprises that ever sailed. It founded oceanography as a separate and comprehensive science: but it had no economic aims, did not employ the developed technique now necessary, and at that date many problems which a modern investigation must attack could not even be realised. Its thirty odd monumental volumes include but one short paper on whales, and that dealing only with their bones. Similarly the suggestion that whales will be frightened from the South Georgian grounds carries but little weight when twenty years whaling have proved ineffectual to drive them away. The extent to which the statement that Norwegian whalers disapprove of the investigation is justified is very doubtful. One Norwegian whaler has financed at his own expense a small expedition which, though mainly exploratory, was equipped in a modest way for work of the same character as that of the Committee. Professor Hjort, who is sufficiently persona grata with the Norwegian whalers to have been their agent in the negotiations as to duty on whale oil, has followed, hopes to follow and has inculcated on other whaling countries precisely the Discovery type of work.

At this stage it appears essential in this section, difficult as the task is, briefly to outline the aims and policy of the Committee. The Interdepartmental Committee (Dependencies Committee) appointed to advise upon the development of the Falkland Island Dependencies found a wide field of enquiry, but naturally were concerned mainly with the continued prosperity of the chief local industry, whaling. Their aim was to find how to keep this industry at the highest level consistent with permanence. They were faced with the fact that other historic whale fisheries had ceased owing to depletion of stock. Their enquiries elicited profound divergence of opinion among Norwegian and other whalers as to whether



dangerous depletion was going on in the waters with which they were concerned. They could in fact discover no reliable basis for any recommendations as to the extent to which whaling might there be carried on without acting to its own detriment and bringing about its ultimate extinction. It was felt that this basis could only be furnished by organised scientific investigation. In this view they were supported by what is now a widely established practice in connection with other economic enquiries. Not only has a special Department, presided over by Sir W.B. Hardy, F.R.S., Ex-Secretary of the Royal Society, been established to organise and supervise research in the interest of industry, but no less than fifteen European nations co-operate in marine research for economic ends (mainly those of the fisheries) through a permanent council, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. After the publication of the Dependencies Committee's report, Sir John Middleton, then Governor, expressed the opinion that scientific and economic researches of the nature of those recommended by that Committee should be undertaken with as little delay as possible; and he said that both Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Binnie, then magistrates, shared this view.

The researches required properly to inform whaling regulations are necessarily wide and many sided. Many are outlined in the next Section. Very substantial progress has been made in most of the lines followed. Two results, however, may be mentioned, namely the discovery that the Blue whale in all the extensive area covered by the work feeds almost exclusively on one particular shrimp like creature, Euphausia superba (except near Patagonia where another and similar form Munida gregaria probably is eaten), and that this most important species was never found in quantity by either ship except near land.

As the Blue whale is feeding when in the Southern Ocean, should further cruises finally establish this distribution of the food species, it is clear that the comfortable view that the whole vast area of ocean in these latitudes must be well populated by whales will have to be definitely abandoned. This is a matter of the very first economic importance. It is in relation to this work that the Governor quotes a Press description of the Discovery Expedition as a search for shrimps. Combined with studies of currents and water these biological studies appear to explain the incidence and limitation of the South Georgia grounds. Another result of much importance is the confirmation of the suggestion that birth, usually of one calf only, occurs not more frequently than once in two years, a fact of fundamental importance in gauging the rate of replenishment. The statistical evidence collected showing that sexual maturity may be reached in Blue and Fin whales at the end of the second year, is also of the greatest economic value.

Summing up it can be said that the utility of all the lines of work followed can be shown, and that without them it can never become practicable to obtain a thoroughly sound basis for the regulation of the industry.

Another item of the investigations which the despatch, in the Committee's opinion, treats too hastily, is that of fishery surveys. The Governor's statement "fish are to be had in any quantity all about the island", as the Committee understand it, is misleading. What is sought is accumulations of fish adequate to repay modern commercial fishing methods, and as far as they are aware no such accumulations have yet been located. As has been seen, his statement that markets for fish in South America are absent is not correct: it may be added that the market is growing, Argentine import having increased

by about two-thirds since 1914. Since this state receives nearly half its fish from distant Norway, the possibility of opening a trade from the Falklands should undoubtedly be explored, and the Governor's "failure to see how they (the trawling investigations) can ever promote the welfare of the Colony" seems lacking in vision.

It should be added that the Committee hold strongly that while their primary purpose is the conduct of researches with a definite economic end, it is nevertheless their clear duty to facilitate other scientific enquiries for which their operations may afford opportunity, provided that this is practicable without detriment to the attainment of their main purpose, even although these enquiries may not have an obvious bearing on economic problems. Experience has shown that most valuable results frequently ensue from investigations undertaken with no other motive than the acquisition of knowledge. The scientific staff is at present employed on work from which early results of economic utility may be expected. The Committee have, however, been fortunate in enlisting the voluntary help of a number of recognised authorities in general science and propose to publish their results in the series of reports which is contemplated. It is anticipated that publication will begin before the close of the present year.

I. Suggested Organisation. The alternative scheme proposed by the Governor is in the opinion of the Committee not only totally inadequate, but its results could only be so meagre that it is very dubious whether the expenditure it would entail would be justified. It consists in the employment of the Scoresby by Norwegian Officers, (an arrangement which the Committee consider unnecessary and undesirable), as the only ship constantly at the disposal of the staff, who, under this scheme, would be largely scattered among whaling stations and floating factories, with a large part of their ship's time

occupied in keeping the Director in touch with his staff and in other Colonial services.

Work at shore stations in determining the actual species taken, in the study of their size in successive seasons, their maturity and fecundity, is of fundamental importance. Full attention has been paid to it at South Georgia, Saldanha Bay, Durban, Deception and other stations, during the progress of the researches. It is of course limited in character where not backed by a properly equipped laboratory, and the greatest volume and intensity of work has been secured at South Georgia for this reason: it may be added that even were private companies willing to provide thoroughly equipped laboratories for work which might result in the recommendation of measures restricting their activity, the situation would be embarrassing both for the Government and the staff, and very dubiously desirable.

Work at whaling stations is, however, only one part of the necessary investigations. It casts no light on the causes of the fluctuations of the catch from year to year, because it fails to determine the causes of the movements of the whales, or indeed in any satisfactory and conclusive way what these movements are. These problems can be solved only by wisely planned investigations into the hydrographical and biological character of the regions affected, carried out on an adequate scale over a sufficient area and through a sufficient period by properly equipped research vessels. Until, at least in outline, this task is accomplished no regulations made in the interests of whaling can be properly informed. Investigations of this kind, meagrely supplemented by occasional employment of the Scoresby, whose other duties moreover would confine her almost entirely to the Dependencies, can furnish no reliable solutions of the problems it is necessary to solve.

Mr. Hamilton who is well fitted by experience to make the most of the facilities afforded by whaling vessels, has referred in his report to the waste of time work on them involves even in such simple work as alone can be attempted; it is in any case clear also that the positions investigated from a whaler are dictated by the exigencies of whaling, not of research. These proposals therefore, involve a slowing down of the whole investigations, and would bring one essential wing of them almost to a standstill. It is necessary therefore to enquire whether a slowing down is desirable or defensible at the present time.

The researches were inaugurated to give the data necessary for the drafting of such regulations of the whaling of the Dependencies as should ensure the maintenance of that industry at the highest point consistent with permanency. It was realised from the first that though the examination of the whaling grounds of these territories must be the main and first charge on the attention of the staff, their work would need to cover a far wider area. The relation of the whales of the Dependencies to those of the African coast, the determination of the question as to whether the former were or were not part of a great circumpolar stock, to quote but two instances, were obviously material points which no researches confined to the waters of the Dependencies could solve alone. It is true, however, that these territories dominated the world's whaling, and that the regulation of whaling within their borders was practicable at any time through the licensing system by which the stations and catchers were controlled. The inception of pelagic whaling, by removing the necessity of utilising the shelter of the land - even if less completely in fact than could be maintained plausibly in theory - brought about a change that could but affect the whole position.



Last season (1927-28) the Dependencies yielded 804,000 barrels of oil: but of this 491,000 were obtained from South Shetlands, South Orkneys and South Sandwich group companies, whose factory ships had, it was known, been working along the ice, against 313,000 from South Georgia, a marked superiority per catcher for the more southerly field. It may be that this superiority was accidental, in the sense of being due to passing ice conditions: but with what had gone before, it was sufficient to occasion a positively amazing enthusiasm for pelagic whaling in Norway. This season the Hektor company release the Ronald for service along the ice, replacing her by the old White Star liner Medic, and in various expeditions from Deception eastward 17 additional catchers are, it is said, to be used, apart from six more about Bouvet Island: while four more expeditions are said to be fitting out during the coming winter. The great ships employed must involve investment of a magnitude which for Norway is of the first importance. One ship, by no means the largest (Thorodd, ex Colonia, cable ship) apart from costly alterations and additions bears seven Hartmann extraction plants, worth £2,500 each, and twelve ordinary pressure boilers, she carries 180 men with all the engineering shops, forges and other equipment that such a vessel requires when working far from a yard: and she can deal easily with twelve whales a day. Probably to build a first class pelagic whaler and her catchers would cost close on a quarter of a million pounds.

It seems clear, therefore, that the danger of depletion of stock is greatly increased by the new developments, and that (particularly if the present season proves successful) a very powerful vested interest will be created, and that the

control of catching power by the Government will be impaired and may even be jeopardised. It would appear probable that in the near future really effective control could only be obtained by means of an international convention.

Now it is well known that in all quarters of the world - Australia, Africa and America as well as Europe - very grave apprehensions have been widely entertained that the whaling industry was engaged in development to the point of suicide. Some of these fears have been perhaps excessive, some based on misconception. They have never, however, had so strong a support as at the present day when enormous catches must be sought at all cost to give remunerative returns on a fleet of unprecedented costliness. Well judged or ill, the fears of depletion have led to a very widespread demand for regulation of whaling of an international type, and unless the immense expansion of Southern whaling meets with some drastic natural check by a succession of bad seasons, the pressure of this demand will inevitably and rapidly increase. The Economic Committee of the League of Nations has been approached on the matter, but has agreed at present to leave investigation of the problems relating to whaling in the hands of an International Committee which had already been formed by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, a body whose raison d'être is the provision of reliable information on which to base a rational exploration of the sea.

For reasons which it is unnecessary to set out here, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain decided some years ago that it was inexpedient for them to initiate international action regarding whaling. That decision still holds good, but the balance of arguments upon which it was based has undoubtedly changed, and may so far change as to induce His Majesty's Gov-

ernment themselves to propose international action. Apart from this contingency His Majesty's Government have already been approached in the matter by other Powers, and may in future find it inexpedient to resist any widespread expression of opinion in favour of an international conference for the regulation of whaling. If as it appears to the Committee such a conference is a possibility and even a probability there is no need to emphasise how important it is, from the point of view of the protection of British interests in general and of those of the Dependencies, that His Majesty's Government should enter such a conference with an adequate equipment of scientific knowledge. In the view of the Committee, the greater part of the knowledge needed remains to be acquired.

How does this affect the Discovery investigations? The Committee has the largest, best equipped and most experienced staff engaged in whaling research that at present exists. It is working in the most important whaling area producing 60% of the world's whale oil, in a territory dependent on whaling as is no other. The Dependencies have the most to gain by the sane management of whaling, and the most to lose by neglect or ill informed regulation. The Norwegian companies are not ill disposed to this country, and afford the Committee valuable information which could hardly be obtained from any other source. The Committee, therefore, appear to be in a position uniquely favourable for acquiring knowledge which will influence any international action that may be taken.

So far, therefore, from the present position indicating the desirability of slowing down researches, it appears to the Committee to require the most energetic pressing on of the investigations to a stage at which they will yield economic conclusions. Slow researches on a small scale would yield

results of a scientific interest, it is true: but in the Committee's opinion what should be aimed at is scientifically sound conclusions on economic questions attained in time for them to be the basis of effective action. They consider, therefore, that it is necessary not merely to proceed with the researches on the present scale, but to expand that scale. Bearing in mind the widening spread of whaling about the Antarctic, and the intimate effect on whaling in one area which may be exerted by destruction of stock in neighbouring regions, they venture to suggest also that efforts should be made to secure the co-operation in whaling investigations, in the first instance of the Dominions lying about the Antarctic, secondly of Norway and, lastly, on account of West African whaling, France.

J. British Museum. This institution has throughout given assistance of the first importance to the investigations. It has granted accommodation and facilities, advice most generously given by expert zoologists, and access to literature which collectively could probably be found in no other one place and institution: and for all these services the Committee has been able to return nothing but a few specimens and their gratitude. They wish, therefore, to state that they resent the obvious imputation of the despatch that they have been exploited by the Museum, to which institution "avarice" is imputed. Still more do his colleagues resent the substance and tone of the reference to their Vice Chairman, Sir Sidney Harmer, F.R.S., lately the Director of the Museum. Sir Sidney Harmer, who is one of the greatest living authorities on whales, has devoted himself to the study of whales and whaling for a longer time than that covered by the existence of all the Committees mentioned in this note. The interest and relevance to practical

ends of the results he has obtained may be illustrated by a statement of Sir John Middleton, that one of the things he looked forward to most in the year was Sir Sidney's report on whaling. In view of the time and thought which, as a member of the Committee, Sir Sidney Harmer has given voluntarily to the public service, the Committee feel that the Governor's reference shows a lack of understanding and of gratitude that they can but deplore.

The Committee regret the length to which this paper, notwithstanding the greatest efforts at compression, has extended. They cannot, however, apologise for it, since it seemed essential for them to meet, in however bare an outline, the charges made against them. They would in conclusion say that while the Governor has disclaimed any hostility to them or their work, his despatch is not consistent with such a disclaimer. Throughout the document there is no word of appreciation for work well and steadily carried out under conditions of the utmost rigour, and there is no sign of any judicial sifting of the statements on which criticisms are based. The Committee consider that the present attitude of the Governor must gradually give rise to an atmosphere seriously prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of the researches, and they view with grave apprehension the effect which the Governor's evident lack of sympathy may have on their work in the future.

The Committee have no more the wish than the right to resent criticism, but they feel that in the public interest it should be constructive, that it should reach at least a reasonable level of accuracy in matters of fact, and that in all cases it should be free from bias.



Communications on this subject  
should be addressed to—

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
COLONIAL OFFICE,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

and the following Number quoted : 56930/26



Downing Street,

13 November, 1928.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit to you a copy of a note by the Discovery Committee upon the criticisms made in your Confidential despatch of the 8th of May last.

2. It appears to Mr. Amery that the note substantially rebuts the criticisms with which it deals, and that the despatch in question contains a number of hasty and ill-considered statements.

3. Mr. Amery presumes that you will now wish to withdraw these statements and I am to afford you the present opportunity of doing so.

4. A copy of the despatch is enclosed for convenience of reference.

Fr. Gov. Conf.  
8 May 1928

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

*R. D. Amery*

ARNOLD MODSON, ESQ., C.M.G.

*Stacy*  
{

Travellers' Club,  
Pall Mall,  
London, S.W.1.

Confidential.

10th December, 1928.

My dear Sir Samuel,

I am forwarding the attached letter from Campbell.

With regard to paragraph 3, you will understand that it is difficult for me to forward a full reply owing to the fact that my papers have already been dispatched to the boat and that I have very little time at my disposal, owing to my sailing on the 13th inst.

2. Shortly I object to the purchase of a new boat by the Discovery Committee on the following grounds:-

(a) If you read the Committee's reply to my recent criticism you will notice they state in so many words that the Discovery is an excellent ship well suited for the purposes for which she was bought.

In view of this fact I should like to ask the Committee why, if the boat is as good as they state, they are trying to dispose of her by sale or lease to another Government? I imagine they are not philanthropists, and that the reason they wish to dispose of the vessel is that she is unsuited for navigation in the Antarctic.

(b) You will also notice that in the reply in question they emphasise the fact that urgency is

necessary in dealing with research work in the Southern Seas.

I should again like to ask the Committee, if this is the case, why the Discovery has remained inactive for so long? She has not been doing any research work, at any rate since I have been in the Falkland Islands, and I believe also for some considerable time before I arrived there.

This, surely, makes it quite clear, once again, that the Discovery is not suitable for the work she is supposed to do. In fact, I would go so far as to say that it is well known she is unsuitable; that unsuitability accounts for the proposed disposal of her to another Government.

It appears to me, therefore, hard to reconcile the Committee's attitude. If the boat is suitable why are they going to the enormous expense of buying another steamer, and why do they want to dispose of her to another Government? If she is not suitable why do they in their reply to my criticisms assert the contrary?

I also maintain that the Committee's statements are in some cases inaccurate and unreliable. I will just give you one instance. You will remember that when the La Motte incident occurred in the Falkland Islands the Committee reported to the Secretary of State that excellent work had been performed by the William Scorsby on that voyage. Yet I was told by Johns himself that the navigation had been so bad that the "work they had performed had been of very little

value, if any." As far as I remember those were the exact words he used. As Johns was head scientist in charge of the scientific part of the expedition the Committee could only have obtained their information from him; yet he states one thing and they another.

You will, therefore, understand that I wish to go into the matter with my Executive Council and forward you a well-considered and dispassionate report on the whole proceeding. This I cannot do until I arrive in the Falklands. I am firmly convinced that this Committee, as at present constituted, is unable to run this expedition, and that large sums of money are being wasted with no benefit to anyone.

With kind regards,

Yours truly,

Sept 10. 1925

BRITISH LEGATION,  
OSLO.

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Dear Hudson,

My wife and  
I send you our kindest-  
compliments & good  
wishes. We are sure that  
the Falklands will be  
sure of a peaceful future  
even for you in the  
future. I am sure the  
"Discovery" should be



I've got out the papers.  
I tell from my numerous  
friends that the committee  
the business has been  
grossly mismanaged.

Best of health  
& good wishes for you

Yours sincerely  

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(111)

Confidential.

I have just received a letter from Colonel Andrew Thorne who is now commanding the Grenadier Guards. He writes to me privately saying that he was thunder struck on going to the Falkland Islands Film to see how my militia was held up to ridicule and contempt and writes to condone with me in the matter.

Mr. Watt who has been staying with me said of his own accord that he wrote to Mr. Harding when he was in England and told him that he was going to visit the Falkland Islands film. Mr. Harding wrote back to him at once begging him not to go and see it as it was too terrible for words. Afterwards Mr. Watt went and saw the film and was horror struck to see the way that the local soldiery out here were simply made to act as a laughing stock for the people who visit Cinemas. He told me himself, having been born in these islands, that he doubts if this matter will ever be forgotten as the insult is too great.

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Mr. Watt told me that the 'Discovery' Committee went to Lord Leverhulme to ask him for advice about the "William Scoresby". Lever Bros. told them exactly what kind of boat to get and that there was only one yard in England capable of building it. If they did not go to that yard they would have to go to Norway. The firm in question put in a reasonable tender but another firm in England put in a tender which was £2,000 cheaper. Against expert advice the Committee accepted this tender. Before the boat was finished this Company wanted to go into liquidation but was bolstered up by the Committee, the result being that the boat cost somewhere near £50,000 instead of £26,000 which Lever Bros. pay for their whale catchers, and in addition the vessel is quite unsuitable for the work it has to do.

Communications on this subject  
should be addressed to—

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
COLONIAL OFFICE,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

and the following  
Number quoted: 56930/28.



Downing Street,

7<sup>th</sup> December, 1928.

*File in Confidential Enquiry  
Papers re Discovery M.*

Sir,

I am directed by Mr Secretary Anery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th of November in which you state that on your return to the Colony you propose to answer in detail the report of the Discovery Committee on the charges you have made against them.

2. The Secretary of State had hoped, as was made clear in the letter from this Office of the 13th November, that this report would enable you to withdraw the charges you have made, the gravity of some of which you do not appear to have appreciated, and to proffer some expression of regret for the intemperate language in which they were expressed. He feels bound to

express

ARNOLD HODSON, ESQ., C.M.G.

express to you his own conclusion that the Committee have completely and satisfactorily answered the very serious charges which you have made as to the suitability of the discovery and the William Scoresby for the work on which they are employed and the action of the Committee in selecting the ships for the purpose.

3. I am to add that the Secretary of State intends to request the Committee to continue their work and that he is not prepared to consider any proposals for transferring the control of their operations to you in your capacity as Governor of the Falkland Islands.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. Grindle

115

Travellers' Club,  
Pall Mall,  
London, S.W.1.

Confidential.

10th December, 1928.

My dear Sir Samuel,

I am forwarding the attached letter from Campbell.

With regard to paragraph 3, you will understand that it is difficult for me to forward a full reply owing to the fact that my papers have already been dispatched to the boat and that I have very little time at my disposal, owing to my sailing on the 13th inst.

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Southern Seas.

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value, if any." As far as I remember those were the exact words he used. As Johns was head scientist in charge of the scientific part of the expedition the Committee could only have obtained their information from him; yet he states one thing and they another.

You will, therefore, understand that I wish to go into the matter with my Executive Council and forward you a well-considered and dispassionate report on the whole proceeding. This I cannot do until I arrive in the Falklands. I am firmly convinced that this Committee, as at present constituted, is unable to run this expedition, and that large sums of money are being wasted with no benefit to anyone.

With kind regards,

Yours truly,

L116



COLONIAL OFFICE,  
DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

11th December, 1928.

*My dear Hodson.*

I have just received your letter of the 10th instant enclosing an official letter, dated 6th December, which is signed by Campbell. The letter in question as well as the one signed by Grindle, to which you refer as a "strange letter" in your postscript, were both seen and approved by Mr. Amery himself. I have shown your letter ~~to me~~ to the Secretary of State.

*Yours sincerely.*  
*J. H. Wilson.*

ARNOLD HODSON, ESQ., C.M.G.

(1119) (19)  
R.R.S. Discovery  
Port Stanley  
Falkland Islands  
29th April 1926

The Secretary  
"Discovery" Committee  
Colonial Office  
London S.W.1.

Sir,

I have to report the arrival of the "Discovery" at Port Stanley at 4.30 p.m. 24th April.

2 In my last report, dated 22nd February, I gave you a record of the ship's movements until 20th February, the date of our arrival at Grytviken.

3 From the 20th February until the 17th April, whenever weather conditions permitted, the ship was engaged in research work off the North East coast of South Georgia with Grytviken as base. Dr Kemp has already given an account of the movements of the ship during this period in his fourth scientific report. Owing to the lateness of the season our work was much restricted.

4 During our stay in South Georgian waters Lieutenant Commander Chaplin carried out survey work on all possible occasions. Surveys were made of King Edward Cove, parts of East and West Cumberland Fjords and adjacent points. I arranged for Lieutenant Commander Chaplin to proceed by sealing steamer to Else Harbour and the North West end of South Georgia. Accordingly on the 22nd March he, accompanied by Dr Marshall, Mr Matthews and Cadet O'Connor, left Grytviken in the Pesca'Company's sealing steamer "Don Ernesto". The party was landed at Else Harbour and camped there until picked up by the "Don Ernesto" on her return from the Western sealing grounds several days later. Surveys were made in the neighbourhood of Else and Undine Harbours. The party returned to the ship on 31st March. A full report of all survey work done in South Georgia, will be forwarded when Lieutenant Commander Chaplin has worked out his results; meantime I enclose a summary of work done.

5. Early in April when at Grytviken I received from His Excellency the Governor letters of appointment as Whaling Officer and Seal Fishery Officer. I enclose copies of the letters notifying me of the appointments.
6. During a heavy South West gale at Grytviken on the 5th April the "Discovery" dragged her anchors and although steaming full speed ahead with ~~two~~ anchors down, she drove on to and bent the government wharf much to my regret and to the annoyance of the local magistrate. This circumstance has already been reported to you in my letter dated 7th April.
7. After the departure of the shore party at Grytviken the motor boat and dinghy belonging to the Marine Station were handed over to Mr Esbensen, manager of the Pesca Company, for safe stowage during the winter. The Chief Engineer thoroughly overhauled the motor boats' engines and inspected all engine spares stowed at the Marine Station. Mr Esbensen promised to haul the boats up into one of his sheds as soon as the whaling season finished and to have them overhauled by his carpenters and painted. Previous to the departure of shore party the Chief Officer and working party from the ship re-stowed the Marine Station sheds, painted specimen tanks, and generally straightened up around about the Marine Station.
8. The Cairn erected on Hope Point to the memory of Sir Ernest Shackleton was found to be badly weathered and almost in ruins. I had this repaired temporarily and arranged with the local Whaling Manager to have the whole Cairn and cross re-erected on a concrete base. Shackleton's grave too was in a sad state of neglect. The woodwork around the grave was repainted and the grave cleared and tidied up.
9. Our passage from South Georgia to the Falklands was extremely fortunate. Instead of prevailing Westerly winds which we expected, fair winds held most of the time, On the 17th April, on leaving



Grytviken we encountered South East winds with a high confused sea. The ship laboured and rolled so heavily that I had to 'heave to' in order to ease her. During the whole of the night of the 17th the ship continued to roll with occasional violent lurches. At daybreak it was found that the fore and main topmast caps were working badly and in the main, the wood of the topmast head was badly splintered. Temporary lashings were fitted; I have had strong preventer caps made and fitted in Port Stanley. These preventer caps have been fitted close under the existing caps and make a strong fitting. I do not anticipate any further trouble with the topmast caps.

10- His Excellency Sir John Middleton and Lady Middleton visited the ship on the 28th April. His Excellency inspected the ship fore and aft and inspected the ship's company.

11. I should like to confirm all that Dr Kemp says in his fourth scientific report about the unsuitability of the ship for research work in latitudes where wind and sea combine to make conditions difficult for outboard work. There is little doubt that the 'Discovery' is the finest ship afloat where ice alone is the test of superiority. I feel that this ship could with safety penetrate into heavy ice where few ships could follow and while appreciating these special qualities I feel that in endeavouring to work lines of stations in the stormy seas between the Trades and the ice we are expecting too much from the ship. Were all research ships built like the "Discovery" our relative standard of efficiency would, I hope, be high, but in comparison with ships of modern build I am afraid that our results make a poor show.

I enclose Track chart of our passage between South Georgia and Port Stanley.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

*J.R.S.*  
Commanding Officer



(137) 26

RRS. 'Discovery'.

Port Stanley.

1st May, 1926

Sir,

I send you herewith, for the information of H.E. the Governor, a copy of my fourth report on the scientific work of the RRS. 'Discovery'.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Stanley Kemp.

The Colonial Secretary  
Falkland Is.

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25

Fourth Report on the Scientific work  
of the R.R.S. 'Discovery'.

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In my third report I gave an account of the Scientific work up to the time of our arrival in South Georgia on February 20th. The present report covers the period from March 2nd to April 24th and deals mainly with our attempts to make a biological investigation of the South Georgia whaling grounds.

2. Judged from an economic standpoint the work in this area is the most important that we have to undertake and, thanks to our fortunate passage from Cape Town we had ample time for a full investigation of the conditions which exist at the close of the whaling season. I regret to report, however, that we have failed to carry out the programme of work that we contemplated; apart from some experience of the proper methods to be employed we have achieved little and it will not be possible to form any accurate idea of the conditions which exist at this season from the scanty material we have obtained.

3. The causes of this <sup>failure</sup> ~~result~~ are two; the weather and the unsuitability of the ship for research in these latitudes. The weather has been consistently bad throughout the period, usually with strong winds from NW to SW, frequently with high seas and a heavy swell, and often with icebergs in the neighbourhood of the whaling grounds. At intervals fair weather has prevailed, but it has rarely lasted more than a single day. The conditions, however, were often no worse than are met with in winter in the North Sea or on the Irish coast and, with the exception of one or two occasions when a full gale was blowing, the whalers were out daily, usually making good catches. It is therefore to the unsuitability of the ship that our lack of success is mainly to be attributed.



I am convinced that with a full-powered vessel vastly more could have been done and data of real value obtained, notwithstanding the <sup>adverse</sup> weather conditions.

4. As the Committee is already aware, the violent rolling is a most serious hindrance, only on rare occasions has it been possible to work on the outboard platforms and only twice have we succeeded in taking lines of stations with vertical nets. The heavy rolling will we hope be lessened when sister keels have been fitted, but we shall still be faced with other disadvantages which will undoubtedly prevent us from carrying on work in the weather we have recently experienced. Insufficient power and much top hamper make the ship very unhandy; when she is stopped to ~~take~~ take observations we make excessive leeway even with very moderate winds and the lines 'stray' to such an extent as to render our work quite unreliable. In a high wind we have often drifted bodily to leeward, finding it impossible to heave to with engines turning at 65 revolutions.

5. At South Georgia strong winds are usually accompanied by fog and when a series of stations is interrupted by bad weather it is not possible in ice-frequented waters to ride out the gale and continue the line when conditions improve. We are obliged to run for shelter and find our bearings and with off-shore winds this has sometimes taken us 48 hours even when we were only some 30 miles out. Fortunately we have never had the land directly under our lee.

6. It is possible in the 'Discovery' to make isolated observations by taking advantage of suitable opportunities, but in economic work much more than this is necessary. We need repeated series of observations at regular intervals over a large area and in South Georgia these cannot be made in this vessel except in unusually favourable conditions of weather.

7. Before attempting to summarise the results of our work on the whaling grounds it will be convenient to give a brief account of the investigations we have been able to make in the form of a diary.

8. After our arrival at Grytviiken some time was spent in inspecting the Marine Station and in transferring water-samples, stores, etc.; on March 2nd we steamed out intending to begin our survey of the whaling area. At our anchorage, surrounded by hills, it was difficult to form a good estimate of weather conditions and when we reached the mouth of Cumberland Bay we found that it would not be possible to carry out our programme. We therefore shot a large rectangular net in over 300m. and, though the net was torn, obtained a large haul of very interesting material. The specimens were transferred to the Marine Station and are entered in their log-books under St. MS 68.

9. On March 5th we took a line of five stations, at intervals of 10 miles, running NE from Larsen Point (sts. 13-17). At each of these, 70cm and 2m. nets were used vertically and full series of hydrographic observations made. The line was finished at 2.30 am. on the 4th when we steamed inshore to pick up our bearings, resuming the work later with a second series of four stations, at 5 mile intervals, on a parallel line to the SW (sts. 18-21). At these stations the same observations were made, with 1m. vertical nets in addition. Returning inshore we took horizontal hauls with 2m. nets (st. 22), and anchored at Grytviiken at 7.30 am. on the 5th. These two lines of stations gave us valuable indications of the proper methods of investigating 'krill' and, as events turned out, have proved to be our only source of knowledge of hydrographic conditions in the whaling area. Except with horizontal nets we were never afterwards able to make a line of stations.



10. Three days were now spent in coaling ship and thick fog and squally weather prevailed until the 14th, when we ran out to take a series of stations off Merton Rock. At the first station vertical observations were made with water-bottles, 70cm and 50cm nets (st. 23), but the ship rolled very heavily and it became evident that work on the outboard platforms was impossible. We continued, however, towing 1 m. nets at different levels for 3 miles in every 10, with wind and sea rising. By the time we had finished st. 26 it was blowing hard from the NE with thick fog, the ship rolling heavily and shipping water. We had made a great deal of leeway and at 10.15 pm. we turned towards shore. During the <sup>night the</sup> Magistrate telegraphed that he had an important message for me and we therefore ran in to Grytviken, anchoring at 2.45 pm on the 15th. On the way we shot a dredge (st. 27) off the mouth of Cumberland Bay.

11. On March 16th we again put to sea, but finding that conditions offshore would not permit work, turned into West Cumberland Bay, which is mainly uncharted. We entered Jason Harbour and steamed to the head of the bay, close to the Neumayer Glacier, dredged at three positions, took a full series of vertical observations off Maiviken (sts. 28-30) and returned the same evening to Grytviken.

12. About midday on March 17th we ran out for another attempt to take a line of stations off Merton Rock. The first station (st. 31) again proved that vertical observations were impossible: Mr. Herdman and Mr. Gunther were both immersed to the waist when working water-bottles and nets from the outboard platforms. We continued the line with a series of 1m. horizontal nets, towed for three miles in every 10, with wind freshening from the SE and the ship rolling ~~very~~ violently in a heavy westerly swell. Captain Stenhouse found it necessary to heave to for the night and we continued the

5.

line in a moderate gale on the 18th, the outermost station being st. 35. We then turned back, taking three other hauls of nets (sts. 36-38) at positions intermediate to those on the outward run. These were completed by 5.3 am. on the 19th and we anchored in Grytviken about noon. This series of eight stations has given us the best data we possess on the distribution of 'krill'.

13. Bad weather held us up till March 23rd when we again steamed out, but finding weather conditions impossible made an experiment with the large otter trawl. The net was shot through the port fairlead, but swivel and shackles jammed and the net was slightly damaged by the propeller in hauling. Later in the day it blew a full gale of wind which continued throughout the 24th. On the 25th a further attempt at offshore stations was made, but wind and sea being too high we returned ~~1/11/1111/111~~ and shot the otter trawl in East Cumberland Bay (st. 33), working the net very successfully through the stern fairlead.

14. On the 26th and 27th gales blew from the NE and E, moderating on the evening of the 27th. On the 28th in ideal weather we steamed out to the whaling grounds hoping to make a 24-hour series of observations at one position in order to study the diurnal rise and fall of 'krill' and associated plankton. On the way we towed series of 1m. nets to discover if we were among 'krill' (st. 40) and at st. 41 anchored ship by the stern with 1200m. of trawl warp in 270m. of water. A full programme had been arranged, with observations every two hours and, in addition to water-bottles, 70cm and 50cm nets, we hoped to haul 4m. nets vertically from the main yard. The latter, however, proved to be a very difficult operation and, since it would not have been possible to work this large net through the night, we discarded it and used a 2m. net instead. Soon after we began our work the wind rose from the

NW and the sea with it. After eight hours, when five sets of observations had been taken (st. 41/A-E), the ship was bumping heavily and shipping water over the stern and it was not possible to hold on longer. During the night it blew a fresh gale from the NW, the ship labouring heavily in a high sea and making 5 points of leeway under full steam. Though only a few miles out we did not succeed in making harbour until the evening of the 28th by moonlight. During the afternoon of the 28th Captain Stenhouse endeavoured to tack, but with no sail and engines turning at full speed only succeeded after 1½ hours. Being close to the shore he had no room to wear ship.

15. On March 30th strong westerly winds prevailed with squalls and snow, veering on the 31st to SW, force 6-9, and moderating with heavy snow in the evening. On April 1st we put out and trawled offshore with good results (st. 42). April 2nd, being Good Friday, was observed as a holiday. On the 3rd we ran out early and tested the midwater otter trawl which, however, failed to open properly, all three boards floating on the surface. We then attempted a series of stations with horizontal 1m. nets, towing for 1 mile at 20 mile intervals, hoping to reach the Diatom belt which we traversed on our passage from Tristan. After taking stations 43 and 44 wind and sea rose in a manner to which we were now well accustomed. We attempted to heave to for the night with engines at full speed but drove far to leeward. The whole of the 4th was spent in an endeavour to get back to harbour against a fresh to strong gale and we finally reached our anchorage at 4.15am. on the 5th. The same day we dragged our anchors and drove on the Government jetty in squalls of hurricane force from the SW.

16. We trawled in the mouth of Cumberland Bay on April 6th (st. 45), this being the last scientific work done in the

(130) (19)

area. The s/s 'Harpon' arrived on the 8th, without bringing the long overdue private mail, and we coaled from her on April 15th to 16th. Between April 7th and 16th, through the kindness of the Manager of the Pesca Co. all the scientific staff went out on whale-catchers, some also visiting St. Andrews Bay, New Fortuna Bay, the floating factory at <sup>id</sup> Gethul and the stations at Leith and Stromness.

17. On ~~17~~ April 17th we left for the Falkland Islands, expecting a difficult passage against the prevailing westerly winds. I had hoped to make a series of hauls with 1m. nets while passing through the whaling grounds, but very heavy weather prevented us, the ship rolling with the greatest violence during the first two days. On the 19th in fair weather we made a further trial with the midwater trawl, omitting the long spans between boards and net and using two weighted boards and one light one. We shot at a speed of 5 knots. Immediately the boards were lowered the net tore bodily away from the head-rope and was lost, and though we put about we were~~d~~ unable to recover it. It is probable that our speed was too great, though the net was intended for fast towing, and in rigging the second net it will be well to rope it throughout its length. The loss of this net is disappointing, for there is reason to believe that squids, though never seen, occur in great numbers in the neighbourhood of South Georgia. Mr. Matthews at the Marine Station has found their beaks in the stomachs of elephant seals, albatross, mollymawks, macaroni penguins and other birds. Surface nets were also used on the passage to the Falkland Islands and some very interesting records obtained with the Continuous Plankton Recorder.

18. Throughout the past season the 'krill' found at the Pesca station, in both Blue and Fin whales, has consisted of a single species of Euphausian, Euphausia superba. In beginning ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> plankton work our first object was to discover where this

this/

species was concentrated and the best method of obtaining it.

19. Our work at Stations 13-21 showed us that vertical nets, even when 2m. in diameter and hauled as rapidly as possible, will not give an adequate sample of the Euphausian population. On one occasion Euphausia superba was found in 70cm. nets and not in 2m., on another vice-versa. Our experience indicates that the species is an active one, able to avoid all nets hauled vertically with the exception of the 4m. It is best obtained in nets towed horizontally, the 1m. nets which are very easily shot and hauled, yielding a sufficiently large sample.

20. The stations made in the South Georgia area are shown on the tracing attached to this report, with the total numbers of Euphausia superba caught per mile tow in 1m. horizontal nets indicated in red. So far as our investigations go the principle concentration of the species is seen to be about 15 miles off shore and in this region whales were very numerous and whale-catchers constantly at work. Whales were also often taken farther out, about 30 miles from the land, and it ~~was~~ is ~~probable~~ probable that another concentration of Euphausia was to be found in this area. Our observations, however, do not extend sufficiently far to prove this.

21. Euphausia superba probably occurs all along the NE coast of South Georgia and it may be conjectured that its distribution is, in part at any rate, correlated with soundings, the species being found wherever there is shoal water. The whalers all speak of offshore banks and it will be one of our main objects next season to demarcate these banks and determine whether 'krill' exists on them. It is unfortunate that so few offshore soundings were possible in our recent



recent/

work.

22. The whalers often find 'krill' actually on the surface of the water. Sometimes it is said to occur in patches visible by their reddish colour and its presence is always advertised by flocks of birds (Prion, Cape Pigeons and others). On the 'Discovery' we have never found these patches, which are most frequently met with earlier in the season, but Mr. Gunther, when out on a catcher on April 16th, some 30 miles off shore, came upon an area 3 or 4 miles in length with numerous birds. No 'krill' was visible at the surface, but with a hand-net young post-larval Euphausia superba were obtained, together with Hyperiid Amphipods of the genus Eutthemisto.

23. In the course of our work we have never obtained Euphausia superba in very great numbers. At st. 38 they occurred in maximum abundance — 5316 in the surface net, 5400 in the net at 50 metres and 31 in that at 90 metres. If it be assumed that the 'krill' is evenly distributed and that the nets catch all in their path, the density is not great, for the length of tow was 3 miles.

24. Euphausia superba is the largest known species of its genus and, except for some very young post-larval individuals found in small numbers, the specimens we obtained are almost or quite full-grown. Measurements show that in males the greatest frequency is of individuals with carapace 12.5 to 13mm. in length, whereas the females are slightly smaller with greatest frequency at 12mm. The measurements taken are given graphically at the end of this report, but although the curves are moderately regular in form, a closer inspection shows that, in males at least, the specimens are not all at the same stage of development. A study of the

(127) (16)

the/

first pair of pycnopods of males indicates that four different moults exist in the material examined. The variation in size for any particular moult is great, with the result that the curves do not give a correct idea of the constitution of the sample. The important fact established by this examination is that only a very small percentage of the males is in the final breeding /~~h~~/ phase.

25. I have already remarked on the presence in our nets of occasional very young post-larval Euphausia superba and have noted their occurrence in the patch of 'krill' seen from the whale-catcher. We have, however, only found these very young individuals and large specimens which are approaching or have already reached maturity: intermediate stages have never been obtained. With similar data collected at other times of the year it should be possible to arrive at definite conclusions regarding the breeding season and the time taken to reach maturity.

26. That Euphausia superba undertakes vertical movements in the water appears probable from the figures we have obtained, but the data are somewhat conflicting and are insufficient to form a basis for discussion.

27. The stomachs of Euphausia superba have been examined frequently but in most of them there was little food that could be determined accurately. The forms identified are the Diatoms Fragilaria sp. (v. many), Navicula sp. (v. many), Gossin-  
-ediscus spp. (v. many), the Silicoflagellate Heterophant  
speculum (many) and the Foraminiferan Globigerina sp. (v. few). Most of these are very minute and would pass through the meshes of the 70  $\mu$ m. vertical nets. Though 50 $\mu$ m. nets were used on some occasions few, if any, of the genera mentioned above were taken, while none whatever could be detected in centrifuged water-samples taken at station 41. The Diatom

season/

was apparently over in inshore waters, though further out to sea, as mentioned in para.33, other genera are abundant, at any rate locally.

28. In addition to Euphausia superba a number of other Euphausiids occur in South Georgian waters. Euphausia frigida, Euphausia triacantha and Thysanoessa macrura occur just outside the area in which we found 'krill' proper, while Euphausia vallentini and Euphausia longirostris were taken during our passage to the Falkland Islands. These species are all much smaller than Euphausia superba and, except for the statements of whalers, which are discussed below, we have no evidence that they are eaten by whales. In addition to their structural characters they are distinguished, sometimes very readily, by their coloration.

29. One curious feature in the coloration of Euphausia superba deserves mention. Up to the end of March the gonads (which show clearly through the transparent carapace) were sage green in colour, whereas ~~XXXX~~ in the majority obtained later, though not in a more advanced stage of development, these organs varied from reddish-brown to chocolate. This colour difference occurred in both sexes.

30. The whalers speak of different sorts of 'krill' and Capt. Anderson, the leading gunner of the Pesca Co., recognizes four kinds. These are 'red krill', 'grey krill', 'white krill' and a kind, stated to be common at the South Shetlands, which is grey, resembling jelly-fish, with red spots. The 'red krill' is Euphausia superba. The grey is said to be smaller than the red and to form the principle food of Blue whales; to its scarcity this season the shortage of Blue whales is attributed. One gunner recognized Euphausia as 'grey krill', but this Amphipod we found to be very abundant and though occasionally found in whales' stomachs, along with true

11/25  
14

true/

'krill', seems only to be swallowed because it cannot be avoided. 'White krill' is said to occur close to shore and Capt. Anderson mentioned a patch (found in a previous season) in which he could rely on getting one or two Blue whales daily. The grey jelly with red spots is almost certainly a salp. Mr. Sörrie, manager at Stromness, recognized Euphausia triscantha as the "small krill" eaten by Blue whales.

31. It seems that the whalers regard almost any planktonic organism seen at the surface as 'krill' and believe that it must form the food of one or other kind of whale. It is improbable that salps are ever eaten and, judging by the work done by the Marine Station staff, the same is true of Euthemisto. The impression left, after a discussion of the subject, is that there is probably some organism other than Euphausia superba, most likely a small species of Euphausia, which sometimes forms the food of Blue whales but is scarce or absent this season.

32. As regards other constituents of the plankton on the whaling grounds, the most abundant, found in 1m. nets, are Beroe, Hyperiid amphipods belonging mainly to the genus Euthemisto and very young Euphausians. The distribution of these in the series of hauls taken at sts. 31-33 is shown in graph III attached to this report. The Beroe, which are often very large, appear to be restricted to inshore waters. The Euthemisto frequently occurred in very large quantities, as many as 33000 having been taken in a single net. (When they occurred in great quantities it was not possible to count the Euthemisto and their numbers were consequently estimated by the amount of water they displaced. The same method was also employed with Euphausia superba when unusually abundant.) These amphipods, as clearly shown by an examination of their stomach contents, feed on young Euphausians. The food is

is/

always greatly disintegrated, but in almost every individual we examined we were able to find photophores or luminous organs which could only have come from the Euphausians with which they were associated. At many of the stations young Euphausians were taken in immense quantity, but with the exception of one or two specimens it seems almost certain that none of these are Euphausia superba. Many belong to the genus Thysanoessa, while the remainder are ~~1/2~~ perhaps to be attributed to Euphausia frigida. The results obtained with 70cm. vertical nets at sts. 15-17 and 18-21 are summarised in graphs IV and V. Apart from those shown on the graphs several interesting organisms were obtained — a very peculiar form resembling Hydra, some interesting species of Medusae, the Pteropod Spongiobranchaea, // very large Tomopteris and a spiny Mysid.

33. In my third report I have referred to the dense patch or belt of Diatoms which we found at st. 12 when approaching South Georgia from Tristan da Cunha. These Diatoms were found to be Thalassothrix longissima and the Continuous Plankton Recorder showed that the species extended, though with somewhat irregular distribution, to a point about 80 miles off shore. We made every endeavour to reach this Diatom area again during our work on the whaling grounds, but were always thwarted by weather conditions. During the run from South Georgia to Port Stanley Diatoms were again found in abundance in the Continuous Plankton Recorder over an area extending from 330 to 450 miles from Cumberland Bay. The species on this occasion was Rhizosolenia polydactyla. Though we have no evidence that either the Thalassothrix or the Rhizosolenia are eaten by Euphausia superba these large patches of Diatoms must play an important part in the economy of the area and should be studied in detail when opportunity



opportunity permits.

34. I have already pointed out that the only satisfactory hydrographic observations we possess are those taken at sts. 15-17 and 18-21. The data for temperature and salinity are shown on graphs VI and VII. As regards temperature the most characteristic feature of the area (except very close inshore) is the cold intermediate layer, with readings at or near zero, which exists at depths between 100 and 200 metres. We have not found any definite correlation between this cold layer and the plankton, but our observations are inadequate. The salinity shows a gradual rise from surface to bottom with a mean value of about 34. For some stations the densities have been calculated, the figures showing that the water-masses are in a stable state of equilibrium. The hydrogen ion concentration varies from 8.26 at the surface (decreasing to 8.20 during heavy rain) to 7.93 at the bottom. The values for oxygen content, if our results are reliable, are very irregular in distribution, and the quantities vary from 4 to 7 grams per litre. Although the Diatom season is over the water still contains an abundance of phosphates, the determinations, expressed in mgms. per cubic metre, varying from 102  $\frac{7}{10}$  to 108 at the surface to 160 to 188 at the bottom layers. The figures given here should be accepted with caution for they are all based on a very small number of observations. All available data are shown in the sheets of the General Scientific Log which accompany this report.

35. On various occasions when the weather prevented us from attempting plankton work we have worked nets at the bottom. The conical dredge, light and heavy rectangular dredges, simple rectangular nets and the 40ft. otter trawl have been used. We attached fine-meshed nets of three sizes to the back of the trawl and have obtained in them great quantities of small organisms which would otherwise have

have escaped.

36. In this work we have found that the bottom fauna is extremely abundant and varied. Great quantities of Sponges, Hydroids, Actinians, Corgonians, all ~~XXXXXX~~ classes of Echinoderms, Polychaetes, Cumaceans, Tanaids, Mysids, Amphipods, Pycnogons, Polyzoa, Ascidians, and Fish have been obtained and it seems that much of the material will prove to be of considerable scientific interest. Records of the catches will be found in the log-book sheets which accompany this report, but naturally it has not been possible to identify even a small proportion of the species. Among the forms which struck us as being of more than ordinary interest are a remarkable large fleshy Hydroid of the genus Myriothela (probably M. austro-georgiae) and anemones resembling Edwardsia; Promachocrinus — a 20-armed Crinoid, a large multi-radiate Asteroid of the genus Labidiaster, large Cidarids, Spatangids of the genus Abatus, with young in the ambulacral grooves, and several peculiar Holothurians; very large Aphroditidae and Sternaspis among the Polychaeta; Tepalia, large Isopods (Antarcturus and Serolis) and a single specimen of the Anomuran crab Lithodes antarcticus; among Pycnogonids five specimens of a 10-legged form (probably Descolopoda antarctica), two very large Colossendeis and two of a species with scarlet bands on the limbs; two species of the Molluscan family Neomeniidae and a remarkable large Gastropod with flexible shell; an Entoproctous Polyzoon (Barentsia) and large simple Ascidians of the genus Aacopera.

37. Some fourteen species of fish were taken, one Ray, ten Nototheniiformes, one Muraenolepid and two Cyclopteridae. Of these, ten species, including all the abundant forms, have been provisionally identified. The fish commonly caught among the kelp at the whaling station at Grytviken are mainly

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mainly/

Notothernia rossii, a species of very poor consistency and flavour; the trawled fish, however, are of much better quality, particularly the abundant Champsoccephalus gunneri.

36. During the whole of the period spent in South Georgia whales were very abundant, the Fin whale predominating. All the companies have had a very successful season and, shortly before/ we left the island it was reported that over 6100 had been taken. The whales appear to be concentrated on the grounds in the vicinity of the land, for during our passage to Port Stanley, once we were well clear of South Georgia, no whales whatever were seen. On April 18th., while on this passage, at about  $53^{\circ} 18' S.$ ,  $37^{\circ} 48' W.$ , we came upon two dead whales drifting at the surface. These whales had probably been harpooned by the whalers but had escaped and afterwards died from their wounds. In one at least the flukes were entire which proves that it had not been flagged and subsequently lost in fog/ or bad weather. Dolphins (either Lagenorhynchus<sup>h</sup> or Cephalorhynchus) were seen on one occasion only, from a whale-catcher, and no specimens were obtained.

39. Though it does not properly come within the scope of this report I feel that I should make some reference to the opinion which Captain Stenhouse and I have formed regarding the supervision of the whaling and sealing industry, which is at present very far from efficient. The magistrate at South Georgia has no vessel in which he can make tours of the whaling stations and is dependent for such service on the goodwill of the manager of the local whaling company. In the South Shetlands supervision is at present only nominal, notwithstanding the large interests involved. As the Committee is doubtless aware the 'Lancing' has been engaged during part of the present season in pelagic whaling in the Dependencies and it is not unlikely that another unlicensed vessel of the

the/

same type will be operating next season. With a fast patrol ship a good deal might be done to check the activities of such vessels. Captain Stenhouse and I are of the opinion that patrol ships, from which survey work might <sup>also</sup> be undertaken, have now become a necessity and we shall be glad, if the Committee so desire, to give our views in greater detail.

40. So far as other work permitted every available opportunity was taken to improve our knowledge of the coast of South Georgia, and Captain Stenhouse is giving in his report a full account of the surveys made by Lieut-Commr. Cheslin. It is evident that years of work are necessary before an adequate chart of the island can be made.

41. After our arrival at Grytviken Mr. Hamilton moved to the Marine Station and Mr. Mackintosh and Mr. Wheeler joined the ship for short periods. On leaving South Georgia Mr. Hamilton returned, together with Mr. Matthews, who is making the passage to Cape Town with 'Discovery'.

42. In the first part of this report I have endeavoured to explain the great difficulty of undertaking efficient economic research work in this ship and I fear that our experience during the past two months will be repeated when we again visit South Georgia. It is most important that an adequate biological survey of the whaling grounds should be made next season and I propose therefore, with the concurrence of the Committee, to divert the 'Searesby' from her trawling operations to assist us. The 'Searesby' should in my opinion spend two months at plankton work on the whaling grounds, one month at the beginning of the season and one near the end, trawling off the Falkland Islands in the intervening period.

Stanley Kemp

1st May, 1926.

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~~Secret~~  
Confidential.

From His Excellency the Governor

to The Honourable the Colonial Secretary.

Private

Copy of Private Letter to  
Sir Samuel Wilson.

Govt House  
F. D.  
9.9.29.

My dear Sir Samuel,

I don't want to bother you with old matters or to resurrect them again but I do want you to read the attached enclosure. It will show you, I think, that I did not make hasty or reckless statements when I stated that the Discovery was quite unsuited for the work she was supposed to perform. You will remember the Committee flatly denied this. I have another document signed by Stanhouse, the late Captain of the Discovery confirming <sup>Plamp's</sup> ~~John's~~ statement. This proof is irrefutable and needs no further comment on my part. <sup>Plamp's</sup> ~~John's~~, as you know, was head of the scientific staff and in charge. This mistake cost the Govt somewhere in the neighbourhood of £200,000!! I am not bringing the matter up again because I have no further responsibility in the matter, but I am within my rights in writing to you personally, as what I said at the time was the truth and I shall like you to know it.

R. W.  
J





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COLONIAL OFFICE,  
DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

18th December, 1929.

*My dear Hodson.*

I feel very much ashamed of myself, as I have had several letters from you which I have never answered. My only excuse is that I am so frightfully rushed that I never get time to sit down and write a letter, or even dictate one. I must, however, do so now and thank you for your letter of the 13th of November, wishing me a Happy Christmas and New Year. It is too late for me to wish you a happy Christmas, but I do wish you and yours the best of luck in the New Year.

I was very sorry indeed to hear about the son, it must have been a terrible disappointment to your wife. I was also very sorry to hear about her operation, but am glad to hear it is all successfully over now.

I

ARNOLD HODSON, ESQ., C.M.G.

-1

I am interested to hear that your father and sister-in-law have gone out to stay with you, I wonder how they will like the climate. I suppose they are with you now.

I am glad to hear that everything is going on so well, and that you have now got rid of most of your "duds". I am sure that in a small place like yours it makes a tremendous difference if you can weed out the rotters, and everyone is pulling his weight.

I was most interested in the photographs you sent me of the pantomime, and also what you told me about the broadcasting.

I was also glad to hear that the visit of the "Durban" was so successful. I should have liked to see your field day.

I don't know if it will be possible to send anyone out to visit you. We are very shorthanded at present, and I doubt whether I can spare anyone for long enough; but perhaps later on it may be possible.

I



COLONIAL OFFICE,

DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

I must ask you ~~now~~ to forgive a short letter, but now that I have started to dictate I find I have hosts of letters similar to yours that I have not answered.

I forgot above to thank you for your letter (marked "Personal") about the "Discovery!" I was interested to get it and also to read the enclosure.

Again wishing you and your wife the best of luck in the New Year.

Yours sincerely  
J. H. Wilson

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## DRAFT DESPATCH.

*From the Honourable the Colonial Secretary*

*to His Excellency the Governor.*

(Copies to be typed .)

### ALTERATIONS.

### DRAFT.

My dear Sir S.

You once told me if I had any worry I could always write to you about it, and so you must not be angry if I send you a very long letter containing some of the things I have been turning over in my mind during the long lonely winter months. There are indeed two reasons why I should write to you about the Discovery: first I know you would be justly angry with me if I did not put the whole facts before you: secondly I have for some time past felt worried at the idea that I have forfeited in this affair, and not through my own fault, something of the good opinion you once held of me. I cannot forget that the late S of S wrote to me officially that I had been hasty and inconsiderate, and that he had expressed his disapproval of my action in a more than unfriendly manner.

I do not mind much as a rule what people say, but I cannot bear the idea that you should think I had let you down, and in your eyes at least I must clear myself. So I send you, in the shape of a private letter, my answer to the charges brought against me by the Discovery Committee.

Yrs.  
I ask in common justice  
that any unfavourable comments  
in connection with myself  
may be removed from my  
personal record.  
Yrs.

C.S.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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1926

~~1924~~

No. 30/1926.

Director of Research,  
Discovery Expedition.

SUBJECT.

192 6

12th December.

Previous Paper.

SEVENTH REPORT ON THE SCIENTIFIC WORK OF  
THE R.R. S. "DISCOVERY." containing  
REPORT ON THE SUITABILITY OF THE "DISCOVERY"  
FOR THE SERVICE OF THE EXPEDITION.

MINUTES.

1.-15. Letter from Dr. S. W. Kemp, Director of Research, 12th Dec. 1926.

*yo. Skilled. / with acknowledge receipt with  
Rechn at with add that the contents are  
being kept strictly confidential.*

*JMS*

*23. 12. 26*

*B.*

*24 Dec. 1926.*

16. Letter to Dr. Kemp dated 31. 12. 1926.

*MJS*

*31. 12. 26*

Subsequent Paper.



16.  
R.R.S. "Discovery"  
South Georgia  
c/30/1926.

12th December 1926.

31st December,

26

Sir,

I send you herewith for the information of the Governor  
a copy of my seventh report on the scientific work  
of the R.R.S. "Discovery". I have marked it "Confidential".  
Thinking that the Governor would like to see it, I have  
forwarded it to him.

Sir,

I am directed by the Acting Governor to  
acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter  
of the 12th of December, submitting, for His Ex-  
cellency's information, a copy of your seventh  
report on the scientific work of the R.R.S. "DISCOVERY".

2. I am to add that the contents of this  
report are being kept strictly confidential.

The Colonial Secretary  
Falkland Is.  
I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Ag. Colonial Secretary.

Dr. S. W. Kemp, D.Sc., F.R.G.S.,

Director of Research,

"DISCOVERY" EXPEDITION.

R.R.S. 'Discovery'  
South Georgia.

12th December 1926.

Sir,

I send you herewith for the information of the Governor  
a copy of my seventh report on the scientific work  
of the R.R.S. 'Discovery'. I have marked it 'Confidential';  
thinking that this would probably be the wish of the  
Discovery Committee.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Stanley Kemp.

The Colonial Secretary  
Falkland Is.

Seventh Report on the Scientific Work  
of the R.R.S. 'Discovery'.

1. We left Simon's Town for work on the Saldanha Bay whaling grounds on September 21. On the following day experiments were made with small release gears for horizontal nets and on September 23 work began with a line of stations running west from Saldanha Bay. Six full stations (sts. 93 - 98) were taken and at each of them, in addition to vertical nets, horizontal nets 1m. and 70cm. in diameter were used. Except for those at the surface these nets were closed before hauling and the maximum depth of the lowest was determined by means of a Kelvin tube. Owing to the strong currents which prevailed off shore these stations were not accurately spaced, but in all other respects the work was satisfactory. I attach a graph of the hydro<sup>gra</sup>phical observations (No. I). It will be observed that temperature, salinity and phosphate content all indicate, though not perhaps so distinctly as we expected, an upwelling of the deeper layers of water along the coast.

2. When the line of stations was completed we returned to a position about 65 miles off the coast and hauled series of 1m. and 70cm. nets every four hours throughout a 24-hour period (st. 99A-F). This series began<sup>at 8.30am.</sup> on September 27 and ended next day at 7.30 am. Every four hours five 1m. nets and five 70cm. nets were towed, the former for 1 mile, the latter for  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile. The nets were closed before hauling and the depths were determined by Kelvin tube and the Budenberg gauge.

3. This series of 60 plankton gatherings, all made within a limited area, should produce some very interesting results when the catches are methodically examined. During the work the entire staff was very fully employed in shooting and hauling the nets and it was not possible to make even a preliminary examination of the material obtained.

4. The weather at this station was bad, with wind of force

force/  
5-6, a rough sea and heavy or very heavy swell. It was a good opportunity for testing the sister keels under actual working conditions and it was a pleasure to find how great an improvement has been made. The keels were more efficient than I had thought possible and it is certain that without them we should again have failed to carry out our programme.

54. When work at St.99 was ended we steamed out to deeper water with the intention of taking a series of hauls with the Petersen trawl and 4½ metre net. We did not succeed in carrying out the ~~full~~ full programme I had drawn up, which was decidedly an ambitious one, but at St.100 three surface hauls were made with the Petersen trawl and eight others at various depths down to 2500 metres. Some trouble was again experienced with the gear and, in particular, we found it extremely difficult to secure large nets at intermediate positions on the warp-- a procedure which must be adopted if more than one is to be used at the same time. The screw stops constantly slipped and the upper net slid down to the end. When this happens both nets are liable to be closed prematurely and, on ~~one~~ occasion, a reversing thermometer frame attached below the lower net was wrenched from the warp and lost.

6. When these hauls were completed we ran into Cape Town, arriving on October 6. On the 13th we again put to sea and in deep water at St.101 made four hauls with the 4½ metre net at depths down to 2580 metres. The nets, as usual, were closed before hauling and though the catches were not large some very interesting material was obtained. We returned to Simon's Town on October 17.

7. During these short cruises on the African coast we were accompanied by the Admiralty echo-sounding<sup>n</sup> expert. He had every facility for making his tests in conditions of sea and wind much superior to those we normally meet further south. His

His/ reports have already reached the Committee. I greatly regret the results of the tests; after all the expense that has been incurred it is most unfortunate to find that we cannot use the deep gear.

8. We left Africa for South Georgia on October 27, with full bunkers and 60 tons of <sup>extra</sup> coal <sup>in bags</sup> ~~as deck cargo~~. As the Committee is aware the route we proposed to take on this passage was south from the Cape of Good Hope to about Lat.  $58^{\circ}$ , where we hoped to reach finer weather and easterly winds. This programme was upset by ice conditions. On November 9 in Lat.  $50^{\circ}$  we passed the first iceberg and from this date onwards they increased rapidly in numbers. On the evening of the 13th pack-ice was sighted and on the 14th we entered it. At first the pack was loose with wide leads of open water but, as we went on it became much closer; it was clear that if we were ever to make our passage to South Georgia we should have to abandon the route we had planned. We were then to the east and south of Bouvet I. and we turned north-west, laying a course for the island.

9. On November 16 it blew strongly from the WSW, driving the pack-ice close and making it very difficult to penetrate. Everywhere icebergs were hemmed in by the pack and these, in the high wind that then prevailed, gave cause for some anxiety. The pack drifts fast before the wind, while the bergs with their greater hold on the water move so slowly that they might almost be islands. In the comparatively heavy ice in which we found ourselves we could make scarcely any progress on our course but drifted rapidly to leeward. One berg we escaped by little more than ten yards and since a considerable swell was breaking on it a collision might have resulted in serious damage. The berg, moreover, was not one with which we desired near acquaintance; it was evidently in unstable equilibrium and, while we were within a short distance, rolled over through an angle of  $90^{\circ}$ .



By crowding on more sail than he normally would have done Captain Stenhouse succeeded in clearing this berg and after some hours, under both steam and sail, we succeeded in breaking our way out of the pack.

10. Our short experience in the pack-ice does not afford any proof that the ship - apart from mere structural strength - is well suited to ~~such~~ such conditions. On the contrary I was again forcibly impressed with the difficulties that may arise through lack of power. In a high wind berg-st<sup>r</sup>own pack-ice is as dangerous to us as a lee shore.

11. We sighted Bouvet I. on the 17th, but there was much pack-ice round it and we could not get nearer than about 5 miles. I had hoped to dredge in shallow water, but a sounding gave 1723 metres. We passed round the north end of the island, obtaining a distant view of Cape Circum<sup>c</sup>vision, first sighted by Loziers Bouvet in 1739 and thought by him to be part of the Antarctic continent. We laid a course for South Georgia, meeting thick weather and innumerable icebergs, and eventually arrived on December 5.

12. More precise details of the ice-conditions will be found in Captain Stenhouse's report. The year is without doubt an abnormal one. I learn that floating factories have been unable to reach Deception I. and have been working off the edge of the ice in the neighbourhood of the South Orkneys. According to Mr. Hansen, Manager at Leith, the season is more severe than any since 1916.

13. At an early stage in the passage it became evident that shortage of coal would be a difficulty. We took three stations with vertical observations when leaving Africa, two complete and one partial (Sta. 102, 103, 107), but after November 4 the paramount necessity of making the passage forced us to abandon all work for which the ship had to be stopped. Thereafter no vertical stations were taken except for a partial one near Bouvet I.

14. As we went further our anxieties greatly increased and eventually we found that even if the comparatively good weather that then prevailed were to continue - light to moderate head-winds, a smooth sea and moderate swell - we had not sufficient coal to carry us through. Captain Stenhouse and I frequently discussed the probable necessity of turning back to Cape Town, though we realized how serious this would have been and that it would have wrecked the whole seasons programme. Actually we were within an ace of returning and, if at this time we had had a westerly gale lasting two days, this course would have been forced upon us.

15. Owing perhaps to the position of the wireless station at Grytviken we were unable for a long time to get into touch. We succeeded when 800 miles away and instructed the 'William Scoresby' to fill her bunkers and hold herself in readiness to meet us. Fortunately for our pride we managed without having to be towed. For the last four days we had strong favourable winds and when we finally reached harbour we had enough coal in hand for rather more than two days steaming. We covered 3133 miles in 38 days and 20 hours, our average speed being thus 3.36 knots. Our best day's run was 119 miles, during which we slowed down for rather more than an hour to tow horizontal nets. The worst day's run was 26 miles.

16. From what I have already said it will be evident that so far as vertical observations are concerned the passage was almost a complete failure. A line of full stations to Bouvet I. would have been extremely valuable and others on our westerly course to South Georgia would have been equally useful. The season appears to have been very abnormal. We had a wonderful opportunity of attempting some correlation between physical and ice conditions but were unable to make any use of it.

17. It was our intention to tow flights of horizontal nets, 1m. and 70cm. in diameter, on alternate days, morning and evening, throughout the passage. This work can be done in almost any

any/ weather and it yields a very good indication of the plankton down to a depth of about 120 metres. The 'Scoresby' also took hauls on her passage and we hope that by such simultaneous observations we may obtain results of real value. The 'Scoresby' carried out all her work, but owing to ~~our~~<sup>our</sup> anxiety regarding coal we were only able to make 18 series of hauls, most of them to the north of Bouvet. To work these nets a speed of 2 knots is necessary for not more than an hour. At a slower speed the nets tend to reduce the way on the ship and at greater speeds it is necessary to slow down. In the latter half of the passage our position was so precarious that even a loss of 1 or 2 miles for each series could not be considered.

18. I attach to this report (Nos. II & III) charts showing the results of some preliminary observations on the plankton collections. No. II shows the volumes of plankton obtained in 70cm. nets by both the 'Discovery' and 'William Scoresby', the most interesting feature being the occurrence of dense masses of diatom in the vicinity of Bouvet I. No. III shows the distribution of some of the organisms caught in the 1 metre nets. It will be noticed that Euphausia superba was only obtained once in these nets, a few half-grown specimens having been found not far off Bouvet I. This species so far as we have seen at present would appear in the main to be a coastal form and, when adult, occurs only near land. Inspection of the published records of the species seem to bear out the truth of this statement but much more work is necessary before it can be regarded as established. Already, however, it appears certain that the adult is not oceanic, thus differing widely from some other species such as Euphausia vallentini, Euphausia frigida, Euphausia trisecta, and Thysanoessa.

19. The Continuous Plankton Recorder was used on several occasions. Its running has been greatly improved by certain minor

minor/  
alterations carried out at Cape Town. That it was not used more frequently on this passage was due to ice and fog and, latterly, to the fear that even this small apparatus would retard the ship's progress.

20. I attach a chart (No.IV) showing the positions in which whales were sighted, the most interesting feature being the marked concentration round Bouvet I. During part of the time when we were near the island we were among pack-ice and visibility was always low owing to mist and snow squalls. It is probable therefore that the numbers were actually much greater than shown. All the whales that were sufficiently near to be identified were Blue whales. On the pack-ice Antarctic penguins, "crab-eating" seals and sea leopards were observed.

21. It will be seen that except for the incomplete series of horizontal hauls and for the observations on whales the scientific work done on this passage has again been a failure. For a considerable part of the time the staff has been engaged in work which could have been done elsewhere at any time. We could have done twenty times as much and I do not myself know anything more exasperating than to travel over unexplored areas with full staff and equipment without any chance of making use of the opportunity.

22. This third failure to carry out our programme during a passage is in my opinion very serious. It is now fully established that the 'Discovery' cannot do the work we are asking of her and it is necessary to consider if there are any steps which can be taken to improve her. To this subject the remainder of my report is devoted. I wish to assure the Committee that no one could possibly regret more than I do the conclusions to which I have been driven. To find fault with the ship is a most unpleasant task but it is clearly my duty to keep the Committee fully informed. I

I have purposely given my views in rather full detail so that in future reports it will not be necessary for me to say any thing further on the subject.

23. <sup>For</sup> ~~The~~ Antarctic exploration Square-rigged vessels with auxiliary steam, such as the 'Discovery', have usually been employed <sup>and</sup> for making comparatively short runs to the Antarctic continent and for wintering in the South they are doubtless the most efficient type. For the special work in which we are engaged they are, as we have now proved, altogether unsuitable.

24. Even the best vessel of this class can only carry out marine biological research under great disadvantages. For work in the greater oceans she will always be too slow. Because of this she is uneconomical, for the highly paid scientific staff cannot be employed at its full capacity. Good progress can only be made under both steam and sail and she must therefore suit her course to the prevailing wind. Except in peculiarly favourable weather she will not be able to carry out a straight line of stations and a persistent fair wind will entail a great amount of labour in setting or shortening sail to suit the scientific programme. A vessel of this class will have much top hamper and this necessarily results in excessive drift. A full powered steamship, making little drift, can so manoeuvre that the lines used for sounding or other observations are kept almost vertical even in half a gale of wind. With an auxiliary vessel such manoeuvres are impossible or vastly more difficult; her capacity for work is thereby limited and to carry out the same programme she will require much finer weather.

25. In really bad weather another disadvantage is apparent. Then have to in a strong breeze all ships of this class make excessive leeway, and when the weather improves may have great difficulty in working back to their position. The



The standing rigging and running gear are a great hindrance in carrying out the operations required of a research vessel. With the 'Discovery' it has rarely been possible to consider how any particular manoeuvre can best be performed, the difficulty is to do it at all.

26. With all these serious disadvantages the auxiliary ~~vessel~~ vessel of the Antarctic type is superior in one respect only - her wooden hull and solid construction render her far safer in heavy ice. It is for this reason that such vessels have been exclusively used by Antarctic expeditions. In the work in which we are engaged we shall unfortunately never have any use for these qualities. To enter heavy ice is no part of our programme - if we got there scientific work would be impossible, and to winter in the south is still further from our thoughts. A steel ship with extra strengthening to the hull could go anywhere we want with comfort and in pack-ice such as we encountered off Novet I. would be much more capable than the 'Discovery'.

27. This Captain Stenhouse and I believe to be a fair statement of the advantages and disadvantages of an auxiliary wooden vessel of this class when used for oceanographic research. In any such vessel the difficulties are great and it is thus particularly unfortunate that the 'Discovery' is less efficient than most vessels of her own class.

28. With full speed on both boilers and making use of wind wherever possible our average speed is 4 knots - a figure not based on guesswork but by calculation of time and distance run since we left Falmouth with due allowance for halts or reduced speed for scientific work. To maintain this speed a daily expenditure of 6½ - 7 tons of coal is required. Our bunker capacity, without deck cargo, is 210 tons, giving us 30-32 days steaming and a cruising range of about 3000 miles. Given

Given/  
favourable winds this range can be slightly extended by  
reducing to one boiler.

29. Taking now for comparison the 'Aurora' and the 'Terra Nova', of whose capabilities Captain Stenhouse and Lt.Cdr. Horton have had personal experience, we find that the former vessel made an average speed of 6 knots with 4.7 tons of coal and the latter 6 knots with 4½ tons. If the bunker capacity of the 'Terra Nova' had been 210 tons (actually it was nearly double) she could have steamed for 46½ days with a cruising radius of over 3500 miles.

30. These figures indicate that the 'Terra Nova' and 'Aurora' were more than twice as efficient as the 'Discovery', but the comparison for two reasons is hardly a fair one. In the first place neither of the other two vessels ever attempted a passage to windward, such as we have now made for the second time, and secondly they had fewer auxiliaries. The 'Terra Nova' had only one small winch which was rarely used, obtained her water from ice and thus had no evaporator and she had no dynamo, no circulators and no steam capstan.

31. But when all allowance has been made there is no doubt that the 'Discovery' is considerably less efficient than other vessels of her own type. Her bunker capacity is also much less for the 'Terra Nova' carried 405 tons of coal and the 'Aurora' 386.

32. Captain Stenhouse and I have given much thought to the possibility of improving the ship and making her more efficient for the work she is called upon to perform. Apart from the fact that the type of vessel is unsuitable, the reasons for her

her/ <sup>ci</sup> inefficiency when compared with vessels of her own class are (1) lack of sailing qualities (2) insufficient bunker capacity and (3) the 2-bladed propeller. Lack of sailing qualities is perhaps the most important. Captain Stenhouse informs me that the 'Discovery' is greatly inferior to the 'Aurora' in this respect and the defect is unfortunately inherent in the ship and cannot be remedied. When we left England we expected to spend as much time under sail as under steam but actually, during the whole course of the present voyage, we have not been more than three weeks under sail alone. We make our best speed, rarely exceeding 6 knots, under both steam and sail, but this is only possible with strong favourable winds. It is on such winds that we are almost entirely dependant in making long passages.

33. To make sufficient increase in our bunker capacity seems also to be impossible. By extending the bunkers forward at the expense of the holds a little extra space could be found but not nearly enough for our needs. Were it not for the serious objection to oil fuel in a wooden ship, one would be inclined to recommend conversion to oil and the fitting of large storage tanks at the bottom of each hold. In no other way does it seem possible to provide sufficient increase.

34. To fit a 4-bladed propeller will no doubt be an improvement; it will reduce slip and increase our power and cruising range. <sup>however,</sup> We are/convicted that the advantage gained will be insufficient and that we shall still find ourselves deficient in power.

35. Captain Stenhouse and I have come to the conclusion that the ship cannot be made efficient for the work we are attempting. Alterations will involve still farther expense and the best that can be hoped from them is a slight alleviation of our difficulties.

To us there appear only two alternatives, either a drastic limitation of our work or the purchase of another vessel.

36. We have now made three long passages in the South Atlantic and during none of them have we been able to carry out the scientific <sup>work</sup> that we had planned. We did best on the passage from the Cape to South Georgia via Tristan da Cunha, when - as a whole - the weather was exceptionally good; but even on this occasion we did not complete more than half the scientific programme. I regard it as now fully established that the 'Discovery' is not able to carry on scientific work during long passages. <sup>\*</sup> If she is to be re-commissioned such passages must be avoided and she must work from fixed bases where fuel is obtainable. By this means the Committee will, in my opinion, get the best results from the ship and the scientific staff, but we shall still be unduly dependent on weather and a recurrence of the conditions we experienced during our first visit to South Georgia (when we failed to make any adequate survey of the whaling grounds) is only to be expected. In avoiding long passages it will be necessary to give up all work on the African coast. The ship will be based on Grytviken, Deception I. or Port Stanley and will refit at Montevideo or other South American port.

37. This limitation of movement to suit the capacity of the 'Discovery' is in my opinion likely to be disastrous to the scientific results, for it is most improbable that we shall ever find a satisfactory solution to the problems on which we are engaged by purely local investigations. Though intensive

<sup>x.</sup>

I notice in the extracts from the minutes of the 46th Committee meeting (3c) that Captain Nares expressed the opinion that the ship behaved satisfactorily on her voyage from Stanley to Cape Town. Seeing that she could not even complete half the scientific programme this view has astonished me. Presumably Captain Nares was referring merely to the passage.

intensive/  
work, undertaken on the actual whaling grounds, takes a large place in our scientific programme it has always been recognized that research extending much further afield is necessary if the results of the local investigations are to be appreciated at their proper significance. In the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee Mr. Berkeley laid stress on the need for this extended research and even from what we have seen of planktonic conditions in the Southern Ocean its importance is evident. We need to cover the entire area south of Lat.  $35^{\circ}$  with our observations, skirting or even penetrating the pack-ice, perhaps reaching the Antarctic continent, and ranging northward as far as the Equator on routes frequented by whales. If the work is to be properly done the scientific programme must never be curtailed by shortage of fuel. It must be rigidly adhered to, with us as with the 'Meteor', and if the weather is such that work is impossible we must have sufficient power and sufficient reserve of fuel to stand by until conditions improve.

38. With the 'Discovery' we shall never be able to carry out such a programme and the arguments against restriction of our work are so weighty that in my opinion the only course is to replace the present vessel by one of a different type. This conclusion which Captain Stenhouse shares with me, I now recommend to the consideration of the Committee. I do so because I can find no other remedy for our difficulties, very unwillingly and only after making every effort to discover a more satisfactory solution.

39. The type of ship that Captain Stenhouse and I recommend would be similar to some of those employed in cable work such as the S.S. 'Cambria'. She should be rather larger than the 'Discovery', 250 - 275 ft. in length and with a gross tonnage of about 2000 tons. She should be of iron or steel, with the hull sheathed in hard wood or with extra plating to well above



above/  
the water line, with single screw, oil fuel, an economic speed of 8 or 9 knots (maximum perhaps 14) and a cruising radius at economic speed of fully 6000 miles. Captain Stenhouse thinks it possible that a suitable vessel could be found on the market and adapted to our requirements without building specially. By this means, if the Committee is able to consider our proposal, a great saving in cost would be effected. The large winch, the auxiliary engines, practically all the scientific equipment and much other gear could of course be utilized in the new vessel.

MEMORANDUM ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE 'DISCOVERY' EXPEDITION.

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R.R.S. "DISCOVERY".

COST.

The first fundamental and most expensive error was made in purchasing Scott's old ship the 'Discovery' which was originally constructed at a cost of £45,000, for work in pack-ice. The vessel was bought for £5,000. Her total cost when refitted amounted to £131,550.

UNSUITABILITY.

The 'Discovery's' unsuitability for the work for which she was intended although denied by the 'Discovery' Committee, is admitted by Dr. Stanley Kemp, Director of Research, in his fourth scientific report, dated 1st May, 1926, *and in his seventh dated 12.12.26.* and by Commander Stenhouse, Captain of the 'Discovery' in his letter reporting the vessel's arrival at Stanley on the 24th of April, 1926. This testimony of the vessel's unsuitability for work in the Antarctic seas is confirmed by the fact that she has been lent to the Australian Government for exploration in pack-ice, being replaced by a new vessel the 'Discovery II', which arrived in South Atlantic waters early in January, 1930.

EXPENDITURE.

That the 'Discovery' Expedition has been financed with extravagance is a fact well known to everyone in the Falkland Islands and in the best informed circles in Norway and can be proved by analysis of the published financial returns.

A comparison of the original estimated cost of the Expedition and the actual expenditure to the 31st December, 1929, will make the situation clear.

According/

According to the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Research and Development in the Falkland Islands, April, 1920, p.p. 27 and 28 the original estimate of expenditure was as follows :

<u>Capital Expenditure.</u>			£.
Two vessels...	...	...	85,000.
Scientific Equipment	...	...	20,000.
TOTAL			105,000.
Annually Recurrent Expenditure			£33,000.

The following table shows the actual cost to the 31st December, 1929.

<u>Expenditure.</u>						
<u>Year.</u>	<u>Capital.</u>			<u>Recurrent.</u>		
1925	£150,591.	0.	8.	£39,966.	14.	1.
1926	31,911.	14.	1.	46,568.	4.	1.
1927	283.	12.	7.	39,010.	18.	11.
1928	2,350.	0.	0.	55,351.	0.	0.
1929	73,000.	0.	0. <sup>x</sup>	38,944.	0.	0.
	£258,136.	7.	2.	£219,840.	17.	1.

An average of £43,968 a year compared with the estimate of £33,000.

An excess of £114,840 over the estimate.

<sup>x</sup>This sum represents only the initial cost of the 'Discovery II'. To it must be added the cost of the additional equipment that will be required and the high running cost of the new vessel as compared with a ship of the type of the old 'Discovery'.

It will thus be seen that the total sum expended on the Expedition up to the 31st December, 1929, amounted to at least £477,977. 4. 3.

The funds in reserve for the purpose of the Expedition on/

on the same date amounted to £451,270.

Thus nearly one million pounds sterling of the money belonging to the Colony of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies has been earmarked for scientific research, and of this sum about half a million has already been spent.

RESULTS DISPROPORTIONATE TO EXPENDITURE.

It may well be asked what results have been obtained from such huge expenditure. According to the printed reports issued by the 'Discovery' Committee the acquisition of new scientific data is not very extensive. Though a considerable amount of information has been collected about the feeding grounds of whales and a large number of these animals have been carefully examined and measured by the Zoologists of the Expedition little of the data acquired is new and very little of it has any commercial value.

The marking of whales, originally one of the chief objects of the Expedition has proved a total failure. In any case it is quite certain that such knowledge as has been obtained could have been acquired at a very much smaller cost than half a million sterling.

Members of the 'Discovery' Committee do not seem to be aware of the fact that they have enormously exceeded the normal expenditure of expeditions such as the one they have undertaken to organize. They have ventured to declare in their Note :-

"The Committee feel confident that their expenditure will bear favourable comparison with that of other Antarctic Expeditions."

The following figures will give an idea of the costs of previous expeditions, both arctic and antarctic during the past few years.

The/

	£.
The first Scott Expedition ...	92,000.
Shackleton's Second Expedition	80,000.
Scott's last Expedition. ...	75,000. (approx.)
Mawson's Expedition ...	84,000.
Shackleton's First Expedition.	44,000.
Berchgreivink's Expedition ...	40,000.
Perry's 1906 Expedition. ...	40,000. (approx.)
Hansen's Fram Expedition ...	25,000.
The Belgica Expedition.. ...	12,000.
Sverdrup's Fram Expedition ...	12,000.
<b>TOTAL FOR TEN EXPEDITIONS ...</b>	<b>£484,000.</b>

From the comparison invited by the Committee it is thus apparent that they have spent on the 'Discovery' Expedition approximately as much money as was spent on ten previous expeditions of a similar kind.

Even when the work accomplished has been shown in the most favourable light, even when the scientists of the expedition have been given all the credit they claim for themselves in their reports, it must still be clear that the results obtained are inadequate when compared with the huge expenditure.

#### COST OF PERSONNEL.

The scale on which the Committee have organized their expenditure will be realised when it is stated that the total amount paid as personal emoluments to the various staffs connected with the Expedition exceeds the total emoluments of the Civil Servants, (including tradesmen and labourers) of the Colony and its Dependencies.

The following is a comparative table :

<u>PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS</u> <u>'DISCOVERY' EXPEDITION.</u>		<u>PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS</u> <u>FAKLAND ISLANDS &amp; DEPENDENCIES.</u>	
	£.		£.
SCIENTIFIC - Director of		THE GOVERNOR ...	1450.
Research... ..	1500	Entertainment Alce.	350.
Entertainment Alcece	94	Gardener. ...	200.
Ten Zoologists ...	4465	COLONIAL SECRETARY	
Two Assist -do-...	459	AND STAFF ...	2604.
Three Hydrologists	1425		
<b>Carried Fwd.</b>	<b>£7943.</b>		<b>£4604.</b>



Brought Fwd.		27943.	24604.
SCIENTIFIC -	Clerical and Technical Assistance...	872.	1686.
	Marine Station Assistant ...	215.	536.
	-do- helps ...	247.	980.
			1064.
SURVEY -	Survey Officer ...	650.	590.
	-do- Personnel ...	923.	136.
DISCOVERY -	Captain ...	1075.	788.
	Chief Officer ...	514.	2991.
	Second -do- ...	400.	2102.
	Third -do- ...	315.	314.
	Surgeon ...	660.	50.
	Chief Engineer ...	530.	400.
	Second -do- ...	392.	716.
	Ship's Company ...	3842.	3860.
WILLIAM SCORESBY .	Captain ...	495.	3150.
	Officers ...	1411.	
	Ship's Company ...	2568.	
	Discovery Committee	1510.	
		<u>225870.</u>	<u>223967.</u>

The salaries of the Expedition for 1930 are bound to exceed the above figures as the staff of scientists, officers and ship's company of the 'Discovery II' amount to no less than fifty in number.

It should be noted that the Director of Research is in receipt of a higher salary than the Governor whose entertainment allowance does not cover more than half his expenditure on entertainment and whose passage home on leave is not paid. It should also be borne in mind that the Director of Research and the members of the Expedition are provided with free messing on board. Moreover, the Governor and other civil servants in the Colony and Dependencies do not share with the scientific staff of the Expedition the advantage of escaping the rigours of the hard winter by a visit to the congenial climate of South Africa.

WHAT AN EXPENDITURE COSTING £5,000 HAS DONE.

A still clearer idea of the waste of money incurred by the 'Discovery' Expedition will be gained by considering the following extract from an article on whaling and exploration in the Antarctic published in the Norwegian Trade News and reproduced in the 'Penguin', the daily paper of the Falkland Islands (December 11th to December 16th, 1929) (See my despatch to Secretary of State, No. 13 of the 11th of January, 1930.)

The writer of this article shows that the Norwegians working in the same seas and with the same or similar objectives as the 'Discovery' Expedition have achieved valuable results at a very small cost. The article describes how a small vessel, the 'Norvegia' was fitted out by a member of the Norwegian Whaling Association, Mr. Lars Christensen and sailed with two scientists on board for the Antarctic in 1927. In the course of two brief seasons the expedition achieved the following results :

1. "Carried out a number of coherent investigations relating to conditions of whale's food, currents, wind, weather, and ice in the seas from approximately 12° E to 141° W. Whilst other vessels belonging to Mr. Christensen explored the waters eastward up to about 17° E. His ships have therefore explored, in all, practically half of the South Polar circuit."
2. "Opened up a large and valuable new whaling ground - the Bouvet area in King Haakon's Sea - where, as a result of the 'Norvegia's' expedition of 1927-1928, there has this year according to a rough estimate been extracted something like 500,000 barrels of whale oil representing the value of approximately twenty-seven million kroner."

With regard to the above area as a whaling field it should here be noted that a few months before the occupation of Bouvet Island by the Norwegians, the 'Discovery' Expedition was making scientific observations on the suitability of the locality as a whaling centre and that Dr. Kemp stated that it was worthless for the purpose. Verification of such a statement by Dr. Kemp is to be obtained by reference to the Minutes of the Sixty-fourth meeting of the

'Discovery' /

'Discovery' Committee held on the 14th of February, 1928,  
viz :-

"7. Bouvet Island.

"The claim of Norway to the ownership of Bouvet Island was discussed. Dr. Kemp said that, in his opinion, Bouvet was quite worthless as a whaling station owing to the ice conditions and the configuration of the Island."

This error of judgment due to hasty and incorrect observation and to want of practical knowledge of the whaling industry and its requirements has led, as is well known, to an exchange of diplomatic correspondence with Norway with consequences unfavourable to British interests, and to a loss of revenue equivalent, on a basis of the present returns, to about £30,000 per annum.

3. "Established that the west area of Cape Horn, which was believed by many to abound in whales, is practically devoid of whales and whale's food, whilst another of Christensen's vessels proved that, at the same time, that is January, February and March of 1929, the whales occurred in great numbers in the seas south and east of Bouvet under ice conditions that allowed of fishing operations."

4. "Proved that Thompson Island, The Chimnies, Pagoda Rock and Dougherty Island do not exist."

5. "Annexed for Norway two islands one of which - Bouvet Island - is of far greater importance than most people know or believe."

The Report adds that the work was "quietly prepared and carried out..... without state aid and without any elaborate equipment." I was informed by Mr. Christensen that the actual cost did not exceed five thousand pounds sterling.

In the face of such a record of valuable achievement by an Expedition of their own country it is small matter for wonder that the whaling community both in the Dependencies and in Norway regard the 'Discovery' Expedition as inefficiently organised and extravagantly financed.

From the foregoing facts and figures it is clear that the 'practical' scheme worked out by the 'Discovery'

Committee/

Committee, has proved a failure and that large sums of public money have been wasted.

LACK OF DISCIPLINE.

There is, moreover, evidence to show that the Expedition has been conducted with a disregard not only of sound finance but also of good discipline. The chief but not the sole testimony to the slackness and mismanagement which have marked its progress is provided by the events which occurred on the visit of the 'William Scoresby' to Stanley in April, 1928.

Immediately on arrival, scientists, officers and crew, landed and proceeded together to visit the public houses. In the course of the morning scientists, officers and crew were seen stumbling about the streets of Stanley in various stages of intoxication. In order to regain the ship some had to crawl on board on their hands and knees. The second engineer, who had assaulted a lady in the town, was arrested by the police and sentenced next day to a term of imprisonment.

The 'William Scoresby' had not been without adventure while in Southern waters. According to the 'Discovery' Committee Report she "had struck a rock on March 20th, in "entering Stromness Bay, and fractured her stern frame.... "and was consequently prevented from carrying out the "whole of her programme....." The Committee omitted to mention the following important facts :-

1. The rock in question has been known to mariners since 1908.
2. The rock in question was charted by the 'Discovery' six months before the 'William Scoresby' struck.
3. The Navigating Officer of the 'William Scoresby' was a chronic inebriate and utterly unskilled in the science of navigation. Shortly after the Stromness incident he was dismissed for drunkenness.

4. The Captain Commander Lamotte, who had proved himself to be wholly incompetent, had his contract cancelled about the same time and was sent home on a passenger steamer.

THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS BEEN VEILED.

It is presumably only because such facts as these have been concealed from the public and probably from many people in official positions including the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the President of the Royal Geographical Society could declare at a meeting of the Society that -

"the expedition was obviously managed with the greatest success and we must congratulate all those connected with it, not forgetting the Colonial Office.."

Misleading statements such as these when made by men in a public position are highly derogatory to British prestige. By people who know, i.e., by the people of the Colony and by the important whaling community in the Dependencies and in Norway such statements are regarded simply as so much eye-wash dispensed by the authorities responsible for the Expedition in an endeavour to direct public attention from a colossal blunder.

THE COLONY NEEDS ITS OWN FUNDS.

It is hard to understand how this expenditure can be justified when the attendant circumstances have been taken into account.

The community of the Falkland Islands, comprising a population of about 3,000, all of British stock, has remained almost entirely without the most elementary necessities of civilization, partly owing to lack of funds, partly owing to their own lack of energy, but chiefly owing to the lack of interest in their fate shown by Government in the past.

In 1923, the year when the expenditure on the 'Discovery' Expedition began, there were only five houses  
with/



with a bathroom in the whole Colony. Port Stanley, the capital, had no water supply, no drains, and no roads. Many of the houses were wooden hovels more than fifty years old, overcrowded with tuberculous infected families.

Surely in the cause of humanity it is not too much to claim that at least a tenth part of the sum that has been spent on an investigation into the habits of whales might well have been allowed to this unfortunate population to enable them to live up to the normal standards of British civilization and culture.

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FAKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

office copy  
143  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

21st February, 1930.

My dear Sir Samuel,

I forward you herewith my answer to the Discovery Committee's note in reply to my despatch dated the 6th of May, 1928.

2. In the first place I must point out that my unfavourable criticisms which led the Committee to make a formal reply were contained in a Confidential despatch addressed personally to the late Secretary of State. This despatch was circulated to each member of the Committee, and probably to other people as well, without my knowledge or consent, a procedure which is surely altogether indefensible and contrary to the usage and common custom of the Service.

3. The Committee rightly refuse to discuss in their reply the first six paragraphs of my despatch which deal with the principles I consider should be followed in adjusting the financial relations of the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Although the question discussed in those paragraphs is fundamental it concerns the Secretary of State and not the private individuals who constitute the Discovery Committee. Incidentally no reply has ever been received to the six paragraphs in question.

4. The note begins by objecting to "certain extravagant criticisms" of the Committee: these attribute to the Committee "inconsequent stupidity", "wanton waste," "action little short of criminal," and  
express/

BRIG.-GENL. SIR SAMUEL H. WILSON, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E.,  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,  
COLONIAL OFFICE.

express the Governor's "unalterable opinion" that the "Discovery Expedition should forthwith and forever cease!"

5. The Committee then proceeds to :-

"note with satisfaction that the Secretary of State has dissociated himself from the intemperate language of the despatch. They nevertheless consider it proper not merely to examine the specific allegations made against their conduct of the work but to review briefly the aims they pursue, etc., etc."

6. The Committee having thus implied that the Secretary of State has given his verdict in their favour, before the evidence has been heard, then go on to foundate a counter-charge against me :-

"In view of the sweeping and hostile character of the Governor's conclusions, they consider it desirable to call attention to the extraordinary hasty and incorrect nature of the statements on which these are based."

This counter-charge, if it could be substantiated, would be sufficient to upset the whole case against the Committee. Let us consider it in detail. The most important of the statements thus challenged, and the most crucial one in my despatch, deals with the suitability of the "Discovery" for work in the Antarctic Seas :

"I beg to point out that the words actually used be me 'entirely unsuited for cruising in latitudes south of 40°' are meant to bear their most literal interpretation and that the expression 'cruising' is used expressly in contradistinction to making a direct passage or lying in the ice. I am informed that the Captain of the ship, Commander Stenhouse, D.S.O., himself an ardent lover of sail as opposed to steam, while stating that he would desire no stouter ship for work in the nature of polar exploration, complained that she was useless in keeping to a programme of stations for the purpose of an oceanic survey and was positively unsafe for any operation necessitating manoeuvres in loose ice or off shore. In support of this opinion it will suffice for me to invite your reference to Commander Stenhouse's report on the voyage of the "Discovery" from Capetown to South Georgia in November, 1926, and to cite an instance on the occasion of the first visit of the R.R.S. "Discovery"

to/

"to the Colony in the early part of that same year when  
"for a time she was in imminent peril off a lee shore  
"on the north-east coast of the Falkland Islands."

7. It should be observed that I have based the charge mentioned in the above paragraph on certain statements alleged to have been made in writing by an important witness, i.e. "I am informed that the Captain "of the Ship, Commander Stenhouse, complained that she "was useless....". So that the real point at issue is whether or not I have correctly reported the opinion of Commander Stenhouse. Analysis of the argument used by the Committee in dealing with this point shows that they have not only shuffled, quibbled and evaded the crux of the matter, but that they have suppressed pertinent evidence; and more serious still they have made statements which they must at the time have known to be false.

8. Consequently the whole question under discussion now assumes a graver aspect. The Committee has been accused by me, in my official capacity as Governor of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies, of wasting public money. They reply with a counter-charge that I have made statements which are "extraordinarily hasty and "incorrect." In endeavouring to substantiate this counter-charge the Committee have suppressed important evidence and have moreover seriously garbled the text of my despatch.

9. The Committee has now therefore to face a triple charge :-

- (a) Wasting Public Money.
- (b) Suppressing important facts in order to conceal their misconduct from the Public and the Secretary of State.
- (c) Making charges against me in my official capacity as Governor of the Falkland Islands which are of such a nature as to prejudice my career, knowing such charges to be false.

The/

The kind of defamation referred to in paragraph (c) is not far removed from what is called *scandalum magnatum*, i.e. "the spreading of false reports against peers and "certain high officers of the realm" and "is subjected "to peculiar punishments by various ancient statutes" (Indermann - Principles of Common Law, London 1909. pp. 403-404.).

10. In view of the gravity of paragraphs (a) and (b) of the triple charge which lies against the Discovery Committee pages 1 and 2 of their note wherein they accuse me of making "extraordinarily hasty and incorrect statements" must be examined in detail. Careful analysis of the arguments used on these pages shows that the Committee have employed various dialectical devices with the object of concealing or confusing the points at issue. The first example of their argument provides an obvious specimen of the "non sequitur", combined with an inexcusable garbling of a quotation. They write :-

"Captain Stenhouse is represented as complaining "that "the Discovery was positively unsafe for any "operation necessitating manoeuvres in loose ice or off "shore". Captain Stenhouse (letter of 22.2.26) reported "that in a gale between Tristan da Cunha and Grytviken, "South Georgia, the ship behaved wonderfully well" and "that "few ships would have weathered this gale without "damage".

It is easy to bring evidence in proof of the assertion that the "Discovery" was unsafe in loose ice or off shore, and that Captain Stenhouse on more than one occasion complained of such danger as it was his duty to do.

11. It is puerile, therefore, for the Committee in trying to refute this charge to quote part of a sentence from a letter written by Captain Stenhouse to the effect that the ship behaved well in a gale in mid-atlantic. Such a quibble is even audacious in the face of my careful explanation that the ship was unsuitable for 'cruising', and that this word was used expressly in contra-distinction/



distinction to making a direct passage, or lying in the ice for neither of which purposes was the "Discovery" essentially obtained or employed, but for both of which she is evidently suitable.

12. It is necessary to point out here that the Committee in quoting from this letter of Captain Stenhouse, and suppressing the context of the words quoted have effectively disguised the true significance of what the Captain actually wrote. The complete sentence runs as follows :-

x "The ship behaved wonderfully well, and although at times not under command and rolling like a log in the trough of the sea, she shipped little water except that which came over the lee rail."

13. The Committee have made further use of this disloyal weapon of misquotation in citing my despatch and omitting the most important feature of the indictment. They protest against my representation of Captain Stenhouse complaining that the "Discovery" was unsafe in loose ice or off shore, whereas the full text of my representation reads as follows :-

"I am informed that the Captain of the ship, Commander Stenhouse, complained that she was useless in keeping to a programme of stations for the purpose of oceanic survey and was positively unsafe in loose ice or off shore."

14. The point then at once arises why did the Committee leave out the most important part of my indictment ? If the "Discovery" was useless in keeping to her programme of stations then it must follow that she was unsuitable for her work, yet this fact is carefully omitted. It is easy to understand why because Captain Stenhouse supplies the answer in his letter dated the 28th of February, 1926, from which the Committee quoted:-

"Strong variable winds with confused seas and swells were experienced during the whole passage from Tristan de Cunha to South Georgia and it was not possible to

work/

"work the full line of stations as intended."

15. It is thus quite clear that the letter written by Captain Stenhouse which the Committee have put forward as evidence of my "extraordinarily hasty and incorrect statements" does, as a matter of fact, confirm those statements in regard to the most vital point, i.e. the unsuitability of the "Discovery" to carry out the intended programme.

16. I quote the following extracts to show beyond all possibility of doubt how the Committee have trumped up a case against me by continually misquoting and garbling my despatch, and by suppressing facts material to the discussion and well-known to themselves :-

EXTRACT FROM COMMITTEE'S DESPATCH - P 2.

"Further being asked for comment on the substance of the Governor's remarks, he (Captain Stenhouse) directly denied making such statements as are attributed to him and wrote that it was entirely wrong to say that the "Discovery" or any ship of her class is unsafe for working off shore."

EXTRACT FROM 4TH REPORT TO DISCOVERY COMMITTEE BY DR. KEMP, CHIEF SCIENTIST ON "DISCOVERY".

"Insufficient power and much top hampering make the ship very unhandy; when she is stopped to take observations we make excessive leeway even with very moderate winds and the lines stray to such an extent as to render our work quite unreliable. We are obliged to run for shelter and with off shore winds this has sometimes taken us 48 hours even when we were only some 50 miles out."

EXTRACT FROM LETTER OF CAPTAIN STENHOUSE TO SECRETARY, DISCOVERY COMMITTEE, 29TH APRIL, 1926.

"I should like to confirm all that Dr. Kemp says in his 4th scientific report about the unsuitability of the ship for research work in latitudes where wind and sea combine to make conditions difficult for our board work."

17. It is evident that the above extracts contain a contradiction which calls for some explanation.

Captain Stenhouse on being asked to comment on the

story is false, that there is no contradiction substance/  
that it is typical of the many false and

substance of my remarks is alleged to have directly denied making such statements as are attributed to him. Yet the substance of the remarks put forward in my despatch with reference to the "Discovery" are that she is entirely unsuited for cruising in latitudes south of 40° and it is perfectly clear this statement of mine is confirmed by Captain Stenhouse when he states that he confirms Dr. Kemp's report about the unsuitability of the ship for research work as mentioned in the extracts given above.

Hence it follows :-

- (a) Captain Stenhouse has either repudiated his written report,
- (b) or the Committee have misrepresented to Captain Stenhouse what I wrote,
- X (c) or <sup>also</sup> the Committee have suppressed some pertinent portion of Captain Stenhouse's letter of 12.9.23.

18. In the Committee's charge against me of having based my despatch upon "extraordinarily hasty and incorrect statements" they lay considerable emphasis upon my assertion that Captain Stenhouse complained the "Discovery" was positively unsafe for manoeuvres in loose ice or off shore. They always omit to mention a very salient point that I safe-guarded myself by stating "It has been reported to me, etc., etc.," and to one specific instance I quote below they give a categorical denial :-

"The "Discovery" is said early in 1926 to have been "for a time in imminent peril on a lee shore on the north-east coast of the Falkland Islands. This is "without foundation. She was not in peril, nor on a "lee shore".

The wording of this denial is comprehensive. The meaning conveyed, and meant to be conveyed is that the whole story is false, that there is no foundation for it, and that it is typical of the many hasty and incorrect

statements/

statements I have made. Yet the story of how the "Discovery" was in danger off Macbride Head on the north-east Falklands is a matter of common knowledge in this Colony. She had gone out to look for a sailing vessel in distress. She had on board Mr. Gresham, a Member of Council and the General Manager of the Falkland Islands Company. Mr. Gresham kept his own yacht and was well acquainted with the sea and he definitely stated that they had been in real danger owing to their having lost their exact position by reason of fog and drift and finding themselves close in to the lee shore near Macbride Head to beat off from which proved a matter of considerable difficulty and anxiety. In spite of these facts the Committee state "This is without foundation; she was not "in peril, nor on a lee shore." Sworn evidence of Mr. Gresham's statements can even now be obtained from witnesses whose honour and integrity could not be denied.

19. There is however the testimony of Commander Stenhouse himself to a similar incident which is sufficient to provide ample foundation and grounds of credibility for the story of the incident near Macbride Head. It is moreover an important part of the evidence which can be brought to bear to show that the "Discovery" during her brief career as a "cruising vessel" was more than once in peril off a lee shore.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER OF CAPTAIN STENHOUSE AT PORT STANLEY, TO SECRETARY, DISCOVERY COMMITTEE, 17th May, 1927.

"While trawling at the entrance to Cumberland Bay, "on the 30th of December, we were overtaken by a south-west gale which came on suddenly and blew with great "fury.....it was impossible to make headway against the "wind under steam and although I steamed at full speed "in an endeavour to maintain our comparatively safe "position under the land we were rapidly driven to lee-  
"ward. Several large bergs which were stranded off the

coast/

"coast caused us anxiety; two of these, lying about 5 miles to leeward of Larsen Point, were in our direct line of drift and in the thick weather I was afraid that we might be driven close to them and fail to sight them until too late to avoid collision. Fortunately when close to these bergs the weather cleared and the wind moderated almost to calm..... At 10.55 p.m. when rounding Hope Point we were struck by a heavy squall and snow on our port bow which caused the ship to take ground. We were making very little way at the time.....at 11.00 p.m. another heavy squall this time off shore, struck the ship and cleared her....We rounded Cape Horn at a distance of 1 1/2 miles and shaped a course for the Strait of Le Maire. We passed through the Strait on the following day, not however without incident, for with a strong north north-west wind we were set towards the Staten Islands and shore and in the tide race were unable to make headway. All hands were called and all sail set except top gallant sails. The ship was labouring heavily in the high confused sea and the main engines raced as I have never known them to do before. We.....eventually made a good offing, clear of danger."

20. It is therefore not possible to assume that the Committee could have been in ignorance of the fact that the "Discovery" had been in peril, more than once, on a lee shore. The following extracts will show that they were kept fully informed of this by Captain Stenhouse :-

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN STENHOUSE TO SECRETARY,  
DISCOVERY COMMITTEE.

October 1st, 1925.

"The 'Discovery' sailed from Dartmouth at 7 p.m. 24th September, and proceeded towards a position in deep water in order to carry out Echo Sounding tests.

"On the afternoon of the 25th the wind freshened from the South-Westward and the sea became rough. We were in a position close to Lizard Head and owing to the adverse wind and sea little progress could be made. The ship did not alter her position for a considerable time and as we were wasting coal and making no progress I altered course and ran for Helford River (Falmouth Bay), where we anchored..... The 'Discovery' with heavy top hamper and small engine power cannot make headway against wind and sea and has to be treated when on a lee shore as a sailing ship."

Thus it can be said with truth that the "Discovery" was known to have been in difficulties on a lee shore even before she started and her unsuitability for 'cruising' must have been evident even when she was doing her tests. This unsuitability was once again emphasised by Captain

Stenhouse/



Stenhouse after his arrival at Capetown, as will be seen from the following extract :-

LETTER FROM COMMANDER STENHOUSE TO SECRETARY,  
DISCOVERY COMMITTEE.

Capetown,  
24/12/25.

"On leaving Las Palmas fresh trade winds were blowing and with the wind blowing at force 3, the ship, with all available sail set to a quarterly breeze and steaming on one boiler made a maximum speed of only 7.0 knots. This low speed in such favourable conditions was due in a large measure to the foulness of the ship's bottom, but I decided to conserve our coal and prepare for a long passage..... As the ship was proving extremely sluggish under sail or steam, however favourable the conditions, Dr. Kemp agreed with me that it would be unwise to do outboard work, such as deep sea sounding, working vertical nets and water bottles, or towing large nets which would necessitate the stopping of the ship or slowing down for long periods. As we approached the Equator, the hull, already foul with long grass, became covered with barnacles and the speed of the ship was greatly reduced..... As our stock of coal was being rapidly depleted, Dr. Kemp agreed that it would be better to get to a position within easy steaming distance of Cape Town before making further tests with the Deep Echo gear. After running our fasting down to a position within 500 miles of our port we intended to carry out a series of tests with the Echo Gear and with the 45 metre net and release gear. Unfortunately a high S.W. swell with a short cross sea was running, which caused the ship to roll violently and I was afraid that serious damage would be done aloft if way was taken off the ship. Since leaving Ascension the top gallant and topmast riggings have worked down and become very slack.....

"Notwithstanding my remarks in my letter dated at Las Palmas, 17th October, regarding the rolling of the ship, I am now of the opinion that the ship is too stiff and rolls excessively..... in these conditions scientific work can only be carried out under great difficulties. The maximum roll during the passage was about 40°."

21. The above lengthy extracts from the correspondence of Captain Stenhouse with the Secretary of the Discovery Committee are sufficient to justify the wording of my despatch and it is now also proved that the Committee in their note by garbling and otherwise misrepresenting the text of the reports received from Captain Stenhouse have concealed the true facts from the Secretary of State.

22. The Committee in their note immediately after making their flagrant mis-statement concerning the peril

of/

of the "Discovery" on a lee shore then proceed to specify charges of 'hasty and extraordinarily inaccurate statements' against me. They complain of my assertion that there is no demand for fish for local consumption or a market for it in the neighbouring countries of South America. On this they remark "yet in 1927 Argentina alone imported 17,000 tons of fish, and the total for South America is over 57,000 tons."

23. This is another attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the Secretary of State. I say there is no market for Falkland Islands fish in South America on the authority of the British Consul at Bahia Blanca with whom I discussed the whole question and who told me there was not even sufficient demand to absorb the production of local fishing vessels. In any case to start fisheries here is quite impossible owing to the continuous gales, and anyone who knows the real conditions out here could have informed the Committee of this fact. Also where would the labour come from?

25. Having thus borne false witness against me the Committee conclude with an aplomb almost unexampled in the history of dialectic :-

"The above are merely examples of more than a score of direct mis-statements made or repeated in the despatch. The Committee feel that material of this character is totally inadequate as a basis for the broad conclusions and charges which the Governor has built upon it, and regret the expenditure of public time in dealing with them."

26. Having thus disposed to their own satisfaction of my credibility the Committee then continue on page 5 of their note to make a detailed examination of the criticisms contained in my despatch. It would be an easy but an inordinately lengthy task to make a complete exposure of

the/

the methods employed all through the Note to deceive the uninstructed reader. In every page, often almost in every line, occurs a suppressio veri or a suggestio falsi. The ordinary reader would often be convinced by the absolute confidence with which the most staggering mis-statements are made. For sheer audacity the following words on page 10 of the Note can hardly be equalled :

"The "Discovery" as commissioned is said to have been "unseaworthy owing to rolling. This is unfounded. "Stability tests were made before sailing."

27. The Committee will not accept the evidence of their own Scientific Director that the "Discovery" rolled to such an extent that work was impossible except in unusually calm weather. They will not believe the Captain of the ship who confirms the Scientist's report and adds "the ship is too stiff and rolls excessively." Will they still disbelieve Sir Douglas Mawson who cabled to the Times on the 15th of December, 1929, "Life on Heard Island has been most entertaining after the long sea "voyage in the ever-rolling "Discovery"? At risk of wearying you with repetition I would again say that my use of terms such as unseaworthy or unsafe must be read in their true context, that is, with reference to the special work for which the "Discovery" was commissioned.

28. As a further example of dialectic which cannot be described as otherwise than disingenuous their paragraph on page 5 must be quoted. Here the Note enters into a description of the efficiency of the "Discovery". It begins as usual by misrepresenting what I have written :

"The Governor's criticisms may be classified as "directed against her safety and seaworthiness and her "suitability for the work. In regard to the first two "allegations they have been specifically denied above: "she withstood gales of unusual violence and has penetrated "pack-ice with complete success."

29. In order to emphasize the unfairness of this  
paragraph/

paragraph it is necessary to repeat once more that I declared I had been informed that Captain Stenhouse had complained that the "Discovery" was unsafe in loose ice or off shore. I have never alleged that the ship could not in the open sea withstand gales of unusual violence. This the Committee know perfectly well. I expressed my meaning with all the clarity words can convey, i.e.,

"The expression cruising is used expressly in contradistinction to making a direct passage or lying in "pack-ice."

No one has ever denied that the "Discovery" was suitable for pack-ice. She is suitable for that and for little else.

30. The Note then goes on to devote five pages to a defence of the suitability of the "Discovery" for the work to which she was set, i.e., cruising in antarctic waters for the purpose of taking soundings and making various scientific observations.

31. The complete answer to this five page struggle to evade the truth is contained in the following report of the Chief Scientist of the expedition, Dr. Kemp, a short extract from which has already been quoted. The following more lengthy extract contains practically the whole of the text which is relevant to the question at issue:

EXTRACT FROM THE FOURTH SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF  
"DISCOVERY" SIGNED BY DR. KEMP, 1ST MAY, 1926.

"I regret to report however that we have failed to carry out the programme of work that we contemplated... "It is to the unsuitability of the ship that our lack of success is mainly to be attributed....the violent rolling is a most serious hindrance..... Insufficient power and much too hamper make the ship very unhandy; when she is stopped to take observations we make excessive leeway even with very moderate winds and the lines 'stray' to such an extent AS TO RENDER OUR WORK QUITE UNRELIABLE.... We are obliged to run for shelter and find our bearings and with off shore winds this has

sometimes/

"sometimes taken us 48 hours even when we were only some  
"30 miles out..... We need repeated series of observat-  
"ions over a large area and in South Georgia these  
"cannot be made in this vessel except in unusually  
"favourable conditions of weather..."

This report is fully confirmed by Commander Stenhouse  
who wrote as follows to the Secretary of the Discovery  
Committee on the 29th of April, 1926 :-

"I should like to confirm all that Dr. Kemp says in  
"his 4th Scientific Report about the unsuitability of the  
"ship for research work in latitudes where wind and sea  
"combine to make conditions difficult for outboard work...  
"I feel that this ship could with safety penetrate into  
"heavy ice where few ships could follow and while appreciat-  
"ing these special qualities I feel that in endeavouring  
"to work lines of stations in the stormy seas between the  
"Trades and the ice we are expecting too much from the  
"ship.... in comparison with ships of modern build I am  
"afraid THAT OUR RESULTS MAKE A POOR SHOW."

32. Comparison of these extracts with the following  
statement made on page 9 of their Note will show beyond  
all doubt that the truth has been deliberately suppressed:

"where weather conditions were at all favourable the  
"programme was completed."

Dr. Kemp, however, had reported exactly the contrary for  
he wrote "the needed observations cannot be made in this  
"vessel except in unusually favourable conditions of  
"weather." It is difficult to escape the conclusion that  
someone is lying.

33. The Note then proceeds to make a careful but  
cryptic reference to the reports of the Chief Scientist  
and the Captain of the "Discovery", as follows :-

"The reports of Dr. Kemp and Captain Stenhouse on  
"these operations are most valuable illustrations of what  
"the work is like under conditions less adverse than the  
"ship frequently encountered. The Committee have felt it  
"desirable to discuss the suitability of the "Discovery"  
"for whale researches in some detail. They hold that she  
"has her definite and very important place in these invest-  
"igations, which no other ship could fill as well, and  
"they contest as demonstrably erroneous the Governor's  
"implication that the "Discovery" is unsuitable for her  
"work."

The dishonesty of this paragraph is now obvious. It has  
been shewn that the reports of Dr. Kemp and Captain

Stenhouse/



Stenhouse state with some rigour that the "Discovery" was unsuitable for her work. The Committee have not merely suppressed this truth, they have gone further, they have here committed themselves to a direct contradiction of facts they know to be true.

34. I am bound to point out that this misrepresentation of the truth does not fall far short of moral fraud. According to principles of common law moral fraud consists "in a representation made with a knowledge "of its falsity and with dishonest intention, or made "for the purpose of benefiting the party making the "representation" (Indermann op. cit. p. 290). It may here be noted that according to the same authority suppressio veri is deceit, in law, if withholding what is not stated makes what is stated absolutely false.

35. The Note fills up several pages in an attempt to reply to my comments on the subject of the "William Scoresby". The opening paragraph of their reply to this part of my despatch starts with a characteristic evasion :-

"The despatch alleges that the Scoresby was built "for the special purpose of marking whales. This is "only one of her three purposes the others were trawling "and the prosecution of marine biological and hydro- "logical survey. The misconception presumably accounts "for the comparison of her cost with that of a catcher."

36. There is no misconception; I wrote as follows:

"The ship was constructed and commissioned for the "special purpose of marking whales and is styled the "whale-marking vessel."

I did not say she was built solely for marking whales. It is a fact which cannot honestly be denied that she was built specially for marking whales. In the first official printed report of the Discovery Committee 1926-27 the "William Scoresby" is styled the whale-marking vessel; and it cannot be denied that up to the present she has failed in her mission to mark whales.

37. When the Scoresby visited Stanley in 1927 the harpoon gun which was to have served the purpose of whale marking was observed by several people who visited the ship to be obviously uncared for and rusty. On this occasion, Mr. John, the Senior Scientist on board, admitted before several witnesses that they had not succeeded in marking more than one or two whales and that they were doubtful even of these.

38. The fact that the Scoresby has completely failed in marking whales, although specially sent out to do it, would appear to have been concealed from the public and the Secretary of State. The printed report published by the Committee instead of honestly admitting this fact states that whale-marking could not be carried out owing to the pressure of other duties.

39. Although the Committee have covered several pages of foolscap with an attempt to reply to my strictures on the navigation of the Scoresby and on the conduct of the officers in charge, they have endeavoured to conceal the facts behind an evasive phraseology instead of admitting that a serious error had been made. The indictment, to which no effective reply has been, or can be made is contained in the following extract from my despatch :

"I must perforce bring before you the disastrous  
"state of affairs which has prevailed on board this  
"unfortunate ship from the beginning of her history,  
"because in this direction in particular I hold to be  
"revealed the sheer inability of the Committee to  
"administer an enterprise of this nature which involves  
"the running of ships and the handling of men. On  
"arrival at Stanley in May 1927, the officers and men of  
"the R.S.S. "Scoresby" were a most unhappy crew and in  
"the circumstances of which you are doubtless aware.....  
"all tendered their resignations which were in due course  
"all accepted..... Another grave mistake would now seem  
"to have been made in the selection of Commander de  
"Lamotte to succeed Lt.-Commr. Mercer in command of the  
"R.S.S. "Scoresby"..... I have no hesitation in stating  
"that he is entirely unsuitable for the specific task of  
"commanding the R.S.S. "Scoresby" in her present  
"commission and on her present duties in Antarctic waters.  
"He has no previous experience of ice.... prior to his  
"appointment he was engaged in the callings of a book-  
"maker and wine salesman. Such antecedents are not  
belied/

"belied by his appearance and I have reason to fear that  
"he is not of temperate habits...  
"On arrival at Stanley on May 1st 1928, the whole ship's  
"company generally, including officers, scientists and  
"men were drinking together in public bars and within six  
"hours of arrival many of them were drunk in the streets  
"of Stanley... Artificer Engineer J. Sutherland was in  
"arrest in gaol for being drunk and striking a Police  
"Constable.... among those reported as being drunk or  
"under the influence of drink in the streets of Stanley  
"in broad daylight on the afternoon in question are the  
"Senior Scientist, Mr. D. John, the Scientist Mr. Marr,  
"the Second Officer, Lt.-Commandr. Morley, and the Cadet  
"Third Officer, Mr. F. Pease.... This case should be  
"taken in conjunction with the fact that in the harbour  
"of Grytviken, South Georgia, Commandr. Lamotte twice put  
"his ship ashore, once badly entangling her propeller in  
"a mooring hawser, and had to call upon the Argentine  
"Whaling Company there to tow him off... it must also be  
"taken in conjunction with the fact that in entering  
"Stromness Bay the R.S.S. "Scoresby" struck a rock the  
"existence of which had been known to local mariners for  
"many years past.... in parenthesis you will observe that  
"the Court of Inquiry into the accident was fully satisfied  
"that "the existence of this rock has been common knowledge  
"since the year 1908 and was actually surveyed by a member  
"of the "Discovery" expedition in March 1927."

40. My comment on the above events was as follows :-

"The action of the Committee in sending out the  
"R.S.S. "William Scoresby" with an untried complement both  
"of officers and men, including a navigating officer who by  
"his own statement is deficient in the required training  
"to operate in these waters which are notoriously the most  
"difficult and dangerous in the world, is little short of  
"criminal."

The gravamen of this charge consists in my assertion that  
the Captain was unsuitable for his post and the Navigating  
Officer was untrained, inefficient and a drunkard. The  
determination of the Committee to avoid as far as possible  
contact with these unpleasant facts is made evident from  
their reply to the above paragraph where they correct me on  
an unimportant detail concerning the ship's crew but are  
evasive on the subject of the main charge :-

"The ship's company was not untried, many members of  
"the crew having served satisfactorily on the first  
"commission. Lieut.-Commander Lamotte, in the Committee's  
"opinion, should have undertaken the navigation if he found  
"Lt.-Commander Morley incompetent; and neither is now on  
"the Committee's Staff. On this voyage however, for  
"several successive days the weather precluded the taking  
"of sights, and no navigator could have determined positions  
"accurately."

The last paragraph omits to mention, however, that Captain

Lamotte/

Lamotte has stated in writing that the Navigating Officer could not find his position on many occasions even when the weather was fine. After this example of shuffling not easily to be matched anywhere, even in their own Note the Committee go on to declare that the allegation made by the Navigating Officer that he had no maps of the South Atlantic is 'absolutely erroneous'. It is here necessary to clear up some of the fog the Committee is spreading by drawing attention to the following facts :-

- (1) Commander Lamotte's contract was terminated owing to his unsuitability to command and his notorious indulgence in liquor.
- (2) Lt.-Commander Horley was also got rid of for incompetency and chronic drunkenness.

To my charges of incompetency and drunkenness against Commander Horley the Committee have now added a third charge of untruthfulness. There is no doubt, as the Note points out, that this officer had been issued with maps; this fact I never denied. It is, however, possible that being of drunken and careless habits he may have lost them, and if so then his statement made to me in writing 'that he had no maps' may not after all be 'absolutely erroneous.'

42. It would be tedious to follow the Note step by step in its tortuous endeavour to keep the facts in the dark and to throw the blame upon me for every mistake anyone connected with the case has ever made. The Committee, for instance, state that my despatch is incorrect when it says that the rock struck by the "Scoresby" had been charted by the "Discovery" but not reported. My assertion that the rock in question had been charted by the "Discovery" is taken from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry into that accident. If the existence of the rock was reported to the "Scoresby" then it makes the accident all the more inexcusable.

43. On page 22 of their Note the Committee make the following statement :-

"The Committee feel confident that their expenditure will bear favourable comparison with that of other antarctic expeditions."

To show how misleading this statement is I have taken the trouble to compile the expenditure incurred by other Antarctic Expeditions. These are shown in the note I attach to this letter and speak for themselves. Further comment is unnecessary.

44. To illustrate still more effectively the incompetency of this Committee I may say that I was solemnly informed by them when I attended the meeting in London that as only two applicants had applied for the post of Captain of the "William Scoresby" they had picked out the candidate they thought was the best. As well might the Manager of a large railway choose one of two men, both unsuitable, to drive an express train and <sup>thus</sup> ~~these~~ endanger hundreds of lives. It must be <sup>borne</sup> ~~born~~-in mind that very special qualities are required in the Captain of the "William Scoresby" and the greatest care should have been taken in selecting a candidate for this post, and if a suitable candidate did not apply the obvious thing was to delay the sailing of the ship till one was found. Any further particulars required about Captain Lamotte, his Navigating Officer and other matters in connection with his ship can be obtained on referring to our jackets Nos. C/10/23, C/11/28, and D/47/26. They make strange reading.

45. In conclusion I have one more statement to make, perhaps the most startling of all. Shortly after my return from leave in 1929, Sir Hubert Wilkins, then on his way to the Antarctic stopped a few days at Government House. On one occasion in the course of

our/



our many conversations about his programme of exploration he brought up the subject of the "Discovery". Among many matters of great interest he revealed one astonishing piece of information. He told me that he had asked a member of the Discovery Committee why on earth they had ever bought the "Discovery" for Research work when she was designed by her architect for a special purpose only, i.e., long periods of service in actual ice. This man replied "We know we have made a mistake but the matter has gone too far for us to alter it now. The only thing is to bluff it out." The actual man's name was even mentioned to me but I will not repeat it as I do not wish to bring personalities into this letter. This evidence I am prepared if it is ever necessary to give on oath.

46. From the analysis I have made of the Committee's Note it is now clear that the substance of my indictment is established from evidence possessed, but suppressed, by the Committee themselves, and my one regret is that the whole matter cannot be fought out in a Court of Law. It can no longer be denied that :-

- (1) The "Discovery" was unsuitable for her work.
- (2) The mismanagement of the "William Scoresby" was such that lives were endangered and that the action of the Committee in appointing incompetent officers to navigate the ship is correctly described as "little short of criminal".

It is also clear that the Discovery Committee in framing their Note were chiefly concerned to conceal these facts from the Secretary of State. In this they have apparently been successful.

Yours sincerely,

P.S. I attach a few notes on the Discovery's Expenditure for your information.

P.P.S.

Since writing the above further important evidence, in the shape of Dr. Kemp's 7th report, has come to my notice; the document in question is indeed so important that I think it is my duty to submit the contents to you more fully than can be done by quoting a few extracts. You will see from this report that it now finally establishes beyond all possibility of denial that the despatch wherein I criticised the unsuitability of the 'Discovery' was neither hasty nor inaccurate. I am sure you will agree that it was my duty to write as I did, and I hope you will judge it equitable that the severe reprimand inflicted upon me by the late Secretary of State may be removed from my record.

In the following pages I include the whole of Dr. Kemp's 7th report in so far as it refers to the unsuitability of the 'Discovery'. What makes the document really amazing to me is the fact that at the Committee Meeting in London in 1928, at which I attended, Dr. Kemp when questioned by me categorically denied that he had ever said either verbally or in writing that the 'Discovery' was not suited for the work she had to do. I can find no suitable comment for all this; the situation has got beyond comment and I must simply leave it to your judgment.

COPY OF LETTER FROM DR. KEMP TO THE COLONIAL  
SECRETARY, 12th DECEMBER, 1926.

R.R.S. 'Discovery'.  
South Georgia.

"Sir,

I send you herewith for the information of the Governor a copy of my seventh report on the scientific work of the R.R.S. 'Discovery'. I have marked it 'Confidential', thinking that this would probably be the wish of the 'Discovery' Committee."

(SGD.) STANLEY KEMP."

EXTRACT FROM SEVENTH REPORT ON THE SCIENTIFIC WORK  
OF THE R.R.S. 'DISCOVERY'.

"9. On November 16 it blew strongly from the WSW, "driving the pack-ice close and making it very difficult to "penetrate. Everywhere icebergs were hemmed in by the "pack and these, in the high wind that then prevailed, gave "cause for some anxiety. The pack drifts fast before the "wind, while the bergs with their greater hold on the "water move so slowly that they might almost be islands. "In the comparatively heavy ice in which we found our- "selves we could make scarcely any progress on our course "but drifted rapidly to leeward. One berg we escaped by "little more than ten yards and since a considerable swell "was breaking on it a collision might have resulted in "serious damage. The berg, moreover, was not one with "which we desired near acquaintance; it was evidently in "unstable equilibrium and, while we were within a short "distance, rolled over through an angle of 90°. By crowd- "ing on more sail than he normally would have done Captain "Stenhouse succeeded in clearing this berg and after some "hours, under both steam and sail, we succeeded in break- "ing our way out of the pack."

"10. Our short experience in the pack-ice does not "afford any proof that the ship - apart from mere structural "strength - is well suited to such conditions. On the con- "trary I was again forcibly impressed with the difficulties "that may arise through lack of power. In a high wind "berg-strewn pack-ice is as dangerous to us as a lee shore."

"11. We sighted Bouvet I. on the 17th, but there was "much pack-ice round it and we could not get nearer than "about 5 miles. I had hoped to dredge in shallow water, "but a sounding gave 1723 metres. We passed round the "north end of the island, obtaining a distant view of Cape "Circumcision, first sighted by Loziers Bouvet in 1739 and "thought by him to be part of the Antarctic continent. We "laid a course for South Georgia, meeting thick weather and "innumerable icebergs, and eventually arrived on December 5."

"12. More precise details of the ice-conditions will "be found in Captain Stenhouse's report. The year is "without doubt an abnormal one. I learn that floating "factories have been unable to reach Deception I. and have "been working off the edge of the ice in the neighbourhood "of the South Orkneys. According to Mr. Hansen, Manager "at Leith, the season is more severe than any since 1916."

"13. At an early stage in the passage it became evident "that shortage of coal would be a difficulty. We took "three stations with vertical observations when leaving "Africa, two complete and one partial (Sts. 102, 103, 107), "but after November 4 the paramount necessity of making the "passage forced us to abandon all work for which the ship "had to be stopped. Thereafter no vertical stations were "taken except for a partial one near Bouvet I."

"14. As we went further our anxieties greatly increased "and eventually we found that even if the comparatively "good weather that then prevailed were to continue - light "to moderate head-winds, a smooth sea and moderate swell - "we had not sufficient coal to carry us through. Captain  
"Stenhouse/

"Stenhouse and I frequently discussed the probable necessity of turning back to Cape Town, though we realized how serious this would have been and that it would have wrecked the whole season's programme. Actually we were within an ace of returning and, if at this time we had a westerly gale lasting two days, this course would have been forced upon us."

The Committee's Note, page 8, reads as follows:-

"It should be clearly stated that the Discovery has accomplished a great volume of most valuable work. Her mean speed has been 5.2 knots, her mean daily run 124.8 miles."

These estimates must now be regarded as "hasty and inaccurate."

"15. Owing perhaps to the position of the wireless station at Grytviken we were unable for a long time to get into touch. We succeeded when 800 miles away and instructed the 'William Scoresby' to fill her bunkers and hold herself in readiness to meet us. Fortunately for our pride we managed without having to be towed. For the last four days we had strong favourable winds and when we finally reached harbour we had enough coal in hand for rather more than two days steaming. We covered 3133 miles in 36 days and 20 hours, our average speed being thus 3.36 knots. Our best day's run was 119 miles, during which we slowed down for rather more than an hour to tow horizontal nets. The worst day's run was 26 miles."

"16. From what I have already said it will be evident so far as vertical observations are concerned the passage was almost a complete failure. A line of full stations to Bouvet I. would have been extremely valuable and others on our westerly course to South Georgia would have been equally useful. The season appears to have been very abnormal. We had a wonderful opportunity of attempting some correlation between physical and ice conditions but were unable to make any use of it."

"17. It was our intention to tow flights of horizontal nets, 1m. and 70cm. in diameter, on alternate days, morning and evening, throughout the passage. This work can be done in almost any weather and it yields a very good indication of the plankton down to a depth of about 120 metres. The 'Scoresby' also took hauls on her passage and we hope that by such simultaneous observations we may obtain results of real value. The 'Scoresby' carried out all her work, but owing to our anxiety regarding coal we were only able to make 18 series of hauls, most of them to the north of Bouvet. To work these nets a speed of 2 knots is necessary for rather more than an hour. At a slower speed the nets tend to reduce the way on the ship and at greater speeds it is necessary to slow down. In the latter half of the passage our position was so precarious that even a loss of 1 or 2 miles for each series could not be considered."

"18. I attach to this report (Nos. II & III) charts showing the results of some preliminary observations on the plankton collections. No. II shows the volumes of plankton obtained in 70cm. nets by both the 'Discovery' and 'William Scoresby', the most interesting feature being the occurrence of dense masses of diatom in the vicinity of Bouvet I. No. III shows the distribution of some of the organisms caught in the 1 metre nets. It will be noticed that Euphausia superba was only obtained once in these nets, a few half-grown specimens having been found not far off Bouvet I. This species so far

"as/

"as we have seen at present would appear in the main to be  
"a coastal form and, when adult, occurs only near land.  
"Inspection of the published records of the species seem  
"to bear out the truth of this statement but much more  
"work is necessary before it can be regarded as established.  
"Already, however, it appears certain that the adult is not  
"oceanic, thus differing widely from some other species  
"such as Euphausia vallentini, Euphausia frigida, Euphausia  
"triacantha, and Thysanocesa."

"19. The Continuous Plankton Recorder was used on  
"several occasions. Its running has been greatly improved  
"by certain minor alterations carried out at Cape Town.  
"That it was not used more frequently on this passage was  
"due to ice and fog and, latterly, to the fear that even  
"this small apparatus would retard the ship's progress."

"20. I attach a chart (No. IV) showing the positions  
"in which whales were sighted, the most interested feature  
"being the marked concentration round Bouvet I. During  
"part of the time when we were near the island we were  
"among pack-ice and visibility was always low owing to mist  
"and snow squalls. It is probable therefore that the  
"numbers were actually much greater than shown. All the  
"whales that were sufficiently near to be identified were  
"Blue whales. On the pack-ice Antarctic penguins, 'crab-  
"eating" seals and sea leopards were observed."

"21. It will be seen that except for the incomplete  
"series of horizontal hauls and for the observations on  
"whales the scientific work done on this passage has again  
"been a failure. For a considerable part of the time the  
"staff has been engaged in work which could have been done  
"elsewhere at any time. We could have done twenty times  
"as much and I do not myself know anything more exasperat-  
"ing than to travel over unexplored areas with full staff  
"and equipment without any chance of making use of the  
"opportunity."

"22. This third failure to carry out our programme  
"during a passage is in my opinion very serious. It is  
"now fully established that the 'Discovery' cannot do the  
"work we are asking of her and it is necessary to consider  
"if there are any steps which can be taken to improve her.  
"To this subject the remainder of my report is devoted. I  
"wish to assure the Committee that no one could possibly  
"regret more than I do the conclusions to which I have been  
"driven. To find fault with the ship is a most unpleasant  
"task but it is clearly my duty to keep the Committee fully  
"informed. I have purposely given my views in rather full  
"detail so that in future reports it will not be necessary  
"for me to say anything further on the subject."

"23. For Antarctic exploration square-rigged vessels  
"with auxiliary steam, such as the 'Discovery', have usually  
"been employed and for making comparatively short runs to  
"the Antarctic continent and for wintering in the South they  
"are doubtless the most efficient type. For the special  
"work in which we are engaged they are, as we have now proved,  
"altogether unsuitable."

"24. Even the best vessel of this class can only carry  
"out marine biological research under great disadvantages.

For/



"For work in the greater oceans she will always be too slow. Because of this she is uneconomical, for the highly paid scientific staff cannot be employed at its full capacity. Good progress can only be made under both steam and sail and she must therefore suit her course to the prevailing wind. Except in peculiarly favourable weather she will not be able to carry out a straight line of stations and a persistent fair wind will entail a great amount of labour in setting or shortening sail to suit the scientific programme. A vessel of this class will have much top hamper and this necessarily results in excessive drift. A full powered steamship, making little drift, can so manoeuvre that the lines used for sounding or other observations are kept almost vertical even in half a gale of wind. With an auxiliary vessel such manoeuvres are impossible or vastly more difficult; her capacity for work is thereby limited and to carry out the same programme she will require much finer weather."

"25. In really bad weather another disadvantage is apparent. When hove to in a strong breeze all ships of this class make excessive leeway, and when the weather improves may have great difficulty in working back to their position. The standing rigging and running gear are a great hindrance in carrying out the operations required of a research vessel. With the 'Discovery' it has rarely been possible to consider how any particular manoeuvre can best be performed, the difficulty is to do it at all."

"26. With all these serious disadvantages the auxiliary vessel of the Antarctic type is superior in one respect only - her wooden hull and solid construction render her far safer in heavy ice. It is for this reason that such vessels have been exclusively used by Antarctic expeditions. In the work in which we are engaged we shall unfortunately never have any use for these qualities. To enter heavy ice is no part of our programme - if we got there scientific work would be impossible, and to winter in the south is still further from our thoughts. A steel ship with extra strengthening to the hull could go anywhere we want with comfort and in pack-ice such as we encountered off Bouvet I. would be much more capable than the 'Discovery'."

"27. This Captain Stenhouse and I believe to be a fair statement of the advantages and disadvantages of an auxiliary wooden vessel of this class when used for oceanographic research. In any such vessel the difficulties are great and it is thus particularly unfortunate that the 'Discovery' is less efficient than most vessels of her own class."

"28. With full speed on both boilers and making use of wind wherever possible our average speed is 4 knots - a figure not based on guesswork but by calculation of time and distance run since we left Falmouth with due allowance for halts or reduced speed for scientific work. To maintain this speed a daily expenditure of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  - 7 tons of coal is required. Our bunker capacity, without deck cargo, is 210 tons, giving us 30-32 days steaming and a cruising range of about 3000 miles. Given favourable winds this range can be slightly extended by reducing to boiler."

"29. Taking now for comparison the 'Aurora' and the 'Terra Nova', of whose capabilities Captain Stenhouse and Lt. Cdr. Horton have had personal experience, we find that the former vessel made an average speed of 6 knots with 4.7 tons of coal and the latter 6 knots with 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  tons. If the bunker capacity of the 'Terra Nova' had been 210 tons (actually it was nearly double) she could have steamed for 46 $\frac{1}{2}$  days with a cruising radius of over 6500 miles.

"30. These figures indicate that the 'Terra Nova' and 'Aurora' were more than twice as efficient as the 'Discovery', but the comparison for two reasons is hardly a fair one. In the first place neither of the other two vessels ever attempted a passage to windward, such as we have now made for the second time, and secondly they had fewer auxiliaries. The 'Terra Nova' had only one small winch which was rarely used, obtained her water from ice and thus had no evaporator and she had no dynamo, no circulators and no steam capstan."

"31. But when all allowance has been made there is no doubt that the 'Discovery' is considerably less efficient than other vessels of her own type. Her bunker capacity is also much less for the 'Terra Nova' carried 405 tons of coal and the 'Aurora' 386."

"32. Captain Stenhouse and I have given much thought to the possibility of improving the ship and making her more efficient for the work she is called upon to perform. Apart from the fact that the type of vessel is unsuitable, the reasons for her inefficiency when compared with vessels of her own class are (1) lack of sailing qualities (2) inefficient bunker capacity and (3) the 2-bladed propellor. Lack of sailing qualities is perhaps the most important. Captain Stenhouse informs me that the 'Discovery' is greatly inferior to the 'Aurora' in this respect and the defect is unfortunately inherent in the ship and cannot be remedied. When we left England we expected to spend as much time under sail as under steam but actually, during the whole course of the present voyage, we have not been more than three weeks under sail alone. We make our best speed, rarely exceeding 6 knots, under both steam and sail, but this is only possible with strong favourable winds. It is on such winds that we are almost entirely dependent in making long passages."

"33. To make sufficient increase in our bunker capacity seems also to be impossible. By extending the bunkers forward at the expense of the holds a little extra space could be found but not nearly enough for our needs. Were it not for the serious objection to oil fuel in a wooden ship, one would be inclined to recommend conversion to oil and the fitting of large storage tanks at the bottom of each hold. In no other way does it seem possible to provide sufficient increase."

"34. To fit a 4-bladed propellor will no doubt be an improvement; it will reduce slip and increase our power and cruising range. We are however, convinced that the advantage gained will be insufficient and that we shall still find ourselves deficient in power."

"35. Captain Stenhouse and I have come to the conclusion that the ship cannot be made efficient for the work we are/

"are attempting. Alterations will involve still further  
"expense and the best that can be hoped from them is a  
"slight alleviation of our difficulties. To us there  
"appear only two alternatives, either a drastic limitation  
"of our work or the purchase of another vessel.

"36. We have now made three long passages in the South  
"Atlantic and during none of them have we been able to  
"carry out the scientific work that we had planned. We  
"did best on the passage from the Cape to South Georgia  
"via Tristan da Cunha, when - as a whole - the weather was  
"exceptionally good; but even on this occasion we did not  
"complete more than half the scientific programme. I  
"regard it as now fully established that the 'Discovery'  
"is not able to carry on scientific work during long  
"passages:<sup>x</sup> If she is to be re-commissioned such  
"passages must be avoided and she must work from fixed  
"bases where fuel is obtainable. By this means the  
"Committee will, in my opinion, get the best results from  
"the ship and the scientific staff, but we shall still be  
"unduly dependent on weather and a recurrence of the con-  
"ditions we experienced during our first visit to South  
"Georgia (when we failed to make any adequate survey of  
"the whaling grounds) is only to be expected. In avoid-  
"ing long passages it will be necessary to give up all work  
"on the African coast. The ship will be based on  
"Grytviken, Deception I. or Port Stanley and will refit at  
"Montevideo or other South American port.

"37. This limitation of movement to suit the capacity  
"of the 'Discovery' is in my opinion likely to be disastrous  
"to the scientific results, for it is most improbable that  
"we shall ever find a satisfactory solution to the problems  
"on which we are engaged by purely local investigations.  
"Though intensive work, undertaken on the actual whaling  
"grounds, takes a large place in our scientific programme  
"it has always been recognized that research extending much  
"further afield is necessary if the results of the local  
"investigations are to be appreciated at their proper  
"significance. In the Report of the Inter-departmental  
"Committee Mr. Borley laid stress on the need for this  
"extended research and even from what we have seen of plank-  
"tonic conditions in the Southern Ocean its importance is  
"evident. We need to cover the entire area south of Lat.  
"35° with our observations, skirting or even penetrating  
"the pack-ice, perhaps reaching the Antarctic continent, and  
"ranging northward as far as the Equator on routes frequent-  
"ed by whales. If the work is to be properly done the  
"scientific programme must never be curtailed by shortage of  
"fuel. It must be rigidly adhered to, with us as with the  
"'Meteor', and if the weather is such that work is impossible  
"we must have sufficient power and sufficient reserve of  
"fuel to stand by until conditions improve."

"38. With the 'Discovery' we shall never be able to  
"carry out such a programme and the arguments against  
"restriction of our work are so weighty that in my opinion

"the/

•x•  
"I notice in the extracts from the minutes of the 45th  
"Committee meeting (3c) that Captain Nares expressed the  
"opinion that the ship behaved satisfactorily on her voyage  
"from Stanley to Cape Town. Seeing that she could not even  
"complete half the scientific programme this view has  
"astonished me. Presumably Captain Nares was referring  
"merely to the passage."

"the only course is to replace the present vessel by one  
"of a different type. This conclusion which Captain  
"Stenhouse shares with me, I now recommend to the consider-  
"ation of the Committee. I do so because I can find no  
"other remedy for our difficulties, very unwillingly and  
"only after making every effort to discover a more satis-  
"factory solution."

"59. The type of ship that Captain Stenhouse and I  
"recommend would be similar to some of those employed in  
"cable work such as the s.s. 'Cambria'. She should be  
"rather larger than the 'Discovery', 250 - 275 ft. in  
"length and with a gross tonnage of about 2000 tons. She  
"should be of iron or steel, with the hull sheathed in  
"hard wood or with extra plating to well above the water  
"line, with single screw, oil fuel, an economic speed of  
"8 or 9 knots (maximum perhaps 14) and a cruising radius  
"at economic speed of fully 6000 miles. Captain Stenhouse  
"thinks it possible that a suitable vessel could be found  
"on the market and adapted to our requirements without  
"building specially. By this means, if the Committee is  
"able to consider our proposal, a great saving in cost  
"would be effected. The large winch, the auxiliary  
"engines, practically all the scientific equipment and much  
"other gear could of course be utilised in the new vessel."

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FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

STANLEY,

10th March, 1930.

My dear Sir Samuel,

In order to save you the trouble of looking up the files I subjoin copies of a correspondence which I am sure you will agree would never have taken place if such evidence on the unsuitability of the 'Discovery' as is set forth in my letter to you of the 21st of February, 1930, had been put before the late Secretary of State.

- (1) THE COLONIAL OFFICE TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 13TH NOVEMBER, 1928.

"Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to "transmit to you a copy of a note by the Discovery "Committee upon the criticisms made in your "Confidential despatch of the 8th May last. It "appears to Mr. Amery that the note substantially "rebutts the criticisms with which it deals and that "the despatch in question contains a number of "hasty and ill considered statements. Mr. Amery "presumes that you will now wish to withdraw these "statements and I am to afford you the present "opportunity of doing so.

"A copy of the despatch in question is enclosed "for convenience of reference."

I am, etc.,

(SGD.) R. DARNLEY."

- (2) THE COLONIAL OFFICE TO THE SECRETARY, THE DISCOVERY COMMITTEE.

Downing Street,

11th December, 1928.

"Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to "request you to inform the Discovery Committee that "after carefully considering their note on the "criticisms of the Committee made by the Governor "of the Falkland Islands he has come to the con- "clusion that they have completely and satisfact- "orily answered the very serious charges made by "the/

BRIG.-GENERAL SIR SAMUEL H. WILSON,  
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E.,  
COLONIAL OFFICE.



"the Governor and that Mr. Hodson has been so informed."

"I am to add that Mr. Amery has every confidence in the Discovery Committee and trusts that they will see their way to continue their valuable work."

"I am, etc.,

(SGD.) G. GRINDLE."

(3) THE COLONIAL OFFICE TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

"Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th of November in which you state that on your return to the Colony you propose to answer in detail the report of the Discovery Committee on the charges you have made against them."

"The Secretary of State had hoped, as was made clear in the letter from this Office of the 13th November, that this report would enable you to withdraw the charges you have made, the gravity of some of which you do not appear to have appreciated, and to prefer some expression of regret for the intemperate language in which they were expressed. He feels bound to express to you his own conclusion that the Committee have completely and satisfactorily answered the very serious charges which you have made as to the suitability of the Discovery and the William Scoresby for the work on which they are employed and the action of the Committee in selecting the ships for the purpose."

"I am to add that the Secretary of State intends to request the Committee to continue their work and that he is not prepared to consider any proposals for transferring the control of their operations to you in your capacity as Governor of the Falkland Islands."

(SGD.) G. GRINDLE."

I must confess that these letters, though obviously based on a misunderstanding of the true state of affairs, have caused me considerable pain.

It is undeniable that the charges I have made as to the unsuitability of the Discovery are "very serious." As, however, these same charges have been expressed by the Chief Scientist of the Discovery Expedition himself in far  
more/

more "intemperate language" than I have ventured to use, you will not be surprised that I should have felt a little aggrieved. Now that all the facts have been placed before you I feel quite sure in my own mind you will see that I get fair play.

Yours very sincerely,

Ad.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. J. BOWENS, 2ND OFFICER  
ON R.S.S. "WILLIAM SCORESBY" TO HIS WIFE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

R.S.S. "William Scoresby"

Rio de Janeiro.

19th May, 1930.

My dear Elsie.

I am trying to write this before we get in port but the d..... beast wont keep still. Well anyhow here goes even if the writing is bad you must decipher it as well as you can. I was awful sorry to hear about Peter. Poor old chap he must have had a rotten time. A lot of people in S. Georgia had seen the notice in the paper & you can imagine my surprise when a Mr. Oversen of the whaling station asked me if he were better. About the same time I was stretched out with a busted ankle which was swollen about twice normal size & as Pete will tell you it was painful. You

You remember me telling you about Rumbolds down at G'viken well he has his wife out there from England for the winter. Of course you know the Governors crowd were down there & we saw quite a lot of them, also Mr. Ellis who by the way said he would see you when he arrived in Stanley. I wonder if he did. Barlas the magistrate is a top hole chap & we really had a comfy time down there only to be spoiled by that ..... Dinning. I think I told you he had been taken to the Discovery II (Dishcover) to investigate the books. He investigated them alright but could not account for about £1,000. Poor Capt. Shannon got it in the neck & Dinning was court martialled. Shannon was not accused of taking the money as Dinning confessed to stealing it, but Shannon was censured for negligence for not watching more strictly the ships accounts. He was very upset & came back done up. I had to go as a witness & by God I did

not spare the dirty swine (Dinning). Anyhow they have taken Shannon to the Cape also Dinning where a court martial is to be held. Every one on board here was furious & two or three attempts were made to get hold of Dinning by our crew. They were going to hammer him & then keel haul him. That is, tie a rope round him & pass it under the ship & then throw him overboard & then drag him underneath the ship from side to side. They would have probably killed him. Anyhow the Capt. of the Dishcover got to hear of it & as he said "He deserves it", he had Dinning locked up and guarded. We have now Lt. Com. Irving here & he was 1st Lieut. of the Dishcover. They took our S. African sailors back to the Cape & gave us some Bolshi men in exchange to take home, & they are beauties. I should not like to go to the Dishcover as things are not happy on board there. Old Bill Scoresby for



me everytime. Now dear, did you think I had forgotten about the increase of your allotment? You can see how it was all our books were on board the Discovery & we had our work to cut out so it was difficult to get hold of the Accountant to make arrangements. Your first £15 is to be paid on or about 25th May I think. Anyhow I managed to get the wire going & the accountant said he would wire the Treasury of the increase which I hope is being paid. By the way Dinning was only trying to get away with £86 in my name which he said was 7 months allotment at £12. And I was to pay it twice? No. It put me in debt to the ship a devil of a lot & before it was found out I got chewed up a bit for extravagance. You have heard of the Porters in Stanley I think well one of them is down at G'viken as cook to the Government Station

& he has his wife & kids. Oh Else its awful. She is a foul mouthed dirty beast of a woman. Rumbolds was so disgusted by things that he does his own cooking. The kids "wee" & do "duns" in the kitchen & hall & not in "poe's" just like dogs. This slut was heard to ask her hubby when I went to see Rumbolds, "Who the b..... hell is that bug...". She was ill, one day so Rumbolds bathed the kids & Mrs. R. tried to wash Mrs. Porter but gave it up as there were no towels or soap & as she said afterwards "I was not going to let her use one of my towels, it would have had to be burned afterwards". By the way Mrs. R. tells me she knows the Tombs, as she comes from there Newbury, & when I said we knew him & how he had been our lodger she was very surprised. His reputation is below zero & it was well he got clear of England when he did I think, I dont want you to

recognize him in future and if you wish your name to keep clean & my respect & love please abide by my wishes. By God there's some horrible people about. By the way again, we are doing a trawling survey round the Falklands next commission & Stanley will be our base. Say Elsie lovey, did you tell anyone on the Delhi that I was here? One of the officers or Commissioned Warrant Officers? and who showed you over the ship. Its strange how things get about but I knew before your letter, that you had been aboard. We are hoping to get a mail in Rio. If there is anything you want please let me know, size pattern length all particulars. Do you want some shoes. If so let me know. What did Pete think of Mr. Lauries letter? I bet he was "bucked" We had an awful time after leaving Grytviken, S. Georgia. I was on watch at night & it was a bit misty. Suddenly I heard an awful roar & a crash & then through the mist an iceberg appeared. Oh my

God it was a near go, but we just managed to clear & stopped. Next morning at daylight Milward was on watch when suddenly he saw another one & had to go full astern. We were so close that we touched the berg with a stick. The danger was getting away without hundreds of tons of ice falling on deck. Well we steamed away slowly & for days we were trying to get clear but found that the berg measured 150 miles long by 11 miles wide. It was nerve racking. Thick fog all the time & at night searchlight going. It used to give one a queer sensation to see the searchlight shine into an ice cave in a berg & then you quickly backed away from it. Well eventually we got to the end of the iceberg & found a howling wly gale blowing. The berg certainly sheltered us from that but when we got into the gale oh my hat it was serious, very, & we were due to be smashed up & swamped very quickly

unless something was done & that pronto. So we got the pumps going full speed pumping oil fuel overboard which lightened the ship & so saved the situation. We were hove to, just heading up to it, for 7 days & talk about misery. Now tonight we have a stiff breeze from the Eastward & she is flogging about in a righteous gambol. We have just shipped a nice drop of water down the wardroom & got washed out completely. Now dear can you wonder why we get scratchy when a somebody fool says how lovely it is to go about & see different places - Kats.

The last two days I've been busy making a cock to hoist up the mast. Cook o' the South. He is to be painted white, red comb & wattles big tail & he stands about 4 ft high. We have a "paying off" pennant (flag) 180 ft long which has also to be flown. But I say where are you



addressing my letters? Either to Syds or Con who I suppose is still at No. 17 Cap. Anyhow I shall get them a. l wherever you send them, only dont make them too short. Now darlingest I'm not going to close this up, but shall wait until Rio in case I hear of any more news. Now cheerio dear Night night.

Darling

Just had a letter from Poll re Income Tax lovely, in'nt it. Have not heard any more regarding ships movements. Dont feel very well this morning as we "dined" on the Brazilian Flagship last night. Too many fat greasy "wives" there for my taste. Hope Arthur gets his letter. Now sweetheart dear au revoir. We leave tonight for St. Vincent, Cape Verd Islands, 22nd May, 1930.

Elsie I love you my utmost feeling.

Your Jack.