

SECRET

C. S.

1945.

No.

S/8/45.

Secretary of State.

SUBJECT.

19 45.

16th July.

POST WAR DEFENCE OF BASES.

Previous Paper.

MINUTES.

1. S. of S. Despatch No. 45 of the 16th July, 1945. ✓

(2)

O.C.F.I.D.F.

To see (1) pl.

Sh. J. C. S.
21/1/46.

(3)

Honorable Colonel Semlany.

See 1.4. Copy (1) attached & signed receipt attd. for transmission to W.O.

O.W. O.C.F.I.D.F.
22.1.46

4. Minutes from O.C.F.I.D.F. of 28/1/46.

(5)

4/6. Red (4) submitted, pl.

Sh. J. C. S.
30/1/46

Subsequent Paper.

79/Gen/3418(MO7)

8 July, 1945.

SECRET

Sir,

1. I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that the post-war defence of bases has been under consideration, and that the Chiefs of Staff have approved the following principles as a basis for further planning :-

- (a) An efficient standard of defence must be provided but the maximum economy of manpower in war must be aimed at.
- (b) The number of Main Bases and the strength of the fixed defences of Secondary Bases should be reduced to a minimum.
- (c) Reserves of transportable defence equipment should be maintained at Main Naval Bases, with a view to the reinforcement of Secondary Naval Bases, or to the establishment of new Advanced Bases in accordance with likely operational requirements.
- (d) The equipment for the essential defences of each base should, as far as possible, be kept on site or stored locally.
- (e) The maximum use should be made of local forces.
- (f) Cadres should be maintained at all bases which would be defended in war by local forces and at bases where it is necessary to retain a nucleus of defences.
- (g) The Chiefs of Staff should, from time to time, prescribe periods of notice within which the defences of any base must be manned at full efficiency.

2. The Defence of Bases Committee have had under consideration the future scale of coast artillery and anti-aircraft defences, in accord with the above policy. At Annex to this letter is their estimate of the future gun defences for bases in your command, together with an estimate of the manpower involved. In the case of coast artillery the types of weapon referred to are those approved by the Chiefs of Staff in DEC(44)132 ("Future Policy Regarding Coast Artillery"), a copy of which is in your possession; in many cases, of course, it will be some time before these weapons are actually installed.

3. I am to add that the post-war distribution of the Armed Forces has yet to be settled and that, therefore, the following should be taken into account when considering the information at Annex :-


- (a) It has yet to be decided if all the bases listed therein will be defended; a suggested scale of defences is given, however, in case it should be decided to do so.
- (b) The scales of defence are long-term and do not necessarily apply to the immediate future.

/ 4. I am further

4. I am further to add that several requests have been received from Commanders-in-Chief for some guide as to the future scales of defence for bases. For the reasons given above it is not yet possible to provide a firm guide, and the information at Annex should, therefore, be regarded as being only of an exploratory nature and it should be treated with reserve. The object of submitting these provisional scales at this stage, is to obtain your views thereon so that, when strategical decisions have been made, planning can be carried a stage further.

5. I am to request that you will, therefore, examine these proposals and, after due consideration thereof, forward your detailed observations.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant



His Excellency The Governor and Commander-in-Chief,
Malta,
~~Cyprus~~.

His Excellency The Governor,
The Falkland Islands (Through Colonial Office)

His Excellency The Commander-in-Chief,
Middle East,
India.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
East Africa,
West Africa.

The Officer Commanding Troops,
Bermuda,
St. Helena.

The Commander,
North Caribbean Area,
South Caribbean Area.

SCALES OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND COAST ARTILLERY DEFENCE PROPOSED FOR FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA.

(a)	ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY									COAST ARTILLERY										
	Full Scale armament - guns -			Full Time Cadres		Reinforce-ments		Total Full Scale Manning		Prospective Full Scale - guns -					Full Time Cadres		Reinforce-ments		Total Full Scale Manning	
	HAA	LAA	SL	UK	Local	UK	Local	UK	Local	HCB	CB	Cl	Def	AMTB	UK	Local	UK	Local	UK	Local
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)		
Falklands	8	6	-	36	38	10	710	46	748	-	-	4	2	10	15	-	355	10	370	
South Georgia	8	6	-							-	-	2	-	10	15	-	105	10	120	
TOTAL	16	12	-	36	38	10	710	46	748	-	-	6	2	20	30	-	460	20	490	

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

1. The scale of armament and manning estimated above is for the period following the defeat of JAPAN. Until the defeat of JAPAN a small full-time training cadre may be needed but manpower will not necessarily be available. Should an emergency arise during this period the commitment would have to be mainly if not entirely UK personnel.
2. After the defeat of JAPAN local forces with the UK training cadre used as an operational increment should be able to take over the full commitment. It is realised, however, that owing to the comparatively small population, manpower would have to be earmarked in time of peace otherwise industrial and other requirements would probably obtain priority in time of war.
3. WEs used are HAA IX/258/2, LAA IX/386/1. Cadres have been calculated on 5% of full WE for care and maintenance of equipments plus U.K. training cadres for local personnel. In estimating the full WE an overall allowance of 4% of bty WE has been allowed to cover requirements for overheads.

COAST ARTILLERY.

4. Cadres have been calculated on the basis of the personnel required for the care and maintenance of existing equipment plus training cadres for local personnel. Searchlight personnel has been allowed for on the basis of one light per gun including AMTB. It is appreciated that further lights may be required for illuminated areas according to layout. An allowance of 40 personnel per regiment has been made for Regimental and Fire Command HQs.
5. Although the 5.25-inch CA/AA gun has been adopted for the role of Close Defence, the 6-inch (45°) gun, may be substituted although obsolescent; again, the latter weapon, when available, may be used to thicken defences in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 20(d) of DBC (44) 132.
6. Whilst the existing armament differs from that shown above, should it become necessary to man any of the existing equipment before defences are modernised the manpower required should not differ greatly from the figures shown.
7. As enough trained local forces are not at present available, should an emergency arise at any time before the defeat of JAPAN any deficit will have to be made good by UK troops.

No.

MINUTE.

(4)

(It is requested that, in any reference to this minute the above Number and the date may be quoted.)

28th January, 1946.

To The Hon. Colonial Secretary,

From The Officer Commanding,
Falkland Islands Defence Force,
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

STANLEY.

S E C R E T.

I have the honour to refer to the W. O. letter of the 8th July, 1945, No. 79/Gen/3418(M07) filed under your M.P. Secret/8/45, and to offer the following detailed observations called for in paragraph 5.

2. In the second paragraph reference is made to a pamphlet which I have not seen and I cannot therefore say whether all or any of the weapons now installed are of a type approved in this pamphlet.

3. Having regard to the figures for weapons given in the annex 8 H.A.A. Guns are shown as the establishment, only 4 3.7 Guns are in the Colony. Of the 6 L.A.A. laid down there are at present 8 in Stanley. There are no A.A. Guns in South Georgia of either type. No Detector System is available, nor are there any trained personnel. It would appear that the present Coast Artillery is more than adequate both in South Georgia and here, but new 6" guns are needed for real efficiency.

4. With regard to personnel, the full-time cadres can be found by the Defence Force for both A.A. and C.A. both here and in South Georgia, but the figures for reinforcements (710 and 355) are quite impossible even if economic life was completely brought to a standstill. I feel it is important that this point should be raised urgently having in mind paragraph 5 of the Explanatory Notes in the Annex.

Lieutenant-Colonel,
Officer Commanding,
Falkland Islands Defence Force.