

CONFIDENTIAL

C.S.O.

TRN/AVI/2#11

0.270/F

0.270/F

(Formerly)

SUBJECT:

FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT AIR SERVICE.

Flying Operations.

NOT TO LEAVE THE OFFICE WITHOUT HCE'S
CONNECTED FILES. AUTHORITY

NUMBER AND YEAR.

S. I. G. A. S. Flying Operations.

As so much money is at the moment being spent upon the Air Service, it is necessary that the actual flying operations be handled as efficiently as possible. As the amount of flying done per annum is comparatively small, the possibility of increasing this should be investigated. The potential number of passengers wishing to fly every year is, so far as past records may be trusted to indicate this, approximately 2200, of whom, with an existing organisation, the Air Service may expect to fly 1000 to 1200, leaving a residue of 1000 potential passengers who will either find other means of transport, or who will not travel.

This is not good
Flying hours in the Colony are limited by weather conditions & navigational aids. As nothing can be done to improve either of these, it follows that any improvement in operational efficiency must come from either:- (a) better utilisation of such favourable flying conditions as are available during normal working hours, & (b) possible utilisation of hours at present regarded as outside normal working time.

Not to any extent, surely.
Taking (a) above first. Some improvement may be expected when slipping & unslipping is possible at all states of the tide: this is already in hand in the development programme & results can be ascertained by experience. However, it is doubtful whether, in actual fact, more than six flying days are lost every year due solely to the tide, and in consequence the improvement will probably be limited to 50 passengers per annum when made.

It is considered that more advantage might be taken of favourable weather conditions now that two pilots are available by occasionally, when for instance the waiting list is more than fifty, making a shift system with the pilots, both carrying out a three hour flight with the Beaver on the same day. If this were only done, say, 20 times a year, it would increase

(2)

the number of passengers carried by approximately 150. This could not be put into effect at the present time, as the second pilot is insufficiently experienced, but it may be regarded as an aim for 1955.

The problem of economical flight planning should also be constantly borne in mind, & it should be regarded as an aim that at some stage of every flight the aircraft should be loaded to capacity.

Apart from these three considerations, further improvement during the existing working hours appears unlikely, and in consequence, the potential increase in passengers under (a) may be assumed to be 200 per annum ultimately.

To still further decrease the gap between the number of passengers carried & the potential number requiring passages, it is now necessary to consider (b), the utilisation of possible flying time at present regarded as non-working time. This falls under two heads, (i) early morning & evening flying, & (ii) weekend flying.

It is repeatedly argued by laymen that a considerably increased efficiency could be attained were the Air Service to utilise the early morning hours for flying operations, & this has now been argued at length with no very satisfactory results, largely because no records of experiments have been kept. Whether or not the number of passengers carried in a year were the Air Service to carry out early morning flights is still a matter of dispute, and it is suggested that as soon as it is practicable to carry out tests into this a carefully conducted experiment be implemented & its results analysed.

Before this is done however, it is felt that the various theoretical advantages & disadvantages should be appreciated by all concerned, & the following brief notes may assist to this end.

1. At the present time the Air Service organisation is such that the aircraft takes off from Stanley in the morning at

^{Two}
^{It can be}
^{obtained}
^{earlier} approximately 1030, the staff having turned to at 0830. This seemingly long interval is occasioned by the fact that the weather forecast is received at 0915. Passengers are then notified that the flight for the day will be carried out; this being done by means of the telephone & "box", & it can usually be assumed that all know by 0930. Allowing passengers half an hour to reach the office - a not unreasonable time when it is remembered that young & old have frequently to walk carrying their baggage - they are then weighed & sent to the aircraft, which will by this time be launched & at the buoy, either in the "Alert" or the crash-boat. A take-off at 1030 is therefore not unreasonable.

2. It can be argued from the above that were the weather forecast available to the Air Service at 0830, three quarters of an hour could be saved at the outset & a take-off made at 0945. It is doubtful whether this could possibly increase the potential number of passengers carried however.

3. But it has been suggested that 0830 should be the take-off time: using the arguments put forward in 1. above, this would entail a weather forecast & Air Service personnel turning to at 0715. Again it appears doubtful whether this would result in any increase in passengers carried. It also presents difficulties as regards the "contact organisation". It would entail the office staff & the "box" operator turning to at 0715, & as they have other duties to perform extraneous to the Air Service, it would be undesirable to give "time in lieu" from office hours later in the day.

4. This leaves as a last choice (and the plan which carries most supporters) the dawn take-off, so that the flight may be completed before the wind rises at 0900. The supporters of this scheme quite rightly maintain that there are a large number of days during which the weather is calm and clear between dawn & 0900. As the average flight however lasts for three hours, this would entail a take-off at 0530 if

the aircraft is to be certain of returning before the wind gets up. And following once more the arguments in 1. above, this would entail a weather forecast & turn-to being made at 0415. This plan could be put into operation, but there is no doubt it would be very wearying for the Air Service staff, when it is also remembered that they would be faced to take their breakfasts before turning to, which would mean rising at approximately 0315! Notification of passengers at 0415 also presents a difficulty, some system such as a gun or fire alarm being the only possibility. Nor would the collection of camp weather reports at 0400 for the forecast at 0415 be popular. Office hours would of course be completely disrupted.

5. Disregarding momentarily the possibility of the dawn take-off & reverting to the previous plans for an early start, it is possible, generally speaking, for the forecaster to give a fairly accurate estimate of the maximum surface wind speed for the day as soon as a pilot balloon ascent has been carried out. If the surface wind is to remain low, there appears to be very little advantage in turning to before the conventional hours as the flights will be possible even if the take-off is not until 1030. If the wind is to become strong during the day then, with the exception of a dawn take-off which would allow a return to be made before the rising wind, it is inadvisable to fly since the aircraft will probably be caught in the camp.

6. Lastly, while considering working outside conventional hours, it should be borne in mind that the wind strength tends to chop off during the late afternoon & evening, & that from some points of view it is preferable to start a flight then & be flying into (almost invariably) improving conditions, rather than at the other end of the scale when they are almost invariably deteriorating.

It is suggested that committee be named to study

CNO has written a piece on this which I would like to see again.

And what?

I would like to have CNO's views on this proposition.

existing meteorological records and assess in fact, over a period of, say, three months, exactly what would have been possible with regard to flying with starts made at dawn, 0830, 1000 + with evening flying also considered. On the basis of this investigation a careful experiment could then be carried out by the Air Service to ascertain the actual improvement in numbers of passengers flown.

The other "out-of-hours" flying which is worth consideration is Sunday flying. There are 52 Sundays per annum, and working on the basis of 5 good flying days in 14, which appears to be the average over the year, approximately 18 Sundays should be suitable for flying, which would allow for a potential increase of approximately 100 passengers - in theory this figure should be higher, but it must be remembered that the Air Service is already committed to some Sunday flights. The main objection to Sunday flying is that it is the only day the Air Service staff can be certain of having at home to complete their household chores. Any offer of time in lieu would not be attractive as the staff could never be certain when they would in fact get it & in consequence could not make social arrangements etc in advance. It is also unattractive to be informed "on fine days you work for the Government, on wet days you work for yourself" - particularly if you are a gardener. Some incentive other than time in lieu would obviously be required.

Night flying cannot at present be considered, although without a doubt the weather is better on an average for flying at night. This possibility must wait however until a twin-engined aircraft is used by the Air Service - if such a day ever dawns - as forced landings without power at night would be altogether too risky to be justified in single-engined aircraft. The further objection to night flying, namely the cost of additional equipment, would not be prohibitive. All that would be required would be ten

I do not think this is a practicable proposition.



or fifteen air beacons, costing perhaps £100 apiece, + simple flare paths for the settlements + Stanley which the farms could be asked to pay for themselves.

Appendix 'A'

Is this from CMO's minute?

An analysis of the wind speeds at hourly intervals between sunrise & late afternoon in Port Stanley for the period January 1st to March 31st, 1952, shows the following:-

- (a) On 47 days out of the 91, flying would be possible both in the early morning & later in the day.
- (b) On 20 days flying would be possible early in the morning but not later in the day.
- (c) On 10 days flying would be impossible all day.
- (d) On 8 days flying would be possible later in the day, but not in the early morning.
- (e) On 6 days, if early morning flying were being carried out, the aircraft would be unable to complete the flight before the wind rose to more than 20 knots, the remainder of the day being unfit for flying.

This means that so far as the wind is concerned, working on the present hours (0830 - 1600+), the aircraft would fly on 55 days out of 91, and working on early morning hours (0415 - 1200+) it would fly on 73 days out of 91, but would either be unable to complete the flight or would be caught in the camp on 6 of these days.


This still leaves an advantage of 12 days.

The net profit over the 91 day period would therefore be 12 days, an increase of flying time of 13%.

As this would only be possible during the summer months (October - March), the actual increase in passengers flown over the year would be 6½%, or approximately 80, for which it would be necessary for six months to have the Air Service, the R/T studio, the met forecaster, & the H/M office staff working continuously the hour

4. 0415 - 1200 daily.

This would not appear justified.

 17.18.

17.18
17.18
17.18

HARBOUR DEPARTMENT.

STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS.

.....19.....

Y.E./

Attached notes were written by me
to put my own thoughts on the subject
in order. However, they may be of interest
to you & I would be grateful of your
criticisms.

John Lush
H.M.

H/M

Read with interest. A very
clear analysis of the difficulties.

I support the proposal for the
investigations. I still favour Sunday
flying when weather has permitted flying
for three days.

Mc 2ix

HM.

Also read with interest - 10
You should discuss the met.
info with J. C. R.

2) As regards Sunday flying -
it would appear reasonable to
expect this if there has been
no flying for three or four
days, but I consider it an
imposition on pilot & ground
staff if they are kept ~~hanging~~
around in the hangar
on Thursday, Fri & Saturday.

3) If Friday is clearly a no-fly
day. I think they should
get the afternoon off & if
Saturday is also bad they
should go off as soon as
it is decided that there will
be no flying. On each
day they should have been
able to complete daily
maintenance.

4) If there is flying on Saturday
the Friday $\frac{1}{2}$ day does no harm

" as they will possibly get no Saturday half day.

5) If there is no flight on Sunday also they 'score', but against that there are bound to be emergency medical or Council flights on Sundays at short notice when they have been unable to take time off on Fridays & Saturdays.


6) Please consider with ground staff - the only person who never rests is the H.M. if he flies on Sunday!

Q
10/9

12

Pilot, Engineer, Mechanic.

A great deal has been said recently about increasing the number of hours flown, & in an endeavour to sat out the pros & cons I wrote something which H.E. & H.C.S. have read & commented upon. Most of my paper is negative - in other words reasons why we cannot do some of the things suggested by laymen. H.C.S. has produced a constructive line into proceedings, & I would be grateful of the views of all of you on this. The relevant papers are attached.

 H. K.

H.M.

With regard to the paper on "Flying Operations", I do not think it practicable to fly two normal Beaver flights on the same day. The average flight would in my opinion, last about 4½ hours. This time added to the two hours already allocated (08.30-10.30) for launching & passenger-collecting, plus some ninety minutes or so, for beaching the aircraft and washing down etc, would add up to a full days work.

Assuming that a short three hour trip were to be flown as well as the longer trip, refuelling and passenger-gathering would take at least another hour, thus increasing the time spent at the hangar by the ground staff by some four hours. In other words they would be starting at 08.30 a.m. and finishing at 08.30 p.m.

We hope to get the weather forecast in future at 08.45 a.m. that is, immediately after the met. people have released their pilot balloon and have weather reports from Pebble Island and Fox Bay.

I think night flying would be a risky proposition in a single-engined or twin-engined aircraft here. It would be asking a lot to expect the camp people to lay out and take up flare-paths. It would be difficult too, for the pilot to assess whether the flares were laid

13
out correctly into wind. I think it would be essential to have a motor-launch standing by at all settlements when the aircraft is landing, or taking off, in case of a mishap.

I agree entirely with the rest of the paper.

With regard to Sunday flying, I would prefer to look upon Sunday as a non-flying day, except for medical flights, & members of the legislative council travelling on duty. Admittedly the air service will lose some flying weather throughout the year by carrying on this scheme, but I think it is essential for the members of the air service to be fairly sure of one day off duty per week.

J. 11/10/53
F. G. S.

H.M.

Re early morning flying, Mr. Huchler's Appendix A shows that on 6 days out of a period of 91 days the aircraft will be caught out in the camp, this in fact may mean more than six days in the water due to weather conditions other than wind with the obvious effect on the aircraft.

Re. Mr. McNaughton's report on the previous early morning flying experiment, two points arise

- ① On only one occasion was a take off made before 07.00 hrs and this was a test flight with no passengers on board, and on a number of occasions the aircraft flew back in a wind speed of over 30 kts due to the late take off.
- ② With the Beaver's smaller draught early morning flying launching of the aircraft will be possible on more occasions than before but until the slipway extension is completed ~~that~~ number of days that early morning flying can be attempted will still be limited.

Re. Sunday flying we most wholeheartedly agree with Mr Huchler's comment and like Mr Devine we would like to look upon Sunday as a non flying day except for emergency flights.

Re. H.C.S. comments on Sunday flying, when the aircraft is flying on a Sunday the ground staff are at the hanger only to prepare the aircraft for take off and receive it on its return, and do not wish Sunday to be treated as a normal working day

Fair
up

15
We approve H.C.S. suggestion of time off in line
and if Sunday flying is imposed we hope this
will be adopted.

We. normal day flying, with only one Beaver trip
in the course of a day we are more often than
not working out of normal hours and we consider
that two Beaver trips would extend our working
day beyond reasonable limits and that every effort
be made to get the aircraft off by 1000 hrs.

Which.

20.9.53.

H.M.

I have read these notes with interest and have already told you that an investigation of the type you suggest was in fact carried out last November. (you were in UK of course. So was H.E. but there are some records of the matter and the Pilot and Engineers will no doubt remember much).

C.M.O. had extractions made of the number of hours of wind speed less than the critical speed of 20 knots for four hours after sunrise, four hours before sunset and one hour in the middle of the day when winds were strongest (between 1 & 2 p.m.). He had a graph drawn and sent it to the Controller of Communications on October 15th., 1952 with the remarks.

".....I think you will agree that it confirms what everyone has always believed - i.e. that the early morning winds are much lighter than those in normal working hours. But it establishes much more than this: it shows that the lighter winds persist for 3 hours after sunrise (i.e. 4 hours after daylight), which gives sufficient time to complete the longest flights. It also shows that there is another period of light winds in the evening but that this starts only two hours or less before sunset and is therefore not usually long enough to complete West Falkland flights.-----I suggest that the analysis is sufficiently convincing to make a proper trial worth while. This, I suggest, should be done for one month----- So far as the Met. Office is concerned I can arrange for a forecaster to be present in the evenings who can give a preview about 10 O'clock Stanley Time for the following morning, and again in the morning half an hour earlier than any take off time you care to arrange.-----"

Which is what I have possibly argued.

And so a test was undertaken during the month of November. Some Camp Stations were prepared to pass weather reports at 04.30 L.M.T. (all times quoted here are L.M.T.) and these were collected throughout the month. A forecaster was on duty to talk to the Pilot at 8 P.M. and again at 4.30 in the morning. By 4.45 the Pilot had made up his mind and the work of implementing his decision was begun. Two salient points (amongst others) emerged:

- (i) Because of the inadequacy of the slipway it was not possible to undertake any early morning flying for two weeks in the month; and when early flights were possible the tide was invariably unsuitable for beaching the aircraft on return and, as a result, both Pilot and ground staff were kept standing by for long periods to no purpose - to say nothing of the fact.

that the aircraft had to be moored out in the strong day-time winds. The improvement of the slipway would therefore radically alter this aspect of the problem.

Why not?

- (ii) Although the limitations of the slipway were the most obvious reasons for the failure of the experiment, they should not be allowed to obscure another important lesson. Although the Pilot made up his mind about flying at 1.45 he did not get off the water till about 6.15 and one day it was 7.30. Assuming ~~that~~ the task of calling the passengers was undertaken at 5 O'clock (which is about right), there was therefore a delay of $1\frac{1}{4}$ hours -- the delay mentioned in the third page of your notes, -- and that is the real crux of the problem.

We can provide a forecast at any time but, having regard to the very limited information we have available, I think it would be unreasonable to expect us to provide more than:

- ✓ (A) A preliminary survey of next morning at about 9 or 9.30 P.M. L.M.T. The degree of confidence with which this is given depends largely on the synoptic situation.
- ✓ (B) A forecast when we have received some camp **OBSERVATIONS** in the morning.

Any Camp observations before daylight would have little value and we cannot therefore expect to have these before sunrise minus 30. The Pilot could decide his programme and advise the Air Service staff by sunrise minus 15 at the earliest, and calling of passengers could commence. Take-off would normally follow $1\frac{1}{4}$ hours later at sunrise plus 1 hour. The quiet spell normally lasts for 3 hours after sunrise and any flight lasting more than about 2 hours would thus catch the aircraft in the Camp as the wind rose. This is, in fact, just what tends to happen - either the aircraft gets caught out, or the wind continues light all day and flying could have been undertaken in normal working hours.

It may be argued then (with good reason) that the

fundamental difficulty lies in the inability of the Met. Office forecasters to provide a reliable forecast in sufficient time. Information from South America (and sometimes there is very little of it) reaches us for 2 O'clock and 7 O'clock daily and takes about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours to reach us. Camp reports are spasmodic and we often get none from one morning till the next. Can we reasonably be expected to forecast in the afternoon for the next morning on such a basis? I don't think so! Even if a reliable forecast could always be provided from the 7 O'clock L.M.T. observations from the coast, would it be of such great value - it is difficult to get it out before 10 O'clock Stanley Time and passengers who had to be up again at 5.30 might not take kindly to having to stay in neighbours' houses till a late hour waiting for a telephone call - not everyone has a 'phone in Stanley. There is another point - the critical wind-speed for the operation of the aircraft (20 knots) is just about 2 knots more than the average wind speed for the hours in the middle of the day. Not only must the forecast be provided in plenty time then, but it must also be ^{of} quite remarkable accuracy. In the circumstances it just can't be done. To give an aviation forecast of any reliability I think we must have a few Camp observations and a pilot balloon ascent if cloud permits (which is by no means always). At present that is not before about 8.35 (the current arrangement of 8.45 is satisfactory) and I don't see how it can ever be before about half an hour after dawn. And if this was done with two forecasters it would mean being up on duty till midnight, or by 1 a.m., every day during the summer. As you rightly say, it can be done but it would be "Very wearying". However the fact remains that, during the summer, we do get periods of several days (sometimes several weeks) of Northwesterly weather, in which the daytime winds are regularly about 25 knots and the weather almost perfect. If the Air Service does not operate in the early morning, or in winds over 20 knots, then it doesn't operate at all, the waiting list piles up and the hours of lost flying time mount steadily.

Signal?

If this happens around (for example) Christmas when many people want to travel, it tends to bring the Service into disrepute and people are very naturally prone to complain that we are spending very large sums on an Air Service which doesn't fly. During these periods it seems to me that there is strong justification for making very strenuous efforts to increase the number of hours flown. Although the arguments you (and I) have set out appear to preclude regular early morning flying there may still be virtue in even closer examination of all the relevant problems by a Committee including yourself, the Pilot, at least one Engineer, myself and (say) a couple of "independent" members who won't have preconceived ideas or axes to grind. The amount of meteorological information available is very considerable and I can have it examined and presented in many different ways. As an example, I looked into the question today of how much more flying would be possible if you raised the "critical" wind speed from 20 to 25 knots. I examined all the observations made during 1952 at 2 p.m. (which is just about the windiest time of the day). I found that the 366 days in the year were divided as follows:

<u>WIND SPEED</u>		
<u><20K.</u>	<u>21 - 25K</u>	<u>> 25K</u>
232	73	61

The raising of the critical figure would therefore allow a 32% increase in days flown - but only if the number of days lost through weather, low cloud etc., was not greater in the higher speed range. To satisfy myself on this point, I then threw out all the occasions in the first two ranges when the cloud base was less than 1500 feet or visibility less than 10 miles. This reduced the figures to

<u>WIND SPEED</u>	
<u><20K</u>	<u>21-25K</u>
160	49

and the increase is still over 50%. If at present you fly 1200 passengers a year, you could then carry 360 more passengers in normal hours. Is this quite out of the question? - there were certainly short periods in the past when the critical figure was 25 knots instead of 20. Is there not hope that, as the Pilot gains experience in the operation of the Beaver, he would be prepared to consider something on these lines?

That is merely an example of the kind of thing we can do (and may be of no practical value) so please let me know what further information I can get out. I am anxious to get on with the business as we should decide whether (and, if so, when) to call for Camp reports and whether special early morning watches will be necessary for the forecasters.

G. Man

ACMO.

16/9/53.

Many thanks for your appreciation of the situation which helps us along the track. I do not think that consideration of the slipping & unslipping difficulties, which were as you mention a major stumbling block in the past, need enter these discussions as it is intended to adjust this in the near future so that the slipway can be used at all times.

The other difficulty, the $1\frac{1}{4}$ hours wait for the passengers from the decision to fly cannot be altered.

I appreciate all your forecasting difficulties - indeed we have frequently discussed these - but it is useful to have a full record of these on paper for other interested parties to peruse.

Regretably - & regretfully - neither Devell nor I feel inclined to raise our 20 knot maximum - admittedly we quite frequently do fly in more wind than 20 kts - the other afternoon we both landed when it was gusting to 35-40 - but these occasions are when the forecast has said 20 & it has gone beyond 20! As you say, it is most unfortunate that the limiting speed should be so near the average midday wind speed, but in case it should be felt that pilots here are unduly timid (Spencer waked on the same 20 knot maximum incidentally) it is of interest to note that R.A.F. light aircraft stations in peace time have a 15 knot maximum for normal flying, & Hamble used 20 knots as maximum for everything except the Dakotas.

I support your suggestion of two "independents" on a committee - I would suggest & will to the H.C.S. that we have yourself, Devell, McWhan & Hardy ("no show without Punch") & myself & really get down to this one afternoon. An engineer is not essential as this is basically a flying problem & Devell & I can be depended upon to look after the lengths of working hours side of things.

17.12.

H.C.S.

This is as far as we've got so far. What do you think we ought to do now please? Everybody has now had a say & the general consensus of opinion is against doing anything, but to finalise things I feel it would be a good idea to have a meeting with two "independents" present - we may all be biased as we shall be the people concerned in getting up early etc. What do you suggest?

Sh 20. IX.

Recd. via
Zimanyi on 3. X.
d.

46

(9)

Confidential

Pre see (10) - (22) attached.

27

I see no reason why H.M. should not have an unofficial meeting with her. Nowham & the Hardy who are interested parties as M.C.s. I doubt if they will contribute much but as we agreed before, the more we can air the P.C.A.S. problems & differences the less carping criticism will be received.

2) As C.M.O. introduces an interesting point about the average daily wind speed of 25 knots, 5 knots above critical speed. From the correspondence, one gains the impression that figures can prove anything and that a satisfactory argument could be put up that there should never be any flying at all in the Falklands.

Yes indeed.

- 3) There now seem to be three alternatives
- a) Raising (unofficially) of the critical wind speed by the pilots and getting in more flying days.
 - b) Dawn flying and return by 9.30 am
 - c) Early morning flying with possibility of being caught in the camp till evening or the next day.

We can't

- 4) a) above is purely a question for the pilots and I do not feel we should exert any pressure in that direction. b) & c) are more likely to bear fruit.

5) I am opposed to dawn flying as a regular institution but I do not see why, if there are large arrears of passengers, it should not be laid on for say a week - with compensatory time off the following week. We would of course need to have to complete the ship way improvement to make this worth while.

6) As regards early morning flying (as above) - provided no harm is done to the aircraft being

✓ moved out all day. provided adequate
beings are provided then I see no reason
why this should not be tried out also
when the passenger list starts to mount.

They will
have to
adjust their
ideas.

7) I have the ~~us~~ cannot help feeling
that the NCBP pilot and engineers have
rather too much of the 'hourly paid worker -
knock off on the bell' attitude & are not
even prepared to cooperate in a rush period.

No.

I repeat that I consider it wrong to expect
them to do long hours of overtime indefinitely
but not every now & again.

Yes.

8) I think ~~and~~ trials would be useful - or
better still that he should take part in
the discussion.

P
13/10

Y.F.

Since writing the attached minute I have had a very interesting discussion with Lt. Lytle on the subject. While regretting that he has not made a detailed study of our problems and could give no considered opinion he offered the following comments:-

a) With our weather & conditions & circumstances we can never operate a scheduled air service & our efforts must be irregular. The members should therefore fit themselves into this irregular pattern working in bursts and getting compensatory time off.

I have always held this view - I expressed it.

So said Fowler - and Javers.

b) The whole success of our air service depends on pace and drive on the part of the members - particularly the pilot.

The ideal would be a Canadian "bus pilot" but we couldn't afford him; they work out at about £200 a month.

c) While having nothing against Bevell who is pleasant, willing and able conscientious, we cannot expect to get other than the "scrappings" of commercial pilots on the money & prospects we can offer. He ^(Lytle) would like to see a

But no use "humming" ~~to~~ £1400 p.a. out here for a short while to make nearly to sink back into the doldrums when he goes?

more highly powered and experienced pilot on about £1400 p.a. out here for a short while to make things hum.

d) The critical speed of 20 knots appears to err very much on the cautious side. Hori's suggestion of 15 knots at Hamble may be true for beginners with a few hours flying in small planes but bears no relation to normal practice, 25 knots is not unreasonable.

Provided that it doesn't make the sea get up too steeply - a 2 ft. wave is the limit according to Fowler.

I entirely agree.

e) To limit flying to only one flight a day is ridiculous. With a little more bustle, elimination of "smokes" etc., two flights should be routine.

Yes - they could be worked by signal?

f) Passenger facilities should be improved & delays thereby reduced i.e. transport to wake & collect them.

~~On the road to~~

2) In other As we suspect it all boils down to drive & energy and Lygo agreed with my comment that you could convince yourself that every day was a new flying day if

26 You sat in the ^{an} office gazing at the weather - especially if the window was a little dirty!

He also agreed that it was very difficult for us, as laymen, to press matters particularly as our technical adviser, ~~him~~, was himself only still in the 'reference book' stage of aviation and had no proper ~~experience~~ practical experience.

It is a pity he wasn't asked earlier.

If asked earlier he would have been very pleased to have gone into the matter more thoroughly & where necessary brought the weight of his flying experience to bear to knock some of our misconceptions on the head.

3) I would like to discuss our next approach with you if I may.
HCS.

→ Please do so, early; I am not happy about things as they are.

the 13
X

28
Henderson

We discussed this morning and I think it necessary to issue a directive which I attach below; we shall otherwise go on arguing to no purpose and I am getting a little tired of it. H/M himself has plenty of drive and is all out to make a success of the organisation; Devrel, we agreed, is 'negative' in character and will follow a lead. Jones is a loyal and willing type and must naturally be influenced by the views and attitude of his engineers. The latter is a somewhat moody character, very inclined to "beef and bind" and

work, I suspect, "Uniony" ideas. He has
 worked well but I must record that your
 predecessor shared the views ^{on him} / more recently
 expressed by SHO and AO and if he
 shows opposition to my directive we should
 consider seriously whether it is wise to give
 him permanent status. I would ^{myself,} / certainly wish
 to see a substantial quickening of tempo
 before 'confirming' him and must so advise
 my successor.

2. I think we might seek advice
 from de Havillands about the critical wind
 factor; this should be done ~~without~~ delay. I
 will also write to Levens at the next mail.

done done so
 the.

the 14
 8

28
H.C.S.

F.I.G.A.S.

The question of how we are to secure more flying hours and thus run a more satisfactory service for the public has been argued for the past three years and, more intensively during recent weeks in the representations made by H/M, Pilot, Ground Staff, Ag.C.M.O. and yourself. The argument goes round and round like a Tibetan prayer wheel and gets us no forrader. It is unfortunate that we did not ask Liet/Lygo to study the situation and give us the benefit of his experience and advice earlier; I would add, however, that what he says echoes very much what was said to me by both Ievers and Fowler.

2 Briefly, weather conditions being what they are in The Falklands, it is quite impossible to draw up any dependable schedule of flights and we must therefore make the most of every bit of flying weather and take an easy on the days - and they are many - when no flying is possible. This means, inevitably, that Sunday - where not more than four days in the week have been operational - must be regarded as a "flying day" though not, I agree, a normal working day.

3 Various suggestions have been made as to how more effective use can be made of the hours available - early flying, two flights a day, raising of the critical wind factor and so forth; as to the last an enquiry should be addressed at once to deHavilland's (Toronto) and I have myself written to Captain Ievers of the Naval Flying Branch. As to the other matters, I wish ^{and} these to be looked into ^{urgently} by a Committee under your chairmanship, comprising CMO, Mr Mortimer (if you think that a disinterested scientifically trained person would be useful), SMO, Mr Hardy (as a Member of Leg.Co.), H/M and Pilot. Terms of reference:-

^{into}
"To enquire ^{into} and advise upon what steps can be taken to ensure that maximum use is made of available flying hours."

The Committee should sit as early as possible.

4 The Air Service is one of the most vital services in the Colony and capable of conferring a greater benefit on the people than almost any other; but to do this it must give the maximum effective service which, as things are here, requires that all concerned with it should forget about statutory hours and the like and be prepared to make the most of "every unforgiving minute". They are members of a SERVICE, with all that that implies, and not of a commercial organisation: the Government has done and will continue to do all that it can to make their task easier and looks to them, with confidence, to build for FIGAS the reputation we would all wish it to enjoy. *FIGAS costs a lot of money.*

5 The Committee need not concern itself with matters of supply or works (e.g. slipway extension) which have already been arranged for.

He.

19th October

On receipt of the Committee's report I will issue a firm directive

CONFIDENTIAL.

27th October, 1953.

Sir,

I am directed by His Excellency to seek your advice on a problem connected with our Government Air Service and the Beaver sea-plane recently purchased from your Company.

2. The main obstacle to regular flying in this Colony ^{is} are the high winds prevailing and it would be much appreciated if you could advise on the critical wind speed at which the Beaver could safely be flown by not very experienced pilots.

3. At present the Air Service pilots are working on a critical wind speed of 20 knots and it is impossible for the layman to know whether or not this could reasonably and safely be increased.

Mr. Fowler who spent some time here recently testing the Beaver would be able to supply you with full details of the local conditions.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) C. Campbell.
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Reply at 47.

The Managing Director,
The De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited.,
Postal Station,
Toronto,

Seem.

48

See (29) above.

2. Draft report of C'ttee set up by (28) is at cover. It is at present in circulation with members for approval but I thought you may like to see a preview as I am going away.

3. I am afraid there is not much meat in it - we talked in circles for 2½ hours. Some of them could supply further details if you wish to visit the district we before I return.

27/10

Seem. What was the view of other members of the Ctee. on Mr. Hardy's proposal? I doubt, myself, if it is practicable.

mc 27
X

No. 0270/E

MEMORANDUM.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and the date may be quoted.

27th October, 1953. 3

From: The Colonial Secretary.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

To: Hon. Senior Medical Officer,
Hon. Mr. A.L. Hardy, B.E.M., J.P.,
Ag. Chief Meteorological Officer, X
Mr. Mortimer, \
Harbour Master, \
The Pilot, STANLEY.

SUBJECT :-

3-5
I enclose a draft report on the meeting held on 26th October, 1953, to discuss F.I.C.A.S. flying operations and would be grateful if you could indicate if it accurately represents the views of the Committee.

Campbell
Chairman.

Your Excellency,

F.I.G.A.S. Flying Operations.

Ref

I have the honour to forward the report and recommendations of a Committee meeting held in the Colonial Secretary's Office on the 26th of October, 1955.

Present: Hon. Colonial Secretary.
Hon. Senior Medical Officer.
Hon. Mr. A.L. Hardy, B.E.M., J.P.,
Ag. Chief Meteorological Officer.
Mr. Mortimer.
Harbour Master.
Pilot.

Terms of Reference.

To enquire into and advise upon what steps can be taken to ensure that maximum use is made of available flying hours.

- - - - -

Members were acquainted with the substance of the minutes leading up to the establishment of this Committee and after discussion the Committee accepted the Pilot's statement that he was unable to undertake more than one major flight per day say of 3 - 5 hours duration. As it will be some time before the Harbour master is competent to take his turn with the Beaver, the Committee approached the problem on the assumption that only one major flight per day was practicable.

After further discussion the Committee considered that better use could be made of the available flying hours in the following ways.

(a) Extension or improvement of Slipway facilities.

All agreed that this was essential as not only flying days but also working hours for the ground staff were wasted at present.

Mr. Hardy was very dubious of the proposed methods of improvement and considered that a ~~floating~~
^{on rails} cradle or platform was the only practical solution. He also pressed for the highest priority to be accorded to the work.

(b) Dawn flying.

The Committee considered that it was reasonable for F.I.G.A.S. to put in bursts of a week to a fortnight's dawn flying in the rush seasons (Christmas etc.) or when for other reasons there was a long waiting list of passengers.

F.I.G.A.S. staff should obtain compensatory holidays when the arrears were wiped off.

(c) Meteorological.

The establishment of a small meteorological station as far west as possible would greatly assist the Pilot to reach his flying decisions.

In the meantime Acting Chief Meteorological Officer promised to carry out ^{investigations} ~~experiments~~ in Stanley to see if he could relate early morning balloon observations to the mid-day wind speed.

(d) Sunday flying.

There was a wide divergence of opinion. The Pilot was firmly opposed to Sunday flying except for medical and Council priorities and though the Committee felt that Sunday flying on other occasions was desirable, it was very difficult to arrive at a formula for compensatory time off which in their opinion was essential.

An equitable suggestion put forward was that after non-priority Sunday flying Monday should be a day off but could this be reconciled if Monday proved to be a perfect flying day? Also, as the root of the whole problem was the present practice of trying to relate irregular flying conditions to regular office hours, does not a set formula further confuse the issue?

The consensus of opinion finally inclined to a vaguer recommendation of Sunday flying during rush periods with compensatory time off.

(e) Passengers.

The Committee accepted the pilot's assurance that no flying time was unnecessarily wasted embarking and disembarking passengers in the Camp nor under the present arrangements in Stanley whereby passengers are collected at the Government Jetty.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Some Reflections on Times of Flight of aircraft from Stanley - 1953.

The times of least wind each day are after dawn & again before sunset. The tides influence launching at present; say the plane can be launched for 3 hours before & 3 after each high water (that is down to $\frac{1}{2}$ the tidal fall), which occurs twice daily & usually with a variation of $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour each way of the time as calculated from 10 to 6 a.m. on the beach by the kanger on the days of New & Full Moon & getting later each day by 51 minutes (roughly).

The time is 5.30 a.m. for Cape Pembroke.

Tables given for sunrise & sunset for London or on a vessel before (there are only 3 to 6 minutes difference) whose latitude more approximates to that of Stanley i.e. $51^{\circ} 40'$ will apply nearly enough here if taken January for July (6 months out) to allow for the difference in hemispheres.

Also such tables being in Greenwich Mean Time will be correct in our Local Mean Time for the 60° longitude, i.e. that of Fox Bay, Charter, Hill Cove, Saunders, & Kappell areas.

But for Stanley of longitude $58^{\circ} W$ will be 8 minutes late. That is the times of M.T. as taken from tables of sunrise & sunset for before will be 8 minutes later than the actual L.M. Times of sunrise & set here in Stanley.

Thus for January 1954 I can construct a table of times etc.
See over leaf.

Now assuming it takes one hour from the first start of work to the plane being ready to fly.

Weather reports could be obtained from the stations scheduled to be visited (& broadcast the previous evening) by the Harbour Dept. R/T net & be transmitted to pilot on water or sent with the embarking passenger.

From table over leaf commencing at 4 a.m. L.M.T. on January 1st (Friday) the plane would be ready to fly at 5 a.m. L.M. (that is 6 a.m. Stanley time); that is just about the time the tide would have $\frac{1}{2}$ fallen.

35

10 nearest
4 of an hour.

The plane would not be able to be shipped again that day until around 12 am L.M.T. & then onwards for 6 hours.

Thus working an 8 hour day with 1 hour breakfast in the middle the plane could be shipped in the final hour.

This could not be repeated next day the 2nd working the same set hours. But ~~assuming~~ a flight of average 6 hours duration the plane is back at 9 am & can by the 5th or 6th to the 7th & 8th be got on the ship by the morning tide.

But then by the 8th the tide will be too low ^{at low} a.m. to launch the plane at the 1/2 am L.M.T. turn to.

I would therefore suggest rotating to working 3 1/2 hour spells as do Government Offices, only staggered.

For one week in 1st January 1956 to 7th inclusive from 5 am standby time to 8.30 am standby time as early morning launching could be made in this phase 4 days before the day of 22 days after a New or Full and another spell from 4 p.m. to 7.30 pm standby time.

to ship the returned plane or during this period from the 1st to 5th the plane if not flown a.m. could be launched at turn to in the afternoon be away in 1 hour i.e. at 4 pm L.M.T. & have 4 hours of daylight to make a flight in, in the other, the evening calm period of the day.

The next week the 8th to 12th would not allow for early 1/2 am L.M.T. launchings. The 12th would be the latest day & launching then could not be before 12.30 L.M.T.

Therefore this week do not start work until 4.30 standby time & work the first spell to 2 p.m. standby time. The plane would be able to be launched each day at turn to. And Pilot will have 9 hours daylight to fly in.

The time from 4 to 7.30 pm standby time would be the same for the second shift in the first week with the early mornings turn to.

Thus as there is a new or full moon roughly every fortnight the 2 weeks cycle would lend itself to repetition with variation as the days shortened.

And in this way the best periods of least wind each day would be made most sure of.

John P. Collins 20/XI/63
A.O.

(Total about 6 New Year
Revolution)

37. ~~km~~

For your comments on 6 — pl.
ndf/s. 23/xi.

H.C.S.

In my office is a tide table produced by
Lieut W.C. Strickland of H.M.S. "Basilisk" — a navigation
specialist — it has the advantage over Mr Oliver's that it
is more accurate & one does not have to worry about
differences between London & Oxford!! As for the remainder, it
is doubtless meant to be helpful, but I fear my advice
on pig-breeding would be about as much use to the A.O.
as his on flying me to me.

rlh

23. IX. 53.

P.S. This year's resolution: — A.O. to write so that I can read it!

17/10/53
24/11


38
~~10~~
H.C.S.

X The Auster will be ready for flying next week. As soon as she has been air tested I am commencing the work of taking photographs of the settlements for the gazetteer as directed by H.E. I have co-opted the assistance of the Boys Brigade (the over sixteen year olds) and intend to take these photos during early morning flights. The boy will operate the camera, which is very simple. He will also assist me to launch the aircraft so that the other members of the Air Service staff will be available for routine flying later in the day. If this experiment works out as I hope, then the others members of the staff should be able to see for themselves the advantages of an early start - if it doesn't work then we shall have some evidence to go on and no one will be any the worse off. This experiment should be completed before the Xmas rush period starts, and will prove whether it's worth putting on a full-scale dawn flying operation during that period.


H.M.

23/XI.

H.M. app's on assumption that there is no parental objection that the boys are covered by insurance & that we too are involved in no charge (other than insurance premium)

H.C.S. noted by  24.XI.

24/11

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAVE HEIGHT, WIND SPEED AND FETCH.

There is obviously a formula from which the wave height can be calculated for given wind speeds and fetch. Basically the wave height varies with the wind speed and fetch, and for wind speeds up to 45 knots, with a fetch up to 5 nautical miles, the following formula appears to be approximately correct.

$$k(V \times F) = h$$

When, k is a constant at approximately 0.78

V is the wind speed in knots

F is the fetch in nautical miles

and, h is the height between trough and crest expressed in inches.

Of course this formula leaves out of account the effect of 'tide against the wind' which tends to markedly increase the wave height, but it nevertheless can be used as a rough working guide to ascertain the probable wave height under given conditions.

As an example, with a 25 knot wind and a 2 mile fetch, we get

$$0.78(25 \times 2) = 39$$

too high for safe operation.
In other words, the maximum wave height likely to be encountered under those conditions will be approximately 39 inches.

With a 15 knot wind speed and a $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile fetch, we get

$$0.78(15 \times 1.5) = 18.55$$

Giving us a maximum wave height of approximately 18 inches for those conditions.

Using this formula it is possible to calculate the wind speeds with varying fetches at which the wave height will reach a certain given maximum, and taking this maximum as 24 inches, we get, with a 1 mile fetch of wind,

$$\begin{aligned} 0.78(V \times 1) &= 24 \\ V &= 30.77 \text{ (approx.)} \end{aligned}$$

It therefore requires approximately a 30 knot wind to raise a wave of 2 feet with a one mile fetch. For a 2 mile fetch we find

$$\begin{aligned} 0.78(V \times 2) &= 24 \\ V &= 15.32 \text{ (approx)} \end{aligned}$$

In this case only a 15 knot wind is required to produce a wave with a height of 2 feet.

As, on an average, the fetch of wind on the harbours used by the aircraft during a normal flight is approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and the limiting safety wave is 2 feet, for these average landing places it is possible to calculate the limiting wind speed as follows:-

$$\begin{aligned} 0.78(V \times 1.5) &= 24 \\ V &= 20.51 \text{ (approx.)} \end{aligned}$$

Which gives a limiting wind speed of $20\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

But it must be remembered that this calculation only gives us the maximum wave height possible with a wind of the given speed and fetch: by no means every wave is of this height (nor even one wave in seven!). The average wave height is approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of the maximum wave height, and so the wind speed to produce an average wave height of 24 inches with a $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile fetch is found to be

40
~~12~~

$$0.78(V \times 1.5) = 36$$
$$V = 30.77 \text{ (approx.)}$$

This shows that it requires a wind speed of $30\frac{3}{4}$ knots to produce an average wave height of 2 feet.

It follows from all this, that if the limiting safety wave height for a given aircraft is 2 feet, then it is possible that landing and take-off operations become dangerous at $20\frac{1}{2}$ knots with a $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile fetch, but that the chances of this are very remote. The danger factor advances steadily through varying degrees until at a speed of $30\frac{3}{4}$ it becomes probably dangerous to land or take-off with that fetch of wind.

The other variable factors which should be considered in this argument which have not so far been introduced are:-

- (a) the 'gustiness' of the wind, which may produce a stall near the surface, and consequent damage to the undercarriage
- (b) the tidal effect in building up a wave's height when the tide is running against the wind, and
- (c) variations in the wind's fetch over the open water. In the calculations above to establish the limiting wind speed to produce a wave height of 2 feet, a constant fetch of $1\frac{1}{2}$ nautical miles has been assumed. Obviously, if this is decreased, then the limiting wind speed is increased and vice versa.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to lay down that in wind speeds above a certain value the aircraft must land and take-off within a certain safe maximum distance from the windward shore, since another variable is then encountered, namely, the height of the windward terrain, which limits the safe overshooting distance, or in the case of a take-off, the safe engine failure on take-off margin. It is also to a certain extent dependent upon the load of the aircraft.

41
Your Excellency,

F.I.C.A.S. Flying Operations.

Ref (28)

I have the honour to forward the report and recommendations of a Committee meeting held in the Colonial Secretary's Office on the 26th of October, 1953.

Present: Hon. Colonial Secretary.
Hon. Senior Medical Officer.
Hon. Mr. A.L. Hardy, B.E.M., J.P.
Ag. Chief Meteorological Officer.
Mr. Mortimer.
Harbour Master.
Pilot.

Terms of Reference.

To enquire into and advise upon what steps can be taken to ensure that maximum use is made of available flying hours.

Members were acquainted with the substance of the minutes leading up to the establishment of this Committee and after discussion the Committee accepted the Pilot's statement that he was unable to undertake more than one major flight per day say of 3 - 5 hours duration. As it will be some time before the Harbour Master is competent to take his turn with the Beaver, the Committee approached the problem on the assumption that only one major flight per day was practicable.

After further discussion the Committee considered that better use could be made of the available flying hours in the following ways.

(a) Extension or improvement of Slipsay facilities.

All agreed that this was essential as not only flying days but also working hours for the ground staff were wasted at present.

Mr. Hardy was very dubious of the proposed methods of improvement and considered that a cradle or platform on rails was the only practical solution.

He also pressed for the highest priority to be accorded to the work.

SMS is also pressing for highest priority for the TB wing, which must obviously come first

(b) Dawn Flying.

The Committee considered that it was reasonable for F.I.C.A.S. to put in bursts of a week to a fortnight's dawn flying in the rush seasons (Christmas etc.) or when for other reasons there was a long waiting list of passengers.

Certainly

*It is a solution but would
involve prolonging the slippyway
as aircraft plus cradle displaces
as well as aircraft alone*

F.I.C.A.S. staff should obtain compensatory holidays when the arrears were wiped off.

(c) Meteorological

The establishment of a small meteorological station as far west as possible would greatly assist the Pilot to reach his flying decisions. In the meantime Acting Chief Meteorological Officer promised to carry out investigations in Stanley to see if he could relate early morning balloon observations to the mid-day wind speed.

(d) Sunday flying.

There was a wide divergence of opinion. The Pilot was firmly opposed to Sunday flying except for medical and Council priorities and though the Committee felt that Sunday flying on other occasions was desirable, it was very difficult to arrive at a formula for compensatory time off which in their opinion was essential. An equitable suggestion put forward was that after non-priority Sunday flying Monday should be a day off but could this be reconciled if Monday proved to be a perfect flying day? Also, as the root of the whole problem was the present practice of trying to relate irregular flying conditions to regular office hours, does not a set formula further confuse the issue?

No.

Yes

The consensus of opinion finally inclined to a vaguer recommendation of Sunday flying during rush periods with compensatory time off.

(e) Passengers.

The Committee accepted the pilot's assurance that no flying time was unnecessarily wasted embarking and disembarking passengers in the Camp nor under the present arrangements in Stanley whereby passengers are collected at the Government Jetty.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

C Campbell

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

YH

Pre see (41) ~~which~~ which is almost identical with (31) which YH has seen at (29). I have minutes on another piece re the Hardy's suggestion.

- 2) The main stumbling block is the Pilot's assertion that he can only manage one major flight per day and as they are from 3-5 hours duration & the wind gets up at 9 am, there seems little point in pressing for earlier flying as opposed to down flying which should be tried out in short bursts.
- 3) I am afraid the Cites findings give YH little material for the issue of a directive and perhaps a modified "pep talk on paper" might meet the case.

Q
1/12

Notes - para 2 and 4 of my minute on 28 should provide the material for a brief summary: will you knock something together therefore?

2. As to X on 38 I enquired yesterday whether the Auster is in operation yet and was extremely disappointed to learn that it is not; it ^{will only be} has taken over 13 weeks and ~~W/M~~ ^{W/M} being useful flying time but I shall have to disappoint you, ^{least}
3. ~~Y/CQA~~ ^{Y/CQA} overhaul is going to take as long as this every time we shall be in a poor way.

YH

Draft hourly etc. as over.

MC 3
X

- 2) As regards Auster - H.M. has fixed a date for repairs.

44 and advised Garrison staff that
an hours overtime + Sat. afternoons must
be worked until the task is completed.

Q. 12

I spoke to Mr. Jones this a.m. and gotten that they
hope to have the Order completed by the end of
next week as indeed it is necessary that it should
be.

the 5th
Xii

Spec
Pse fair draft
at even.
7/12

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and the date may be quoted.

9th December, 19 53.

To: The Colonial Secretary,
Stanley.

From: His Excellency the Governor,

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

SUBJECT:-

F.I.G.A.S. Flying Operations.

The question of how we are to secure more flying hours and thus run a more satisfactory service for the public has been argued for the past three years and has recently been the subject of an investigation by a representative committee.

I am satisfied that with weather conditions being what they are in the Falkland Islands it is quite impossible to draw up any dependable schedule of flights and that we must, therefore, utilise every bit of flying weather vouchsafed to us and take an "easy" on the days - and they are many - when no flying is possible.

The service can therefore only operate as an irregular one and its efficiency must in consequence depend on the keenness, energy and drive of the pilots and ground staff to whom it is quite impossible to offer normal office hours and working days. In short there can be no place for "clock-watching" in the organization.

The Air Service is one of the most vital institutions in the Colony and capable of conferring a greater benefit on the people than almost any other: but to do this it must give the maximum effective service which, as things are here, requires that all concerned in it must be prepared "to make the most of every unforgiving minute". They are members of a SERVICE, with all that that implies, and not of a commercial organization; the Government has done and will continue to do all that it can to make their task easier and looks to them, with confidence, to build for FIGAS the reputation we would all wish it to enjoy.

Will you please bring this to the notice of all FIGAS staff.

Miles Blifford

GOVERNOR.

14th December,

To: The Harbour Master,

From: The Colonial Secretary,

Stanley.

45
I am to invite your attention to the attached copy of a
minute addressed to me by His Excellency the Governor.

(Sgd.) C. Campbell

Colonial Secretary.

PC
14/12

THE DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT
OF CANADA LIMITED

POSTAL STATION L. TORONTO

November 11, 1953.

Confidential

The Colonial Secretary,
Stanley,
Falkland Islands.

Your Ref: 0270/F

Dear Sir:

We have your letter of October 27th, and we notice from the report of our pilot Fowler, who spent some time with you, that the main weather problem is high winds and rough water conditions.

It is almost impossible to lay down any fixed rule for carrying on flying operations with any aircraft, as so much depends upon the availability of some shelter, the experience of the pilot, and the docking facilities. Operations are carried on in many parts of Canada in much higher winds than 20 knots and again at other times, in other places, the limiting wind is about 20 to 25 knots. The main advantage of the Beaver is that it will land and take off in a small area and usually some sheltered spot can be found from which the Beaver can operate. In most places of importance, floating docks are available, usually in a reasonably sheltered place, and this makes the docking and handling of the aircraft practical even under quite rough conditions. I understand from Fowler that you do not have floating docks and that the main slipway at the base is concrete, which is liable to cause damage to the floats in a rough sea. Most slipways in Canada are constructed of wood, which is not so liable to cause damage to the floats and once the aircraft is brought to the slipway it can be pulled up on the wooden planking, clear of the water, without having to put on the beaching wheels. The floats slide well on the wet wood.

* see note later.

We feel that perhaps it is best to rely on the judgment of the pilot, provided you have confidence in his all-round ability and his common sense.

B.W.F.

This gets us no further - practice may induce the Pilot to take a less conservative view

Yes! P20 see above - they are not committing themselves! P. P

0270/4 H - FLEAS
Landing Facilities

X47

6 DEC 1953
FALKLAND IS.

48

The Colonial Secretary.

Page Two.

Many times it is possible to operate in Canada in the early morning where operations have to be suspended in the middle of the day, and it might be worthwhile considering some such arrangement if it can be adapted to your particular requirements.

I regret we cannot give you any specific ruling on the matter for the reasons explained herein.

Yours very truly,

THE DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT OF CANADA, LIMITED

(Sgd) C.H. Dickins,
Sales Director.

*pass
6/1/44*

CHD:mw

FLYING OPERATIONS.

These observations are in effect a follow-on from the previous lengthy and exhaustive discussions which culminated in the formation of an independent committee to examine and advise upon Air Service operations. I will not pretend that the actual advice received was of any great value: however, the general airing of opinions did give us something to work upon, and a particular effort has been made in the period since the Christmas holidays to find out exactly what can be achieved. This experiment has confirmed some theories and exposed the fallacies in others.

Passenger Potential. In the previous discussions I argued that the potential number of passengers available to the Air Service was approximately 2,000 per annum, of whom we have never flown more than 850 in twelve months. This estimate was based upon experience with the waiting list, but could not be confirmed as no figures of actual bookings received, as opposed to passengers flown, has been kept. During January the Air Service carried 155; there were 15 cancellations owing to alternative means of transport being found, and there were 17 passengers still awaiting their flight at the end of the month. The actual passenger potential was therefore 187, of whom 83% were flown. Bookings for 52 flights for February have already been received (a considerably higher number than were on hand at the beginning of January) and in consequence the passenger potential for this month may be expected to be as high as that for last. As this is the busy season on the farms, campers may be regarded as travelling as little as possible during this part of the year, and in consequence the number of bookings received should not be regarded as exceptional. It therefore appears that the estimate of 2,000 potential passengers per annum is, if anything, erring on the conservative side.

Auster Operations. An interesting and to me pleasing result of the experimental month has been the success of backing up the normal Beaver flying with the Auster. Auster passengers (38) accounted for approximately 25% of the grand total, and its effect was really even greater since the Beaver numbers would have been reduced had more short hauls been included in its flights. Flying hours for both aircraft were approximately the same (Auster 33 hours, Beaver 34 hours) and this is an average figure for a month's flying - the number of days on which flying was carried out was 14, and the weather during January was, if anything, slightly below average so far as pleasantness for flying was concerned.

Out-of-hours Flying. During the previous discussions the question of out-of-hours flying was considered, and although no firm recommendation was made to the Air Service, it was rather vaguely suggested that something might be done. During January quite a large amount of flying outside regular working hours was tried - sometimes unintentionally when the flights took longer than anticipated, and sometimes deliberately. This type of flying can be divided under three heads:-

(a) Sunday Flying. Flying was done on one Sunday during the month: there were no great difficulties about it, but the following observations were noted. As there is no R/T schedule with the camp on a Sunday, it is difficult to change a flight plan at the last moment as can be done on a weekday: it was found impossible to contact the W/T station that day to take over the R/T watch during the lunch-hour, with the result that if both aircraft are flying the clerk is liable to lose his lunch, as no relief can be given him. Staff involved during Sunday flying are:- Pilot(s), Engineers, Coxswain, Labourer, Clerk, Harbour Master.

(b) Early Morning Flying. This was tried on several occasions with the Auster and once with the Beaver. Its success is dubious, since on only one occasion was a flight made when it was impossible to fly during the remainder of the day, and upon another occasion when an early start was made, flying conditions during the afternoon were very much better than earlier in the day. On the other hand, it was found to be very much smoother flying in the early hours, and as the Auster only requires the pilot and his passenger to launch, it is with that aircraft and for short flights, worth while. Its adoption for long flights is not recommended. If it is to become a regular thing, then something must be done about the night operator on the telephone exchange, since he is not always on duty.

Difficultly will
be overcome
when we have
an automatic

BWF

(c) Evening Flying. This was done during the month owing to flights taking longer than were expected. Both pilots prefer flying during the evening to the early morning, since the weather is almost invariably improving at that time of day. It is also very much easier to organise a flight in the evening than in the early part of the day, because everyone is up and about already.

In the previous discussions out-of-hours flying was suggested for periods when the waiting list was long - I believe the figure of fifty waiting passengers was suggested as constituting a long list. On this basis, it appears that the Air Service would be committed to out-of-hour flying for ever more, since there were scarcely any days during January on which the list was less than fifty passengers awaiting a flight in the near future.

*Other members
do not like*

Time In Lieu. As an integral part of the suggestion that out-of-hours flying should be carried out, the committee advised that time in lieu should be given to the staff who were working an undue amount of overtime hours. The experiment this month has proved that the Air Service can in fact greatly increase its efficiency by working longer hours than normal - the result has in fact been most surprising - but it has not solved the difficulty of time in lieu. I attach my personal working hours for January, and if time in lieu is to be granted, I start next month with two weeks holiday! Admittedly my hours were longer than anyone else's, but the clerk did almost thirty hours overtime and was only given three hours off in lieu, and members of the Air Service were given 4 hours to make up for the overtime they had done, which must have been well over thirty. As things stand, time in lieu is impossible, for on non-flying days there is the maintenance work to be carried out, and for the clerk and I the office work to be done. We based the idea of time in lieu on the fallacy that there would be slack periods: so far as I can see, these are most unlikely to occur. I cannot personally see any way around this particular difficulty. If we cut down to routine hours, the passengers carried during the month would fall to approximately 90 - about 60% of what can be managed by working the extra time. This would be a pity, but if time in lieu is impossible, then it is unfair to expect one section of the Civil Service to continue indefinitely working hours which are 25% longer than the rest of the service. This time factor is vital, and will have to be solved if we are to continue operating at the high level attained during January. It is in the Colony's interest that we should, and I would be very grateful for your observations on this point.

Results.

Passengers Carried.		Revenue.		Flying Days.	
January.	Average.	January.	Average.	January.	Average.
155	68	£602	£280	14	14

The term 'average' has been taken over the period during which the Air Service has possessed a large aircraft, but does not include times when no flying was being done owing to pilot sickness or other causes. In other words, it is the average we have achieved during a flying month in the past.

for Schuchle

DE

WORKING HOURS.

DATE.	NORMAL HOURS.	MY HOURS.
Jan 1		
2		3
3		4
4	Public Holiday	
5	4	
6	Sunday	Sunday
7	6	11
8	6	14
9	6	14
10	6	8
11	4	6
12	Sunday	8
13	6	Sunday
14	6	10
15	6	9
16	6	6
17	6	6
18	4	6
19	Sunday	3
20	6	13
21	6	10
22	6	10
23	6	7
24	6	7
25	4	7
26	Sunday	3
27	6	2
28	6	6
29	6	8
30	6	6
31	6	9
	4	7
	Sunday	13
		Sunday
TOTAL.	140	216
		<u>140</u>
		Out-of-hours worked 76

Y.F.

(49) - (51)

It is satisfactory to note that a real attempt has been made to implement (45) and it is clear that this is principally due to Hm's personal efforts.

Undoubtedly.

2) As regards the overtime - I feel that we need another month or two's operation to get a clearer picture.

3) A point that occurs to me is the hours of work done by the hangar staff & used as a basis for the calculation. I imagine Hm works on a six hour day but in PROD mechanical staff work an 8 hour day which & the extra 2 hours would absorb the 25% overtime quoted by Hm.

Check.

4) Nevertheless we cannot expect such a high performance when Mr Jones is away & we

152
may yet have to have a third engineer
when CPMs are carried out locally,
despite Mr K. Lusk's views. H.M. should, incidentally,
entice the latter down to the hangar for a
Very day when he is next in Stanley.
Satisfactory.

P
R

The service has done very well this last month
as has been a matter of general comment: Their
quantity of 'hours' is difficult. PWD mechanic staff
as you say certainly work longer than the normal
6 hours: FIDS staff similarly more often than
not, but they do not complain and the fact
is that "trades union hours" in a Government
Service don't get the job done. I agree that we
should wait for another month at least.

MC 8/11.54.

He see (51) & (52).

I would like a further review at the end
of this month. Mr K. Lusk's views incidentally
are that we are building up a new 'Aviation'
Dept slowly but insidiously and as in the
case of the Cyp. Dept. this tendency must be
squashed. We presumably expect us to
work with automatic pilots & I suppose,
engineers. If you can show him a despatch
in the life of a a a ground engineer so
much the better.


P
R

H.E.S.

H.E. has spoken with me about this: he has formulated certain proposals to ease the strain which he will doubtless pass direct to you i.d.c.

2. There is one point in your comments which I would like to correct: the improvement has been due to a combined effort & it would be unfair to the other members of the staff to leave with the impression that I am responsible - we've all been in it together, & you may have noticed that Dewell has returned twice recently at 1945 & 2035 respectively - meaning working until after 9 o'clock on both occasions.

3. As regards Mr. Hurst: I will bear it in mind: but I see his bookings are in on the 24th, out on the 27th! Presumably he will be busy on the 25th & 26th so I doubt if he will see us operating. It is extremely difficult to counter uninformed criticism (don't think I've spelt that right) & I think the best way of getting outside support to our claims is to really go flat out to prove our usefulness. - after all, there is a difference between a department which has to maintain £25,000 of equipment & has flown 155 passengers last month with a labour force of 5 men, & a department which maintains a comparatively small value of stock & has a labour force of 4 men.


12. 2. '54.
Rosa 22/2

24/2

See 6/3

February Flying.

It is unnecessary to write a detailed account of the flying operations during the month as there are no further comments to add to those made at the end of January. All essential information can be gathered from the following statistics:-

Passenger bookings :-	171.	
Passengers carried :-	119.	
Percentage of bookings carried :-	70%.	
Cancellations :-	18	
Carried forward to next month :-	44.	
Passenger potential per annum :-	2052	
Revenue :-	£445	
Flying days :-	16	see note 1.
Early starts (before 0600)	9	
Late finishes (after 2000)	4	
Aircraft flying hours, Auster :-	51	
Beaver :-	25	see note 2.
Auster passengers :-	48	see note 3.
Percentage of total passengers carried :-	40%	
Pilot flying hours, Dewell :-	32	} see note 4
Huckle :-	41.	

Note 1. Does not include an abative flight on February 28th.

Note 2. Beaver became due for two inspections during this month, one in the first week & the other during the third.

Note 3. These figures include passengers flown by both pilots, & are given as an example of using the Auster to supplement the Beaver.

Note 4. Pilots' flying hours do not agree with aircraft flying hours as the former do not include taxiing time

General Footnote:- Had it not been for an exceptionally bad spell of weather during the fourth week of February, the figures of passengers carried & revenue earned would have been considerably higher. The Beaver was under inspection for six days, most of which were good flying days, & was serviceable during the fourth week when it could not be used. The Auster on the other hand was under inspection for five days, all but one of which were non-flyers. Had the second Beaver inspection been delayed, it would have clashed with the flying of council members.

A good example of the necessity of these routine inspections was seen during the month, when an oil leak in the hydraulic flap system was discovered. This could have caused a serious mishap had it not been noticed early.

for Studer
28. II. '54.

MA. Q
.913
Bull on 53
of 1000

H.C.S.



56

With reference our conversation regarding Air Service bookings, herewith the state of the union at the beginning of the current week.

Up to Monday we had flown 106 passengers during this month and in the preceeding four months (December - March) we flew 509 passengers, so the total carried between 1st December and 25th April was 615 altogether, and it is interesting to note how favourably this figure compares with the 755 passengers carried during the whole of 1953 - in other words by the end of May we shall have carried as many in six months as we carried in the previous twelve.

But the increase in passengers carried, which has been achieved very largely because we do not now have to waste Beaver flying time on short, uneconomical flights which can be done by the Anster, has, if anything, increased the demand for flights, with the net result that passengers still have the same waiting periods as before to put up with. In fact, we seem to be attempting to plumb a bottomless pit so far as passenger demand is concerned - bottomless with present resources that is.

The attached list gives a good idea of the sort of situation the Air Service is constantly faced with. Bearing in mind the figures mentioned above and in particular the 106 passengers already carried in April, you will notice that there are 119 flight bookings on our list on 26th April, of whom 61 wish to be flown during the current week (their names are shown in red for clarity). I can never make up my mind whether this particular situation is heartening or disheartening - probably it would be worse if we had too few passengers!

However, as you suggest there is a case for trying to improve the service by introducing a modified priority flight for business reasons so that persons with urgent business to complete are not unduly delayed by having to await their turn, but I agree with you that this is not a decision which I can make personally - I have not minded in the past doing so occasionally unofficially in exceptional circumstances, but as a routine it would I am confident be a bad principle - and in any case I would not be prepared to accept the responsibility, so we need not discuss it further. I imagine that in fact these modified priorities would be comparatively infrequent - perhaps three or four per month - and in consequence they would not seriously upset our normal flying programme, but they would assist genuine business interests to get their work done quickly. I think the best sort of committee we could have to vet applications would be yourself, assisted by the Secretary S.O.A. and myself, with applications sent to you.

It will not be quite so simple as it looks on the face of it - in fact I see thunderstorms ahead - but it is worth a trial. Going back to the current list of waiting passengers, I would consider Barton and Harding as worthy candidates, although as they booked so well in advance with comendable foresight, they are in fact at the top of the list and in consequence priority would not be necessary: also J. Barnes, who wants to go out and inspect some jetties at Fitzroy, Teal Inlet & Douglas Station - as he wants to go early in the morning, he also will probably get away before he is really due, but this would be a justifiable case for a modified priority. But also on the list you will note Mr Finlayson and family who wish to get back to Port Stephens where he is manager. If we have a modified priority scheme running, he might claim that his presence on the farm is urgently required, but I should be opposed to a priority in this case since he came to Stanley for pleasure and not business, and furthermore his pleasure was arranged some weeks ago, so his return flight could have also been booked well in advance. Incidentally, Mr Finlayson has not been

trying to push himself in any way - I am merely using him as a convenient example on the current list. 57

Beyond giving a modified priority to bona fide business flights, I cannot personally see how we can do very much to improve the method of carrying passengers - I feel it would be an unjustifiable interference with the freedom of the individual if we enquire why each person is flying, and apart from that, the difficulty of deciding whether a bridesmaid should be carried in preference to a person attending the May Ball would be almost insuperable - in fact I would suggest that the present system be continued with the exception of business flights, since the other categories are so extremely varied. It would also mean that the committee would have to make out the flight plans, which would entail daily meetings after flying for the day is completed - an impossible idea.

It may become necessary to reconsider this latter point once again if it is found impossible for me to keep up the present scale of Auster flying, as it would then mean that our monthly average would almost certainly drop to about 80 - 90, and in consequence the gap between passengers booked and carried would become excessive. I am not contemplating cutting out my flying in the near future, but as I have in the past five months flown more hours than the other pilot, there can be no question but that either he is doing too little or I am doing too much! However, this need not arise yet.


H. M.

57H#

FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT AIR SERVICE.

DATE.	NAME.	FROM.	TO.	DATE.
-------	-------	-------	-----	-------

MEDICAL FLIGHTS.

26.4	Mrs Short	Salvador	Stanley	9.5
------	-----------	----------	---------	-----

PASSENGER FLIGHTS.

13.3	A.Monk	West Point	Stanley	S.P.
16.3	A.Barton & H.Harding	San Carlos	Stanley	S.P.
21.3	6 passengers	West Point	Stanley	3.5
23.3	Miss A.Jones, Mrs E.Lyses, W.Pooler	Stanley	Pebble	S.P.
24.3	Mr & Mrs McGill & 2 ch	Weddell	Stanley	S.P.
24.3	6 passengers	Stanley	West Point	5.6
26.3	Mr & Mrs Blake, V.Goodwin	Hill Cove	Stanley	1.5
29.3	B.Hardy	Teal Inlet	Stanley	21.5
29.3	B.Hardy	Stanley	Teal Inlet	28.5
30.3	Mrs Lewis & ch, B.McLaren	Douglas	Stanley	30.4
4.4	Mrs J.Rowlands	Stanley	North Arm	S.P.
5.4	Mrs C.Harrison & ch, T.Skilling	Dunnose Head	Stanley	S.P.
6.4	Mr & Mrs F.Johnson	Port Howard	Stanley	S.P.
7.4	B.Barnes, Mr, Mrs & Miss L.Lammosa & ch, E.Lee, T.Shorey	Port Howard	Stanley	3.5
8.4	Mr & Mrs K.McGill & 3 ch	Weddell	Stanley	31.5
12.4	Miss N.Pitaluga	Salvador	Stanley	19.5
13.4	Mrs R.Bernsten	Stanley	San Carlos	S.P.
24.4	Mrs R.Goss	Stanley	North Arm	S.P.
14.4	Mr & Mrs R.Finlayson & ch	Stanley	Port Stephens	S.P.
14.4	H.H.Duncan	Fox Bay	Stanley	S.P.
14.4	Mrs & Miss Andreason	Stanley	North Arm	S.P.
14.4	R.Hansen	Stanley	Chartres	29.4
14.4	Mr & Mrs A.Smith	Stanley	North Arm	S.P.
17.4	Mr & Mrs Lewis & ch	Stanley	Port Howard	1.5
17.4	M.Lewis	Port Howard	Douglas	12.5
17.4	Mrs Lewis & ch	Port Howard	Stanley	12.5
17.4	Rev F.McWhan	Stanley	Darwin	S.P.
17.4	Rev F.McWhan	Darwin	Stanley	2 days lat
17.4	P.Robertson & R.McRae	Stanley	Darwin	S.P.
17.4	Mrs H.McLeod & ch	Stanley	Saunders	S.P.
17.4	Murdoch	Stanley	Horseshoe Bay	S.P.
17.4	Mrs Blakely & 2 ch	Stanley	North Arm	S.P.
17.4	P.Duncan	North Arm	Stanley	2.7
22.4	Mr & Mrs E.Johnson	Douglas	Stanley	22.5
24.4	Mr & Mrs E.Johnson	Stanley	Douglas	28.5
22.4	4 Bonners	San Carlos	Stanley	20.5
22.4	D.Stratton	Stanley	San Carlos	S.P.
22.4	F.J.Lee	Port Howard	Stanley	15.6
22.4	Mrs Bound	Stanley	Salvador	
23.4	Mr & Mrs Ingram	Darwin	Stanley	3.5
23.4	Mr & Mrs J.Perry	Walker Creek	Stanley	3.5
23.4	Mrs L.Turner	Salvador	Stanley	29.4
23.4	Mr & Mrs P.Smith & ch	Stanley	Speedwell	S.P.
24.4	A.Chileno	Stanley	Ajax Bay	S.P.
24.4	H.Napier	Stanley	West Point	
26.4	A.Tritton	P.S.C.	Stanley	4.5
26.4	D.Stratton	San Carlos	Stanley	4.5
26.4	M.Evans	Fox Bay	Stanley	3.5
26.4	V.Goodwin	Hill Cove	Stanley	14.5
26.4	Miss K.Smith	Rot Cove	Stanley	4.5
26.4	Father Callaghan	Stanley	Ajax Bay	29.4
26.4	Father Callaghan	Ajax Bay	Stanley	4.5

26.4	Mrs A.Pitaluga	Rincon Grande	Stanley	3.5
26.4	Mr & Mrs H.Cartnell & ch	Stanley	Walker Creek	S.P.
26.4	A.POrter	Pebbly	Stanley	S.P.
26.4	R.Walmesley	Pebble	Stanley	22.5
26.4	Mrs J.Rowlands & ch	North Arm	Stanley	2.6
26.4	Mrs R.Goss	North Arm	Stanley	10.5
26.4	Haddon	Bleaker	Darwin	S.P.
26.4	J.Barnes	Stanley	Fitzroy,	
			T.I., Douglas	S.P.
26.4	Mrs J.Blyth	Stanley	San Carlos	1.5
26.4	E.Barnes	Stanley	Fitzroy	S.P.

57
57E

Ref (56)

YH. may like to place through the file which touches very fully on the activities of the Air Service and the short answer is contained in the Governor's directive at (45).

- 2) There is ^{however} another ~~depend~~ ^{set out in (56)} problem in connection with the Air Service. When things are going badly (pilot sick or plane continually under repair), as happened when we had Pilot Halls & the horseman, people ~~just~~ lost confidence in the service & bookings were few. When it is operating well, as it has done in recent months, demand for passages far exceeds supply and a long waiting list builds up.
- 3) The obvious answer is to expand our service but it is doubtful whether we could afford to do so or whether it is really this would receive general popular support. Failing this ~~the~~ we must operate strictly by bookings or by a graded system of priorities.
- 4) We have priority flights at the moment, mostly medical, & ex to a leg to meetings, but I don't think this goes far enough & I feel we should give priority to urgent business reasons particularly in connection with sheep farming. e.g. the freezer directors, even during times of crisis, have to take an equal chance for a passage with the holiday makers.
- 5) It would be extremely difficult to work out an equitable system & the ~~responsibility~~ ^{responsibility} should certainly not put on the Harbour Master & Pilot. ~~However~~ Chopping & changing of flights due to weather or plane defects will further complicate the issue.

87

6) I feel that it would be worth while discussing in Ex Co. with Harbour Master in attendance, provided members are prevented from 'shooting at' the Air Service and going over all the old ground which has been fully covered in the past.

Q
26/4

Since writing the above, it occurred to me to mention the possibility, which Mr Young is always talking about, of R.C. getting their own plane to fly managers, directors etc, about.

No official approach has ever been made to Govt but I have just heard a rumour that they R.C. hope to train Oliver as a pilot in England while he is on leave!!

Q
27/4

Discuss in Ex Co please. What about an extra fee for priorities? We might consider that The Telegraph Coys do it.

RAA

25/5

Confidential

58

Hm

59 I posed the priority question to com. Pic. in the hope of getting some helpful suggestions but he produced the attached which skirts round the main point & starts going over most of the old ground again. It is however meant to be helpful despite the inevitable cracks which com. unfortunately feels obliged to include in most of his correspondence.

- 2) Though the main point is missed I would like you to comment in detail & give me material for a reply since it is our policy to try & give under publicity to ~~Boat~~ difficulties despite the fact that it is old ground.
- 3) This week end & holidays argument is fallacious as it presupposes that we have two full time pilots which we haven't. If this is desired we must pay for extra staff.
- 4) I think the base on the west is quite a good suggestion.

P
4/5

MEMORANDUM

From:- COLONIAL MANAGER,
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CO, LTD.

To:- COLONIAL SECRETARY



59

FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT AIR SERVICE.

Here are a few reasons why, to my mind, two aircraft and two pilots are not coping with the present demand for air passages.

*The early flight
argument on again*

1. The Beaver is seldom airborne before 10.00 a.m. and rarely makes two flights a day. The one flight is usually a marathon test of endurance for the Pilot.

*Pilot in the
best judge*

2. Insufficient reliance is placed on Weather Reports from Far West Islands which in 8 cases out of 10 denote the weather for at least the forenoon.

3. The reluctance of the Pilot(s) to attempt a West flight in the afternoon.

Be better than

4. The shortcomings of the Slipway which may now be less, after the demolitions carried out by the Navy.

*They haven't all
got cars*

5. The present system of embarking passengers at Dockyard Jetty, though convenient for administrative purposes, wastes an hour of flying time.

6. The lack of a West Falkland base. Fox Bay suggests itself, having two permanent Government employees (Postmaster and Caretaker) who have not enough to do and might be 'encouraged' to service a base to the extent of fitting landing-gear, winching the aircraft up a rudimentary Slipway ($\frac{1}{3}$ rd the length of Stanley Slipway) into a three-sided shed, hose it down, re-fuel, and accommodate the Pilot for a night if needs be, at FIGAS expense.

Note:

The more I consider this proposal the better I like it. Westers are at present the orphans of the Service. I think it would reduce the back log of passengers and save fuel.

Booking:

There is a fault in the booking system somewhere, also in the arrangement of flights.

A passenger's name is announced one evening, but though there is no flight the next day, the passenger's name does not necessarily appear on the list for the following day. Other flights take place without any notification at all.

Cancellations:

Passengers get exasperated by delays and ride, walk or change their plans but neglect to cancel their bookings. For this they cannot entirely be blamed.

Priorities:

This is tricky. I personally have repeatedly been foiled in my desire to be at a certain place on a certain day, occasions when it would have profited my Company to have paid a premium to get me to that spot in time, but in a Public Service it must not be the long purse which merits priority. The man or woman who is paying board in Stanley unnecessarily is equally deserving.

/Would

Would it be feasible to raise fares for Preferred Bookings and lower them for Deferred? Admittedly one of each class might be carried on the same day, but that would be a question of luck.

Week-ends and Holidays:

I am convinced that every flying-day except Christmas Day should be utilised, equally that there is such a thing as pilot-fatigue, though in this country fatigue is more likely to occur from inactivity than otherwise. The early morning flights by Auster are praiseworthy, but it is obvious that one similar flight by Beaver this week to East Falkland ports would have accomplished more than several by Auster.

Note without a second pilot a more prompt stop.

If both our Pilots could fly both aircraft each could be given a complete rest-week one week in four or five, but we would expect every flying-day to be used to the full.

Overhauls:

These are of course vital, but is sufficient attention paid to them when bookings are accepted? The overhauls are in accordance with a set routine every 25 hours, 50 hours etc. and it should be clear to the organisers that such and such a flight or series of flights booked for a certain period will coincide with an overhaul schedule and must be put off. Why then accept?

Communications:

Communications (by Stanley radio) and liason in general with the Public are bad at present but we hope will improve with the new Transmitter. Broadcast then at frequent intervals --

"BEAVER has x more flying hours to complete before
"AUSTER
"undergoing an overhaul which will take x days.

I hope there will be something of use in the foregoing to a Service which is now a permanent feature of our way-of-life, and must be maintained, not at all costs for we cannot afford that, but on a basis of sound planning and efficiency.

A. G. Dawkins

STANLEY
1st May 1954.

59 I think the best way of commenting upon the C.M.'s memo is by taking it paragraph by paragraph, although as some of the points interlock and overlap, some general comments at the end may be necessary. Like yourself, I wish that the C.M. could avoid making cracks when we ask his advice - it tends to put one off asking for his assistance, and obviously we should not be doing so if everything was working well!

1. The answer here is contained in the lengthy papers dealing with flight operations: briefly it takes 1½ hours to launch the aircraft and collect the passengers from the word go, so the C.M.'s estimate of a start between 1000 and 1030 is approximately correct, the weather forecast being received at present at about 0845. I do not understand his reference to a marathon - presumably he means the flight should be shorter for the Beaver - the answer is that so far as possible we make the Beaver flight to the West with a full load out and back, leaving the East to the Auster if possible. Flights never exceed 400 miles (4 hours flying time) and rarely exceed five stops (say 1½ hours) - this makes a total of 5½ hours which is by no means a test of endurance.

2. C.M.O. could more appropriately comment on this, but I know for a fact that the forecast made at 0900 for the aircraft is based upon accurate weather reports from West Point Island, Pebble Island and Fox Bay - reports from other islands, although interesting, are often misleading as they are not backed by instruments.

3. If the Air Service staff are to finish at a reasonable hour then a West flight in the afternoon is impossible, unless one stop only is intended, which is normally economically impossible.

4. The slipway has not once delayed us for more than an hour since the arrival of the Beaver and in future this delay will not be a factor to be considered at all - however, I would still like to see it completed.

5. I do not agree - it does not waste an hour and does in fact save a good deal of time. C.M. does not realise that an aircraft has to warm up anyway, and apart from this, if we wait for passengers to turn up at the hangar we get delayed very much longer. We should also lose time weighing in etc.

6. I think we should require an engineer there also. The point is that 99% of flights begin or end at Stanley so that is the reason why Stanley is the base. It would not in fact save fuel - rather the reverse, as the pilot would then fly to Fox Bay for the night instead of returning to Stanley. Westers are not orphans - since January 1st this year, 40% of all passengers carried have been Westers of one sort or another. Incidentally, Fox Bay would NOT be a good site.

Booking. Flights have to be altered to fit in medicals, maturing booking etc, which obviously cause the disruption complained of by the C.M. This is just as annoying to the Air Service as the passengers, but is inevitable. Unannounced flights do take place I admit, but infrequently and normally because I make a private arrangement with an early morning passenger the night before - a matter which only indirectly concerns the remainder of the population.

Cancellations. Why are they not to blame?

Priorities. I agree entirely with C.M.'s views, which are identical with my own on the subject of the long purse. I would like him to go into greater detail upon his Preferred and Deferred rates before commenting on this.

Week-ends & Holidays. Why should we have Christmas Day off? Since Jan 1st this year the Air Service has flown on 68 days out of a total of 98 official working days - this means we have flown more than two days out of three working days, despite an inadequate maintenance staff off two men most of the time to look after two aircraft. Actually Devrell and I fly an average number of hours for this type of flying - we're not at the top as regards hours, but

62

nor are we at the bottom, and in mitigation of our sins, it should be remembered that we are flying without many of the aids normally found; we have to assist in other duties besides just piloting the aircraft; and we have inclement weather for our type of aircraft. I do not understand the remark about both pilots being able to fly both aircraft, because this only helps if we can make two Beaver trips per day, and we should then require a bigger ground staff.

Overhauls. The best way of answering this one is by example: The Beaver is due for an overhaul twelve flying hours from now. What dates does the C.M. think it will fall between? I know that it will occur after four more flying days which may be in four days time if we have good weather, or if the weather is bad not until a fortnight's time. I can therefore suspend bookings for the period 10th May to 23rd May but that's the best I can do. It is impossible to forecast overhaul dates with any accuracy at all because the weather is not consistent and nor are the duration of the flights.

Communications. Not properly understood.

General. The fact is that we are running an Air Service with four men, which is too few. But unless we are going to treble our running costs, most of C.M.'s suggestions are impracticable. For instance, I would be willing either to do it myself or engage a pilot who would fly every hour possible throughout the year (including Christmas Day), but I should want £3000 per annum to look at it! If we are to expand, then I consider the most economical method would be to purchase another Beaver. Without expansion of some form I am convinced we are flying to our limits, and therefore improvement can only come in organisation of the flights. I cannot personally do any better than at present, but I would willingly accept practicable suggestions or hand over the flight planning to anyone who considers they can manage better.



H.M.

8

Y.F.

63

I mentioned that I had asked Mr. Barton for his views on priority passages and attached are the 58-62 p.p. which Y.F. may like to see.

- 2) I must disagree with his criticisms, however, and all this ground has ~~been~~ been covered before on this p.p.
- 3) Operating as we do with 1 Pilot, 1 Relief Pilot, one engineer & one mechanic (on leave), I think the Air Service does very well.
- 4) Not people forget the domestic side. Pilots & ground staff have to eat, sleep, eat their peat, do normal domestic chores, till their gardens, see something of their families & have some relaxation. E.g. For early morning flying in the summer pilots & their families have to get up about 4 am to light fires & get some hot food ready.

785

C.S.

Thankyou. Let's bring up the question of priorities in X to, & arrange for a joint time of God's service by unofficial members at the June meeting. They can then air their views & hear the answers

ORA 27/5

0270/F

22nd May,

54.

Sir,

59. I am directed to refer to your memorandum dated the 3rd of May, 1954, and to thank you for all the trouble you have taken in suggesting detailed improvements for the Air Service.

2. It would be much appreciated if you could expand on your Preferred and Deferred bookings suggestion as it is felt that some such procedure may have to be introduced.

3. With regard to the other points raised by you I am to offer the following comments:-

Your paragraph 1. It takes about 1½ hours after receipt of the Meteorological report at 8.45 to launch and warm up the plane and to collect passengers.

Your paragraph 2. The Meteorological Department and Pilots are satisfied that all possible reliance is placed on Camp reports from which accurate wind assessments are principally required.

Your paragraph 3. If the Air Service Staff are to finish at a reasonable hour then an afternoon West flight is impossible unless one stop only is made, which is normally uneconomical.

Your paragraph 4. The shortcomings of the slipway are now virtually eliminated.

Your paragraph 5. Time is not in fact wasted as the aircraft is warming up. Dockyard Jetty is also a great convenience for passengers without transport.

Your paragraph 6. The suggestion of a West Falkland base will be considered, but, as 99% of flights begin or end at Stanley, it would be no more than a refuge. It is however, improbable that fuel would be saved and it is also debatable whether the Westers are orphans of the service. Since 1/1/54 40% of all passengers have been Westers of one sort or another.

The Manager,
Falkland Islands Company, Limited,
STANLEY.

Booking. It is very difficult to devise an improved system owing to the disruptions caused by medical and other priority flights and adverse weather conditions. Errors and misunderstandings do occur but not to an excessive extent. Similarly unannounced flights occasionally take place but these are usually last minute arrangements.

Cancellation. It is not agreed that persons who fail to cancel their bookings can be absolved from blame.

Week-ends and holidays. If every flying hour of every flying day (including Christmas) were to be utilised an increase in pilot and ground staff establishment would be required as well as a second Beaver.

It is just not possible to do this with a staff consisting of a Pilot, a relief Pilot, an Engineer, a Mechanic (who is on leave) and a Handyman, if they are to eat, sleep, cultivate their gardens, cut their peat, do house chores etc. and get a reasonable amount of leisure.

Overhauls. Though it is a simple matter to calculate the number of flying hours remaining before an overhaul, it is very difficult to forecast accurately when this will occur. For example if the Beaver is due for an overhaul 12 flying hours from 1st June, she may have completed this quota by the 5th June or the 14th according to the weather and the duration of flights.

It is not thought that the public would wish bookings suspended over a period of a fortnight.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) C. Campbell

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

67

No. 0276/9.

MEMORANDUM.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and the date may be quoted.

Confidential.

28th Mar. 19 54.

From: The Colonial Secretary.

To: The Harbour Master,
Chief Meteorological Officer,

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

STANLEY.

SUBJECT:-

SIGAS Flying operations.

I am directed to state that arising out of a discussion on air passage priorities His Excellency has appointed a sub-committee of Executive Council consisting of the Honourable Senior Medical Officer (Chairman), the Honourable Mr. Barton and the Honourable Mr. Harding to examine how best the increased demands on the air service can be met.

2. I am to request that you and your staff will attend before the committee as and when required.

(Sgd) C. Campbell
Colonial Secretary.



King Edward VII Memorial Hospital,
Stanley,
Falkland Islands,
South America.

.....19th June..... 1954

The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
Stanley.

Sir,

We have the honour to submit the following report on our investigations into how best the increased demands on the Air Service can be met.

In consultation with the Harbour Master, the Pilot and the Chief Meteorological Officer, the following points were made:-

A. Regarding increased flying time:-

- 1) The Harbour Master having been informed that he is not expected to fly as much as the full-time pilot (which he has been doing during the past few months) does not expect to increase his flying hours.
- 2) Both pilots are unwilling to make a decision about a long flight till between 9 and 10 a.m.. Experience has shown them that time is the critical period.
- 3) The Chief Met. Officer expects to be able to provide earlier and more accurate forecasts.

B. Regarding increased passenger-carrying capacity:-

- 1) Shift system for operating Ceeva or Ceeva/Master. This system, which is suggested by the U.N., would necessitate the employment of an extra handy-man at the Wharf.
- 2) Exchange of Master for larger plane. It was agreed that the present demand does not warrant the purchase of a larger plane.

Robert Shaw

A. C. Dyer

H. C. Harding

BUP

JH

(67)

Please see (68). I fear I do not regard this report as a very valuable contribution to our flying problem, but do no doubt the subject has been usefully aired.

→ I will obtain further details of the 'shift system' referred to in B(1).

25/6

Rankin

ORA 26

30th June,

54.

To: The Harbour Master,

From: The Colonial Secretary,

STANLEY.

Flying Operations.

68

I am directed to state that in a report on flying operations submitted to His Excellency by a sub-committee of Executive Council a shift system for operating the Beaver or Beaver/Auster was mentioned.

I am to request that you will supply further details of this suggested system.

Reply at 71

(Sgd) C. Campbell
Colonial Secretary.

Bu 7/7
Reply in

H.C.S.

As I recall the discussion on this point, the suggestion was that with two pilots, one of whom liked early morning flying (?) and the other liking evening flying, would it not be possible to work a shift system, with me taking away the Beaver at (say) 0500 in the morning, returning at approximately 1030 (or earlier if the weather deteriorated); and then Devrell take the aircraft out again at 1130 and fly on until the days work is finished.

There is no doubt that by doing this for six months of the year when daylight permits we could step up the number of passengers flown quite appreciably. The snag lies in that we have not the staff to deal with this. We should require in effect two shifts as shown below (persons in red are additional to our present complement):-

First Shift. 0345 - 1100.

Harbour Master
Engineer
Handyman
Clerk/R/T Operator

Second Shift. 1100 - 1800+.

Pilot
Mechanic
Handyman
Clerk/R/T Operator

But this is not the end of the story: taking next year as an example, we shall only have Smith and Jones here together for a matter of three/four months during the summer, and for five or six weeks of this time they will be undertaking the C.of A. of the Beaver and then a further six weeks to overhaul the Auster. If we were working the shift system during this period we should therefore require a further handyman in the first shift while the engineer was released to work with the mechanic on the Auster for six weeks. Admittedly this handyman could be temporarily employed, but it would still cost his wages for that time.

A shift system would be useful in that it would allow the Air Service to make more of the 'good weather' periods than is at present possible. But it would entail the increase in staff indicated above, and it would then mean that on bad days and during the winter months we should have a surplus staff to our requirements. At the discussion with the committee it was suggested that no such increase was necessary, my taking out the Auster single-handed being quoted as an example. Quite obviously however there is a big difference between launching the Auster single-handed and launching the Beaver. Also the Auster requires nobody in the office - there is no R/T and only one passenger to organise, whereas the mustering of five passengers would require more time.

I do not personally recommend that F.I.G.A.S. staff be further increased - at least not for this reason - as the amount of extra flying obtained will not to my mind counterbalance the additional expenditure in money and labour (the latter being the shorter in the Colony).

YH

(69)

pe

see above

I suggest

copies

Ex. Co.

Rem. Flessor

expans on it

(68)

are

circulated to

Ex. Co.

can then

expans on it

at the meeting.

14/27

MA 16

15
72

ACS

Ch of (68) to members
of ExCo under complimentary
ship (confidential)

16/8

Record

sent 17/7/54
let.

05-23

31 AUG

73

Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of Executive Council
held 19th July, 1954.

0270/F.

12. F.I.G.A.S. Operations - Sub-Committee's Report.

68 Council adopted the Report of the sub-Committee and His Excellency directed that the possibility of varying the R/T wave-length in order to improve the reception of Camp meteorological forecasts in the early morning should be investigated.

W. H. Little

Acting Clerk of the Executive Council.

27th July,

54.

To: Superintendent Posts & Telegraphs,

To: The Colonial Secretary,

STANLEY.

F.I.G.A.S. Flying Operations.

68 I am directed to state that arising out of an investigation into F.I.G.A.S. flying operations by a sub-committee of Executive Council it transpired that delays occurred owing to the inability on occasions to receive Camp meteorological reports over the R/T in the early mornings.

I am to request that you will advise whether any improvements to the R/T reception can be effected - if necessary after consultation with the Wireless Communications Committee.

(Sgd) C. Campbell
Colonial Secretary.

Reply at 76 Sec 75

ACB *Send reminder.*

10/8

By 2 weeks

21/8/54

28th July,

54.

To: The Harbour Master,
From: The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

F.I.G.A.S.

I am directed to inform you that His Excellency has noted with satisfaction the work done by F.I.G.A.S. in connexion with the transportation of people attending the Sheepowners' Association and Falkland Islands Labour Federation meetings and others visiting Stanley on this occasion. His Excellency is aware of the extra work which must have been done by yourself and members of your Department and has directed that an expression of his appreciation should be conveyed to you and through you to others concerned.

(Sgd) C. Campbell.
Colonial Secretary.

See 191



74819#

2nd August, 1954.

From: Harbour Master.

To: The Hon. Col. Sec.

Subject:- F.I.C.A.S.

189 With reference to your Memo. 027/A of 28th July, 1954, the contents have been passed to F.I.C.A.S. staff who wish me to thank H.E. through you for his kind message.

It may interest H.E. to know that last month proved the most successful so far for the Department in so far as passengers carried is concerned. F.I.C.A.S. carried a total of 160 altogether during July (115 in the Beaver and 45 in the Auster), bringing the total for 1954 to 873 in seven months. The previous best twelve month period produced a total of 850, so we have almost doubled our previous best production rate.

The "Alert" also carried more camp passengers than ever before during the month - twenty persons making the trip to or from Berkeley Sound in her, and this figure added to the Air Service and the half dozen "Philomel" passengers makes the total for the Department as a whole 186 passengers during July.

The passenger potential for this month must have been an all-time record - I have no figures for other modes of transport, but I should think that the "Fitzroy" must have carried at least fifty camp passenger during the month; the "Gentoo", "Protector" and other small craft another thirty, and there must also still be quite a large number who still remain faithful to their four-legged friend - say another fifty anyhow - which means that one in three of the camp population must have been on the move during July!

Despite the high figure carried by F.I.C.A.S. last month, it is satisfactory to note that there are 45 bookings for the first week of August, and 80 bookings for the whole month so far received.

Harbour Master.

Memorandum.

12.8.54.

76

To The Honourable
Colonial Secretary,
Stanley.

From Superintendent,
Posts & Telegraphs
Stanley.

Subject. FIGAS Flying Operations.

Your Memo of 27th July, 1954, on FIGAS Flying Operations, I beg to advise you that the camp R/T Sets can not be readily adapted to work on frequencies other than 4.5 and 2 mc/s so as to meet more suitable conditions.

The conditions for reception have now improved considerably and we are working satisfactorily from 8.15 am. There will be a general improvement until next winter but, when Fox Bay W/T Station is fitted with its new W/T equipment, the operator at Fox Bay may be able to assist in collecting met reports on the R/T frequencies and retransmit them to the Met Station on a more suitable frequency.

A. Mercer

S.P.T.
12.8.54

Not

Y.S.
P22 see (76)

ORR 14

Dec for mention at Ex. Co.

13/11/54

F.I.G.A.S. OPERATIONS.

August proved to be the worst month the Air Service has had this year, and as this was due to mishaps other than those occasioned by bad flying weather, I feel some explanation should be given you in writing.

Firstly the Beaver was caught in a very exposed anchorage during a three day gale which resulted in the chain moorings parting and the aircraft being driven ashore, fortunately on a soft piece of beach which obviated structural damage to the floats. The exposure to the salt spray did however result in the stiffening up of the engine controls and in consequence a thorough maintenance inspection was essential upon her return to Stanley.

This overhaul was prolonged by the fact that as it was nearing completion the Engineer had to reassemble the aircraft to have it ready to undertake a flight to the assistance of the Auster which was bogged down at Chartres during the West Island mail drop - this mishap was caused by a deterioration in the petrol used for refuelling at Chartres which resulted in a loss of engine power and serious overheating, the latter causing damage to the starboard exhaust manifold.

Both these mishaps were beyond the control of the pilots and it was most unfortunate that they should have occurred practically simultaneously. The accident with the Beaver can only be completely safeguarded against if the aircraft can guarantee returning to base every night - an almost impossible thing to arrange. In an exposed anchorage with a prolonged gale blowing none but the heaviest of moorings will stand up to the strain and even then deterioration of the aircraft through exposure is inevitable. With the Auster I personally find the safest place for the aircraft is on the beach to start with, but we have always been averse to trying this with the Beaver owing to the extra weight involved. However, after this experience, it has been found that the larger aircraft can be handled without too much trouble at settlements where there is a tractor and planks available, and this may well prove to be the answer to the night out problem for both aircraft.

The deterioration of the petrol in the dump at Chartres is a completely new experience for us. This petrol is sent out in unopened drums and in the past has always proved satisfactory. This particular drum was in no way exceptional, nor had it been open any longer than was usual. The deterioration was most marked, the drop in power being sufficient to make it impossible to take-off under a run of about two miles! Immediately after the aircraft became airborne it was necessary to land again owing to the engine overheating to a dangerous extent. Without facilities for chemical analysis of this petrol, it is impossible to say why this should have occurred, nor do I see any reasonable means of stopping it in the future.

It is obvious that these mishaps have caused a bottle-neck with the passengers, which will be aggravated by the fact that there will be a change-over of pilots during this month and a return of farmers from leave in October. To offset this as far as possible, I am taking over the flying of the Beaver from now until the new pilot is converted, leaving Devrell free to train him on the Auster - with reasonable luck with the weather this should not take longer than a week. After that Kerr will do his Beaver conversion and we shall then 'double-bank' our operations by working two shifts with the Beaver until the back-log is reduced to reasonable proportions. Except in a case of emergency, I do not intend Devrell to fly to the West Falkland after the middle of this month as I require him to convert Kerr and also wish to avoid his becoming weather bound in his last few days and thus miss his passage in the "Fitzroy".



[Signature]

H.M.

See 79

15/9 See above. I am glad that you are all last done his Beaver conversion. The new pilot will also have the converted 15 float planes as there are no facilities in U.K. Devrell has to go to Norway! 129 PTO

78

I am obliged to 'HOM for this report + glad to
learn what he is doing DR/A
7

2

Bof

KIVBU
on 76.

9th September,

54.

To: Harbour Master,

From: The Colonial Secretary,

STANLEY.

F.I.G.A.S. Operations.

77 I am directed to refer to your undated Memorandum and to state that His Excellency is obliged to you for this report and approves the proposals contained therein.

(Sgd) C. Campbell.
Colonial Secretary.

Key Bu on 26
Bu 22/9/54.

Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of Executive Council
held 14th September, 1954.

0270/E.

4. F.I.F.A.S. Flying Operations.

Members accepted the report of the Superintendent,
Posts and Telegraphs, on possible methods of improving the
R/T communications.

Whittle

Acting Clerk of the Executive Council.

Mr.
W.H.

02701E

81

From: Harbour Master.


To: The Hon. Col. Sec.
STANLEY.

14th October, 1955.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IN STANLEY.

During the summer months we are likely to have three (and possibly more) aircraft flying simultaneously in the immediate area of Stanley, viz:- 1 Catalina, 1 (possibly 2) Beavers, 1 Auster and possibly another Catalina and a helicopter. To handle this traffic an A.T.C. organisation will be essential: for one thing the Student Pilot is not experienced: for another, an often experienced difficulty when large and small aircraft operate from the same aerodrome is that they take-off and land in different directions.

2. A signals area is in the process of preparation on the Government Jetty, and will be in use by the end of next week. This will be useful for training the Student Pilot, and is a justifiable charge against the Air Service. I would like however, to improve the R/T communications with the aircraft by using the more powerful and sensitive radio from the old Norseman in the office to replace the existing camp set. I have consulted the Acting S. of P. & T. about this and he considers that this could be done, but would require a battery charging set to be installed in the office to keep the battery power output up. This charging set could also be used to charge the Beaver batteries when required, but I would not normally have required one for the Air Service, and I wondered if there was any vote for the aerial survey from which the account for this could be met (or partially met if you consider part should be met by F.I.G.A.S.)?



Harbour Master.

H.M.

What was the battery charging
set cost?

P. 19/x

H.E.S.

£24.




H.M.

This is a fair charge
against the aerial survey.
(£24). Re. proceed
accordingly & charge to
Aerial Survey (Suspense acc).

H.E.S.

Noted by



PA

P. 21/x

0270/F

82

18th May,

56.

To: The Harbour Master,

From: The Colonial Secretary,

STANLEY.

Late Flights.

It has been observed that on a number of recent occasions the 'plane has arrived in Stanley after dark or in the dusk.

2. It is fully appreciated that there are occasions when a late return to Stanley is unavoidable or is the preferable alternative to remaining in the Camp. Nevertheless it is desirable that flights should be so planned as to ensure that the 'plane does arrive back in Stanley before dusk unless circumstances are exceptional.

(Sgd) L. G. Denton-Thompson
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

83

19th December, 57.

To: The Acting Director of Civil

From: The Colonial Secretary.

Aviation,

STANLEY.

Weekend Flying.

I understand you require some guidance on the subject of weekend flying.

2. This is not a matter as regards which it is possible to lay down any hard and fast rules and much must depend on circumstances prevailing at the time. Nevertheless you should be guided by the following general principles:-

- (i) Air Service staff are as entitled to free weekends as any other member of the Government Service.
- (ii) Generally speaking flying on Saturday afternoons and Sundays should, whenever possible, be avoided.
- (iii) On the other hand it must be recognised that the planes provide an all important service to the community as a whole and it is essential to maintain the high standards that have invariably been provided by pilots, engineers and ground staff. The Colony now depends to a great extent on the Beavers and the department should always, as hitherto, do its best to ensure that its commitments are met.
- (iv) There are circumstances in which weekend flying is called for. Firstly all Medical flight requirements must be met subject only to weather conditions and the serviceability of the aircraft. Secondly if weekend flying is necessary in order to ensure that an outgoing mail connects with the "Darwin", then such flying should take place. Similarly if it is necessary to fly at weekends in order to enable passengers to connect with an outgoing ship then the aircraft should also be flown. Thirdly the aircraft should do all it can to ensure that special commitments (e.g. the transport of children to school or home for Christmas) are met even though it may entail flying at a weekend.

3. In the present circumstances I consider that if the Air Service is unable to fly on the 20th and 21st of December, it should fly on Sunday the 22nd in order to get the school children home, Sir Eric Pridie (who is leaving on the next Darwin) to Stanley and the camp mail to Stanley to connect with the outgoing "Darwin".

(Sgd.) A. G. Denton Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

AGDT/MC

Re
8
F/12

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES. SENT.

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
				20.2.58.
To	Immediate.			
	His Excellency the Governor, H.M.S. "Protector"			H.O. A/C

No.1. Beaver crashed on take off yesterday and overturned at Douglas Station stop No casualties or injuries stop Position is that probably best and possibly only chance of salvage is by using "Shackleton" if we are to save the plane stop I had arranged for "Shackleton" to sail 5a.m. this morning for Douglas Station and was wiring you this schedule to see how much time you could give me with the "Shackleton" before she must sail South stop Unfortunately on casting off she got a great deal of nylon rope round her screw and I cannot say at the moment when we will be able to sail her stop Grateful to know immediately maximum time you can permit "Shackleton" to remain here in light of commitments South stop

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

Time Confirmatory copy phoned to W/T Station at 0915.

Copy filed in 0270/4. - Incident to Beaver Aircraft.

85

Offic.

We had better have copies of the rest of the
Telegrams on the salvage operation put on this
file.

Offic.

27/2/58.

A.C.S.

86.

Telegrams on the salvage operations are in new
file 0270/U - Accident to Beaver Aircraft No. VFFAF 828.

JH. 24/2/58.

Be
27/2/58

88
NEWS ITEM.

Listeners will no doubt be interested to hear the latest news of the Air Service.

Government has ordered a new Beaver aircraft from Canada and this is expected to arrive in the June "Darwin".

One of the two engines held in the Colony has now been shipped in the R.R.S. "John Biscoe" to England where a new part will be fitted. It was not possible for this to be done locally.

A new part for the remaining engine has been ordered and this should arrive in the May "Darwin". If this part corrects the trouble that has been experienced with the particular engine, and it is hoped that it will, one aircraft should be flying by the end of May.

A third engine will arrive from England in the next sailing of the "A.E.S." This engine has recently been completely overhauled.

For Tonight's news please.

SGT/MC

Act. C.S.

(1)

A number of people said to me in effect yesterday "what! no more!" It might come up in the form - "we were asked to pay an allowance for overtime sailing and agreed - now why don't we get the service?" I had a word with the Postmaster and am rather inclined, though I am not too sure about it, to agree with him that it was not really necessary. Either way we should have a reasonable answer ready. What are your views?

(2)

I suspect that we might also get an impassioned letter from Githen why no flying yesterday. The short answer is I think that we must also think of our engines. There are one or two other answers as well - but I think it might be as well to have them ready!

A. Giff.
28.9.59.

Extracted to clear up
"Correspondence relating to flights."

J.H.

3

Extracted to
OEOH/IV

"Correspondence
relating to
Mails"

V

① hereunder.

Of recent years it has not been the practice to work overtime on surface newspapers & postal. unless a ship is sailing for the Bank the following day. As a matter is of course done with to catch the following day's plane. I personally don't think it was necessary for the post office staff to work yesterday.

② hereunder.

Apart from the Engines - there were no priority flights (machine or mail) outstanding which is in acc. w. (82) in the attached file

V

Extracted to
OEOH/IV

{

40

/ agree on second flight.

①

28/9/69.

4/1/71

29.9.71

Pa
Q.

D. C. A.

Suggestion.

Number of flying hours completed at end of each day should be noted at the office.

If at all near the end of the period then Miss Halliday should warn those wishing to book return flights.

What one wants to avoid is those who don't have to go out but must be back by a certain date being taken out and stranded because the possibility of the plane being taken off for inspection was never contemplated.

The above is presumably only needed when we are down to one plane anyhow.

As I say, above is only a suggestion, but I believe you will be able to work out something on these lines to prevent unnecessary inconvenience.

sm.

1st November, 1961.
RHDM/EH .

92

H. C. S.

With reference to the above suggestion, I do not think any additional record of aircraft flying times is necessary to achieve the ^aguarantee required above - whatever this guarantee may be worth - as three separate records of each aircraft's flying time is maintained in the hangar and it is a comparatively simple operation to phone the hangar as and when the actual figure is required.

There are so many variants in non schedule flying operations that I would not be prepared to give anyone a guarantee of a return flight even if I did know exactly how many hours an aircraft had to complete before inspection, and I personally would definitely discourage a person, who did not have to leave town but must be back by a certain date from making the journey at all, especially in the Falkland Islands, where a whole weeks operations can be made up solely of Priority or Medical commitments.

R. C. A.
4/12/61.

DCA explains

Flying hours always announced in news
letter.

Office could always find one if one if for
child's home.

number of flying hours left does not tell you

when last inspection will come e.g.

on 2 days to day ^{about 40} ~~30~~ hours.

once

inspection is at every 50 ~~more~~ hours

but begins inspection at 100 hours &

begin one still at 200

This could be fixed in case to make even

and of again

6/12/61

PA
7.12.61

CLOSED

See Vol 1 =