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FILE CLOSED.....16-8-85.....

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CLOSED

5. Accident to Aircraft Alpha Kilo

The Chairman advised the Committee that the cost to Government for the Accident Investigation Team would be £6000.

EXTRACT FROM MEETING OF STANDING FINANCE COMMITTEE - 28TH NOVEMBER 1976

AIR/7/4S
28.11.76

5.0. Accident to Aircraft Alpha Kilo (5.0)

- 5.1. The Chairman advised the Committee that the Investigation Department of the Board of Trade had waived their expenses in connection with the investigation into the cause of the Alpha Kilo accident. The only charges would be for fares and preparation printing of the report.

SCA informed by telephone


[Signature]
16.12.76

6

AIR/7/54 S 19. Accident to Beaver aircraft VP-FXK

4/77 19.1 His Excellency told Honourable Members that he had now received the report of Mr. Wilkinson, the accidents inspector from the Department of Trade and that in accordance with previously expressed intentions he proposed that it should be published without delay. Council concurred.

19.2 Honourable Members commented upon the clarity and authority of the Report and asked that their sincere gratitude be conveyed to Mr. Wilkinson and his colleagues for the excellent report.


L. D. David
Clerk of Council

184/1

✓ cc C.S.
Smt 84
(7)

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
19 MAY 1977

19 May 1977

G C Wilkinson Esq
Inspector of Accidents
Accidents Investigation Branch
Department of Trade
Shell Mex House
Strand
LONDON WC2R 0DP

PA
M 31/5

Sir,

1. Thank you for submitting to me, with your letter of 28 April, your report on the circumstances of the accident to Beaver FB-FAK on 14 October 1976.

(78)

2. In accordance with the discretion allowed me, I have decided to make the report public. I indicated my decision to the Members of Executive and Legislative Councils, who have asked me to convey to you their gratitude for the thoroughness of your investigation, and for the clarity of your findings. In doing so, I wish to add my own appreciation of the admirable way you carried out the difficult task laid on you.

I have the honour to be
Sir
Your obedient Servant

J R W Parker
Governor & Commander-in-Chief

file

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

1

ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH

DHC-2 Beaver Floatplane VP-FAK

Report on the accident at Mare Harbour,
Falkland Islands, on 14 October 1976

FALKLAND ISLANDS

<u>Aircraft:</u>	De Havilland Aircraft of Canada DHC-2 Beaver Floatplane VP-FAK
<u>Engine:</u>	One Pratt and Whitney "Wasp Junior" Piston Engine
<u>Registered Owner and Operator:</u>	Falkland Islands Government Air Service
<u>Crew:</u>	Pilot - Drowned
<u>Passenger:</u>	Injured
<u>Place of Accident:</u>	Mare Harbour, Falkland Islands. 51° 54' 42" South 58° 29' 48" West
<u>Date and Time:</u>	14 October 1976 at approximately 18.15 All times in this report are GMT.

Synopsis

The accident was notified to the Falkland Islands Government by Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS) at about 1900 hrs on 14 October 1976. Following a request from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth office, the Accidents Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom Department of Trade sent a team to the Falkland Islands to carry out an investigation; operations, engineering and human factors groups were established under the investigator in charge.

The accident occurred when the aircraft was returning to Stanley from Brenton Loch with the pilot and one passenger on board in poor weather with strong winds and rain. The aircraft capsized during a water landing at Mare Harbour, the passenger survived but the pilot was drowned. It is concluded that the passenger was flying the aircraft and that he lost control during the landing manoeuvre allowing the aircraft to stall, capsize and sink.

1. Factual Information

1.1 History of the flight

The aircraft took off from Stanley on a normal Falkland Islands Government Air Service flight at 1255 hrs on what was planned to be an eight sector trip around the settlements. Landings were made at Port San

Carlos, Hill Cove, Carcass Island, West Point, Roy Cove and Fox Bay. Take off from Fox Bay on the penultimate leg to Brenton Loch was at approximately 1715 hrs with two passengers on board. After a smooth and uneventful flight the aircraft landed at Brenton Loch and taxied right up to a beach on the north shore. Two people met the flight and held the floats whilst one passenger disembarked. There were no passengers waiting to be picked up but some mail and packages were loaded for Stanley. When the pilot was ready to depart the two helpers released their hold on the floats and allowed the wind to blow the aircraft downwind away from the beach. The last occasion on which the pilot was seen alive by observers on the ground was when he entered the cabin through the small pilot's door on the left hand side of the fuselage.

After drifting some distance, perhaps half a mile, the engine was started and the aircraft seen to taxi, apparently normally. The take-off run was made right up the loch into a brisk north easterly wind, however the surface of the loch was reasonably smooth.

The two helpers and the passenger who had disembarked watched the aircraft depart from a position near a 40 foot high bank at the north end of the loch. They observed that during the take-off run the aircraft travelled a considerable distance on the left float with the right, upwind, float about two feet clear of the water and that the take-off track followed was not straight. After starting the run into wind on a north easterly heading it gradually turned left ending up on a northerly heading. When the aircraft finally left the water it made a steep, slow speed, climb passing directly over their heads and clearing the bank by a small margin. At one stage the eyewitnesses were concerned that the aircraft might not attain sufficient height to enable it to avoid colliding with the bank. The estimated time of take-off was 1755 hrs.

The last recorded observation of the aircraft in flight was when it was seen passing just to the north of Darwin at about 1804 hrs. Its height was estimated to be about 300 feet and it was flying clear of cloud.

The evidence indicates that during the course of a water landing at Mare Harbour approximately midway between Brenton Loch and Stanley with full flap extended the left wing tip came in contact with the water. This caused the aircraft to yaw to the left, pitch nose up, and roll to the right, bringing the retracted right hand water rudder and right tailplane into contact with the water. The bow of the right hand float then "dug in" causing the aircraft to capsize.

When the aircraft failed to appear at Stanley at the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of 1830 hrs, FIGAS operations started making telephone enquiries to try and establish that it had left Brenton Loch. At about 1900 hrs after it had been established that it had departed from Brenton Loch at 1800 hrs it became apparent that the flight was genuinely overdue. Government was informed and an air and sea search was launched. M.V. Forrest and M.V. Monsunen, two Falkland based vessels conducted the sea search and the sole serviceable aircraft in the Islands, a Cessna 172, was used to make an aerial search along the presumed track followed by the Beaver.

In the event M.V. Forrest sighted the surviving passenger on a small reef in Mare Harbour at about 1800 hrs on 15 October, almost 24 hours after the accident. He was taken aboard M.V. Forrest and found to be suffering from the effects of exposure. He had no clear recollection of the flight from Brenton Loch to Mare Harbour and could offer no explanation for the unplanned landing at Mare Harbour.

The aircraft was located inverted and aground substantially intact with only superficial damage, a short distance to the north east of the reef in an area covered by heavy kelp.

An intensive search was made of the sea and land areas in the vicinity of the reef in an attempt to locate the pilot, without success. His body was eventually recovered on 3 November and he was found to have drowned. The estimated time of the accident was 1815 hrs.

1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	1	-	-
Non-fatal	-	1	-
None	-	-	-

1.3 Damage to aircraft

The aircraft was substantially damaged. Although relatively little damage was caused when the aircraft capsized, more extensive damage resulted from the salvage operation to retrieve the aircraft from the sea and from the effects of prolonged immersion in sea water.

1.4 Other damage

Nil.

1.5 Personnel information

1.5.1	The pilot	Male aged 42 years.
	Licence:	Falkland Islands Commercial Pilots' Licence valid until 30 March 1977.
	Aircraft ratings:	Classes - Landplanes and Seaplanes Types - Auster Variants Beaver DHC-2.
	Instrument rating:	None.
	Instructor rating:	None.
	RTF licence:	Restricted flight radio-telephony operator only.

Total flying experience: 9,818 hours.

Flying experience on type: 9,550 approximately, mostly in command.

Flying hours in last 28 days: 19 hours 30 minutes.

Medical Certificate: Last medical examination on 28 September 1976 valid until 30 March 1977.

The pilot was exceptionally experienced on the Beaver aircraft and had many years of safe operation in the Falkland Islands behind him.

1.5.2 The passenger Male aged 34 years.

Licence: United Kingdom Private Pilot's Licence valid until 25 June 1980.

Aircraft rating: Group 'A' - landplanes.

Certificate A test: Cessna 150 - 22 June 1975.

RTF licence: None.

Total flying experience: 79 hours 40 minutes.

Total in command: 28 hours.

Total on type: 3 hours 5 minutes.

Total in last 28 days: 35 minutes.

Medical certificate: Last medical examination on 25 April 1975 valid until 30 April 1977.

The passenger was a friend of the pilot and there is strong evidence that he had been allowed to fly the Beaver prior to the day of the accident. He had recorded four flights in his pilot's flying log book all as "P1/S", ie commander under supervision. The first two flights were annotated "conv", ie conversion training. The third flight contained in the "remarks" column the entry "i/c Water land/t/o", ie he was acting as pilot in command for a take-off and landing on water. The fourth entry, on the day before the accident, was annotated with the name of the pilot. During these flights the passenger had occupied the left hand pilots seat for both take off and landing with the pilot seated in the right hand pilots seat.

1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 Aircraft history

VP-FAK was a De Havilland Aircraft Company of Canada DHC-2 Beaver floatplane manufactured in 1966 and purchased by FIGAS as a new machine in 1967. It was duly registered in the Falkland Islands on 3 April 1967 and a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) was issued by the

Falkland Islands Civil Aviation Department on 15 April 1967 in the "normal category for the purpose of commercial, state, and private use". The C of A contained no date of expiry, its validity being contingent upon "the aircraft being maintained under continuous inspection".

1.6.2 Aircraft description

The DHC-2 Beaver is an all-metal, high wing monoplane powered by a Pratt and Whitney "Wasp Junior" piston engine which drives a Hamilton constant speed propeller. The cabin is designed to carry a pilot and seven passengers, one of whom occupies the co-pilot's seat. VP-FAK was fitted with a twin-float installation for operations on water only.

The aerodynamic control surfaces are conventionally operated by a single control column and one set of rudder pedals.

The upper portion of the control column, carrying the handwheel, may be "thrown over" to the right hand side for use by a co-pilot. VP-FAK was not equipped with rudder pedals on the co-pilot's side instead of which the right hand foot-well contained the folding anchor and its warp. The ailerons are differentially rigged so as to give a larger upward than downwind displacement and are drooped when the wing flaps are lowered.

The aircraft is fitted with wing flaps which are operated hydraulically by means of a handpump located on the right side of the pilot's seat. The selector lever for the flaps is located adjacent to the hand pump lever and has two marked positions "Up" and "Down". Intermediate positions of the flaps are selected by moving the selector lever to "Up" or "Down" and by then pumping the flaps to the desired position indicator. Normally, "take-off" or "land" flap positions are used for landing. "Full flap" is only required for landing in very restricted areas and was never used by FIGAS pilots.

Two retractable water rudders were attached to the rear of each float connected to the rudder pedals by a simple mechanical linkage. These water rudders are retracted and extended by means of a spring loaded trigger type control adjacent to the pilot's left knee.

1.6.3 Maintenance

Examination of the two "Aircraft Journey Log Books" (equivalent to the more normal Airframe Log Books) showed that VP-FAK had been maintained in accordance with the general requirements of the DHC-2 Inspection Schedule. In addition to preflight and daily inspections this Schedule requires a series of periodic and progressive inspections at intervals of 100 flying hours culminating in an 800 hour inspection. The engine and propeller are required to be removed for overhaul at this point in the inspection cycle, which then starts afresh for a further 800 flying hours. There are, in addition, further requirements concerning the overhaul and replacement of various cockpit instruments which have a specified "life" between overhauls either on elapsed calendar time or flying hours achieved. These additional maintenance requirements have not been wholly complied with.

No spares were held to allow routine replacement of aircraft instruments, the majority of which had exceeded the permitted period between overhauls in one case by $4\frac{1}{2}$ times. There was no record of either VP-FAK or its sister ship VP-FAL, which was damaged beyond economic repair in an accident in August 1976, having had a compass "swing" carried out since manufacture.

At the time of the accident VP-FAK had accumulated a total of some 5,498 flying hours. The last 500 hour inspection was completed on 13 August 1976 at which time an overhauled engine had been installed.

A Certificate of Maintenance (C of M) was issued after this inspection valid for a period of 100 flying hours and some 35 flying hours had been accrued since its issue.

1.6.4 Aircraft loading

The maximum authorised all up weight (AUW) of the DHC-2 Beaver float-plane is 5,090 lbs.

The permitted centre of gravity (C G) range at maximum AUW is from 25.65% Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) to 37.8% MAC.

Below 3,800 lb the C G envelope extends from 17.5% MAC to 37.8% MAC.

Calculations based up examination of an aircraft load sheet recovered from the wreckage showed that the aircraft AUW on the first take-off from Stanley was 5,127 lbs and the C G was 40% MAC. That is to say 37 lbs overweight and 2% MAC outside the authorised C G envelope.

Further calculations indicated that at the time of the accident the aircraft weight was approximately 3,993 lbs and the C G was 28% MAC, well below the maximum permitted landing weight of 5,090 lbs with a mid range C G.

1.7 Meteorological information

The pilot received two weather briefings from the Stanley Meteorological Office before his departure on the morning of 14 October 1976. In the first, at 1145 hrs, he was warned that rain was expected to continue all day associated with low cloud and poor visibility, with a risk of fog especially on the northern coasts. The visibility was expected to remain at 1 to 2 miles provided that the rain continued. The visibility in fog would probably be about 400 yards. The wind was forecast to remain northeast 25 to 30 knots all day.

At 1220 hrs after the receipt of further information from Argentina and Chile he was told that there was a possibility that the wind might drop in West Falkland later in the afternoon with a high probability of fog and low cloud in that area.

East Falkland was still expected to have strong northeast winds and rain with the visibility remaining between 1 and 2 miles. At first the pilot expressed some reservations about the weather but finally said that he would "take a look" and if necessary use his "bad weather route" along the south coast if it should not prove possible to use the northern route.

The following weather observations were recorded at Stanley Meteorological Office, the only professionally manned forecasting station in the Falklands, throughout 14 October:

1200 hrs

Wind:	Northeast 27 knots
Visibility:	10 miles
Weather:	Rain in past hour
Cloud:	8/8 stratus - 500 feet
QNH:	1009 mb falling 1.5 mb in 3 hours

1500 hours

Wind:	Northeast 25 knots
Visibility:	6 miles
Weather:	Slight rain
Cloud:	6/8 stratus - 500 feet 8/8 nimbostratus - 1000 feet
QNH:	1007.4 mb falling 1.6 mb in 3 hours

1800 hours

Wind:	Northeast 30 knots
Visibility:	4 miles
Weather:	Continuous moderate rain
Cloud:	7/8 stratus

It is estimated that the weather at the time of the accident approximated to that recorded at 1800 hours.

1.8 Aids to navigation

The only navigational aid available in the Falklands is a Very High Frequency Omni-directional Radio Range (VOR) beacon provided for use of the weekly airline flight from Argentina. The Beaver was not fitted with a VOR receiver and therefore could not make use of this facility.

1.9 Communications

VP-FAK was not fitted with radio equipment at the time of the accident as it had been removed for maintenance.

The frequency officially allocated for Air/Ground Radio Telephony (RTF) Communications is 5580 kHz in the High Frequency (HF) band. However FIGAS aircraft normally operate on 4500 kHz which is the common frequency used by the outlying farms and settlements. Continuous watch is maintained on this frequency by the Royal Marines, by the Posts and Telecommunications radio station during normal daylight working hours, apart from a 30 minute lunch break, and by FIGAS at Stanley during aircraft operations.

Position reports are normally made by pilots at intervals not exceeding 30 minutes flying time. Usually calls are made on take-off from each settlement and an estimated time of arrival (ETA) is given for the next port of call.

1.10 Aerodrome and ground facilities

FIGAS operations around the Falklands are operated entirely by float-plane. Certain areas of water have been designated for use as aerodromes. Neither Brenton Loch nor Mare Harbour were so listed. However, an adequate stretch of clear water is available at both locations for the operation of a Beaver floatplane.

1.11 Flight recorders

Neither fitted nor required to be so.

1.12 Wreckage

1.12.1 External examination

When the aircraft was examined at Stanley after salvage it was found to be substantially intact with only the left hand pilot's door missing.

Marked flattening of the left wing tip lower and upper surfaces, characteristic of water impact, were observed. The right elevator aerodynamic horn balance also exhibited signs of water impact. The structure had been distorted with flattening of the lower skin associated with "pulled" rivets on the top skin at the spanwise rib attachment.

Examination of the floats showed that, apart from some holes deliberately made in inspection panels during salvage, they were in a reasonable condition. There was some localised damage to the forward ends of the chine outboard flanges of both floats, apparently as a result of contact with the reef. Both inboard vertical anti-spray flanges had been distorted. The forward main float cross braces had slackened.

The outboard operating cable attachment to the right hand water rudder bell-crank had suffered an overstressing failure. The inboard cable attachment was undamaged. The trailing edge of the right hand water rudder had been deflected inboard by about $\frac{1}{4}$ inch. The left hand water rudder was undamaged with both operating cables remaining attached and no rudder blade distortion. Both water rudders were retracted.

Damage associated with the salvage of the aircraft was readily apparent. Distortion of the fin forward fairing and the ventral fin was consistent with a hawser being attached around the rear fuselage associated with a rearward pull. There was evidence that the aircraft had been dragged backwards whilst resting inverted on the sea bed. The upper surfaces of both wings were heavily scored, the marks running from right to left at about 45° to the longitudinal axis. Damage was also apparent to the right hand wingtip fuel tank vent and filler cap, the outside air temperatures probe and the pitot probe mounted on the left wing leading edge.

Inspection of the hinge mounting areas for the missing left hand pilot's door showed that the upper hinge bracket had been torn from the fuselage skin due to forward displacement. The hinge pin on the still intact lower hinge assembly had been deflected forward and outboard. The three remaining doors were attached to the fuselage and undamaged. All cabin windows and the windscreen were unbroken. All doors were of the permanently attached, non-jettison type. There was no evidence of bird strikes. Both wing flaps were fully extended (60°) with the associated aileron droop.

1.12.2 Cockpit and cabin

Inspection of the cockpit revealed the control and indicator settings listed below:

Control wheel	Locked on left side
Flap selector lever	"Down"
Flap indicator	Between "land" and "full flap"
Water rudder selector	Up (ie rudders retracted)
Fuel selector	Centre tank
Magneto switch	Off (at "Both" when salvaged)
Battery master switch	On
Throttle	Fully forward (open)
Propeller control	Fully forward (full fine)
Mixture control	Fully forward (Auto lean) (lever induced witness mark in slot adjacent to "Rich" position)
Carburettor heat control	Mid position
Fire extinguisher switch	Wire locked
Emergency fuel/oil shut off	Open (normal)
Flight instrument switch	On

Engine instrument switch	On
Generator switch	On and gated
Artificial horizon switch	On
Clock	3:17

Examination of the lap-straps on the two pilot's seats showed that with the straps adjusted so that the buckle was centred the occupant of the left hand seat would have to have a girth of 40" whereas in the right hand seat a girth of 48" would be necessary.

The left hand pilot's seat was adjustable, fore and aft, over a range of 3 inches. It was found to be located $1\frac{3}{8}$ inches aft of the forward stop. There was no significant distortion of the seat pan but there was a marked forward displacement of the top right hand side of the backrest. This had caused distortion of the seat pan web plate together with a significant "kink" half way up the left edge of the backrest consistent with a heavy load having been applied to the top left hand corner of the backrest. No distortion was observed on the co-pilot's seat, which was of a different type.

The three-place bench passenger seat located behind the pilot's seats appeared to be free of distortion. Two small holes on either side of the seat cushions that had been punched through the fabric co-incided with two bolt heads on the seat back rest when it was folded down and the seat cushion placed on top. It was also noted that the seat fabric was extensively split over one of the backrest frame supports on the left hand side consistent with a heavy downward pressure on the seat back when folded forward.

The collapsible anchor was secured in its stowage and was causing no obstruction or interference with any controls.

1.12.3 Fuel and oil system

All three fuel tanks were drained and found to contain small quantities of sea water contaminated petrol. The main fuel filter was found to be clean and some 200 cc of fuel was drained from the carburettor. Fresh fuel was placed in each tank and the system pressurised to a pressure of 10 psi using the priming pump without producing any visible leaks. Fuel flow to the engine was checked on each tank selector position and found to be satisfactory.

The throttle and mixture controls and linkages to the carburettor were inspected and found to be intact and easily moved. The carburettor was strip-examined and found to be in good condition with no sign of jet blockage or dirt in the inlet filter or reservoir. The acceleration pump operated satisfactorily and the air intake together with the associated duct and mesh filter were free of obstruction. The engine driven fuel pump was strip-examined and found to be satisfactory.

The engine oil filter was clean and some 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ gallons of oil still remained in the 5 gallon capacity tank in spite of spillage and sea water contamination.

1.12.4 Electrics

The magneto switch and associated wiring to each magneto was checked electrically and found to be without defects. Apart from sea-water corrosion, the condition of the contact breakers was found to be satisfactory. Both magnetos rotated freely and their drives were found to be intact. Both ignition harnesses and all spark plugs were found to be in a satisfactory condition.

1.12.5 Flying controls

Examination of the flying control system showed that the elevator, ailerons and rudder could be moved over their full range without restrictions. The elevator trim indicated slightly nose down with a small amount of right rudder trim applied.

The hydraulic flap actuating system was function tested and found to function normally. The flaps extended symmetrically through their full range and applied the appropriate droop angle to the ailerons. Differential aileron operation was completely normal with the droop applied.

1.12.6 The Engine and Propeller

The engine turned over quite easily shortly after recovery of the aircraft. However when a strip-examination was started it was found to be immovable. Further examination showed that severe sea water induced corrosion of the supercharger impeller was preventing the engine from rotating. All the accessory drives were found to be intact. The nine cylinder barrels were removed and the valve gear, cylinders, pistons, gudgeon pins, connecting rods, crank shaft and associated counterweights were found to be undamaged.

The propeller and propeller governor were found to be undamaged and in a satisfactory condition.

1.12.7 Safety equipment

One RFD type 50c Mark 2A life jacket was found attached to the co-pilot's seat. The date of manufacture was November 1961. The life jacket inflated satisfactorily when the CO₂ bottle was discharged.

An RFD type 6U Mark 1A six person inflatable life raft was found jammed in the baggage stowage at the rear of the cabin. The date of manufacture was January 1962. The life raft inflated satisfactorily when the activating line was pulled. The aircraft contained no survival pack.

1.13 Medical and pathological information

1.13.1 Fitness of the pilot

The pilot was a small, wiry man of 42 and of a fit appearance. However his family had a history of heart disease. Some two years ago during a routine medical examination for the renewal of his Commercial Pilots's

Licence a rise in his blood pressure had been noticed but remained within the normally accepted limits for his age group at that time. More recently, in September 1976, during another routine medical examination, a large and sudden rise in blood pressure (170/100) was observed associated with changes in his Electrocardiogram (ECG) which became more apparent after exercise. Examination of the pilot's ECG records covering a period of years was made by a consultant cardiologist in the UK. He expressed the opinion that the ECG's were suggestive of coronary artery disease. A blood sample taken at the time was later shown to have a raised cholesterol level. The pilot was then grounded and started on a regime of Bendrofluizide (a diuretic) and Propanalol (a beta blocker drug), the latter treatment consisting of 40 mg twice daily.

Arrangements were made for the pilot to be examined at the Argentinian National Institute of Aviation Medicine in Buenos Aires. When he attended for his examination the pilot took with him a letter to the Argentine authorities detailing the medication he was receiving. On the day before being medically examined in Buenos Aires the pilot presented the letter to the Institute but, due to a slip in communications, the doctors who were involved in the medical examination were unaware that he was required to undergo anything more than a routine medical examination for the renewal of his pilots licence. If they had been aware that he was under treatment with hypotensive drugs the doctors categorically stated that they would not have declared the pilot fit to fly as, under Argentinian rules, he would automatically have been grounded if he had been taking Propanalol.

If the pilot had been a UK licence holder he would have been classified as a "high risk" and would have been grounded for further investigation by a specialist in cardiology; these investigations would probably have included exercise ECGs and possibly a coronary angiogram. In the interests of his future health most probably he would have been prescribed Propanalol and, if his blood pressure could be controlled by such a small dose, 80 mg per day would seem appropriate. If the elevated blood pressure had been the sole sign of coronary artery disease, and if 80 mg per day of Propanalol had controlled his raised blood pressure he might have been allowed to fly as co-pilot or captain with a check captain in the other seat; he would not have been cleared for single pilot operations. However it is doubtful that, with his family history, ECG changes and high blood cholesterol levels in addition to raised blood pressure, he would have been allowed to fly in any capacity unless all signs had reverted to normal for 12 months after treatment.

When the Argentinian Institute of Aviation Medicine declared the pilot fit and when the supporting medical form reached Stanley, the lay reader was not to know that, since the examiners were unaware that the pilot had been taking Propanalol the assessment of fitness to fly was invalid. The medical report form from the Argentine Institute of Aviation Medicine was passed to the competent medical authority in the Falklands with a request for comments on its contents. There is no record that he had disagreed with the fitness verdict on the pilot.

1.13.2 Incapacitation

Although the pilot could be considered a "high risk" when considering coronary artery disease, this only means that he was more likely to suffer at some indeterminate future date from an acute cardiac condition than a person without the signs he exhibited. Because of the stringent requirements of flight safety it is normal to ground a pilot in this category, but this does not necessarily mean that this pilot was in imminent danger of a heart attack, particularly as he was on Propanalol.

People who knew the pilot and who saw him on the day of the accident did not consider him to be behaving in anything other than in his normal manner. The surviving passenger, a qualified medical practitioner, was quite firm in his opinion, expressed after the accident, that the pilot at no time exhibited any symptoms of cardiac distress. There is no evidence to indicate that the pilot became incapacitated before the accident.

1.13.3 Injuries

The pilot was found to have sustained severe bruising and abrasions high up on the centre and left side of his chest and neck, a large bruise on the ulna side of right forearm and various injuries to his lower abdomen and lower limbs consistent with him not being strapped in a seat at the time of impact with the water. Death was caused by drowning.

The passenger was found to be practically uninjured, apart from a distinct and deep bruise approximately $3\frac{1}{2}$ " x $2\frac{1}{2}$ " centres over the mid-abdominal line between his umbilicus and pubis. This bruise was entirely consistent with having been caused by the seat buckle on the pilot's seat.

1.14 Fire

There was no fire.

1.15 Survival aspects

The accident was survivable and, if both occupants had been secured by their lap straps, the deceleration forces would not have been sufficiently high so as to cause significant injuries. However, the evidence indicates that the pilot was not secured to his seat.

FIGAS have no written instructions regarding the carriage of survival equipment, but the Beaver aircraft normally were equipped with a six man inflatable life raft, a survival pack and eight life jackets. At the time of the accident only one life jacket and the life raft were onboard the aircraft. The life raft was stowed in the baggage compartment with no method of access from outside the cabin; in addition there was no method of restraining the pack in the event of large longitudinal deceleration forces being experienced. Both in the subject accident and in a previous accident to the other Beaver VP-FAL some two months previously when the aircraft was inverted in the water it was not possible to extricate and inflate the life raft or life jackets.

The absence of jettisonable cabin doors made egress extremely difficult and it was fortuitous that in the first accident the sole occupant was the pilot and in the second accident only two people both of whom were pilots were on board.

No facilities exist in the Falkland Islands for the overhaul and repacking of safety equipment. In the past this task has been tackled in an informal way by using the services of a Royal Navy safety equipment rating from a visiting ship more or less on a casual basis.

The water temperature around the Falklands seldom rises much above about 4°C. At this temperature the chances of anyone surviving more than one hour's immersion are remote. The survivor was fortunate in that, as a doctor, he was aware of the dangers of hypothermia and that he recovered a large plastic bag from the aircraft, which he first used as a form of flotation gear and then, when lying on the reef, he places his feet in the bag to conserve body heat. He also built a small wall around himself as a shield against the wind and use quantities of kelp to cover the remainder of his body. Even with these precautions it is remarkable that he managed to survive for 24 hours before being rescued.

The pilot emerged from the aircraft after the passenger and was last seen clinging to one of the floats. His injuries, although not incapacitating would undoubtedly have been extremely painful and, taken together with his waterlogged, clothing, would have made swimming extremely difficult. In the post accident search divers equipped with wet suits took 50 minutes to swim through the kelp beds from the aircraft to an adjacent island.

1.16 Tests and research

None.

1.17 The FIGAS operation

1.17.1 Introduction

Before the two recent accidents FIGAS operated two Beaver floatplanes based at Stanley, and it is the intention that two replacement aircraft will be introduced into service. A virtually on demand taxi type service is provided, serving more than forty isolated settlements and sheep farming stations throughout the group of islands. Roads are practically non-existent, there is no regular inter-island service by sea and the only practicable means of communication is by air. The furthest settlement from the base at Stanley is New Island in the west of the group, a distance of 131 nm. Direct flights over such a distance rarely occur as daily flight planning is normally arranged to cover as many en-route stops as possible.

For some twenty years the vast majority of the flying has been carried out by two pilots, one of whom has also had administrative responsibilities. With two aircraft this situation has, in the past, frequently led to a very heavy work load for individual pilots.

1.17.2 Operations manual

FIGAS does not have an Operations Manual, as required by Article 21 of the Colonial Air Navigation Order. Instead they have issued a list of Pilots Orders containing some of the material which would be included in an Operations Manual. In January 1975, as a result of recommendations made in a UK CAA report made on the operating procedures of FIGAS, a start was made to amplify the information contained in the Pilots Orders with a view to the production of an Operations Manual. However, the scope and content of this document fell far short of that required in an Operations Manual. The Tenth Schedule to the Order, which stems from Article 21, specified in Part A the matters which should be included in the Manual. The CAA document CAP 360 "Air Operations Certificates" provides guidance material on the manner in which both specific and general requirements relating to the operation of aircraft should be met.

1.17.3 Load sheets and technical logs

Article 23 of the Order requires the operator to provide written instructions as to the manner in which the load on board an aircraft is distributed and secured.

The Article further requires that a load sheet is prepared in duplicate and is signed by both the person supervising the loading and the commander of the aircraft. In the case of FIGAS the commander himself supervises the loading, so that only one signature is required. One copy of the load sheet should be carried in the aircraft and the other left on the ground on the occasion of each flight.

The FIGAS aircraft load sheet is prepared in duplicate in so far as Flight number, Aircraft Registration and days routeing is concerned, together with, on the back, a list of passengers booked and their destinations. Only this skeleton copy is left on the ground. The columns for recording fuel and oil quantities and weights; passenger numbers and weights; luggage height and weights and AUW at take-off were left for the pilot to fill in and were not available on the ground until the end of the day's flying. Fortunately the pilot's copy of the load sheet was recovered for the accident flight. It was noted that the various figures had been faithfully recorded for each leg of the flight. No entries had been made for take-off weight, maximum AUW or Basic Weight. No space was provided for recording C G. In the event of the pilot's copy of the load sheet being lost in an accident, no record of the actual weights carried would be available on the ground.

Although a record of defects and the corresponding certificates of maintenance and compliance after rectification of defects are kept in the FIGAS hangar at Stanley, no technical log is carried in the aircraft or left on the ground at en-route stops.

1.17.4 Carriage of Documents

Article 51(2) of the Order provides that an aircraft registered in the Colony shall, when in flight, carry documents in accordance with the Eleventh Schedule to the Order as amended. This Schedule

requires seven documents to be carried by aircraft for the purpose of public transport within the Colony. Of these documents only three, the load sheet, the technical log and the operations manual, are considered to be necessary for flight safety purposes in the particular conditions in which FIGAS operates.

1.17.4 Safety launch

No safety launch is provided to cover operations in Stanley Harbour. However, boats are usually available when aircraft use approved landing areas around the islands.

2. Analysis

2.1 The Accident

The aircraft was making a flight from Brenton Loch (not an approved aerodrome) to Stanley. Whilst making an unscheduled landing at Mare Harbour (also not an approved aerodrome) the aircraft's left wing tip contacted the water and it capsized. There was no evidence of any pre-accident failure of the aircraft, its engine or equipment. The fact that neither Brenton Loch nor Mare Harbour were approved aerodromes is not considered to have been related to the accident as both areas of water were suitable for use by Beaver floatplanes. The weather, although not good, was not particularly severe by Falklands standards and Mare Harbour would have provided good shelter from the prevailing northeast wind with comparatively smooth water available in the lee of the land.

There is no evidence to suggest, despite his recent medical history, that the pilot suffered any incapacitation which caused him to make a precautionary landing en route to Stanley. The surviving passenger, a qualified medical practitioner, although unclear concerning certain portions of the flight, was adamant that the pilot had exhibited no signs of cardiac distress either before or after the accident.

The standard of flying skill demonstrated during the take-off from Brenton Loch was below that to be expected from a pilot with over 9,000 hours experience of the Beaver floatplane. In addition, the use of full flap in high wind conditions was significant on two counts; firstly one of basic airmanship and secondly as this flap setting was never used by FIGAS pilots. The maximum setting used in their operations was "Land" and, under the prevailing weather conditions, it is considered that an experienced pilot would probably have used the "Take-off" setting.

With a wind speed of 25 to 30 knots at Mare Harbour the ground speed at initial wing tip water contact could have been as low as 25 knots or even lower if the aircraft had stalled after a touchdown on its floats and becoming airborne again. It is considered that mishandling of this magnitude would be most unlikely by a pilot with considerable experience on the Beaver, particularly as the slow speed handling characteristics of the aircraft are excellent.

The pilot and the passenger were friends and it was established that on at least four previous occasions the pilot had permitted the passenger to handle the controls, including during take-off and landing.

The Beaver aircraft in question, VP-FAK, was not equipped with dual controls and the only feasible way in which dual instruction could be given, with the instructing pilot retaining any significant ability to control the aircraft would be for the pupil to be seated in the pilot's (left hand front) seat and the instructor to position himself behind the pupil, sitting on the edge of the middle passenger seat with the seat back folded forward and with the seat cushion placed on top to increase the height and provide a firm base. The pupil could be secured in his seat by the lap strap, but the instructor could not use the lap straps provided as they would be underneath the folded seat back and in any case even if available would not have enabled him to have access to the control wheel.

Seated in such a fashion it is quite convenient for the instructor to brace himself with his left hand by holding onto the back of the pupil's seat with his left hand and by leaning forward provide aileron and elevator control inputs via the control wheel if necessary. However he would not be able to exercise any control over the rudder pedals. In the event of a sharp wing drop being experienced, at low speed, during a landing manoeuvre rapid and large rudder pedal deflections would be necessary in order to "pick up" the downgoing wing and restore the aircraft to a laterally level attitude if wingtip contact with the water was to be avoided.

It if is assumed that this was the state of affairs obtaining during the landing at Mare Harbour, it would have been natural for the instructor to lean forward in order to open the throttle so as to increase engine power. Taking into account the deduced aircraft motions during the capsize, the instructor, not being secured by a seat belt, would be thrown forward and to his right in which case his right forearm would come into sharp contact with the throttle and propeller controls, which would have been fully forward by this time anyway, and the mixture control which should have been at the "Rich" setting moving the latter lever to the "Auto Lean" position where it was found after the accident. An indentation in the mixture control quadrant adjacent to the "Rich" reference point supports this hypothesis.

Examination of the survivor showed that his only significant traumatic injury had been caused by a seat belt buckle and, because of its design, only the pilot's lap strap buckle could have caused the particular bruise on his abdomen. The injuries sustained by the pilot were entirely commensurate with his having been seated on the passenger seat. His left forearm was bruised where it came in contact with the pupil's seat back, his chest was heavily bruised from contact with the right top corner of the seat back, which had also been distorted. His right forearm bore a large bruise where it would have contacted the throttle, propeller and mixture control levers. His lower limbs also exhibited injuries entirely commensurate with his not being restrained by a seat belt when the aircraft experienced a sudden deceleration. As the aircraft rolled he received head injuries consistent with contact with fittings in the cabin.

The pilot was known invariably to fly the Beaver with his seat adjusted fully forward. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the pilots seat was locked approximately half way back along its travel, a position more appropriate for a heavily built man of moderate height than the pilot who was a short wiry man.

Reviewing the evidence, the conclusion must be reached that the passenger was flying the aircraft during the attempted landing at Mare Harbour and that he lost control of the aircraft, at low speed, during the landing manoeuvre and that the pilot without access to the rudder pedals was unable to regain control before the left wing tip struck the water.

It is considered that the pilot was most imprudent in attempting to carry out dual instruction on an aircraft not equipped with dual controls particularly in view of the weather conditions obtaining at the time of the accident.

2.2 FIGAS operations

2.2.1 General

The excellent safety record of FIGAS since its inception must be associated with the dedicated service of the two pilots who have operated the Air Service for the majority of the last 20 years. Air communications are vital to the Falklands. However in a small community, where pilots are an integrated part of that community, sociological pressures applied to them can be as, if not more, demanding than the normal pressures present in any air transport undertaking. In this context there is ample evidence that over the years the pilots have been asked, and finally expected, to fly in conditions which their better judgement might have suggested were unsuitable.

2.2.2 Operations Manual

Apart from the purely legal requirement for FIGAS to have an Operations Manual, it is a most necessary document from a flight safety point of view. It provides a set of standards against which the operation can be judged. Without it, standards can slip, effectively reducing the level of safety. This state of affairs had been reached in FIGAS at the time of the accident.

2.2.3 Load sheet and technical logs

The form of load sheet currently used by the Air Service does not result in a true take-off weight or C G being established, nor is a copy of the load sheet left on the ground before each take-off. The weight of the dinghy pack is not taken into account, nor is the effect of its carriage on the C G. A good example of the shortcomings of the load sheet was the situation which existed on the first take-off from Stanley on the morning of the accident. On this occasion both the weight and the C G were outside the permitted limits without this state of affairs being apparent to the pilot. Suggestions made in the 1974 CAA report on FIGAS, pages 10 and 11, are most pertinent and should be actively considered.

2.2.4 Communications

With the lack of search and rescue facilities available in the Colony radio communications are most necessary to ensure a rapid response to an emergency. Except for the "get you home" case with an en-route failure, all flights should be required to carry a serviceable HF radio and this should be used to indicate departures and arrivals away from base. In addition ETAs at the next point of call should be given to base and if any sector is longer than 15 minutes flying time a progress check should be made at intervals no greater than 15 minutes.

2.2.5 Maintenance

The present system of maintenance documentation is unsatisfactory. When the long serving contract aircraft maintenance engineers were replaced by RAF personnel on short term secondment, a system should have been devised so that the in service life of the various components was easily obtainable. With a one or two year tour it is quite unrealistic to expect RAF personnel to simultaneously introduce a new system and at the same time try and work a defective existing system. The history of the aircraft flying instruments was quite unacceptable for a public transport undertaking. For example, one instrument was 4,500 flying hours overdue for overhaul. An adequate stock of serviceable spare components should be maintained and their shelf life remaining should be readily apparent.

The maintenance of radio equipment is unsatisfactory. If an appropriately qualified radio engineer and suitable test equipment and maintenance equipment cannot be made available, then an adequate supply of spare radio equipment should be available so that unserviceable radio sets can be replaced immediately and the defective equipment sent away for rectification.

The absence of any record of a compass swing having been carried out since manufacture on a nine year old aircraft used for public transport must be unique in the history of British air transport and is quite unacceptable. Swings should be carried out at least annually and after any major maintenance inspection.

2.2.6 Safety equipment

With the type of flying carried out in the Falklands each crew member and passenger should obviously be provided with a life jacket. As the accident demonstrated, a stowed jacket is of little use if there is no warning of an impending emergency and the aircraft occupants do not have time to don the jackets. Certainly at the comparatively low heights at which aircraft in the Colony are forced to fly the pilot, in particular, would be unable to put on a life jacket in flight. When the risks inherent in transferring infirm and possibly old - or very young - passengers between tender and aircraft are also considered, the adoption of some form of constant wear life jacket should be seriously considered.

The carriage of a life raft was presumably originally decreed because of the low sea temperature obtaining around the Falklands throughout the year. However, both the accident to VP-FAL and to VP-FAK have shown that the use of the existing stowage for the life raft is quite unrealistic. In neither accident was it possible to deploy the life raft with the aircraft inverted, if on the other hand the aircraft is not inverted then the life raft is not required immediately. In the case where a fully loaded aircraft capsizes, the existing combination of an unsatisfactory dinghy stowage and non-jettisonable cabin doors would, it is considered, prove to be lethal. Ideally, some form of dinghy stowage is required where the dinghy can be deployed from outside the aircraft whilst it is inverted. A further potential hazard inherent in the existing installation is the lack of an effective restraint to prevent the dinghy being ejected into the cabin in the event of a high longitudinal deceleration being encountered.

2.1.7 Safety launch

By far the most used alighting area in the Colony is Stanley harbour and at present it is one of the few aerodromes without some form of tender which can act as a safety launch. This is an anomalous situation and should be reviewed critically.

2.1.8 Pilots

FIGAS, in the near future, will need to acquire more pilots. In view of the workload imposed by a two aircraft, two pilot situation in the past, particularly when one of the two pilots bears an administrative load in addition to his flying tasks, it is considered that at least three experienced pilots are needed to operate two Beaver aircraft efficiently.

With the operating environment found in the Falklands the training of even experienced new pilots should not be thought to be a simple task. Experienced floatplane pilots are generally in short supply and it is considered that a dual control facility is necessary for the safe training of new pilots. If newly trained pilots are acquired a considerable period of time would need to elapse before they could be considered adequately experienced to fly passengers unsupervised.

3. Conclusions

(a) Findings

- (i) The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Registration and Airworthiness.
- (ii) The aircraft had not been maintained in accordance with Part 5 of the DHC-2 Inspection Schedule insofar as aircraft instruments were concerned.
- (iii) The pilot was properly licenced and sufficiently experienced to carry out the flight.

- (iv) The Falklands Islands Government allowed the pilot to fly on the authority of a medical certificate issued by the Argentine authorities.
 - (v) However the medical condition of the pilot was such that he should not have been piloting an aircraft. There is no evidence that he suffered any incapacitation.
 - (vi) There was no pre-crash failure or malfunction of the aircraft, its engine or flying controls.
 - (vii) The passenger was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident seated in the pilot's seat with only one set of flying controls available.
 - (viii) The left wing tip struck the water during a landing manoeuvre causing the aircraft to capsize and sink.
- (b) Cause

The accident was caused when the passenger, who was flying the aircraft, lost control during a landing manoeuvre which caused the aircraft to stall, capsize and sink.

4. Safety Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- 4.1 A complement of at least three experienced pilots is provided for a two Beaver operation.
- 4.2 The recommendations of the 1974 CAA Report on FIGAS be implemented, particularly in respect of the provision of an Operations Manual, Load Sheets, Technical Logs and the carriage of documents in aircraft.
- 4.3 Active consideration should be given to the provision of cabin door jettison facilities for use in emergency.
- 4.4 Constant wear life jackets should be provided for the use of passengers and crew.
- 4.5 The present life raft, stowage, restraint and deployment facilities should be urgently reviewed.
- 4.6 The servicing of safety equipment be put on a more regular footing.
- 4.7 Conversion training on the Beaver should only be carried out in an aircraft fitted with full dual control.
- 4.8 A regular inspection of FIGAS should be carried out by an outside agency, such as the UK CAA, covering both operational and airworthiness aspects at intervals not exceeding three years.

- 4.9 The administration of the FIGAS maintenance organisation should be reviewed, in particular the control of spares.
- 4.10 Serviceable HF radio equipment should be required to be carried on all FIGAS flights originating from Stanley.
- 4.11 An adequate reserve of spare radio equipment should be available for rapid replacement of defective installations.
- 4.12 Aircraft compasses should be swung at least annually.



G C Wilkinson
Inspector of Accidents

CONFIDENTIAL



3
Ian Bridges,
Air Service,
Stanley,

19th May 1977

Dear Sir,

On reading the accident report of Beaver VP-FAK released today reference is made in the text para 1.6.3. 2.2.6 and Conclusions a (ii) to Maintenance.

I wish to bring to your attention the enclosed letter and survey I carried out during April and May of 1976.

The object of this survey was to highlight and bring to the attention of the Superintendent of Civil Aviation the non-compliance with section 5 of the inspection schedule, since VP-FAK and VP-FAL entered service. It contained detailed proposals to rectify the situation.

The report was submitted to S.C.A. by hand, a reply was not received.

I made the contents of this survey available to Mr. Wilkinson and he has duly commented on the situation in his report.

Action required
The proposals contained in my letter of 26th May 1976 remain relevant.

I have since instigated a system to rotate lifed components, this must now be supported by the purchase of additional instruments so that rotation can be effected in accordance with Part 5 of the DH02 Inspection schedule. In conjunction with the system now in operation it will ensure F.I.G.A.S. can not revert once again to an unacceptable rotation of the in service life of components.

Yours faithfully,

I. Bridges
(IAN BRIDGES)
F.I.G.A.S.

The Chief Secretary,
STANLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

3A

Ian Bridges,
Air Service,
Stanley.
26th May, 1976

To: Superintendent Civil Aviation.

Jim,

During a recent non-scheduled replacement of the Altimeter in VP-PAK due to unserviceability, I noticed that the instruments last Bay check/Overhaul date stamp read June 1965. A detailed check of the flying and engine monitoring instruments on both VP-PAK and FAL has shown that with one exception, all the instruments are long overdue a manufacturer's overhaul.

I make reference to the DHC2 Beaver Inspection Schedule Part 5. This schedule details component overhaul intervals in flying hours and calendar months. You will see from the attached survey that in some instances we have exceeded the stipulated period by as much as five times.

We are now faced with a potentially dangerous situation; it is imperative that corrective action be taken immediately. I, for obvious reasons, cannot allow you to place your trust in instruments that may fail you.

I propose that:

- (a) Place an A.O.C. PRIORITY ONE demand for two complete sets of aircraft instruments as per attached list.
- (b) On receipt, we instal them in AK and AL, the removed items to be sent for overhaul and once certified use them as a stock holding of out of phase items.
- (c) That we incorporate in the aircraft flying log an Out of Phase section listing all lifed items, and to show serial numbers, date and airframe hours on fitment, date due replacement and part 5 life.

NOTE: Once overhauled most components have a shelf life of three years. If fitted before this expiry date, the in-use service life will be as in Section 5.

- (d) Authority be granted to continue flying until receipt of replacement items - this to be ⁱⁿwritten and a copy to be placed in Journey Log Book of both aircraft.
- (e) Compass swing to be carried out annually and included in Out of Phase log.

Ian Bridges

A/C INSTRUMENT SURVEY I.A.W. DHC2 BEAVER INSPECTION SCHEDULES

3B

ITEM	VP - FAK	VP - FALK	STOCK	SECT. 5 OVERHAUL LIFE
	LAST KNOWN TEST DATE	LAST KNOWN TEST DATE	QTY	OVERHAUL DATE
Indicator Turn & Bank	Nov. '66		1	Dec. '69 1200hrs 36mths
" Art Horizon	Jan. '66		1	June '75 1000hrs 24mths
" Altimeter	Sept '70*		2	May '57 2000hrs 1 June 75
" Airspeed	Nov. '66		3	2 Dec. 69 2000hrs
" Rate of Climb	Nov. '66		1	Jan. '61 2000hrs
" Directional Gyro	May '66		1	June '75 1000hrs 24mths Jan. '69
Trans Fuel Contents	NOT KNOWN		2	Jan. '73 2000hrs 36mths
Gauge Vacume	NOT KNOWN		2	June '57 2000hrs
" Cyl. Head Temp.	May '66		1	Nov. '60 1200hrs
" Eng. Multiple	NOT KNOWN		Nil	- 2000hrs
" Manifold Pressure	NOT KNOWN		1	June '75 2000hrs
Indicator Tachometer	May '65		1	Dec. '67 2000hrs 36mths
Gauge Carb. Temp.	May '66		1	April 63 2000hrs 1 June 63
Volt Ammeter	NOT KNOWN		3	2 Oct. 61 1200hrs
Magnetic Compass			Nil	- 36 months
Indicator Fuel Contents	May '66			
Regulator Voltage	NOT KNOWN		1	NOT KNOWN 800hrs
Cut Out Reverse Current	NOT KNOWN		1	NOT KNOWN 1000hrs
SOLENOID STARTER	NOT KNOWN		Nil	- 1000hrs 1 Setp 69 5 yrs from Manu.
Cartridge Unit	NOT KNOWN	NOT KNOWN	3	2 Sept 72 2 yrs after fitment
Starter	OVERHAUL BY HANTS & SUSSEX EVERY ENGINE OVERHAUL			
Generator				
Tachometer Gen.				
Flap Jack				
Ratchet Valve				
				1400hrs

3C

INSTRUMENTS TO BE DEMANDED PRIORITY ONE

<u>Part No.</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
1718-1A-A1	Indicator Turn & Bark	2
AN5736L2A	Indicator Artificial Horizon	1
544KN05	Indicator Altimeter	2
AW2-3/4-16BCF12	Indicator Airspeed	1
G993-01-1B	Indicator Rate of Climb	2
AN57352A	Indicator Directional Gyro	1
56949-29B	Transmitter Assy Fuel Contents	4
AW1 7/8 21W	Gauge Vacume	2
841-7Y1	Gauge cylinder head temp.	2
AW2 3/4 - 19AJ	Gauge Engine Multiple	2
AW2 3/4 - 25L	Gauge Manifold Pressure	1
8DJ - 13 - AAS	Indicator Tachometer	2
AW1 7/8 - 20U	Gauge Carburetor Temp.	2
8DW 53BC 210	Volt Ammeter	2
AN 5766 T4	Magnetic Compass	2
8DJ 54 OAH	Indicator Fuel Contents	2
1589 - 1C	Regulator Voltage	2
665 - 2	Cut Out Reverse Current	2
5C 897	Solenoid Starter Type II	2

19 May 1977

Chief Technician I Bridges
F I G A S
Stanley

(silent copy HE)

Thank you for your letter commenting on Mr Wilkinson's report. I have taken note of the contents and I am grateful to you for your invaluable help.

2. I shall deal with your letter in the most effective and appropriate way.

C. 1.
Thank you. We now
have time to safeguard
the future in the
command - aircraft are
fairly new. *John. 24*
1-5



A J P Monk
Chief Secretary

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Beaver Alpha-Kilo left Brenton Loch this afternoon and is now overdue in Stanley. Unfortunately the radio is out of action.

A comprehensive and intensive search is now under way. The Broadcasting station will remain open until further notice. Nomad will be on 2 megs all night. 'Lively' is requested to come in on 2 megs.

Secretariat,
14 October 1976.

m

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo.

The Broadcast service will remain open until further notice. Nomad will remain open throughout the night on 2 megs until the search is successful.

Will any person having anything further to report about the 'plane after it left Brenton Loch please 'phone or send this through by any means to the Chief Secretary.

The last reported news of the 'plane was by a child who is said to have heard and seen the aircraft at Bluff Cove at 15:30 hours (Stanley time). The child said the 'plane was heard about Shed Point and suggests that it might have been heading for Rolon Cove.

Announcements for the search teams will be made every hour on the air by the broadcasting system.

Secretariat,

14 October 1976.

(19:30 hours)

MEMORANDUM

From :-

● Officer Commanding
Royal Marines
NAVAL PARTY 8901

To :-

Chief Sec

4

Date

Arthur,

Draft announcement for Bill Linton.

Please check and amend as necessary.

Ahs

Most grateful for your offer of assistance to fly. Request you standby from first light tomorrow for briefing from Moody Brook which is coordinating the rescue operation. No decision on flying will be made until first ~~stage~~ light and will depend on the information received during the night and on the met report.

The decision to fly rests with Mr Luxton, after clearance by the Chief Secretary, and he should abort at any time if he is not happy about the flying conditions.

5

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo.

As already announced the broadcast service will remain open until further notice. Nomad will remain open throughout the night until the search is successful.

Will any person having anything further to report about the 'plane after it left Brenton Lock please 'phone or send this through by any means to the Chief Secretary.

The last reported news of the 'plane was by a child who is said to have heard and seen the aircraft at Bluff Cove at 15:30 hours (Stanley time). The child said the 'plane was heard about Shed Point and suggests that it might have been heading for Nelson Cove.

Insert * below

The 'Forrest left North Arm some time ago and will be off Lively Island at first light tomorrow.

Mr Bill Luxton has offered to fly Alpha-Sierra tomorrow in the area of search. A further announcement will be made about this during the night.

Announcements for the search team will be made each hour on the hour over the broadcasting system until further notice.

* Lively reports hearing ~~xxx~~ the noise of a 'plane North of Lively at 15:30.

The Secretariat,

14 October 1976.

(Approx. 8pm)

6

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 9 p.m. Stanley time.

There are no specific alterations in the search party arrangements.

The Marine search party, which includes two Government drivers and a Government doctor, is now well on its way towards Bluff Cove. It has reported sighting a light in the direction of Rolon Cove which it expects to reach at about 21:00 hours Stanley time.

Two further search parties are standing by to go to Eliza Cove and explore left and right towards Mullet Creek.

Mr Willie Bowles accompanied by his daughter reports the possible sighting of an intermittent light on high ground on Port Harriet Point, between the Point and Port Harriet house. At the time Mr Bowles and his daughter were at Goose Green (Eliza Cove) - about ~~20:00 hrs~~ ^{20:00 hrs} Stanley time.

Vice-Comodoro Carnelli has offered his good offices to liaise with the Argentine authorities for a sea-search aircraft should this be required.

The main Marine party will assess the situation on arrival at Bluff Cove.

Earlier reports indicate that the 'plane was seen and heard in the area of Bluff Cove on its normal route, at about 15:30 hours Stanley time.

Apart from the pilot there was only one other person on board.

7

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 10 p.m. Stanley time.

Two further search parties have been covering the area east and west of Bliza Cove on foot.

Another Land Rover party with Pat Whitney, 'Jumbo' Whitney, Walter Felton, P C Morrison and Marine Rowland, is on its way to Port Harriet Point via Sand Bay.

The earlier Marine party under Sergeant Lazenby expects to rendezvous with the Bluff Cove party very shortly and will then decide on further search areas, probably going down to the beach and continuing westwards. *TL*

The Bliza Cove party has reported sighting a white light some 2,000 metres south of Seal Point. They report that it might be a ship.

If the assistance of Mr Luxton is required tomorrow morning the Chief Secretary will notify him in good time and asks if Mr Luxton could please stand by from first light, when he will be briefed from Nomad on instructions from the Chief Secretary.

The weather report is that conditions should improve after midnight.

Secretariat,

14 October 76

(10 pm)

10:15 pm 14 Oct 76. Telephone conversation with
V C Carnelli:-

The Vice Comodoro advises he proceeded as follows:-

1. Advised LADE radio not to be turned off.
2. Saw HE to confirm that
3. need for rescue was definite.
4. Was (and is) in permanent touch with his HQ
5. Has followed situation here (by search parties, sightings, Beaver route, when last seen etc)
6. Has relayed (5) above to LADE HQ, who are in turn
7. Relaying to Comodoro Rivadavia.
8. When contact by radio with Comodoro Rivadavia ceases the VC Carnelli will continue to be in touch with BA.
9. He expects a Hercules should be here first thing tomorrow morning.
10. He is having the 'obstacle' vehicle removed from the temporary airstrip. Via the Police he is advising the Marine sentry that 2 Air Force personnel will be doing this.
11. VC Carnelli checked the weather forecast with me.

Navia.

9

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 11 p.m. Stanley time.

The land search situation is proceeding as reported at 10 o'clock. The patrol to Seal Point is now past Pony's Pass.

M.V. Monsunen, which had been undergoing repair, has been readied ^{in case she is required to} ~~and is shortly putting to sea~~ to investigate the light sighted off Seal Point.

Preliminary information about the air-sea search is that a Hercules aircraft is expected first thing tomorrow morning. The search area has already been agreed.

Broadcasting will continue for as long as necessary throughout the night. The rediffusion will close down at midnight Stanley time.

Secretariat,

14 October 1976.

(11 pm)

10

Special Announcement

Would Ron Buckland at Shag Cove please ring
Pat Luxton at Chartres.

(Phoned the studio 23:15 hrs)

14 October 1976.

m.

12.00

Monsoon sailed

Bluff Cove reached.

Date

Shr/Sea Search started for 6.30 of ground

8.00

Forest left W. Arm

W. Lusk has offered

Arm on the ~~low~~ end lower

9.00

Martin Smith Party light at Nelson 2000 S.T.

Mr. Barker - Good Sun Edegar Lane 4th P.H. + Pt.

Complete lighting of light on ~~back ground~~ on

Pt. H. P.A.

Ray Hutchins

Fontle

10.00

CS

12

HE will be at 38 from
11.30 if wanted. He is
monitoring signals. Do not
hesitate to ring.

DM 24/10

13

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at midnight Stanley time.

M.V. Monsunon is sailing to investigate the light observed at or off Seal Point and she should reach the vicinity at about the same time as the land patrol.

The patrol under Sergeant Lazenby has reached Bluff Cove and has confirmed that the child actually saw the Beaver passing the entrance to Bluff Cove on its way to Stanley at about 15:30 Stanley time. The patrol at Bluff Cove will overnight at that settlement.

A civilian patrol is searching the Cape Pembroke area.

Arrangements for the air-sea search have been firmed up and can be put into motion at approximately 6:30 tomorrow morning if required.

A reserve patrol has been mustered at Moody Brook for immediate deployment at first light if need be, to act on information received from air sightings tomorrow morning.

Secretariat,
14 October 1976

(midnight)

14

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha Kilo. Bulletin at 0100 hrs Friday 15th October

There is little change to report in the situation.

The Marine patrol who observed the light south of Eliza Cove has been de-briefed and confirm that three persons saw ~~the~~ a bright white light over a period. there were intervals of ten and seven minutes between the periods during which the light showed. They also said that the light appeared to be revolving.

The air/sea search will go ahead ~~unless~~ as planned unless called off beforehand because the aircraft has been located.

Plans are now being made to co-ordinate the air to ground communications

Secretariat
15 October 1976

0100

15

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha Kilo. Bulletin at 0200 hrs Stanley Time

There has been no significant change in the situation.

The 'Monsunen' reported heading west off the Seal Rocks about an hour ago and will probably be in the area of Seal Point shortly after this bulletin. The patrol travelling overland will also arrive in the area at about the same time.

Early weather reports will be called for shortly. We are anxious to establish whether conditions will be favourable for flying early in the morning

One patrol from Eliza Cove to Sand Bay reported having seen ~~nothing~~ nothing of any note

Secretariat

15 October

0200

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha Kilo. Bulletin at 0300 hours Stanley Time

There have been no significant changes in the situation during the past hour.

The patrol which covered the Cape Pembroke area has returned with nothing to report.

The Monsunen is now in the vicinity of Seal Point and is in communication with Forrest which was south of Driftwood about three-quarters of an hour ago. ~~Monsunen will probably be going to the island after receiving the Seal Point message~~
The overland patrol moving down to Seal point is attempting to make contact with Monsunen.

~~The other reports from the Stanley area are as follows~~

The bad weather continues to make the search difficult but the wind has dropped in the Stanley area and it has become milder.

~~It is possible that the search will be resumed at a later date~~
~~xxxxxx~~

Secretariat
15 October 1976
0300

17
Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0400 hours Stanley time.

Land searches have now covered practically the whole of the area between Pembroke and Bluff Cove except for the seaward side of Port Harriet and the extreme east of Fitzroy Park and East Island. Monsumen is now south of East Island and will steam towards Seal Point at first light.

So far nothing has been seen but it is quite possible in the very bad conditions for the aircraft to have been missed.

Forrest will arrive off Lively Island at dawn and will then cover the coast up to East Island.

It is now probable that we shall have to wait for the first daylight before locating Alpha-Kilo. We hope then that the weather will have improved sufficiently for an air search to be made.

Patrols are now at the ready at Bluff Cove, Port Harriet House and Seal Point as well as additional ones in Stanley.

Secretariat

15 October 1976

(0400 hours)

18
Message for Mr Bill Luxton, from Chief Secretary

If you consider conditions are safe at first light please search area from Fitzroy to Hooker's Point after receiving weather reports at dawn from Nomad. Start by flying route from Fitzroy over entrance to Bluff Cove and thence along bad weather route to Stanley. Land patrols have covered all but seaward side of Port Harriet, Fitzroy and East Island but could have missed Beaver in bad weather.

Please report position soonest after airborne to Nomad and periodically on 2 megs or 4.5 and maintain liaison with Nomad throughout. Please also advise if you require assistance at Hooker's Point or passenger to help in search.

Keep look out for Hercules aircraft which will be in same area from early morning.

If weather is bad or becomes bad please use your discretion and abandon flight if you have doubts about safety.

Secretariat,
15 October 1976 .

*Frequencies
Skid Point*

*5580
5581*

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0:500 hours Stanley time.

There has been no significant change since the last
bulletin. A special message for Mr Luxton follows (attached)

Nomad has been asked to collate with ^{weather} ~~the~~ reports

Secretariat

15 October 1976

(0:500 hours)

20

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0:600 hours Stanley time.

There has been no material change since the last bulletin. The plans proposed in previous bulletins are being acted upon and will be set in motion as soon as conditions are suitable.

Secretariat

15 October 1976

(0:600 hours)

21

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0:700 hours Stanley time.

With the prospect of continuing bad weather we have had to decide to utilise the ground forces without air liaison.

The parties led by the Marines will cover the same ground as last night, that is returning from Bluff Cove, and other parties will go out to cover Port Harriet and along the coast to Rookery Bay and Sand Bay

M.V. Monsunen will continue the search along the seaward side of Port Harriet and will probably then enter Port William.

The Forrest is covering the coast north of Lively Island along to East Island.

Parties are going out ^{again} from Fitzroy on foot and horseback to cover Mount Pleasant Pond and Fitzroy Park ^{and other} areas.

Difficulties are being experienced in getting Mr Luxton back to Chartres but he could not usefully fly in these conditions in any event. As soon as they improve arrangements will be made for an air search.

Normal R/T will come on at 08:30 as usual on 4.5 and the communications side of the operation will continue to be conducted on 2 megs, with communications control operated by Nomad. If eventually the operation has to use 4.5 for its communications, normal R/T will close down.

The Monsunen party is in visual contact with the party at Seal Point, which is ~~now~~ making its way on foot through the tussac to the Point. Another party is going out to cover the Murrell. Rediffusion will re-open at 0700 hours with this announcement.

Secretariat,
15 October 76, (0:700 hours)

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0800 hours Stanley time.

The weather is improving slightly on the West but is not yet indicative of any general clearance.

The Bluff Cove party is split into two, one returning via the coast, the other going inland.

A Marine party has left for the Murrel.

A party of teachers is checking the area between Sappers Hill and Eliza Cove.

Two or three experienced ^{local} horsemen will explore Mount William/Tumbledown and Mount Challenger.

A party of eight Defence Force volunteers will form the patrol for Port Harriet.

In a few hours' time the whole of the hinterland between Stanley and Fitzroy including the high land which has been covered as far north as Green Patch, where Jock McPhee will be sending out a party.

The 'Lively' will check Port William.

Other parties of volunteers are being held in reserve.

Handwritten notes:
The party is a group of 10-12
and is a good team and suitable
will arrive in Stanley approx 1400 hours
Stanley time and will then search.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976

(0800 hours)

23

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 0900 hours Stanley time.

There have been no material developments during the past hour and the situation remains very similar to that reported at 0800 hours. Parties are still out searching and will continue to do so until the aircraft is found.

Efforts are still being made to contact Mr Luxton in the hope that the weather will improve, but our best hopes for an air-search remain settled on the use of the F-27.

Civilian members of parties should ensure that ~~at least~~ ~~two of the~~ ~~members~~ carry a transistor radio with them so that they can listen to these ^{hourly} ~~daily~~ bulletins.

Secretariat,
15 October 1976.
(0900 hrs)

24

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 10:00 hours Stanley time.

Efforts are continuing to try and locate the Beaver but so far there is nothing to report.

The search is being widened to include inland areas, Port William and adjacent areas .

The 'Monsunen' has searched East Island and will search the coast up as far as Kidney Island.

Mr Luxton is expected back at Chartres in about an hour or an hour and a half.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976.

(10:00 hrs)

25
Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 11:00 hours Stanley time.

All parties are still out and none have reported seeing anything positive.

Discussion is now taking place with all concerned to see whether ~~it~~ to intensify the search in the present area or to widen it.

Mr Luxton has reached Chartres.

Secretariat,
Stanley.

15 October 1976

(11:00 hours)

26

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 12 noon Stanley time.

Forrest is to stay in the area and search the Box area.

Party under Johnson to go to Bluff Cove provided they have the fuel to do it.

The main Bluff Cove party is on its way back to Stanley.

The following areas are covered by different parties:

- . ~~Port Harmer~~
Port William
- . Two Sisters and Tumbledown - this party has a back-up on horseback.
- . Green Patch: party going out to Mount Kent.
- . Party on foot going from Sappers Hill to Eliza Cove.

The F27 is in Comodoro Rivadavia awaiting a favourable weather report.

The Chief Secretary has spoken to Mr Luxton, hopes to arrange a rendezvous of both 'planes at Hooker's point on arrival, to arrange search programme and communications frequencies.

4.5 channel will be open through the lunch hour.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976

(noon)

Telegram to Luxton Chartres

27

1145 hrs

Hope to have a meeting at the airport with you and Vicecomodoro Carnelli and Fokker pilot. Do you need an observer?

MONK

1200 hrs

This telegram arrived at Chartres after Mr Luxton had left (departure at 1140) and was sent to Darwin to be relayed to Mr Luxton ~~there when~~ when he arrived there, with the addition of:

Would appreciate therefore let me know ETA after stating weather.

CONVERSATION WITH VICE COMODORO CARNELLI, 12:15pm 15 October 76

1. VC accepts CS's idea of rendezvous at airport (i.e. F27, Bill Luxton plus self and CS)
2. F27 still in Comodoro awaiting weather report.
3. F27 will come with "reinforced" crew of 7.
VC Carnelli wonders about possibility of Government assisting with housing these 7 men. He is almost certain the plane will overnight here.
4. Suggests that ~~XXXX~~ Bill Luxton should land first, and move his aircraft to the side of the strip.
Meantime he has asked all concerned (including JCL) that strip should be kept clear - prohibiting crossing and driving round it.
5. VC Carnelli cannot accept the suggestion that Bala and/or a local person board the plane while search is under way. Explained that the F27 would be coming under orders from BA and this could not be arranged.

Mania.

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

SEARCH FOR ALPHA KILO BULLETIN AT 1300 Stanley time

The operational frequency is now 4.5

Mr Luxton has arrived in Stahley. No further news is
available yet about the arrival of the Folker.

Meanwhile the search continues.

30

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 14:00 hours Stanley time

The air search has been commenced by Mr Luxton.

The Fokker is expected here at approximately 15:45 hours
to assist with the air search.

The temporary airstrip is closed to vehicular traffic.

The Bluff Cove patrol returned to Estancia. *Woody Brooke*
having seen nothing

Apart from this there is nothing of importance to report.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976.

(14:00 hours)

31

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 15:00 hours Stanley time.

The 'Monsunen' returned from her coastal search about 1400 hours ~~2000~~ and is at present refuelling and preparing to proceed to sea which should be about 1700 hours.

Meanwhile the 'Forrest' is continuing her search in the Lively Island area.

The Folker is due in about three quarters of an hour, when a meeting will be held to co-ordinate the air/sea search.

A land search of the South coast from Cape Pembroke to Port Harriet has been carried out in daylight without result. Search parties have also been active in Mount William, Tumbledown and Two Sisters areas without success. Searches are continuing in other areas.

Alpha-Sierra has made a coastal search as far as Lively and is now searching the Kidney Island area.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976.

(15:00 hours)

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 1600 hours Stanley time

A report has been received from m.v. Forrest that the Beaver has been found at Seal Island. Full details are not yet to hand but as soon as these are received they will be announced.

Any search parties still in the field should return to Base.

Secretariat

15 October 76

(1600)

33

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 17:00 hours Stanley time

There is nothing further to report.

Secretariat,
15 October 1976.

(1700 -)
(Phoned)

34
Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 18:00 hours Stanley time

There is nothing further to report but a listening
watch is still being maintained.

Secretariat,
15 October 1976
(18:00 hrs)

35
Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 18:00 hours Stanley time

'Forrest' is on its way back to Stanley with Dr Lee, who was rescued from a small island.

It is said that Ian Campbell is on another small island adjacent and a rescue party which includes the Marines' Medical Aide has been left to search for him.

Monsunen is on its way to rendezvous with the rescue party on the small island.

Watch is being maintained.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976

(18:00 hours)

CS
36
Government Announcement

Search For Alpha-Hilo. Bulletin at 1900 hours Stanley time.

The situation remains substantially the same as at 1800 hours. A decision will be taken at 20:00 whether we broadcast late into the night.

Secretariat.

13 October 1976

(1900 hrs)

C1
37

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 20:00 hours Stanley time

There have been no new developments and the position is unchanged.

The Forrest is due in Stanley at approximately 22:15 hours.

This station will remain broadcasting until midnight.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976.

(20:00 hrs)

38

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 21.00 hours Stanley Time

There have been no new developments and the position is unchanged.

We are awaiting the arrival of Monsunen in the vicinity. This is expected to be about 22.00 hours.

Secretariat

15 October

(21.00 hrs)

39
Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at 2200 hours Stanley time.

There is nothing further to report. 'Forrest' is
expected shortly.

Secretariat, (phoned)

15 October 1976

(2200 hrs)

40

Government Announcement

Search for Alpha-Kilo. Bulletin at midnight 15 October

The Forrest has returned to Stanley with Dr Lee, who has suffered a moderately severe degree of exposure but is making a gradual recovery from ~~it~~this . His condition at present is satisfactory, but he will require hospital treatment and observation for a day or two. From Dr Lee's account of the accident it is evident that the 'plane turned over, that both the pilot and Dr Lee got out and clung to the floats for some time.

Dr Lee cannot be closely questioned at this stage but from his account it seems that Captain Campbell stated his intention to swim about 75 yards to Johnsons Island.

Although a search party has been scouring the island for several hours now and will continue to do so tomorrow so far Captain Campbell has not been found.

Meantime, Monsunen has anchored in Mare Harbour; the Forrest will join the Monsunen tomorrow.

The studio will close down after this announcement.

Secretariat,

15 October 1976

(midnight)

41
Medical Department,
Stanley,
Falkland Islands.

15 . 10 19 20

Medical Report - Do Lee 11.4.51.

Do Lee has suffered a moderately severe degree of exposure, but is making a gradual recovery from this. His condition at present is satisfactory, but he will require hospital treatment and observation for a day or two.

J. H. C.
SMD

42

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 10:00 hours Stanley time.

A party from the Monsunen has been searching for Ian Campbell since dawn.

A large party left Swan Inlet House first thing this morning and is also searching the area.

Forrest sails at 10:00 hours from Stanley to liaise with Monsunen and the rescue party at Johnsons Island area.

The F27 will shortly carry out a reconnaissance of the area and will report back to Stanley before leaving the Colony. The F27 carries a special party of seven specialists which include a parachutist and a doctor.

Mr Luxton has offered his assistance and is standing by in case of need.

Monsunen and Forrest will work on operational band.

Nomad is being operated by Moody Brook as usual.

One purpose of these bulletins is to inform the persons who are not on the operational frequencies of what is going on. If they have any messages which they cannot communicate direct to the Monsunen or Forrest they may use 4.5 and ask for the message to be relayed to operations control.

A further bulletin will be issued at 12 o'clock.

Secretariat,
16 October 1976

43

Government Announcement

Bulletin at noon (Stanley time)

Forrest, carrying one additional complete rescue team with Gemini and fully equipped for extended search, is expected at Johnsons Island about 15:00 Stanley time. Both rescue teams will remain in the area and be based on Forrest.

Decision concerning movement of Monsunen will be notified separately.

While rescue teams have been searching, Monsunen reports that ship's crew have brought aircraft alongside and that life raft is intact in the aircraft.

A decision concerning how best the search should be continued in the area by civilian parties co-operating with the Marines will need to be made during the afternoon. A report from the Darwin party should therefore please be made by any means to operations control, Secretariat, as soon as possible.

Fitzroy has offered to send out parties. These are best kept in reserve at the moment to take over from Darwin parties at time and place to be agreed.

All present indications are that ~~most hopeful prospects for~~ ^{best made} search are in area West of Swan Inlet, ~~in area~~ in which Darwin party has been searching, that is area of West Cove, Mylor Point, Seal Island, Archer Cove and White Point --references are to Admiralty Chart No. 2671.

It is repeated that an important point of these bulletins is to keep members of search parties as fully in the picture as possible so that they can operate with maximum efficiency.

If any member of a search party is unable to communicate

*because of
this the
bulletins
are inclined*

*to contain detail
that makes them
rather lengthy, but
this is unavoidable.*

/ direct with

direct with Monsunen or Forrest they should use 4.5
or telephone and ask for message to be relayed to
operations control.

A further bulletin will be issued over the broadcasting
system at 15:00 hours Stanley time.

Secretariat

16 October 1976

(noon)

Notes.

Saw Bernard Lee about midday 16th. He seems very much better and very willing, even anxious, to talk.

He said that the 'plane had turned over immediately on landing and that he and Ian scrambled out immediately and drifted for about two hours sitting on the floats. They both dived to try and get the life-raft out, Lee diving half a dozen or more times. All Lee could get out of the aircraft was his medicine bag. At the end of this period the aircraft grounded and at this point they tried by various devices to drift ashore, using the medical bag and/or a blown up polyethylene bag as a float. They gave up and returned to the aircraft floats. The land was not far away, about 20 feet through kelp and Lee struck out for this and made it after a very strenuous effort lasting he thinks about half an hour. He advised Ian to drift on/^{to} the land as well but Ian wanted ^{an} to swim approximately 75 yards to ~~the~~ island which Lee estimates was approximately half a mile across.

While they were on the floats Ian commented to Bernard "this is what happened to John". I understood Lee interprets this as a sudden shift in wind which caused the aircraft to upset.

Lee says there ^{was} ~~is~~ nothing wrong with Ian Campbell and so far as he was aware nothing wrong with the aircraft or its engine. He says further that if only they had been able to get the life raft out they would probably have been saved that night.

AJPM

16 October 76

45

Telephone conversation with Vice Comodoro Carnelli,
12:10 pm 16th October 76.

1. VC reporting from Hookers Point airfield.
2. F27 had returned and landed, having spent some hour 40 mins flying over the area of Johnsons Island.
3. Flew at various heights but as low as 10 metres
4. Covered the area some 20 times
5. Land party ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ naturally spotted (4 land rovers, 1 tractor, approx 15 people)
6. Monsunen had aircraft alongside her
7. Thorough search revealed no signs of Ian
8. VC stated that unless he heard otherwise from us the 'plane would now return to Argentina.

12:25 : phoned Vice Comodoro to confirm that CS agreed they should ~~give up the search and~~ return home.

M.

m.

4 b
MESSAGE BY R/T SCHED TO MR LUXTON, CHARTRES

F27 has carried out detailed search of area
sometimes ^{flying} down as low as 10 metres. In view
of this agree you should stand down. We will
attempt to give you ample notice if we need
to call on you.

Chiefsec

16 Oct 76

Phoned Moody Brook 12:58

M.
—

DRAFT

TO MONSUNEN AND FORREST, (BY OPERATIONS FREQUENCY)

On arrival of Forrest and after search and rescue parties have set about their tasks would Masters please advise whether in their view Monsunen ~~may~~ ^{should} ~~now~~ return to Stanley. The important consideration is whether Forrest can accommodate all the members of the Services/ rescue teams.

One air technician should remain, the other two may either continue to co-operate with search and rescue forces or, if lack of space on Forrest for them, ^{they should} return to Stanley when and if Monsunen returns.

16 Oct 76

48

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Bulletin at 1500 hrs Stanley Time

The Forrest is due at Johnsons Island at 1500 Stanley time
After the Masters have ^Consulted about the details of the
search and decided whether the Forrest can accommodate all
the persons (allowing for some who may have to camp out in tents)
a decision will be made as to whether Monsunen should return to S
Stanley.

The Fokker carried out a ~~xxxxxxx~~ detailed search this
morning of the area from as low as 10 metres. In view of this
it was decided not to call for the services of Mr Luxton. The
Fokker has now left for its home base.

An extension of the land search tomorrow morning to the West of
Mount Pleasant with searchers from Goose Green and Fitzroy will
be dependent on the success of today's search. Brook Hardcastle
and John Felton are asked to liaise about these arrangements to
decide on a course of action and advise Operational Control.
Hopefully the fresh team can be near site to commence at first
light.

The Monsunen has had 10 men searching the island throughout the
day but without success. This will continue until nightfall.
A further bulletin will be issued at 1800 Stanley time.

4.5 is now guarded by Cable & Wireless until further notice.

Sent.

16 Oct 76

49
MESSAGE TO MONSUNEN AND FORREST BY OPERATIONAL FREQUENCY

13/10
MESSAGE TO MONSUNEN AND FORREST BY OPERATIONAL FREQUENCY

After discussion with Brook Hardcastle and John Felton we advise ~~that~~ ^{all} ~~civilian~~ ^{land based} members of search and rescue team,, unless they wish to volunteer to continue, should return to Darwin or Swan Inlet House as they have been in the field for very many hours.

If volunteers wish to remain in area they should join forces with Fitzroy party which will re-start search early on Sunday, 17th.

Party from Fitzroy will set out at dawn and will consist of upwards of a dozen men. Party will travel round the head of Swan Inlet River so will not require boat to cross ^a More Harbour although use of a boat would be useful for them to explore indentations.

Remember that when Lee was found he was almost indistinguishable from the kelp. Therefore scrutiny should be of the very closest.

Sent

16th ?

50
MESSAGE TO MONSUNEN AND FORREST - OPERATIONAL FREQUENCY

Have you any developments to report; Particularly interested to learn if land party managed to cross on to island.

sent

(1635) Reply received
Yes - boat has been away half an hour
party should be on the island now

51
MESSAGE TO FORREST - OPERATIONAL FREQUENCY

DIVER

Halliday required by Cable & Wireless for essential duties.

Am arranging therefore for Dave Marsh to leave here approximately

1700 hrs. He will travel with Marine driver and Marine diver.

Party will be in two vehicles led by ^{Rushy}~~Michael~~ Clarke.

Sent

52
Message from Brook Hardcastle - 1645 hrs

Goss's party returned to Swan Inlet House. They have searched Tipps Rincon and associated areas and found nothing. Could not cross to island because boat not provided. They are not satisfied that the island has been satisfactorily searched and advise thorough re-search

Tomorrow morning early Darwin will send out tractor with boat to take men across on to Johnsons Island. The six or seven volunteers remaining at Swan Inlet House will search the island thoroughly and then return to Darwin. Eric Goss, who led today's party, is talking to John Felton to put him in the picture about today's operations and try to indicate areas that warrant further investigation.

53

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Bulletin at 1800 hrs Stanley Time.

A Darwin party of 17 persons, led by Eric Goss, explored the area west of Swan Inlet today. Most of the party has now returned to Darwin although six volunteers are remaining ^{at} ~~in~~ Swan Inlet House overnight. They will go down to West Cove opposite Johnsons Island tomorrow with a tractor and boat. They will use the boat to cross over on to the Island and continue the search.

Fitzroy has had two men searching the area east of Swan Inlet.

The search is being continued by service personnel from the Monsunen and Forrest until nightfall.

Tomorrow morning before dawn a party of 12 or more men will leave Fitzroy for the vicinity of Tipps Rincon to continue to explore areas that Eric Goss reported as warranting further investigation.

Rudi Clarke has led a party in 2 landrovers taking divers out to join the Forrest. They will arrive opposite Forrest early tomorrow morning. They will be accompanied from Fitzroy by a driver and propose to travel on the track crossing Bertha's Beach to ^{Fox Point at} the western end of East Cove.

A decision will be made this evening whether Monsunen will return to Stanley or remain in the vicinity of Johnsons Island. The decision will depend largely on whether the personnel carrying out the search can all be accommodated either on the Forrest or in tents.

Normal R/T working will be maintained during Sunday 17 October, but Marines will open up on that frequency if circumstances warrant it.

It is not intended to issue another bulletin tonight unless there are any positive results to report. The next bulletin will be made over the broadcast frequency at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

doing reasonably well
* Dr Lee is progressing satisfactorily.

16 Oct 76

MESSAGE TO MONSUNEN - OPERATIONAL

When?

16-10-76 54

We assume you will be remaining overnight in which case we will contact you in the morning. Normal listening watch will be maintained.
Please arrange pick up diving party at Fox Point first light tomorrow.

Sent

Master Monsunen

Diving Team including
Royal Marines will operate
under your direction

Ch Sec

Sent at request of OIC to make it
clear that Geo Betts is in charge of
Diving Team
Ch

55

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 10:00 hours Stanley time. Sunday, 17 October.

Marine Halford 'phoned operations control from Island Harbour House ^{at 0815} to give sitrep ^{from Forrest & Monsunen} ~~at 0815~~. He reported that the diving teams had been dropped off at Fox Point and had been taken on board the Forrest.

Search parties from Forrest and Monsunen have searched Seal Island --that is Johnsons Island-- again, and also the tussac island. They are concentrating now on the two upper fingers of Seal Island. The search of the seaward side of the island is being considerably hampered by the abundance of kelp.

The Monsunen is continuing to remain in the area. The diving teams have been operating under the direction of George Betts. The divers are temporarily resting but will recommence shortly.

4 Reports of the activities of the land-based search parties are not quite clear because of difficult radio communications but it is believed the volunteers from Darwin who remained overnight are now attempting to meet up with the party from Fitzroy. Confirmation of this or any details of the activities of these parties should please be relayed to operations control by any means for information of operations control. *operations control is monitoring operational frequency and 4.5 and is on telephone 186.*

5 Unless there is any important development in the meantime the next bulletin will be issued on the broadcasting frequency at 14:00 hours Stanley time.

6 For the information of the members of search parties this bulletin will be repeated also on the broadcast band at 12 midday Stanley time.

56
Studio:

For repeat broadcast at 12 noon Stanley time 17 Oct;
please note the following:

1. Bulletin to be read as it stands except for last para.

- the last paragraph*
2. Instead of ~~that~~, please broadcast:

"Since this bulletin it has been learned that nine volunteers from Darwin stayed overnight at Swan Inlet and left in relays this morning for the coast, and that a Fitzroy party consisting of 12 or more persons arrived at Swan Inlet House very early this morning and left in contact with the Darwin party.

Phoned.
M.
Secretariat,
Noon 17 Oct 76

57

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 14:00 hours Stanley time.

Service and civilian search parties continue to scrutinise Johnsons Island (otherwise known as Seal Island) and adjacent areas.

These parties ~~consist~~ of volunteers from Darwin and Fitzroy. ~~they~~ have a tractor, ^{they} and also ~~have~~ a boat to cross over to the nearby islands if need be.

Divers ~~we~~ have been working off the two vessels since dawn under the direction of George Betts.

Consideration is now being given to the advisability of requiring the two vessels to remain in the area for much longer. If they have to withdraw, another announcement will be made shortly, and in any event an announcement will be made at 15:00 hours Stanley time.

The next main bulletin will be made at 19:00 hours Stanley time unless there are ^{positive} ~~positive~~ developments in the meantime. If another announcement is required before then it will be made on the hour.

Secretariat

17 October 76

14:00 hours

58
① ● Message.

From Operations Control to Monsoon Forest.

(Phoned to VPC 1350 17 Oct 76)

Please advise whether you consider that it is now essential you withdraw. If only Monsoon leaves divers should not operate in the absence of George Belts. This decision made after consultation with OCRM.

② Message.

From Operations Control to Monsoon

(C's phoned ^{VPC} direct 1400 hours 17 Oct;)

After further consultation, divers should not operate ~~&~~ without expert direction. I am not prepared to risk divers if their task is hazardous. Will masters please discuss further between themselves and advise. Fully appreciate your situation but will support your decision as final.

(VPC to Monsoon 14:10)

George Bell (from Forrest) to RPC for CS
1425 17 Oct 76.

Have ~~been~~ carried out 9 man hours diving
in the area (between Seal Island, Little
tussac island, etc) Have nothing to
report.

Diving is cold, there is quite a strong current
and the area is thickly covered with kelp.
The land search parties went to Seal Is.
again today, 24 people from Darwin,
Fitzroy & Mousmen. The area of the ~~man~~
reefs has been completely searched.
Have nothing to report.

Decision up to you in the Secretariat.

(Repeats parts of message, adding that
"maybe we could get some more
information from Schee as to where Ian
would have tried to go" etc.)

CS 14:30 asks Forrest & Mousmen to
stand by.

Message to Monsunen and Forrest from Operations Control.

Monsunen and Forrest should return Stanley now
bringing divers, Marines and technicians.

The independent land search parties from Darwin and
Fitzroy will continue searching.

Please give ETA Stanley soonest so that we can
re-assess need for vessels and/or divers return
~~tomorrow~~. later if required

17 October 76

1450 ~~1440~~ hours Stanley time.

(To VPO for transmission)



carried out 1455.

61

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 1500 hours Stanley time

It has been agreed that the Monsunen and Forrest return to Stanley to re-assess the situation and to replenish vital supplies.

Nine man-hours of diving have been carried out in difficult conditions, which are deteriorating. Shortage of compressed air and the cold weather have made the divers' task a very tiring one.

It is reiterated that the position will be re-assessed this evening on the return of Monsunen and Forrest .

The independent shore-based parties are continuing the search.

There will be a further announcement
~~The next bulletin will be made~~ at 19:00 hours Stanley time.

Secretariat,
17 October 76
(15:15)

Telephone call from Brook Hardcastle - 17.40

17 Oct 76

62

~~The Search Party~~

Darwin and Fitzroy parties have now returned to Swan Inlet House and are going to return from there to Darwin and Fitzroy. As they have had a very heavy time I agree with Brook that they should not go out again in that area unless specifically requested to do so.

He will arrange with Walker Creek for the ~~next~~ coastline along Sound and opposite Lively to be searched tomorrow. He cannot get on to the islands in the Sound or on to Middle Island and has no contact with Lively.

Entered in diary.
M.

63

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 19:00 hours Stanley time.

Search parties operating from shore, from the Forrest, and from the Monsumon, have been searching almost continuously since Friday afternoon when the floats of the overturned aircraft were sighted in Mare Harbour, on the eastern end of Johnsons Island, also known as Seal Island; and for nearly 24 hours before this, various parties had been searching along the lines of flight of the last leg of that day's schedule.

Dr Lee, who was the only passenger on board at the time, was picked up by the Forrest on Friday afternoon. The Forrest had sighted the upturned floats following a search of Lively Sound, and was attracted positively to the scene by Dr Lee waving his arm. Dr Lee, who is progressing reasonably, is not yet well enough to be closely questioned, although efforts have been made to get as much information as possible to assist in the tracing of Captain Ian Campbell's whereabouts.

When Dr Lee last saw Ian Campbell he was believed to have expressed an intention to try and swim towards the eastern end of Johnsons Island --a distance of about 75 yards from where the aircraft had grounded after having drifted for some time upside down.

Despite this intensive scrutiny of the area and the adjacent areas that Captain Campbell might have reached had he been able to make the shore, there has been no trace of him so far.

/The personnel involved
~~/Despite this~~

The personnel involved in the searches, which includes ships' crews, Marines, and many volunteers from Camp settlements, particularly Darwin and Fitzroy, have worked unceasingly beyond the normal limits of endurance, sometimes in very bad conditions, and their effectiveness is now severely diminished.

Monsunen and Forrest have been instructed to return to Stanley so that the situation can be re-assessed in the light of what the Masters have to report. They are expected to arrive back at about half past eight this evening, and the plans for a further continuation of the search will depend from their report. The search has not been called off; it will continue so long as there is any prospect of finding Ian Campbell. However, it would be to not face up to reality to state other than that our hopes of finding Captain Campbell alive must now be receding. Nevertheless so long as there is any hope that he may survive, we must continue to look for him.

One reason for the recall of the two vessels is so that if they are needed again tomorrow their crews and complements may be refreshed and/or replaced.

It was considered whether the ships should divert to Middle Island, some three miles or so from where the incident took place, but search of this area could only be done as a separate and complete exercise requiring a number of people over an extended period. A diversion to Middle Island at this stage would have given only a cursory examination

/to the area

to the area and achieved very little, but it would have meant delaying the return of the vessels so that their crews and complements would not get adequate refreshment and/or sleep. Account was also taken of the fact that the waters in between the site of the incident and Middle Island were covered during fairly long periods by the Forrest on Friday afternoon, ^{twice} by the Fokker ^{once} aircraft on Friday afternoon and again on Saturday morning, and by Mr Bill Luxton, who flew over the area around Lively Island on Friday afternoon when the waters were generally calm and it should have been easy at that time to see if there was anybody in the water.

A meeting of the Masters of the vessels and operational headquarters will be held as soon as the ships arrive, to formulate plans for tomorrow. These will be included in a broadcast announcement to be made at 10 p.m. this evening.

Secretariat,

17 October 76

(19:00 hours)

m.

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

64

Bulletin at 22 hrs Stanley Time

The Forrest will return to Mare Harbour tomorrow with a number of searchers and swimmers. It will put ^{a search party} ~~7 people~~ off on Middle Island to search the beach there and will then go on to the area where the Beaver was found for 7 swimmers to swim over the area in formation.

The Forrest will stay the night at Mare Harbour and on Tuesday continue to investigate other areas of kelp and islands in Choiseul Sound.

A small party from Walker Creek will search the coast from False Creek to Pyramid Point
As Forrest will not reach the area much before 1400 hrs Stanley time

the next bulletin will be issued at 1600 hrs Stanley time unless there are positive developments in the meantime.

may be asked to
~~with~~ Mr. ~~will~~ ^{will} stand-by from midday.

Secretariat

17 October

2200 hrs.

65
C.S.

OCRM suggest that if Bill Luxton flies today to take part in the search that he comes to Stanley first

- (1) to pass on the code *and for briefing*
- (2) to get his frequencies otherwise control would be through the R/T *and not Nomad*

2. Would we let OCRM know if Bill Luxton does take part

3. 9 Marines have sailed by Forrest and no 8.

26th 18/10

PRESENT

Captain Sollis and Capt Betts were satisfied that they had exhausted the possibilities of Seal Island. This had been searched 3 times, the last time with 16 men, from the shore line right round the circumference of the island. Major Hooper said the tussac island had been searched at least 5 times, and finally by 25 men in a ~~chain~~ very close chain.

Capt Sollis voiced his doubt that Capt Campbell had been on the float when the plane grounded, but the impression obtained from Dr Lee was that they were together at that time, and had tried to reach the shore using Dr Lee's medical bag and a plastic bag. Capt Sollis said he had the plastic bag, used by the doctor, and it contained shells, apparently ~~of shark risk~~ used by Dr Lee to aid his survival. There was also a mention of butter.

Asked about the prospects of a further search, Capt Sollis said the only thing that might be fruitful was to dive again. Capt Betts said they could go back and dive again; they could possibly have been within 6 ft without seeing Capt Campbell as the kelp was so thick. The main hazard to divers was the cold - after an hour the hands and feet were very cold and the legs starting to lose strength. It would be best to try to get more swimmers, so that the water area could be covered by men closer together - not diving, but swimming on the surface, looking downwards. Apart from the thick kelp areas, visibility was good, and it was possible to see to the bottom, the depth being from 12 to 20 ft. Dave Marsh (diver) remarked that he had a gauge and it registered no more than 15 ft, and for 70-80% of the time it was possible to see to the bottom. They had covered the area of the wreck 4 times (illustrated on map where swimming and diving had been done) A list was made of swimmers who might be called on - and the necessary equipment.

It was agreed that Forrest would return to Mare Harbour with the swimmers

662

and a number of marines to do a land search of Middle Island.

Captain Sollis would land the marines on Middle Island, to be picked up 2-3 hrs later. He would then return to the diving area with the swimmers, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ (Seal - or Johnsons - Island) ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ and stay there from 1-1 $\frac{1}{2}$ hrs, then return to Middle to pick up land searchers.

They would overnight in Mare Harbour, and on Tuesday would search the coast of Centre Island and other islands in the Sound.

Asked if Mr Bill Luxton could help by flying over the area, Capt Sollis said this might be helpful, but a decision was best left until weather conditions were known.

Chief Technician Bridges said he had examined the plane, which was intact except for the pilot's door which seemed to have been torn off the hinges - there had been no sign of the door at the scene of the wreck. ~~A boot had been found~~ There was nothing to intimate that the plane was not functioning.

A boot had been found - thought to belong to Dr Lee, who had said he removed his boots. The other boot had not been found.

Mr. Mark

12 Noon Monday 18 Oct

Message - RIT - from
Bill Hutton - Wind
up to 30 on the west -
Will come back with
weather after lunch.

M.

67

1455 hrs Brook Hardcastle reported the party sent out from Walker Creek had returned. They had found no sign of Captain Campbell. They had, however, found a package of one dozen eggs in an egg container marked in red ball-point pen "Miller KC, Please return". The egg container had printed on it "6 Golden Lay Natural Fresh Eggs Large" and was found about a quarter of a mile on west side of Pyramid Point. Two of the eggs were broken. On the face of the package was printed "Golden Lay UK Limited HQ Wakefield"

The party have now returned to Walker Creek.

1515 hrs Message from Major Hooper.

"We have still not established contact with Forrest and there has been no communications with them today. They have not been heard on 4.5. We are now asking Rene to contact Lively to see if Lively Island has seen them. They should have reached there an hour ago."

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

WAP 15148-821 585968/704663 500 pads 9/69 Grp.782

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
				15/10/76

To

MILLER KC

PLEASE SAY IF AND WHEN YOU SENT PACKAGE OF EGGS IN AN EGG CONTAINER
MARKED IN RED BALLPOINT PEN "MILLER KC PLEASE RETURN"

CONTAINER HAD PRINTED ON IT "GOLDEN LAY NATURAL FRESH EGGS LARGE"

CHIEFSEC

Time

*Reply from Mrs Miller -
eggs given to her on day of accident 15/10*

18/10/76

70

1600

OCRNI reports party has found a bundle of letters and
a syringe on the north side of the small tussac island.

1700

From Sgt Warrington

1. Letters which were found on the north side of the tussac island look like First Day Covers and the definite post mark is FOX BAY 13th

2. Forrest is now moving to Hammond Cove - is under way now.

Government Announcement

Bulletin at 16:00 hours Stanley time, Monday 18 October 1976

Following the meeting with Captains Jack Sollis and George Betts and others yesterday evening it was decided that the best direction of search would be as announced at 22:00 yesterday; that is, swimmers concentrating on the Mare Harbour area coupled to a foot search of the islands in the Sound and the south coast of Choiseul Sound.

Johnsons Island had been searched thoroughly at least three times, the last time with 16 men, right round the circumference of the island. The small tussac island to the south of where the aircraft was found had been searched at least five times, the final time by 25 men in a very close chain.

A plastic bag containing some shells had been found.

The divers had encountered very severe cold and difficult conditions but the water was clear and it was agreed that the best plan was for swimmers in wet suits to search the area around the site of the aircraft's grounding. Accordingly more swimmers were added to the team for today's search.

A land party searching from Walker Creek today found a full package of eggs, of which two were broken. The package was marked "Miller KC Please return" in red ball-point pen. Enquiries have been made of Mr Miller about this. Dr Lee says he thinks he can remember eggs being picked up at KC. The packet was found a quarter of a mile on the west side of Pyramid Point.

/Yesterday the divers

72a

Yesterday the divers found a boot. Dr Lee says he removed his boots while he was on the upturned aircraft.

**** insert**

Dr Lee confirms that Ian Campbell was still on the floats when the aircraft grounded and that they both made attempts to swim across from the aircraft after it had grounded. Dr Lee says that he can recall calling to Ian Campbell when Dr Lee had reached the land and Ian Campbell was still on the floats.

The search will be continued tomorrow amongst the islands at the eastern end of Choiseul Sound and anywhere else after consultation with the Masters of the vessels.

The Beaver aircraft was brought back to Stanley on the Nonsunen and was later towed up to the hangar.

The next bulletin will be made at 21:00 this evening unless there is anything positive to report in the meantime.

****insert:**

The search parties has ~~xx~~ found a bundle of letters and a syringe on the north side of the small tussac island.

Secretariat,

18 October 1976

(16:00)

16th October 1976

The Chief Secretary,
The Secretariat,
Falkland Islands,

Sir,

I refer to the crash of the Falkland Islands Government Air Service Beaver aircraft on Thursday 14th October 1976.

Although this could not yet be officially announced at this stage, in view of the weather conditions prevailing at the time of the crash and for the ensuing 24 hours, and in view of the known condition of the surviving passenger, Dr Bernard Lee, it seems most unlikely that Captain Ian Campbell will be recovered alive. This crash must therefore be considered as a fatal air crash.

Dr Lee is, at the moment, suffering from a degree of retrograde and anterograde amnesia (i.e. his memory of the events both before and after the crash is incomplete) and this condition could remain indefinitely. Even if Dr Lee does eventually recall all of the details of the crash, there is absolutely no guarantee that his recollections will explain the cause of the crash.


There exists, even now, much public speculation as to the cause of the crash, and this may already be causing discomfort to those people who may find themselves falling under public 'suspicion' (e.g. the aircraft mechanics)

I feel that it is rather necessary that the Falkland Islands Government should make an urgent request to the British Civil Aviation Authority for them to send out one or more expert accident investigators to arrive in the Colony on Thursday 21st October, so that we may secure the best possible chance of identifying the cause of the crash.

The important reasons for establishing the cause of the crash do not directly involve the apportioning of blame. The most important factor is whether or not it was due to a fault which could be the cause of a future air accident, but which could be remedied, and so prevent such future accidents. Secondly, however, in view of the smallness and the nature of the community here, I think that it is important that, where appropriate, the people involved with the running of FIA should be publically and unequivocally exonerated of blame. I do not think that the public will accept any such reassurances from anyone but an external, independent, expert inquiry. In view of the public disquiet it is my opinion that the Government should request an investigator as outlined above today, Saturday 16th October, and should, by means of an announcement over the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service, inform the public of this request. If such an announcement is made then it would be reasonable for any member of the public to assume that there was a lack of willingness on the part of the Government to have this accident fully investigated.

I also give notice that in the event of the death of Captain Campbell, should his body be recovered I would be requesting an experienced pathologist, nominated by the Civil Aviation Authority, to be flown here without delay to perform an autopsy.

Yours faithfully,



Frederick C. Cox M.B., Ch.B. MCOP.
Senior Medical Officer

18 October 1976

Chief Technician Ian Bridges

As I instructed you verbally yesterday evening, this is to require you to impound immediately the following documents. They should be placed in an envelope, sealed, and sent to Mr Kanagasabai by the first available means.

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Maintenance Certificate | } (of the lost Beaver aircraft) |
| 2. Engine Log Book | |
| 3. Defects Record Book | |
| 4. Propeller Log Book | |
| 5. Journey Log Book | |

A J P Monk
CHIEF SECRETARY

Mr Mark

Chief Technician Bridges
handed the document
to me mid-morning
today; this letter had
not yet gone out.

2. Passed them on to Mr K,
who

3. Instructed me to seal
them into an envelope
and lock them away
until required.

4. This has been done.

M. 18/10/76

FIF0004/13

3

75

PP FCO

RR BUENOS AIRES

GR 60A



CYPHER CAT A

FM PORT STANLEY 131240Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 673 OF 13 OCTOBER
INFO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES

MY TELNO MODEV 109 OF 12 OCTOBER: CHIEF PILOT

1. PLEASE RELAY AN INSTRUCTION TO THE CHIEF PILOT, CAPT J KERR,
TO RETURN TO THE COLONY WITHOUT DELAY. I TAKE IT HIS CONVAL-
ESCENCE IS NOW COMPLETE AND HE WILL NOT OF COURSE HAVE TO
UNDERTAKE ANY FLYING DUTIES ON RETURN.

2. HIS BACKGROUND EVIDENCE AND ADVICE WILL CLEARLY BE ESSENTIAL
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF ENQUIRY (PARA 6 OF MY TELNO
675 REFERS), ALTHOUGH HE WILL NOT (NOT) BE A MEMBER OF THE
BOARD.

FRENCH

NNNN

SENTAT 13/1430Z

HOW RECD K

RECD AT 13/1430Z HFL

SHOULD THAT BE MO NO 2 22

(4)

74

FOFI 002/13

CO PORT STANLEY

GR 111

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 131645Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY TELNO.465 OF 13 OCTOBER.

Y TELNO.464 AND YOUR TELNO.474.
MISSING AIRCRAFT.

BILL CHRISTIE OF FIC HAS TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT CAMPBELLS
GOD DAUGHTER MISS NICOLA REEVE, IS PRESSING HIM FOR INFORMATION.
SHE IS WORRIED THAT CAMPBELL'S MOTHER (Aged 87) WILL HEAR OF
ACCIDENT AND POSSIBLE DEATH OF HER SON FROM TV AND PRESS REPORTS.
WE CANNOT THEREFORE WITHHOLD MUCH LONGER INFORMATION ON
ACCIDENT AND PRESS ID. ~~LYING~~ LOSS OF CAMPBELL.

REVE

DECEASED

NNNN

SENT AT 131316Z SEP
RECD AT 131316Z SEP

NFO Discussed
with HE. Tel sent
18th asking T. Rowe
to visit Mrs Campbell

18/4

Pl
(4) to BS
16 Dec.
[H =/orison
informed orally]

18/10

18 October 1976

His Excellency the Governor
Government House
Stanley

Sir,

ACCIDENT TO BEAVER AIRCRAFT VP-FAK

In accordance with Regulation 4 of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1959, I append details of the particulars as required by Regulation No. 5 (1):-

(a) Type, nationality and registration marks of the aircraft:

DHC2 Beaver float-plane, VP-FAK

(b) Name of the owner, operator and hirer if any of the aircraft:

Falkland Islands Government

(c) Name of the person in command of the aircraft:

Captain Ian T. Campbell, MBE

(d) Date and time of the accident:

14 October 1976. Approximately 15:30 hours.

(e) Last point of departure of aircraft:

Brenton Loch, East Falkland

Next point of intended landing:

Stanley

(f) Position of the aircraft (with reference to some easily defined geographical point):

East end of Johnsons (or Seal) Island, East Falklands.

2.

- (g) Number of persons, if any, (i) killed, (ii) seriously injured as a result of the accident:

Captain Campbell is missing. The passenger, Dr Lee, was picked up suffering from exposure at about 16:00 on Friday 15 October 1976.

- (h) Nature of the accident as far as is known:

Overturning of aircraft on landing, the reason for which has not yet been ascertained.

- (i) Brief particulars of damage to the aircraft:

- (1) Damage by submersion in salt water
- (2) Structural damage to port wing tip, aileron and flap.
- (3) Damage to tail area caused through recovery of aircraft
- (4) Pilot's door missing.

D R Morrison

(D R Morrison)
for CHIEF SECRETARY

m.

6

Telephone call from the Hon A B Monk and the Hon A B Hadden - E
(1410 hrs Monday 18 October 1976)

76

Both Councillors feel that, in view of what took place in ExCo this morning, there should be a joint meeting of both Councils, so that all Members can be put in the picture.

They will be willing to come into Stanley on any date decided by the CS and HE the Governor, but submit that Wednesday would be a convenient day for them - they would have company over the Camp tracks which would make the journey easier.

The Hon L G Blake could no doubt arrange to be flown in by Mr Bill Luxton, if Government could notify him if and when the joint meeting can take place.

I undertook to telephone Councillor Hadden when I had anything positive on the proposed meeting. Councillor Monk will be coming to the phone every hour, on the hour, ~~after~~ on and after 1500 hrs.



J.B.
18/10/76

Yes we spoke.
b.s. 18/10.
I'll call you.
18/10.

NOTE

Record of phone call to CS - pm 18 October 1976 - from
the Hon A B Hadden BEM and the Hon A B Monk JP

Both Councillors asked if I could confirm that the meeting on Thursday would be a "full" meeting. I said that it would. Adrian Monk made the point that he hoped it would not be a short meeting just to put them in the picture, but that they would be allowed a discussion. I said this was the case and that discussion would be allowed.

• Sigd.'s support so far
from:

(5)

78

San Carlos - ABM

West Point - Davidsons

New Island - M. Evans

Cec & Kitty
Bertrand.

Speedwell - Managers

K.C. - "full support from
the people of KC."
(signed L Miller)

North Am. - Raymond Robson

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

WAP 15148—821 585968/704663 500 pds 9/69 Grp.782

9
79

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
				18/10/76
To	BLAKE HILL COVE	(REPEAT TO LUXTON CHARTRES)		

ARE YOU ABLE PLEASE TO COME IN ON WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY FOR
MEETING

THIS IS COPIED TO BILL LUXTON IN HOPE THAT IN CONSULTATION WITH
YOU HE CAN ARRANGE FLIGHT

FLIGHT WILL OF COURSE BE REGARDED AS ON DUTY

CHIEFSEC

Time

(11)

Government Announcement

His Excellency The Governor today appointed the Deputy Governor, Mr Gordon Slater, to establish a board to carry out an investigation into the causes and circumstances of the accident to Beaver Alpha Kilo.

The Governor's action, taken in accordance with Regulation 7.1 of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, automatically followed his receipt of official notification of the accident.

The Governor also directed that the Deputy Governor should be assisted by Mr Bala Kanagasabai, the Airport Manager, who is well versed in air matters. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was also asked today to identify an air accidents expert who might serve on the Board. Two Falkland Islands residents, one of them with air experience, are being asked to serve on the Board.

~~Mr~~ Captain J Kerr, Superintendent of Civil Aviation, is being asked to return to the Colony as soon as possible.

18 Oct 76.

(10)
80

Government Announcement

Executive Council

The Hon. Mr John Smith and the Hon. Mr Sydney Miller today tendered their resignations from the Executive Council. The resignations were accepted and the Secretary of State notified.

As the Hon Mr John Smith was elected to the Executive Council from the Legislative Council, the available Members of the Legislative Council were informed today of the resignations.

18 Oct 76

1355 Forrest nothing to report. Divers and team from Middle Island
picked up. ETA Darwin 1615 hrs ETA Stanley 2300 hrs.

83

84

Government Announcement

Search for Ian Campbell.

As reported at midday the 'Forrest' has been engaged today on searches of Lively Island, Centre Island and Kidney Island and in the general area of Lively Island. It included a foot search of Middle Island. Divers and swimmers also investigated once again the area in Marc Harbour where Ian Campbell was last seen.

The result of these extensive and intensive searches have yielded nothing positive to enable it to be ascertained whether Ian Campbell reached land.

The search has been continued now well beyond the period of hopefulness and well beyond the period during which there can be any hope of recovering Ian Campbell alive. It is five days since the accident occurred and any further searching would be random and have very little chance of yielding anything material.

Forrest's return to Stanley will be delayed as she has been diverted to Darwin to pick up an urgent medical case and will not arrive in Stanley until very late tonight. The situation will then be re-assessed tomorrow morning with the persons intimately involved in the searches.

If there is then any indication at all that further searching might yield any trace of Ian Campbell or yield any further information concerning the accident, investigations will be recommenced but such indications must be regarded as remote and without them it is probable that the concentrated searches will be concluded although inspections of the area will continue to be made as and when possible.

Notes on discussion with Dr Lee, 18 October 76 pm.

Main points:-

1. He is unable to remember anything of the circumstances at the time of the accident.
2. His first recollection was standing on a cowl which he felt giving way under his feet, as he observed at the same time the tail of the 'plane entering the water with the 'plane upside down.
3. At no time was he or Ian on the 'plane in the water with the 'plane in its correct position. (Note: this is a point that Dr Lee expressly asked his wife to make and she 'phoned this to me shortly before I saw Dr Lee in the hospital).
4. They drifted for about 2½ hours.
5. Both Ian and Lee were on the 'plane when she grounded and both made attempts to swim ashore. These attempts I understood to be towards a large island, but they were given up.
6. Ian had been ~~horrid~~ throughout the flight.
7. Ian's clothes were soaking wet.
8. There was no medical reason for the accident. Lee expressed ^{that} ~~that~~ Ian Campbell could not have had a heart attack.
9. After Lee reached the shingle he called to Ian Campbell (I ^{think} believe) to advise him to stay with the aircraft.
10. In answer to a question of mine Lee says he cannot remember Ian saying that they were going to land; neither did he say anything about the immediate circumstances throughout the accident. He ^{only} ~~only~~ mentioned that the weather was foul.
11. When I said that there had been a reported sighting at Bluff Cove Dr Lee shook his head in disbelief. He said the accident must have occurred at about 3:15 pm.

5/19/02

5/19/02

5/19/02

12. Dr Lee confirmed that when they took off from
Brenton Loch the wind was down the inlet
and that Ian Campbell had told him he thought
there was a front going through. At one time
they saw a blue sky.

AJPMonk

19 Oct 76.

m.

86
Government Announcement

Bulletin at 21:00 hours Stanley time.

There is little further to report. It has not been easy to identify precisely the areas or the extent of the searches carried out today by the parties based on the Forrest. It is known however that no more has been seen than was reported in the bulletin at 16:00 hours today.

The Forrest will stay overnight in Hammond Cove and will continue the search tomorrow as planned.

It is not expected that the assistance of settlements will be required for searches tomorrow in the vicinity of Mare Harbour, as this area has now been exhaustively covered. If assistance is required from other settlements this would be called for after consultation with the Master of the Forrest.

It is proposed tomorrow to issue bulletins at midday and 19:30 Stanley time.

Secretariat,
18 October 1976
(21:00)

TCZC 0237 GFA 428

CHIEF SECRETARY
COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
PORTSTANLEY
ISLAS MALVINAS

VERY MUCH REGRET FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTED LOCAL PAPERS
 EC PIERREPONT PRESIDENT HOULDER BROTHERS AND CO (ARG) LTD

HOULDERS

Find:

Monday 18/10

MESSAGE FROM KC

The box of eggs found at Pyramid Point was given to Captain Campbell by Mrs Carol Miller on the day the plane was lost.

Tuesday 19/10

0300 hrs

Forrest at Centre Island - team ashore. Intention is to search Kidney Island next, then Middle Island again. After that they will move back to Seal Island for the divers to have a final search there.

Government Announcement

90

Bulletin at noon Stanley time Tuesday 19 October 1976

A search party is now ashore on Centre Island in Choiseul Sound. The Forrest has also carried out a search of the northwest coast of Lively Island, and Kidney Island in Lively Sound has also been investigated. The intention is to move back to Johnsons Island once the investigation in the area of the confluence of Choiseul Sound and Lively Sound has been completed. On arrival at Johnsons Island the swimmers and divers will make another search of the area of the incident.

It has been confirmed that a box of eggs was placed on the aircraft at KC on the day of the accident.

Nothing further has been seen.

A bulletin will be issued at 19:30 this evening.

Secretariat,

19 October 1976

(noon)

91
COPY

19 October 1976

B Kanagasabai Esq
Airport Manager
Stanley

Dear Bala.

As you know, His Excellency the Governor has appointed me Inspector to carry out an investigation into the accident involving the DH2 Beaver float plane VP FAK in the vicinity of Johnsons Island, East Falkland, at approximately 1530 hours on 14 October.

2. In view of your very considerable air experience your advice in this investigation would be invaluable. I understand that you are prepared to assist and I hereby appoint you as a member of the investigating board.

Yours sincerely,

G J A Slater

COPY

m.

AIR/7/4

20 October

92
76

G J A Slater Esq
Deputy Governor
Government House
Falkland Islands

Dear Gordon,

Thank you for your letter of 19 October 1976.

2. I will be glad to place my services at the Government's
and your disposal.

3. I accept with thanks your offer of appointing me as a
member of the investigating board.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. S. Kanagasabai
S Kanagasabai

R
m.

cc. C.S. - for information. ✓

93

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT No. 9/76

(To be broadcast twice this evening and once tomorrow morning).

ACCIDENT TO ALPHA-KILO.

His Excellency the Governor met the Captain and crew of the H V 'Forrest' this morning and thanked them most warmly for their untiring efforts in the search for Ian Campbell. He is seeing the crew of H V 'Manawatu' later. His Excellency has asked it to be known that he and the whole Colony deeply appreciate the efforts of all those who gave their time, energy and effort during this anxious period. This of course includes all those who have helped from 'Camp'.

This morning there was a meeting of those concerned in the search when it was decided that a party of Marines will shortly be based on Johnsons Island for the next two weeks or so to carry out boat searches of the area of Navy Harbour.

In addition it would be appreciated if settlements at Bluff Cove, Pitaroy, Darwin, Walker Creek and Lively Island would periodically make a search of their coastlines.

Any further announcements or bulletins will be on an occasional basis, if required.

20 October 1976

(14) 94

184/4

FOFI 202/12

CO PORT STANLEY

RRS AD

CYRBER CAT/A

FM F O C 14193 Z

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY TELETYPE NUMBER 107 OF 19 OCTOBER
INFO 17 ESTATE BUENOS AIRES

YOUR TEL 10 471 : CHIEF PILOT

1. CHIEF PILOT, CAPTAIN J KERR, HAS LEFT U.K. FOR
STANLEY. HE ARRIVES IN BUENOS AIRES 19 OCTOBER
FLIGHT NUMBER AR 107.

CHSLAND

For Galt. m
22/10

NYAK

SENT AT 19/1432+Z P4
RECD AT 19/15439Z GML



Handwritten notes and signatures:
A. L.
11/10
18/10
19/10

Government Announcement

Captain J Kerr is expected to arrive by
tomorrow's flight, 21st October 1976.

Secretariat,
20 October 1976.

(To be broadcast at noon and 7:30 pm)

No. 6/76

File Ref: AIR/7/4

AIR 17/4

96

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT NO 15.

(To be broadcast once tonight and once tomorrow morning).

His Excellency the Governor visited M V Monsunen this afternoon to congratulate Captain George Betts and his ship's company on the untiring and thoroughly professional part played by them in the recent search/rescue operations for Beaver Alpha Kilo.

(G.H.)

21 October 1976

AIR 17/4 97

(To be broadcast ~~once~~ twice tonight, once tomorrow morning and in the weekly Newsletter).

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 13

ENQUIRY INTO LOSS OF BEAVER ALPHA KILO

Vigorous and persistent efforts made by the Government through the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in London have finally secured agreement that an investigating team from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Trade in London will come to the Colony.

They will conduct an independent investigation into the cause of the accident to Alpha Kilo under the Regulations made in Section 10 of the Civil Aviation Act as it applies to the Falkland Islands.

It is planned that the team should arrive in Stanley on Thursday 28 October.

The team will comprise:-

Principal Inspector, Mr G C Wilkinson.

Senior Inspector (Engineering), Mr E J Trimble.

A Medical Adviser ~~(name to be announced as soon as possible)~~ DR. JOHN HOWITT.

The Principal Inspector of Accidents, Mr Wilkinson, will be appointed by His Excellency the Governor under the appropriate Regulation.

It is intended that, in accordance with UK practice, the Inspectors' report will be published.

The findings of the preliminary investigation now being conducted by a Board under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Governor will be placed at the disposal of the Principal Inspector.

Government is advised that the full costs of the investigating team from the United Kingdom will be a charge on the Falkland Islands Government.

Pending the arrival of the UK team, the preliminary investigation already begun by a Board under the chairmanship of the Deputy Governor, and comprising Mr Neil Watson, Mr Bill Luxton, Mr Bala Kanagasabai, the

/Airport Manager

97a

Airport Manager, will continue. The Board met yesterday, Wednesday, to discuss procedure and to familiarise themselves with the Falklands legislation - the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations - governing their inquiry.

Yesterday's meeting was informed of steps already taken to obtain factual background information, for instance about weather conditions on the afternoon of 14 October when the accident occurred, and about the Air Service itself.

Today, Thursday, the Board visited the FICAS hangar and made a detailed inspection of the Beaver. The rest of the day was devoted to hearings, with witnesses being interviewed. One of these was conducted at the hospital with Dr Bernard Lee, who was the only passenger on the aircraft at the time of the accident.

The Board would be particularly interested to hear from anyone who is in possession of facts material to the accident, but the Board also stress that any person who may desire to make representations concerning the circumstances or causes of the accident may do so in writing. These representations should be addressed to Mr Gordon Slater, Deputy Governor, Government House, Stanley, and should reach him not later than 1 November.

(G.H.)

21 October 1976

Secretariat
for your Govt 98
Announcement file
Op 26/10

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 18

(To be broadcast twice tonight and once tomorrow morning)

The team of experts from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Trade in London are expected to arrive in Stanley this week to continue the inquiries into the accident on 14 October to Beaver Alpha-Kilo.

Anyone with factual information which might have a bearing on the accident is asked to submit it as soon as possible to Mr G C Wilkinson, Principal Inspector, Beaver Accident Enquiry, c/o the Secretariat in Stanley.

It is further stressed that anybody who wishes to make representations concerning the circumstances or causes of the accident should communicate in writing with Mr Wilkinson, c/o the Secretariat by 1 November.

The preliminary investigation of the accident meanwhile continues. The Board, comprising Mr Neil Watson, Mr Bill Luxton, Mr Sala Kanagasabai and the Deputy Governor, has interviewed or obtained statements from a considerable number of people. Last Friday three members of the Board visited the scene of the accident near Johnsons Island. The fourth member, Mr Bill Luxton, took part in the air search and was already familiar with the area.

26 October 1976



Reference Board of Enquiry into
Beaver accident

99

1. I should be grateful if you would make arrangements for the Inspectors to be met on arrival and accommodated. Perhaps a vehicle should be put at their disposal during their stay?

G J A Slater

G J A Slater

*Mr. King. Pl. arrange & inform
Mr. Slater.
26/10.*

Mr. SLATER

ACCOMMODATION HAS BEEN ARRANGED IN THE
UPWARD GOOSE FOR 3 ROOMS AND MR. D. MORRISON
(D.C.S.) IS GOING TO COLLECT THEM FROM THE
AIRFIELD IN HIS ROVER.

[Signature]

27/10/76

PTO

CS

Mr King

The position about accommodation for the team is now less clear. I learned today that H.E. has signalled offering G.H. accommodation to the Chief Inspector, and indeed to all the party if they want to stay together. There has been no reply so presumably we shall not know the final answer till the visitors land.

G.H. 27/10

File pl

Don
29/10


Seen
G

102a

CIVIL AVIATION ACT

CIVIL AVIATION (INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS) REGULATIONS 1959

The appointment of Mr Gordon James Augustus Slater as
Inspector in accordance with the above regulations is
hereby cancelled.


N A I French
GOVERNOR.

28^{*} October 1976.

CIVIL AVIATION ACT

CIVIL AVIATION (INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS) REGULATIONS 1959

APPOINTMENT

INSPECTOR

In accordance with the powers vested in me by Regulation 7 of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1959 made under Section 10 of the Civil Aviation Act 1949 as extended to the Colony by the Civil Aviation Act 1949 (Overseas Territories) Order 1969, I hereby appoint Mr G C Wilkinson as Inspector for the purpose of carrying out an investigation of the accident to Beaver aircraft registration letters VP-FAK.

2. The investigation shall be carried out in accordance with the Regulations referred to above and the Inspector shall submit his report to me in accordance with Regulation 9.

3. The Inspector may be advised in his investigation by:-

- (i) Mr E J Trimble,
- (ii) Dr J Howitt.



N A I French
GOVERNOR.

28^{*} October 1976.

AIR/7/45

File .

101

MEMORANDUM

29th October, 1976

From: Chief Secretary

To: Superintendent of Public Works

TRANSPORT FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

For the duration of their stay the Investigation Team should be provided with two vehicles one of which should be a Landrover. Drivers should be provided if required.

You should arrange for Team Members to be authorised as drivers if they are to drive themselves.

The Air Service rover may be used for this purpose as it is not needed by FIGAS at present.

You should designate one officer who can be available whenever requested by the Team. You should notify his name and telephone number to Mr. King in the Secretariat and to G.H.

(A.J.P. Monk)
CHIEF SECRETARY

Distribution:

His Excellency the Governor
Mr. Wilkinson (2)
Supt. Public Works (2)
File

102

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING IN CONFERENCE ROOM ON SUNDAY 31 OCTOBER 1976 TO DISCUSS CPO'S
PROPOSAL TO HAVE A FURTHER DIVING SEARCH FOR THE BODY OF CAPT I CAMPBELL

PRESENT: Chief Secretary
Capt J Sollis
Capt G Betts
Supt T Peck
Major Hooper
Mr Wilkinson (Senior Inspector, Accident Investigation
Dept. Board of Trade)
Divers etc

The Chief Secretary opened by reminding the gathering that a thorough search of the waters in the vicinity of the incident had been undertaken under the control and direction of Capt George Betts. There had also been a further search taking in a greater area. It was after having the reports on these searches that it had been decided unanimously that we should concentrate on a different kind of search. He went on to say that Supt Peck believed that there were good grounds for re-instituting a diving search, possibly coupled with a "swim" search. Obviously, if a person went missing, there was always point in trying to find them, and one could go on doing this. It was laudable. But if Government was to give its support to this search, it must be assured that we didn't hazard anyone else, particularly when, to put it brutally, we were almost certainly looking for a body, and not a man. When the CPO had first suggested the idea, the Chief Secretary had asked him to draw up an operational plan showing how it would be done; who would participate, and how the logistics side would be conducted. This the CPO was prepared to do. Government had been advised that the operation was hazardous - even dangerous - and it was only fair to make this clear to all who might be involved. Another point was, of course, that nobody could be prevented from making a private search, if they wished to. The important point was, was there any possibility of anything resulting from the operation? This was for the persons involved to decide amongst themselves, and Supt Peck was asked to put his programme briefly before the meeting.

Supt Peck: Most of the team know what the plan is that I have in mind. The first point is that I would be in direct control - I would be in charge of the whole operation. I would be supported by George Betts being in charge of one diving team and Ken Halliday in charge of the second. We would have the support of two sea craft - the Seagull and the Nancy - two strongly built boats under the control of Neil Jennings and Montana Short, both experienced boatmen. Mick Clarke would look after the Gemini craft - there would be four of these. Pat Johnson and Jumbo Whitney would also be with the Gemini.

The area of search would be centred round the reef in the kelp area. This was a circular, or sausage shaped area, and would be covered by a grid search - lines and floats. Divers would concentrate in this area and would be moved on as each area was completely searched. If nothing was found in the whole of this area, it was the intention to move in a NE direction towards the place where they believed the plane to have come down - going further into mid-stream, on the N and NE side of where the estuary comes in.

There are seven divers - all experienced - and risks would be reduced to a minimum. Divers would never all be in the water at the same time; there would always be one fully-kitted diver on shore ready to go in in case of trouble, but this was not envisaged. There would also be two more divers (one snorkel, the other fully-kitted) to support. Safety lines would be used. The divers knew the area and were confident about diving. Welfare and care after diving would be in the hands of a shore party, and tents, hot water and baths would be available. Accommodation would be provided on the boats and at Swan Inlet House, an hour's drive from the island. Everything required has been prepared for the needs of everyone concerned (about 15 in all). It was hoped that the two boats would leave tomorrow morning and three landrovers this afternoon, and one tomorrow. Three landrovers and two boats would then be on the scene tomorrow.

The Chief Secretary then said he should have explained at the outset that this was a purely informal meeting to decide whether the plan could go ahead under Government aegis, or privately, or not at all. Mr Wilkinson, the Board of Trade Inspector, Accidents Investigation, had volunteered to come down and help if he could.

Ken Halliday remarked that rope diving could be dangerous, but CPO said this would only be in shallow water, and not used in deeper water. The procedure would in any case be wholly in the hands of the two leaders.

Owen Summers asked if it would not be safer to dive in pairs, and was assured that it would be team-diving - no individual diving would be allowed.

Jack Sollis did not think there was anything more could be done other than had already been done. He was not a diver, but was convinced that the previous diving parties had covered the area as far as was humanly possible.

Major Hooper queried the proposed length of the search: CPO said he thought three days. OCRM thought the planned search would take more than three days if the search was to be a thorough one. Supt Peck said they would concentrate first north of the reef, where he believed the plane landed, and from where it drifted back with the wind.

OCRm reminded the meeting that there was still a party of Marines on the island keeping a coastal watch. If CPO thought it would help, they would continue this watch. CPO said he would welcome such help.

The Chief Secretary then asked Mr Wilkinson if he would comment. Mr Wilkinson said bluntly that as far as the investigation was concerned, he would not ask for further search. Normally the investigation team like to get the body for post-mortem, but after a week the results would be meaningless due to disintegration of the internal organs. Even if the body should be found, it would be useless from a pathological view. Captain Campbell couldn't possibly be alive, as, under the conditions that prevailed at the time, he thought 48 hrs was the maximum for survival, and he was, indeed, astonished that Dr Lee had survived after 24 hrs.

Mr Wilkinson said that with our water temperature, the body should surface in about three weeks - that is, about now, if it was free to come up. But if it wasn't caught up in the kelp, it could be anywhere in the South Atlantic. Although it was commendable to take risks to save a life, he would not ask people to risk their lives to recover a body. This was sentiment, and the only thing it could achieve was to find a body and give it Christian burial; and, as far as he himself was concerned, he did not think the party would find anything. If the search did indeed take place, divers must certainly be in pairs; there should be a compressor and extra bottles, and every diver should have an RFG life-jacket. He instanced that at one time, an investigation party had been searching for a helicopter; they knew to within 10 yds where the machine lay, but in spite of repeated diving searches, the helicopter had not been seen. The final point was, if we accepted that the wind, tide and drift would push the aircraft and body, the body would either go into the kelp and stay there, or be pushed against it and be released when the tide changed: the whole of Mare Harbour and Choiseul Sound, immediately to NE of the reef, was the place to search; but, in practical terms, he did not think anything would be found.

Major Hooper accepted what Capt Sollis and Mr Wilkinson had said and said his party on Johnson's Island had orders to watch for gatherings of birds. If the body came up it would have to be reached by Gemini within an hour or there would be nothing to recover.

CPO said he realised that there was only a remote chance of finding Campbell: the work of the last diving team had been very thorough. Nevertheless, he thought we should make one more effort to find the body, and just hope it would be successful. This would definitely be a final effort.

Mr Wilkinson stressed that the body would be of no use to anyone, except to recover and give it Christian burial.

The Chief Secretary then summed up. There had been the personal side, and although all present had counted Ian as friend, Government's role must be brought into question if further lives were to be put at risk to find his body, when no purpose could be served other than to give that body Christian burial. It must be the Governor's ultimate decision whether the search should be made officially, and considerations other than emotional ones must be brought into this. He confessed he himself would be very unhappy to ask anyone to go and search for someone when we have expert opinion that we were going to achieve nothing material. There had to be an end to any search, and it was difficult to decide when that end should be; but Government had to shoulder responsibility for this.

Supt Peck said he thought one final search should be made and then everybody would accept that nothing more could be done. George Betts said that in that case a deadline should be put down to mark the end of the search. Peck said three days.

The CS then asked for a consensus of opinion. Capt Sollis suggested it would be advisable to consult the widow. Knowing how fond of the sea and boats Ian was, he thought she might prefer him to be left to the sea. George Betts agreed with this. The CS admitted that he had not thought of this and asked if Mrs Campbell would not be distressed if approached in this way. Capt Sollis thought the question could be put at this time - Nadine was bearing up well, and he thought she should have some say in the matter. OCRM thought this point important, and that Mr Hardcastle, with whom Nadine was staying, could act as mediator.

CPO then intervened to say that although Mr Wilkinson has pointed out that the body would not help his investigation, he must say that there is a duty to the body. He was talking as a Police Officer, and this should be kept as a confidential remark. His investigations led him to believe that it was important for the body to be recovered. He would agree that it might be best for the body to be left if he had no reason for continuing the investigation; but he thought it was in everyone's interests that it should be recovered.

The CS then asked if, after he had discussed with CPO and the Governor, and it was decided the search would go on, were all those involved ready to go.

All agreed that they were.

CS then asked how soon the decision would need to be made for the land parties to start off today. CPO said mid-day.

The meeting then closed for CS and CPO to discuss with the Governor.

CS
Brook Handcastle would 104
like to speak to you
urgently

He would like official
confirmation so that he
can tell Madam whether
or not they have
found her body

SB 2/11

As asked to tell that I have received a
letter from Rick about wh. I am now
sitting and making any arrangements considered
necessary.

SB
2/11

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

RECEIVED

P1676 P4416 8/64

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed In at	Date
22	"NANCY"	20	15	2 11 76
To				
EXX	ETAT CHIEF SECRETARY	STANLEY		

MISSION SUCCESSFUL. UNABLE TO TRANSPORT WITH AVAILABLE CRAFT. SEND 'FORREST'
IMMEDIATELY. CONFIRM 'FORREST' E.T.A.

SUPT. PECK

Time

A

106

Alan Hooper says could you
ring him on the other line please

B

Spoke w. J.B.

B. Handcastle wait^{in for} a definitive reply.

C.

W. Bowler asks of J.B. can be told. He
promised to let him know.

Overtaken by phone conversation Mrs Campbell/HE

157
Message to Superintendent Peck.

(Phoned R/T 16:40 hours)

2 November 1976

Marine party will link up with you shortly and
report back to make suitable arrangements.

Chiefsec

m.

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE
FALKLAND ISLANDS
SENT

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
--------	------------------	-------	--------------	------

Phoned in 1740

2.11.76

To	LIVELY ISLAND AND NANCY
----	-------------------------

FORREST SAILING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

MARINES WILL MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH FORREST AND WILL

NOTIFY ETA WHEN KNOWN

CHIEFSEC

*C&W phoned by C.S. to inform CW that Rene
going off air. Wbl C&W pl. words or 4-5
& pass messages to me or OCRM.*

Time

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

139
2 November 1976

Captain J Sollis
Stanley

Mrs Campbell has spoken on the phone to His Excellency the Governor and asked that care should be taken to ensure that there is no interference with her husband's body, either by way of autopsy or any other way, until she has had time to reflect on the matter.

Please impress this on Supt Peck and all concerned.

A J P Monk
CHIEF SECRETARY

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed In at	Date
--------	------------------	-------	--------------	------

2.11.76

To

W LUXTON CHARTRES

IF REQUESTED BY MRS CAMPBELL WOULD YOU KINDLY FLY HER
IN TO STANLEY TOMORROW WEATHER PERMITTING

CHIEFSEC

Time

CONFIDENTIAL



CHIEF SECRETARY'S OFFICE
THE SECRETARIAT
STANLEY

2 November 1976

To: The Senior Medical Officer
The Registrar, Supreme Court
Senior Police Officer, Stanley

The body of Captain Ian Campbell was found at Mare Harbour this afternoon and is being returned to Stanley on the "Forrest".

The "Forrest" is expected to arrive early tomorrow morning and you should please co-operate to ensure the smooth and dignified reception of the body.

Dr Cox should please let me know, as soon as possible, where the body will be lodged. The Police Officer should inform the Revd Gerald Smith and ask him if he wishes to be present when the "Forrest" arrives back in Stanley.

A J P Monk
CHIEF SECRETARY

ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR

With deepest regret His Excellency announces that he was informed this afternoon that the party searching in the area of Mare Harbour has found the body of the late Captain Ian Campbell.

Captain Campbell's widow has been informed. His Excellency the Governor and Government extend to Mrs Campbell their deepest and heartfelt sympathy.

The "Forrest" has sailed to the area.

pm 2nd November.

NOTE Read before all other notices

114
c/o Government House
PORT STANLEY

9 November 1976

The Hon A J P Monk
Chief Secretary
PORT STANLEY

Dear Sir,

ACCIDENT TO BEAVER VP-FAK ON 14 OCTOBER 1976


X As a result of my investigations into this accident I will be making certain recommendations in the report I shall submit to H E the Governor in due course.

Without in any way pre-empting the publication of my report, there are certain points, solely related to flight safety, which I feel need to be made in advance of the publication of the report.

1. A supply of "constant wear" life jackets should be obtained and used by passengers and crew of FIGAS flights.
2. A sufficient number of HF RTF sets should be obtained to ensure that FIGAS flights do not depart from Stanley without serviceable HF equipment on board. This type of equipment tends to be in short supply and probably needs to be ordered well in advance of when it is required.
3. Active consideration should be given to the modification of your new Beaver aircraft to enable the cabin doors to be jettisoned in an emergency. This modification has been embodied in some military versions of the Beaver aircraft. X

The field phase of my investigation is complete and I can now formally release the wreckage of VP-FAK to you for disposal as you think fit.

Yours faithfully,


G C Wilkinson
Inspector of Accidents

cc: H E The Governor

115
10 November 1976

Superintendent of
Civil Aviation
Stanley

I have received a letter from Mr G C Wilkinson, Inspector of Accidents, informing me that he has completed the field phase of his investigation into the accident to VP-PAK and can now formally release the wreckage of the aircraft to Government for disposal as we think fit.

2. Without in any way pre-empting publication of his report the Inspector has made certain points solely related to safety, which the Inspector feels should be made in advance of the publication of his formal report. These points are as follows:

1. A supply of "constant wear" life jackets should be obtained and used by passengers and crew of FIGAS flights.
 2. A sufficient number of HF RTT sets should be obtained to ensure that FIGAS flights do not depart from Stanley without serviceable HF equipment on board. This type of equipment tends to be in short supply and probably needs to be ordered well in advance of when it is required.
 3. Active consideration should be given to the modification of your new Beaver aircraft to enable the cabin doors to be jettisoned in an emergency. This modification has been embodied in some military versions of the Beaver aircraft.
3. Will you please arrange to discuss this with me as early as possible but, in advance of this, please take whatever action you feel necessary both to procure the items and to seek adequate finance for the equipment required.



A J P Monk
CHIEF SECRETARY

ZCZC D016 GRA 453

p/1321

BAFRES 6026 23 1/1645

COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
PORTSTANLEY
ISLAS MALVINAS

DR LEE AND FAMILY LEAVING TODAY BY BR 664
TO LONDON AND ONWARD TO MANCHESTER BR FLIGHT
BR 991 DUE 20.40
HOULDERS

COL 6056/453 6056/453 20.40 991

*Copied to G4 &
S40.*

HHHHH



Med 12/2c

CABLE & WIRELESS
KEEPS YOU IN TOUCH

CABLE
KEEPS YOU IN TOUCH

d1321 file pl. - Dr. Lee's P file

P 1321 ✓

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The British Hospital, Buenos Airesm has advised Government that the original diagnosis at Stanley of Dr Lee's condition has been substantially confirmed and they have accordingly arranged for his onward flight to the United Kingdom to continue treatment. He is due to arrive in the United Kingdom this evening.

Secretariat

2.11.76

RS
/ or have in file? 8/11

P/1321



P1321

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2 November 1976

The Hon A J P Monk
Chief Secretary
STANLEY



Dear Mr Monk,

His Excellency the Governor has received the following telegram, sent by Dr Lee before he left Buenos Aires with his family for the United Kingdom, where he will undergo further medical treatment:

"Sincere thanks to yourself and Mrs French for all assistance given and particularly for support to my wife. Please convey my sincere thanks to all who participated in search and rescue operation and in particular Captain Sollis and crew of M/V Forrest and Royal Marines. My thoughts are continually with all the Falkland Islanders in their great loss. Please reassure Islanders that like General McArthur I'll be back.
Bernard Lee."

I am writing separately to OCRM, Captain Sollis and Captain Betts, but the Governor would be grateful if you would distribute the above as you think appropriate. He does not intend to broadcast it.

Yours sincerely,

Sandra Phillips

Sandra Phillips
P.A.

Dec

W. Frank

5/11/76

Spoken

BA 8/11/76

P/4321

No 24

(137)

P 1321

✓

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

On the advice of the Senior Medical Officer Dr Lee is being flown to the British Hospital in Buenos Aires today. He will be accompanied by his family.

Government wishes it to be made abundantly clear that this decision was made entirely on medical ~~general~~ advice, fully endorsed by ODM's Medical Adviser, Dr A M Baker, with whom Government consulted before authorising the flight.

Secretariat

28 October 1976

Ref: MED/42/2C

To be broadcast at 12 noon and twice tonight please.

Dr Lee's 7/21/76

FO/FI 893 /21

00 PORT STANLEY

GR 70

ENCLAIR

FM BUENOS AIRES 302042Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY TELNO 124 OF 24, OCTOBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE FCC.

XXXXXX

PORT STANLEY TELNO 123 DR LEE.

ILLMAN VISITED LEE THIS AFTERNOON AND SPOKE TO HOSPITAL AUTHORITIES.
INITIAL RESULTS OF TESTS TEND TO CONFIRM ~~THE~~ ^{NO CLASS} DIAGNOSIS
OF PERFORATED ULCER AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENT ~~INFECTION~~, BUT FURTHER
TESTS ARE STILL IN PROGRESS AND RESULTS WILL NOT BE KNOWN BEFORE 1
NOVEMBER WHEN IT IS STILL EXPECTED THAT LEE AND FAMILY WILL BE FLOWN
BACK TO UK. THEY ARE IN GOOD SPIRITS.

SHAKESPEARE

NNNN

SENT AT 011441Z PS

RCVD AT 011441Z SCL



[Handwritten signature and initials]

To me only ph.
O.P.

P.A. on file

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